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After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia appeared on the world stage as a 
sub-system in the wider Eurasian continent. Because of its vast and rich natural 
resources and its strategic location with respect to Afghanistan, within the discipline 
of International Relations Central Asia has been widely considered as a mere ‘pawn’ 
in the competition among the Great Powers for geo-political and geo-economic 
advantage in the area. This framework of analysis, strongly focusing on systemic 
factors, has often downplayed and silenced the dense intra-regional political dynamics 
at play. In the few instances where these dynamics have been studied, the 
international relations of Central Asian states have always been read through a 
strongly realist framework of analysis. Since these states are more interested in 
dealing with foreign powers than with themselves, since there are not Central Asian 
regional organisations and since several problems, mostly related to water-
management and border issues, hinder cooperation between them, the region has often 
been described as a paramount example of realism at play. This thesis, challenging the 
existent literature on the region, shows that an English School (ES) reading of Central 
Asian regional politics reveals much more than it is usually believed to be present 
there, and that despite the strong confrontational character of the region, these states 
have managed to coexist relatively peacefully. How? Drawing on a variety of primary 
sources, interviews with diplomats and practitioners conducted in the region and on 
the analysis of official documents and statements, this research finds that Central Asia 
represents an in fieri, but nonetheless existent, regional international society, featuring 
also local, peculiar interpretations of global norms and institutions, where cooperation 
and confrontation have always been intertwined and seldom mutually exclusive. 
Being the first work in the literature to use ES theory to study Central Asian 
international politics, this thesis advances two agendas: it suggests new, more nuanced 
and ‘autoptic’ readings of the Central Asian region while encouraging the ES to 
expand into the ‘heartland’, therefore bringing forward the recently established 
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The Kazakh chairmanship was a clear sign not only of the  
interest of OSCE in Central Asia, but of Central Asia  





1.1 Central Asia on the international stage 
 
 
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 the 
international system, so far structured in a bipolar logic in which two competing blocs 
were struggling for world hegemony, underwent a new wave of regionalisation,2 the 
first of which had occurred during the decolonisation process in the 1950s-1960s. 
New regional blocs of states, nations and peoples were formed, new political spaces 
were opened and new prospects for international relations were raised. In particular, 
regions became the new loci in which both the production of, and the management of, 
insecurity were dealt with (Hurrell 1995; Hettne and Söderbaum 2000; Buzan and 
Wæver 2003; Hurrell 2007; Paul 2012).  
 Following the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, one could observe the formation 
of Central Europe, of the Caucasus and of Central Asia, a landlocked region between 
the Caspian Sea, the Russian Federation, Iran, Afghanistan and China. This region, 
once home to nomadic tribes and sedentary communities, foreign hordes and empires, 
khanates and city-states governed under Islamic rule, became ‘Russified’ in the XVIII 
and late XIX centuries and subsequently ‘Sovietised’ by the expansionist policy of 
Stalin in the late 1930s, and finally resulted in the five sovereign republics, which 
insisted on their territory: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan (Katz 1994; Anderson 1997; Roy 2000; Bogaturov 2011). 
Immediately following its independence, Central Asia caught the attention of a 
variety of scholars. Internationalists, post-colonialists, institutionalists and 
                                                 
1 Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, former OSCE Secretary, Chatham House, 7 Apr 2011. 
2 Here by ‘regionalisation’ it is meant, at a very basic level, a process by which states’ economic and 
foreign policies become more concerned with their their regional neighbours) rather than with the 
international system on the whole).  
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comparativists were at the forefront of what had become a new, fertile field for 
political and socio-economic research, especially due to the common problems that 
recurrently face relatively new, independent states: those of fragile statehood 
(Kavalski 2010); of political transition from autocratic to democratic rule (Cummings 
2002); of possible power vacuums and consequent domestic destabilisation (Dagiev 
2013); of ethnic conflicts, authoritarianism, and hindered economic development 
(Gleason 2001; Spechler 2002; Akçali 2003; Pomfret 2006; Collins 2009).  
In particular, the inability to spur economic growth and liberalisation of 
political regimes, alongside the inability to prevent social unrest and violent upheavals 
(especially in Tajikistan, 1992-1997), led International Relations (IR)3 scholars and 
practitioners to describe and treat it as a place connoted by chaos, violence and 
unresponsiveness to external stimuli to foster integration and development.  
 Yet, despite the novelty of the field, the years following the immediate 
aftermath of the independence process were marked, in the West, by a considerable 
neglect of the socio-economic situation of the region (Anderson 1997; Roy 2000; 
Lewis 2008). It was believed to be doomed to backwardness, and considered to be a 
‘Russian backyard’, whereas other parts of the previous Soviet Union were in the 
spotlight, either for negotiations and new relations with the brand-new and enlarged 
European Union (EU), or under scrutiny by the wider international community, due to 
local, prolonged conflicts (Caucasus), even if Partnerships for Peace (PfP) were 
offered to all post-Soviet countries (Georgia in particular was very enthusiastic about 
PfP).  
From 1991 to 2001, international engagement in the Central Asian region was 
more talk than action (Olcott 2005). Moreover, as Katz noted (1994), from an 
international politics perspective, much of the literature on the region was concerned 
with the foreign policy of the great powers towards the five republics, and much less 
with the specific international relations within the region.  
 However, Central Asia regained considerable importance in the eyes of a wide 
part of the international community in the years following the 2001 US-led campaign 
in Afghanistan. Potential spillovers of radical Islam, terrorism and drug-trafficking 
from and through the region's southern borders, as well as the necessity of having 
bases and bulwarks close to the operative, theatre of war, led experts and practitioners 
                                                 
3 The usual convention of defining ‘International Relations’ (IR) as the academic discipline and 
‘international relations’ as the content of the discipline is adopted. 
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to consider the region as pivotal in the future geopolitics of Eurasia, not least for the 
richness in gas, oil resources and raw materials which those countries were (and are) 
provided with.  
Since then, Central Asian states have reaffirmed their pre-eminence in the 
wider international context, paradoxically more for their strategic collocation and 
endowments than for their agency in world affairs. This pre-eminence has sparked a 
whole body of scholarship devoted to the ‘New Great Game’, that is to say the 
competition among the U.S., Russia, China and, to a far lesser extent, India and 
Turkey for political and economic influence in the region, consequently configuring 
the agencies of Central Asian states as ‘vassals’ (Soderblom 2004).  
 In terms of IR Theory, these recent developments have led to the adoption of a 
strong neorealist account of the international politics in Central Asia, based on the 
well-known assumptions of competition, balance of power and zero-sum games. This 
theoretical account, despite not being the only one, has certainly dominated the 
scholarship on Central Asia, as it will be shown in the literature review later. 
Complementary to this approach has been the recent emphasis on the so-called 
‘energy geopolitics’, i.e. a revival of old ‘Mackinderian’ categories of geography and 
territorial influence finalised to the acquisition of supplies and large basins of natural 
resources, primarily natural gas, precious minerals and oil (Megoran and Sharapova 
2013).  
If one looks beyond the energy and geo-strategic narrative, however, one 
would realise that in recent years, the five Central Asian republics have gained even 
more importance on the international stage especially with respect to two additional 
important factors: on the one hand, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Afghan 
soil, which will position Central Asia (in particular Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and 
possibly Kazakhstan) as a buffering corridor through which the military equipment of 
the involved Western countries can be pulled out and displaced outside the Afghan 
territory in late 2014; while on the other hand its position between two normatively 
different worlds, those of the democratic, cosmopolitan and market-oriented West, 
and of the authoritarian, communitarian and sovereignty-defendant Sino-Russian 
hemisphere (Lanteigne 2006; Kavalski 2007; Ambrosio 2008; Kavalski 2012; Lewis 
2012a). Recent discourses promoted both by the liberal Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the more conservative, Westphalian Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) seem to establish competing views of international 
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order and its development, a competing view in which Central Asian states have still 
to find their position.  
 Surprisingly, however, few studies if any have inquired into the international 
norms and institutions present in the region. Therefore, it seems that nowadays a 
thorough study of the international relations of Central Asia and in Central Asia, 
especially as far as their normative and institutional orientations are concerned, is not 
only missing, but necessary, if we are to understand how these states are coping with 
the normative structure of the international system, the role that such a region can 
play in future international politics in terms of adopting and redefining norms and 
rules, and to follow its normative and relational trajectories.  
In a world which is progressively tending to economic and financial 
uniformity and interdependence under the constraints of globalisation and which is at 
the same time politically and culturally differentiating within itself as a response to 
such process, a study of how Central Asia perceives itself in the wider international 
arena and of what its norms, rules and codified practices are when it comes to deal 
with international politics is not only necessary, but also vital as it would add another 
piece to the jigsaw puzzle of regions, regionalisms and sub-international societies, so 
starkly marking the post-Cold War era. 
 
1.2 Developments in IR Theory 
 
Like world politics itself, the fields of IR and IR Theory changed greatly after 1989-
1991. Within IR Theory, new approaches and new trends were increasingly adopted 
and discussed: in direct correspondence with the geopolitical processes analysed 
earlier, the scholarly analysis of economic integration and security dynamics 
gradually shifted from a world scale analysis to a regional one (Hurrell 1995, Lake 
and Morgan 1997, Buzan and Waever 2003), and in response to the failures of the 
neo-realist account of international politics in explaining and foreseeing the demise of 
the Cold War and the consequential restructuring of the world order, theories such as 
Constructivism and the English School (ES) started being adopted on a regional scale 
as well.  
In particular, the ES, with its emphasis on norms, procedures and codified 
practices better known as ‘institutions’ such as state sovereignty, diplomacy, 
international law, human rights protection and so forth (Bull 1977; Wight 1977; 
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Buzan 2004; Navari 2009) has been recently applied to the regional level of analysis 
(Ayoob 1999; Diez and Whitman 2002; Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez 2009; Costa-
Buranelli 2014a; Stivachtis 2014), proving to be a useful tool for analysis of the 
internal dynamics of specific configurations of state-order at a level below the global 
one, identifying specific rules of conduct and customs in different regional contexts.  
 Such enterprise has indeed inaugurated a new agenda both within IR more 
generally and within the ES in particular, addressing the need to understand, represent 
and link between them the normative, institutional and rule-oriented behaviour of 
different regions and different regional international societies. Much work has been 
carried out on the EU and Europe more generally (Diez and Whitman 2002, Stivachtis 
2008, Stivachtis 2010) and the Middle East (Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez 2009), Latin 
America (Merke 2011) and  East Asia (Buzan and Zhang 2014a), but a comprehensive 
work on the concept of international society to grasp the significance and the meaning 
of the international relations of the post-Soviet space and of Central Asia per se is still 
missing.  
This seems, to some extent, surprising, given the recent birth of such states 
and the novelty of their international relations, their already noted normatively and 
institutionally ambiguous position among two competing discourses and their 
common shared past. Indeed, returning now to Central Asia, one may question the 
need to study such a region, the decision to defend such an enterprise and especially 
the move to adopt an ES framework of analysis.  
To begin, a shift in theory must not be regarded as a mere change of dress, or 
perspective, but it always implies a new set of questions to be answered, therefore 
expanding our understanding of the ontology we are inquiring on. Some gaps and 
issues needing deeper investigation have been discussed above. However, other 
puzzles are, in my opinion, in need of an answer or, if already provided, of a better or 
alternative answer.  
Why is it that Central Asian states, despite being portrayed as ‘shaky’ and 
‘unstable’, have been nonetheless able to avoid ‘balkanisation’, great inter-state 
clashes and to cope with violent internal conflicts without regional conflagration, such 
as the civil war in Tajikistan and the recent upheavals in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and 
2010? Why is that despite their illiberal politics and their remoteness from the 
Western world they seem to share the most basic norms of international coexistence, 




Why is that despite the sometimes bitter competition among themselves, 
especially as far as water, borders and ethnic divisions are concerned, Central Asian 
countries have so far managed their international relations in an orderly fashion, and 
still emphasise and share recurrent and visible commonalities, such as geographical 
proximity, appeals to common resolution to common regional problems, a tendency to 
legitimise autocratic rule, a strong emphasis on sovereignty paired with a permissive 
attitude towards external powers’ intrusion, not to mention common historical and 
cultural bonds?  
Why were there so many examples of regional organisations comprising the 
Central Asian republics,4 if they have proved many times to be ineffective in 
managing and dealing with regional issues (for an overview, see Allison 2008)? What 
norms did they incorporate, and why did the Central Asian states claim adherence to 
them?  
In Central Asia one can still observe structural impediments to regional 
integration and full-fledged cooperation, such as security dilemmas, prestige contests, 
territorial disputes, nationalist resentments, and economic conflicts. Yet the region 
seems to hold to an acceptable level of inter-state peace. How to account for this 
overarching, relational ambiguity? 
 The existing literature is currently unable to answer such questions, and 
actually it has never addressed them, or if it has, then only in an indirect and 
incomplete way, as the discussion of the literature will demonstrate later. Indeed, in 
one of the most recent works on the connection between regional studies and IR 
Theory, the regions under scrutiny are Western Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, 
East Asia, South-East Asia and Latin America. The post-Soviet space, and particularly 
Central Asia, are still far from this kind of ideational and normative analysis, despite a 
desperate need of it especially with reference to norm of cohabitation ‘which seem to 
be present in the region’ (Paul 2012: 19), pointed at also by Rajan Menon and Hendrik 
Spruyt in their seminal study of post-USSR international relations between the new 
sovereign states: ‘actors [in Central Asia] seem largely successfully to have found 
ways of coexisting without violence, even in the absence of agreement’ (Menon and 
Spruyt 1998: 178). 
                                                 
4 Most of the time without Turkmenistan, due to its foreign policy doctrine of ‘positive neutrality’. 
See Anceschi (2008). 
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1.3 The research questions and the justification of the research 
 
The dominant neorealist theoretical paradigm has prevented scholars and practitioners 
from questioning their own knowledge on the present status of Central Asian 
international relations, on the position of the region in the international scene and on 
its institutional (in ES terms) characteristics. A real gap exists in this respect, both 
from a theoretical and from an empirical point of view. Conversely, given also the 
novelty of its regional turn, the ES seems better equipped to portray Central Asian 
states as actors, agents and protagonists instead of mere pawns in the New Great 
Game among the external, more powerful states, and is provided with the methods 
and the theoretical instruments to assess whether there is a forming, or already 
established, Central Asian international society, whose meaning is explained in the 
seminal passage of Bull’s The Anarchical Society (1977: 13): 
 
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of 
states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, 
form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be 
bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, 
and share in the working of common institutions.  
 
In sum, the puzzles above led to the following research questions, which this project 
intends to answer: How has the region adapted to the normative structure of 
contemporary world politics? Is there a regional international society in Central 
Asia? If yes, how has it evolved and how does it relate to the international society at 
the global level? And to what extent is it definable as pluralist or solidarist? If not, is 
it forming? And what are the current specific characteristics and features of the 
relations among those countries? Is there any peculiar institution which is not present 
in the wider international society? 
What this research seeks to provide, or at least seeks to contribute to, is a new 
theoretical framework able to capture the multi-facetedness of Central Asian state-
relations among themselves stressing the norms, rules and institutions, if any, at play 
in the region. What is missing in the literature, i.e. the viewpoint of these states on 
international relations and international practices, therefore, will be brought to the 
surface.  
Why this, one could ask? In my opinion, the reason is to be found not only in 
the advancement of the knowledge of the region and of the theoretical progress of the 
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ES, but also and mainly in the prospects for future foreign-policy directions. As a 
matter of fact, to understand other regions for the prospects of policy-making and 
development planning it is of utmost importance to understand how the states forming 
that region regulate their relations both with the world and with their regional peers, 
to grasp through what institutions they work and to what extent such institutions are 
entrenched in the regional, relational framework.  
 This research project, moreover, takes on the challenge already proposed by 
Fred Halliday (2009) and aims at being a double test, both ontological and theoretical. 
On the ontological side, it seeks to shed light on a region so far quite neglected in the 
study of international politics in an innovative manner, focussing on an under-
examined array of issues such as the adherence of these states to the norms and 
principles that regulate the common management of world politics, e.g. sovereignty, 
diplomacy, international law, environmental stewardship and nationalism.  
Moreover, still on the ontological side, this project seeks also to inquire into 
the possible ongoing, foreseeable formation, or even existence, of a regional 
international society in Central Asia, i.e. the presence of a pattern of relations that, 
irrespective of  their cooperative or conflictual character, present some form of 
regularity and shared understanding of how such relations should be conducted.  
On the theoretical side, conversely, this work seeks to bring the ES not in terra 
incognita, as Buzan said when applying it for the first time consistently on a regional 
level when dealing with the Middle East, but in terra incognitissima. Its  purpose is 
not only to continue the enterprise of the ES scholarly community to apply the theory 
on a regional level, but also to apply it, for the first time, to a region which has been 
almost entirely detached from the ‘core’ of international relations (read ‘the West’) 
until very recently.  
In support of this goal, and more generally of the need of a comparative 
research on different international societies, Hurrell argues that ‘the history of 
regional state formation has helped to produce regional international societies that 
may have elective affinities with their allegedly universal Westphalian original but 
also have important distinctive features’ (2007: 133), whereas with specific reference 
to Central Asia and Euro-centric categories of analysis, Cummings has rightly noted 
that ‘attempting to further an in-depth understanding of [the Central Asian] region is 
worthwhile, since it increases our critical faculties for assessing often Eurocentric 
methods and methodologies’ (Cummings 2012: 5).  
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Furthermore, the ES provides ‘an alternative and non-materialist theoretical 
perspective, which explores the complex social constitution of the regional order in 
terms of primary institutions, offering a contextualised social structural view of the 
region’, and enriches ‘theoretical perspectives that […] specialists can bring to bear 
on their region’ (Buzan and Zhang 2014a: 15). 
 An additional test concerns the methods to be employed. As a matter of fact, 
speaking of ES methods may sound like a contradiction in itself (Navari 2009). That 
is to say, a strong theoretical work thoroughly employing methods and techniques 
specific to the ES has been so far missing. Therefore, not only will this research 
discuss for the first time in a comprehensive work, the methodological tools and 
analytical devices of the theory, but will also use them to verify their reliability and 
usefulness in discovering and treating social facts.  
 
1.4 What kind of work is this? 
 
A further question one may ask about the present research is what kind of theory it 
proposes, or what kind of framework it adopts. As a matter of fact, it is clear that the 
nature of this work is neither causal (explanatory) nor normative. It does not seek to 
establish a cause-effect relation among two variables deliberately chosen, or among 
two groups of variables. Moreover, it does not attempt to indicate a better path, or the 
right position, or what should be done. The question is not why?, nor should?, but, 
conversely, how?, or is/are there?.  
In fact, this work adopts and defends a specific conception of theory, that of 
‘international theory’ (Suganami 2005), described as ‘a tradition of speculation about 
relations between states, a tradition imagined as the twin of speculation about the state 
to which the name “political theory” is appropriated’ (Wight in Suganami 2005: 30). It 
is a framework that provides a deeper, more thorough and more comprehensive 
description of the international relations of a given system (be it on a world- or 
regional scale) than traditional accounts of international relations such as realism and 
liberalism. An ‘international theory’ puts world politics in a relational, evolutionary, 
diachronic historical dimension and specifies the assumptions, beliefs and normative 
stands of the actors involved in the maintenance of such system (Neumann 2014: 334-




An international theory is one that ‘offers a systematic representation of the realm of 
world politics [in this case regional] that gives us a coherent understanding of it’ 
(Suganami 2005: 42). On this treatment of theory, one may agree with the 
international sociologist Evan Luard, very influential on the ES, when he said that the 
main scope of a theory must be to improve our ‘understanding’ of social facts (Luard 
1976). Following the three main steps of observation, analysis and conclusions, 
research into an international society based on an ES understanding of ‘theory’ 
explains ‘the nature of that society and the behaviour of nations and men within it’, 
adding more information and more nuanced in an inductive rather than in a deductive, 
imposed method of investigation (Luard 1976: 22). 
It may be argued that this kind of theory certainly lacks the elegance and the 
scientific procedures of causal theories, and the ethics-based, justice-inspired 
commitments of normative theories, and may be accused of being a mere descriptive 
engagement with a given ontology. However, not only does the methodological 
pluralism involved in this theoretical framework allow the researcher to shed light on 
important and under-treated issues (Little 2000), but reminds him that ‘achieving 
description that does not come with conceptual baggage is a sufficiently worthy aim 
in its own right’ (Latour and Law in Greener 2011: 94), and that ‘in the most 
elementary sense, “theory” […] “explains” or gives a better understanding of what we 
observe and experience’  (Suganami 2005: 34).  
 Before concluding this short introduction, the tentative nature of the work 
should be stressed and reaffirmed as well. This research is intended to discover 
whether a regional international society is present or not, or, alternatively, whether 
such regional international society is in formation, developing or being hindered by 
external or internal factors. It does not aim necessarily to demonstrate 
deterministically that there is a regional international society, nor that there will be.  
Only a thorough research into the practices, the behaviours and the normative 
stands of these countries (i.e. of their representatives) will reveal whether there are 
sufficient commonalities to speak of some form of regional socialisation. By 
combining the present literature with the intuition that a regional society is possibly 
present or forming in Central Asia, I aim to adopt what Glaser has called ‘theoretical 
sensitivity’, i.e. the combination of inductive theory and already existing forms of 




Moreover, even if this will be dealt later more in depth, it is appropriate to say that 
this research will focus on something different from regionalism, albeit being related 
to it: that is to say that the main focus will be on the practices, ideas and common 
institutions adopted by the Central Asian states to manage their international politics 
in the region, and less on the prospects and potentials for regional integration and 
institutionalisation of cooperative relations, co-ordinated problem-solving attitude and 
common solutions to common problems. The relationship between the two concepts, 
however, is undeniable and will be dealt with more thoroughly in the course of the 
thesis. 
 In sum, the present work contributes to the existing scholarship of IR, Central 
Asian studies and ES in five main, original respects: 
 
 it advances the present knowledge of the international relations of Central 
Asian states, putting them in a normative and institutional context and 
showing to what extent the values and the norms informing the global 
international society are finding fertile ground to grow and consolidate, thus 
studying for the first time the Central Asian system in sociological depth; 
 it explores how general norms and codes of conduct are read, re-interpreted 
and followed in a different regional context, emphasising ‘the centrality of the 
political agency of regional actors to understanding the production and 
shaping of normative order’ (Buzan and Zhang 2014b: 226); 
 it sheds new light on the cooperation-competition debate in the region, putting 
it in a new framework and giving a more multifaceted and denser account of 
Central Asian states’ international relations; 
 it pulls Central Asia out of the ‘presentism’ of contemporary IR and puts the 
region in a holistic, evolutionary historical dimension by using the 
methodological pluralism of the ES and adopting its historical vein; 
 it advances current knowledge about the relationship between a regional 
international society, regionalism and a regional security complex (RSC). 
 
To conclude, the structure of the work will be the following: after reviewing the 
literature both on Central Asia and on the ES, and pointing to the consistent and 
persistent lacunae present in them, I will offer a thorough view of the theory I intend 
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to use, the methodology I will craft and the ontology I will inquire into, so that the 
reader will have the ‘vocabulary’ to understand and to follow the enterprise in its 
development.  
The central part of the thesis will consist of the analysis, through the study of 
declarations, speeches, official documents and archival sources, of what in ES lexicon 
are called the primary (sovereignty, diplomacy, international law etc.) and secondary 
(intergovernmental and regional ‘regimes’) institutions of the region, to assess the 
presence and the degree of ‘thickness’ of the hypothesised regional international 
society. Two chapters are intended to cover the formation and the development of the 
supposed regional international society: the first one deals with Central Asia in the 
1990s, and relies mainly on archival material and official transcripts of media and 
documents released at that time, while the second one relies mainly on interviews 
conducted in the region.  
The following chapter departs from the regional level of analysis and projects 
the analysis of what norms and rules are followed by the Central Asian states at the 
international level, and through an analysis of votes in the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) it seeks to find convergence and similarities in their normative stances. 
In the concluding chapter, the significance and the contribution of the research 
will be assessed, its potential benefits for factual policy-making will be evaluated and 
its contribution both to the studies of the region and to the development of the ES will 
be discussed. A general comment on the findings will be provided, and the relations 
put under scrutiny will be analysed in relation to the concept of regionalism and the 
hypothetical formation of an RSC (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998; Buzan and Wæver 
















2.1 The purpose and the structure of the literature review 
 
In this chapter, the present-day literature on the region and on the five Central Asian 
republics is discussed, and the reader will be offered some of the puzzles and 
questions that have made possible the theoretical conception of the present research. 
While niches and ‘gaps’ will be pointed out, potential engagements with the current 
project will be discussed as well, and the need of the present research will be, 
therefore, discussed not as oppositional to the present literature on the field but 
actually as complementary and as a mutually reinforcing element. 
As it might be expected, the literature on Central Asia is extremely extensive 
and multifaceted. It is not uncommon to find articles, books and sources addressing 
now the region on the whole, now single states, now some states, now non-state actors 
at play on the territory. However, one should bear in mind that since the ontology that 
constitutes the present research is a potential (regional) inter-national society, what is 
of utmost interest are the inter-national relations and politics of the region. Therefore, 
the strategy adopted here is that of identifying some ‘mainstreams’, some ‘sub-fields’ 
which this huge body of work can be sub-divided into.  
In doing so, I will offer a ‘Pawsonian’ survey of the scholarship on the region, 
i.e. I will organically analyse the different shapes in which the material has been 
treated and the different approaches several authors have adopted, and identify 
similarities, differences, cross-references and gaps in different contexts and different 
patterns of research, rather than evaluating single works per se in an inclusionary-
exclusionary logic based on a single methodology or approach (Greener 2011).  
In doing this kind of review, I consider the quality of the work as important as 
its breadth; in other words, I seek to combine a selection of key texts on the region 
while simultaneously incorporating those less known, but which add breadth to our 
subject by addressing different issues. In sum, I combine a vertical criterion of 
‘quality’ with a horizontal one of ‘breadth’. What I am about to propose is, therefore, 
a tripartite compartmentalisation of the literature on the region, based on the main 




 works focused on the ‘New Great Game’ narrative, i.e. on the presence, 
intrusion and struggle of foreign states and often super and great powers in the 
region, to foster possible cooperation and more often to revitalise competition 
and to stimulate economic, military and resource-related frictions among each 
other; 
 
 works that deal specifically with the region as a security complex, and 
therefore are concerned with the security dynamics that pervade the countries’ 
relations among themselves;  
 
 works specifically on the international relations within the region, i.e. those 
works that claim to have a wide lens of analysis and that are concerned, in 
their intentions, with the explanations of specific phenomena and issues 
related to the region, such as political transformations, assessments of the 
leadership and power relations, environmental policies, nationalism and 
rediscovery of the past, economic prospects and developments, cooperation 
alternated to competition. 
 
Given the predominance of the neo-realist paradigm in the wider panorama of IR 
Theory, we should not be surprised when realising that the first strand of the literature 
identified above is the most popular. However, it is our task to assess both the merit 
and the pitfalls of all the sections illustrated above. This will allow to recognise and 
consider what has been done on the one hand, and will help identify those gaps the 
theory used in this work seeks to plug.  
The chapter will proceed as follows: after discussing the key texts according to 
the three specific areas identified supra, light will be shed on those issues, questions 
and aspects either neglected or under-treated in the literature. This will allow for the 
next move, that is, to explain why the present research is needed and what its potential 
contributions are. In the final part, a little synopsis of ES theory’s recent 
developments will be provided, especially to trace its path from a world-perspective 
to a regional one. Since this research seeks to provide answers for both the ontology 
and the theory used, it seems a good move to assess the evolution of the theoretical 
aspect as well. 
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A preliminary caveat before surveying the current literature on the region is that in 
this section I will not take into consideration works, papers or books on specific 
countries or bilateral relations. This is because I am more interested, also in respect to 
the theory I am going to apply later, in how the literature has dealt with the region 
itself, meant as the sum of the dynamics, linkages and issues that are present at the 
interstate level (i.e. among the countries in the region) and at the international level 
(i.e. between the countries in the region and the external environment).  
By no means, should the present chapter be considered as the only locus of the 
thesis where the literature on Central Asia is discussed: while this chapter is the bulk 
of the literature on the subject, additional sources and materials will be addressed 
passim as well. Moreover, as this research is concerned with the application of a 
specific theory to the region, rather than with a single issue per se, great attention will 
be devoted to how the previous scholarship has dealt with it, as well as what it has 
said on it. 
 
2.2 Central Asia as a chessboard for the New Great Game  
 
Although ‘[i]t is risky to impose the clichés of a storied past upon situations in the 
contemporary world’ (Canfield 2010: 1), the largest and the more written about strand 
of the literature concerning Central Asia is usually that referring to the so-called ‘New 
Great Game’, with reference to the political, geo-strategic competition played by the 
British and Russian Empires in the XIX century to jockey for influence in the region 
of khanates and tribes which  now corresponds more or less to the Central Asian 
republics.  
According to the authors whose work can be identified with this part of the 
literature, the region has gained importance in the wake of the 9/11 events, since 
‘[9/11] made Central Asia the epicentre of geopolitical shocks on a global scale and 
redefined the geopolitical situation surrounding Central Asia’ (Rumer 2002: 57). In 
this respect, therefore, Central Asia is nothing more than a ‘battlefield’ (Kleveman 
2003; Kempe 2006) or, in the best case ‘a chessboard and a player’ (Müllerson 2007) 
on which Great Powers such as Russia, China and the West, mostly the US and the 
EU, compete for security influence, energy resources and strategic placement in 




The ‘reification’ of Central Asian states within such narrative is exemplified in the 
work of Gert Flikke and Julie Wilhelmsen (2010) according to whom the five 
republics are basically a testing ground for New Great-Power Relations, and also in 
the work of Yu Bin, who reflects on how the whole region ‘remains the geostrategic 
playground of the world’s major civilizations’ (Bin 2006: 3) and creates a narrative 
where Central Asian republics are rather pawns, or better a theatre, a background, on 
which the tragedy of great powers is played out.  
Since the strategic and competitive aspect between the powerful actors is the 
hallmark of this part of the literature on the region, the analysis conducted into 
Central Asian states in these works is therefore marginal, shallow, as they are 
portrayed as ‘vassals’ and only functional to enlighten the strategies and the moves of 
the greater and more powerful players (Rumer 2002; Swanström 2005; Wishnick 
2009).  
Furthermore, by focusing largely on strategic competition and access to energy 
resources and more viable routes through which the great powers can extend their 
needs of energy consumption and geo-political control, such literature often adopts a 
zero-sum, neo-realist perspective, heavily relying on mechanic power dynamics and 
therefore neglecting the perceptions, the views and the behaviours of the actors 
involved. States are treated as having exogenous, predetermined interests, and the 
Central Asian republics suffer from a ‘theoretical uniformity’ that makes them all 
alike in dealing with such issues while confronting the outside great powers. Rajan 
Menon, for example, argues that ‘Central Asian governments are bound to see 
continued American strategic engagement in their region as a counterweight and 
safeguard against Russia and millenarian Islamic movements’ (2003: 191).  
More recently Marlene Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse have contributed to 
this literature from an economic perspective, even if they do not use the term ‘New 
Great Game’ (2013). 
It must be said, however, that such an approach to the region, in which the 
great powers dominate Central Asian states, has been recently contested within the 
literature itself, therefore generating an informing and useful intra-literature debate. 
Emilian Kavalski (2012), for example, maintains that Central Asia has consistently 
been denied its ‘subjectivity’ in international life, that it has always been a ‘context’, 
spectator or victim whose agency has never been recognised; Tatiana Shakleina 
(2009) has recently argued that the excessive attention to the great powers instead of 
17 
 
to Central Asian states has generated little policy guidance for approaching those 
countries. Iqboljon Qoraboyev (2010) has instead argued that the New Great Game 
literature has overshadowed those little signs of active cooperation among Central 
Asian republics, and therefore major attention should be paid to the inter-state, 
regional dynamics. Martin and Dina Spechler (2010) and Andrei Malashenko (2010) 
have shown how de facto external powers (especially Russia), while competing for 
influence and leverage on the region, are seeing their radius of action limited, and 
therefore the Great Game narrative should not be exaggerated (see also Lieven 2000).  
In addition, within this large and rather uniform body of literature, a few 
authors argue for a more relevant role of the Central Asian republics, thus shifting the 
spotlight from the relentless competition of the great powers to the strategic ability of 
the Central Asian republic in exploiting such rivalry. Ruth Deyermond, for example, 
argues that a more comprehensive analysis of Central Asian state security dynamics is 
required, since ‘neither the “Great Game” image of competition in Central Asia nor 
the literature on post-9/11 cooperation in the region’ adequately account for a crisp 
analytical perspective (2009: 152). David Kerr (2010) deems that the interplay of 
several great powers in the reason can be fully understood only if we adopt the 
perspective of Central Asian states as well.  
Yang Cheng argues as well that the New Great Game narrative has done little 
justice to the complexity of the intra-regional dynamics of the region, and argues for 
more refined theoretical works to elucidate them for the purpose of policy-making. 
Such claim is chiefly visible in one passage of his article, when he stresses the fact 
that recent political developments in the region show that ‘Central Asian countries are 
no longer merely the objects of great  power politics but are more and more involved 
and participating in the management of regional affairs. The main features of Central 
Asian countries in the regional pattern are increasingly evident’ (Cheng 2010: 176).  
To illustrate the regional dynamics among the Central Asian countries and the 
external powers, therefore, Cheng therefore adopts a ‘complex power structure’ 
model, i.e. one in which the zero-sum, neorealist competitive nature of the relations is 
not taken for granted but is tested on a series of issues (economic, military and 
cultural) and shows, through the differentiation of the issue-based power 
configurations, how international relations in Central Asia are characterised by a mix 
of multipolarity, unipolarity and bipolarity, both cooperative and oppositional.  
Lastly, Alexander Cooley (2012) has shown how despite the competing 
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politics of Great Powers in the region and the structurally subordinate position of 
Central Asian states in this competition, the former have found themselves to follow 
rules of behaviour and compromises dictated by the latter, thus bringing the agency of 
Central Asian states into the Great Game picture. 
In sum, notwithstanding the preponderance of the neorealist paradigm in IR 
and the tendency to consider the five Central Asian republics as mere parts of a wider 
game played by the outer great powers, a few authors have started claiming for a more 
refined and accurate theoretical work on the region, and have claimed to shed more 
and brighter light on the specific relations between Central Asian states. While this 
part of the literature has the undoubted merit of highlighting important systemic 
dynamics and traces the major developments at the global level, and has (quite 
paradoxically) contributed to revitalising the academic and policy-making 
environments’ interests in a region which had remained overlooked for a long time, it 
inevitably neglects to underline the sub-systemic, intra-regional, conflictual and 
cooperative dynamics that characterised Central Asian states in the last years. 
 
2.3 Central Asia as a Security Complex  
 
The second strand of the literature concerned with Central Asia and its political 
landscape is that which puts the region in the context of the RSC theory as developed 
by Barry Buzan et al. (1998) and Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (2003). According to 
the theory, a RSC is defined as ‘a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, 
desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot 
reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another’ (1998: 201). Not 
surprisingly, due to the recent independence of the five Central Asian republics and 
the still-ongoing reassessment of their security relations, few works have been 
produced so far from a RSC viewpoint.  
However, this literature points out that the New Great Game narrative is 
running the risk of overshadowing the security necessities and challenges that Central 
Asian states are facing, and therefore this literature presents a plus: it is not concerned 
just with international relations on Central Asia but it is concerned primarily with 
international relations in Central Asia, looking at their internal dynamics in the field 




Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (2001) have analysed the region in these terms, looking 
especially at the issues of terrorism, water-resources management and drug-
trafficking, arguing that while a true RSC is still in formation, it is already possible to 
assist to strongly-linked security dynamics in two sub-RSC, one in the Caspian area 
between Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, and an Eastern one surrounding 
the Ferghana Valley, formed by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.  
Jason Soderblom (2004), conversely, has shown how the formation of a 
regional security community (i.e. a ‘cooperative’ RSC, one in which the states 
involved facing the same threat adopt the same strategies in a convergent and 
cooperative way) is difficult due to the disparate and often divergent interests of the 
states forming the complex, but also that the recent developments within the SCO 
may lead to the future formation of a more structured and cooperative (in an anti-US 
fashion) RSC.  
On the same lines, Osman Yandas (2005) argues that despite being landlocked 
between the ‘Russian Bear’ and the ‘Chinese Dragon’ and the difficulties spurring 
from clashing interests between the great (the US, Russia, China) and the regional 
(Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) powers, the five Central Asian states have started 
forming a more structured RSC under the shadow of the SCO, especially as far as 
militant Islam and energy security are concerned, and that this RSC can help shed 
light on the unique characteristics of the region (see also Lanteigne 2006 and 
Ambrosio 2008).  
Other authors are more sceptical on the prospects for the formation of a RSC 
in Central Asia. Local analysts such as Rustam Burnashev and Irina Chernykh, for 
example, maintain that despite geographical proximity and shared security problems, 
Central Asian states have so far failed to adopt a ‘regional’ view on menaces such as 
Islamic terrorism and border conflicts, adopting bilateral strategies at best and 
individual strategies at worst (Burnashev undated; Burnashev 2002; Chernykh and 
Burnashev 2005).  
Two issues arise from this kind of literature. The first one is that, by looking at 
Central Asian international relations in terms of security and RSC theory, these 
authors have certainly expanded the theoretical understanding of the region, which 
had been limited to neorealist accounts of international relations in the new great 
game narrative. The methodological aspect is also enhanced. Moving from an 
exogenous account of states’ interests formation, these works inquire into the 
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formation of such interests, on the multifacetedness of the relations between regional 
and supra-regional states and the several responses different threats require, thus 
adopting a constructivist, more interpretivist methodology well in line with RSC 
theory (see Buzan and Waever 2003: 40).  
The second one, conversely, is that while such works, by virtue of their focus 
and research assumptions, only focus on security concerns, they nonetheless add a 
wider understanding of regional international relations, addressing issues such as 
‘security community’ and ‘security cooperation’ in relation to the values, norms and 
commonality of intents of all the actors involved in the complex, from the regional to 
the international level.  
This more expanded view of Central Asian international relations made 
possible by the adoption of the RSC theory allows us, as will be shown later, to 
speculate and conduct research on a complex theoretical link, i.e. on the hypothetical, 
binomial relations that exists between a RSC and a regional international society, a 
very much understudied topic in huge need of further research (Lanteigne 2006; 
Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez 2009, Aris 2010).  
As it is evident, the RSC has brought forward the previous focus of the 
literature both in ontological (focus on the Central Asian relations) and 
epistemological (expansion of the available theoretical devices incorporating non-
neorealist approaches) terms. As has been said, however, due to its focus on security 
relations, a larger account of Central Asian normative relations is still lacking, and 
this is the task that the authors working in the third strand of the literature have sought 
to accomplish. 
 
2.4 The International Relations of Central Asia  
 
Compared to the previous two strands of the literature, the literature on Central Asia 
as a region, with its own peculiarities, specificities and dynamics, has proved to be 
more multifaceted and far more sensitive to considering the five Central Asian 
republics as dynamic political actors rather than mere parts of a greater game or parts 
of a regional security complex. Yet, we should not be surprised by the fact that this 
third strand of the literature is perhaps the least developed and the most recent, given 
the fact that ‘what is most important in independent Central Asia is domestic 
development, not international relations’ (Mandelbaum 1994: 16). 
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In this part of the literature, the nature of the relations among the five Central Asian 
states is probably the most treated and debated issue. In economic, territorial and 
political terms, especially as far as water- and border-management are concerned, that 
international relations among Central Asian states are competitive seems to be the 
predominant idea. Johannes Linn, for example, speaks of a ‘disintegration scenario’, 
arguing that ‘Central Asian countries and their partner states do not build bridges 
among themselves and between their conflicting short-term and shared long-term 
interests’ (2007: 10), while Annette Bohr, pointing at competitive behaviours between 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in terms of regional hegemony and between Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan in terms of energy resources management, asserts that there are huge 
‘practical and political constraints impeding regional cooperation’ (Bohr 2004: 494).  
Eugene Rumer has stressed the low salience of market integration in the 
region, and how the overlaps of resources traded by the five Central Asian states 
hinder the prospects for a deeper economic integration (2000) while Allison, while 
recognising the superficial eagerness of Central Asian states in joining regional and 
extra-regional forms of cooperation, has argued that such initiatives are nothing but a 
way to embolden and entrench their sovereign power and internal stability, thus 
benefiting from a ‘protective integration’ through a ‘virtual regionalism’ (2008).  
Sally Cummings seems to take the same line when asserting that ‘[r]egime 
preservation has encouraged the pursuit of state interests but has primarily 
discouraged the pooling of sovereignty out of fear that an outside power will encroach 
upon their policy-making’ (2012: 179), while Martin Spechler (2001) has doomed 
Central Asia as ‘pathologically’ non-cooperative.  
However, several authors have recently made a case for analysing more in 
depth the pale, but nonetheless present, hints of cooperation. Martha Brill Olcott, for 
example, while being sceptical of advanced cooperation among Central Asian 
countries (2001), a few years later admitted that ‘[d]espite all the speeches of leaders 
of Central Asia on the bellicosity of their peoples, in the early years of independence 
competition in the region generally proceeded in a peaceful way’ (2005: 32-33), while 
Mirzokhid Rahimov allows for a possible developing trend in the management of 
Central Asian international relations (2007).  
Alexander Libman and Evgeny Vinokurov, while conceding that cooperation 
among Central Asian states has largely remain unsuccessful and rather competitive 
(see among others Akiner 2007; Pomfret 2009, Torjesen 2008), deem that the 
22 
 
prospects for closer collaboration, especially in the economic field, should not be 
entirely dismissed, especially in the light of the rise of Kazakhstan (2011).  
Olcott has maintained that, despite the largely uncooperative character of the 
region, there is much credit to the argument that CA states have managed to avoid 
collapse, even with the civil war in Tajikistan, and that the kinship substratum binding 
the five states has created a stark contrast with far more bellicose regional clusters 
such as the Caucasus (2005: 20-26).  
Spechler and Spechler have been ‘most impress[ed]’ by how latent conflicts in 
the region have been managed successfully (i.e. without interstate war), and have 
claimed that while ‘some issues remain […] they do not seem likely to lead to serious 
use of force’ (2010: 168). Yet, all fail to ask themselves why this has been the case. 
More recently, again, Olcott (2011) has made a case to carefully consider 
prospects for both conflict and cooperation, and to develop new frameworks to assess 
such conflicting, but ongoing, dynamics. While conceding that Central Asian states 
‘less frequently have contact with one another’ (2011: 18), she also stresses the fact 
that ‘regional competitions will not become the basis of armed conflict in the future’ 
and that while ‘[t]here is certainly cause for pessimism, [...] there is also reason for 
hope (2011: 35)’.  
In addition, while competition and distrust seem to be the common narrative, 
the author points out at several hints of cooperation, or at least of initial dialogue, and 
prospects for enhanced cooperation, especially in the political and economic fields; 
the fact that such states are diversifying their strategies and compete on several 
grounds ‘is an entirely normal process and should not surprise no one’ (2011: 34). 
There are in sum prospects of change in the future, and the relational pattern of 
Central Asian states is increasingly gaining in importance especially since it ‘join[s] 
these countries with the global swath of the global community’ (2011: 34).  
In the light of these accounts, therefore, it seems that the experiences of the 
Central Asian Commonwealth (1991-1994), the Central Asian Economic Union 
(1994-1998), the Central Asian Economic Cooperation (1998-2002) and the Central 
Asian Cooperation Organisation (2002-2005), plus the establishment, via a legally 
binding international treaty, of a Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone 
(CANWFZ) in 2006 and the agreement reached by the five Central Asian 
governments to establish a UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in 
Ashgabat (UNRCCA) in 2007 are concrete examples of an at least nominal 
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convergence of interests which, independently from their success, reveal a common 
normative substratum on certain issues that is in the need of better and deeper 
investigation. As a matter of fact, here it is argued that it is inaccurate, to say the least, 
to dismiss failed examples of cooperation as proof of an inability to integrate, but 
quite the contrary these examples show the need to investigate the reasons why these 
states decided to try to cooperate and the norms and institutions underpinning such 
projects. 
This continuous and mutually reinforcing debate between cooperation and 
competition/rivalry is, in fact, well-portrayed also in the RSC literature: Allison, for 
example, has argued that ‘[d]eep-rooted tensions in the Central Asian regional 
complex […] have been identified. However, cooperative dynamics have also 
developed in parallel in the region, resulting in the creation of a variety of interstate 
structures, frameworks and forums’ (2001: 219) and that ‘[t]hese structures promote 
Central Asian regional cooperation and reflect an effort to reach consensus on matter 
of principal concern to the local states. However, local rivalries and imbalances 
between these states continue to hinder such efforts’ (2001: 219-220).  
Stuart Horsman, when dealing with the delicate issue of water resources in 
Central Asia, asserts that ‘[tensions] have been recorded, but it is unlikely that such 
incidents will escalate into interstate conflict’ (2001: 77), while Allison again points 
out that ‘[in Central Asia] some coordination in countering growing low-intensity and 
non-traditional threats has developed and it is likely to continue’ (2001: 226).  
In sum, competition and incipient cooperation, poor relations but also 
examples of dialogue: while some authors have identified the cause of such ‘swinging 
stability of affairs’ in the presence of the foreign powers (Lantaigne 2006), the shared 
concern for the protection of sovereignty (Cummings 2012) or a more general sense 
of order (Kavalski 2010, Laruelle and Peyrouse 2013) none of the theoretical accounts 
used so far to analyse Central Asian relations, i.e. neo-realism, RSC Theory, neo-
liberalism and post-colonial theory, has proved to be completely satisfactory both 
from a descriptive and an explanatory point of view (Cummings 2012). 
This continuous balance between bitter interstate rivalry and absence of severe 
conflicts (at least involving two or more actors), between the lack of substantive 
cooperation and the several attempts to foster common strategies and basic prospects 
for further collective efforts in dealing with transnational issues and security concerns 
shows that neorealism and neoliberalism, while certainly useful theoretical devices, 
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are ‘grossly incomplete’ (Finnemore 1996: 27) to analyse the present state of affairs 
between Central Asian states. It seems that an intermediate approach would be more 
valuable, especially given the fact that this ‘regional uncertainty’ in structuring their 
international relations may indicate that all Central Asian states are to a certain extent 
working and dealing with each other in the respect of common institution and 
expectations, norms and codes of conduct which, even if not hindering what seems to 
be an embedded and deeply rooted competitive realm, nonetheless make possible the 
prevention of wider, disruptive conflicts, the maintenance of their sovereignty and 
‘stateness’ and the usual game of politics not only among the Central Asian states but 
also between them and the external powers.  
In other words, it does not seem too unlikely that in Central Asia, despite the 
chronic problems of state-building, security management and of counter-measuring 
transnational menaces, there are hints of an international society in formation, albeit a 
‘coexistential’, pluralist one, made up of the incorporation of the institutions of the 
wider international society and supported, possibly, by regional and local institutions 
(again, worth stressing, meant as shared codes of conduct and accepted norms more 
than organisations or policy-making architectures). 
Another way to look at relations between Central Asian states is to look at 
relations between regimes and forms of states. One of the least treated issues in ES 
theorisation, and even more so in the specific sub-literature on international societies 
at the regional level, is how the nature of the state influences the character of the 
international society under examination. This theoretical neglect, which I consider 
borrowed from neorealism (see e.g. Buzan 1993), characteristic of the first generation 
of ES scholars (Bull 1977, Wight 1977) and prone to over-structural readings of 
international relations, is deplorable especially given the regional turn of the School in 
the last year.  
Assuming that ‘the state’ is an idealtypical construct with no differentiation in 
terms of cohesiveness, consolidation, openness, resilience, social composition, value-
based political institutions represents a huge conceptual and empirical ‘miss’ for the 
English School in terms of comparing international societies across the globe. It is in 
fact puzzling that while the nature of the state has been taken into consideration in 
studying regional security complexes (Buzan and Waever 2003: 20-24) it has never 
been treated in international society theory. In one of the very few analyses of how the 
nature of the state influences regional international societies, Mohammed Ayoob has 
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stressed that, especially in postcolonial contexts, ‘the premise that regional states are 
unitary, rational actors that engage in interstate relations to advance their ‘national’ 
interest is drastically undermined’ (1999:250). In such areas, states may not be able to 
defend their borders properly, or contain ethnic grievances, or project power in an 
effective way, or simply may not be able to address social and economic crisis (see 
also, in a ‘strong/weak’ states framework, Migdal 1994; McMann 2004). All this has 
logically an impact on relations with neighbours: ‘the dynamics of regional balances 
and the prospects for the construction of regional societies, therefore become 
inextricably intertwined with the essentially domestic enterprise of state making and 
nation building, thus holding regional dynamics and structures hostage to the internal 
processes of contiguous and proximate states’ (1999: 251). In sum, regional 
international society seems dependent on the nature of the state.  
By ‘nature of the state’ it is meant the complex set of relations between form 
of government (monarchy, republic), form of regime (autocracy, democracy, 
dictatorship), economic system (open, closed economy), institutional background 
(strong/weak institutions of government) and social environment (free society, closed 
society, repressed society) that characterise the political life of a given state. With 
specific respect to international society theory, it may be argued that, while 
foundational institutions (such as non-intervention and sovereignty) and some 
procedural institutions may be developed between very different states for needs of 
order and predictability to consolidate regimes (one may think of diplomacy and 
positivist, state-centric international law), other procedural institutions may be easier 
to develop between more liberal, open states than others (e.g. the market, human 
rights).  
Considering Central Asia, and with specific respect to the regime type present 
there, there is unanimous consensus in the literature that the nature of the state is, 
albeit in different degrees between regional states, neo-patrimonial, i.e. a form of state 
where the ruling elite considers the state and its institutions as sources of benefits and 
enrichment rather than as an independent set of relations to be managed in the interest 
of the people in a more Weberian sense, and where unaccountability and secretive 
negotiations, rather than accountability and openness, characterise the political game 
and how power is shared (Markowitz 2013, Lewis 2010, Lewis 2012b, Heathershaw 
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2014, Anceschi 2010, Collins 2006, Kreikemeyer 2013, Axyonova 2013).5 In the 
words of Kathleen Collins, neopatrimonialism is a ‘modern form of politics organised 
around hierarchical and personalistic networks that are typically informal, non-
transparent, exclusivist and generally non-institutionalised’ (2009: 254 fn. 7). 
Patrimonialism is actually an entire system of authoritarian rule defined ‘by a 
concentration of power in a personalistic leader and his ties, rather than formal 
institutions and legality’ (2009: 255).  
If this is the case, then one may expect consequences for international society 
as regime types have an impact on how ‘the international’ is performed (one of the 
most recent discussion on this in the ES literature is Alice Ba’s analysis of East Asia 
[2015]) . As a matter of fact, Luca Anceschi has convincingly shown (2010: 153-154) 
how foreign policy and international relations in Central Asia are based on the 
inextricable nexus between regime maintenance, regime survival, pre-eminence of 
domestic factors and regime interests. Consequently, the international society present 
there will feature a triangular relationship between nation building, foreign policy and 
regime consolidation (2010: 144).  
What would this international society look like, taking into account the 
patrimonial nature of the regimes? First, authority (avtoritet) order and stability 
(stabil’nost) will be prioritised over change and regime evolution (specifically if 
liberal in nature) (Heathershaw 2006). Speaking of the nexus between state capacity, 
regime and foreign policies, the well-known political scientist Aidos Sarym told me 
that ‘authoritarian governments are bad, but we have to take into consideration the 
capacity of the region as a whole, because the region itself is limited in its political 
capacity. And I personally travel a lot in Kyrgyzstan, I meet with experts, colleagues 
and politologists there and they all dream of a dictator to keep order!’6  
Second, regime-to-regime relations will prevail over 1) state-to-state relations 
(with the possible development of inter-presidentialism as an institution of the 
regional context, like in Latin America) and 2) genuine ‘state’ interests. This is even 
more evident since, in the course of fieldwork, several interviewees acknowledged 
                                                 
5 With respect to Kyrgyzstan, this may be less true after the establishment of a parliamentary form of 
government in 2010. Yet, neopatrimonial dynamics were observable under both Akayev and 
Bakiyev in the previous years. 
6 Interview with Aidos Sarym, Political Risk Assessment Group, Almaty, Kazakhstan, Almaty, 




that ‘the state’, in Central Asia, is a shortcut for ‘the president’.7 With respect to the 
institutions of diplomacy, and in tune with the findings of this thesis, Kreykemeyer 
has recently stated that ‘in accord with the primacy of the informal, and to maintain 
the status quo of maximum control, the Central Asian states frame their foreign and 
security policies largely in informal ways and mostly on a bilateral basis’ (2013: 174).  
Third, institutions related to the economy (the market and borders) may be 
underdeveloped and restricted to favour personal gains of the ruling elite (Collins 
2009: 264). As one of my interviewees stated, ‘In this context, things are managed in 
the way that it is profitable, convenient for the incumbent government’.8  
Fourth, one may expect degrees of competition between the elites when 
conflicting interests arise over possible sources of revenue (water and borders in the 
case of Central Asia) but also a sort of ‘autocratic solidarity’, an ‘elitist solidarism’ 
between them when domestic forces, pushing for liberalisation and/or regime change, 
pose dangers. One of my interviewees expressed this ‘top-down’ conception of 
international society very insightfully: ‘If you ask me about the pattern of 
international relations in Central Asia, the pattern in Central Asia is strong leadership. 
Strong leadership, mutual recognition, stability, and sovereignty. These represent the 
uniqueness of Central Asia, especially strong leadership… A bona fide rule we have 
[in the region] is that despite our distrust, grievances, etc. we do support each other in 
the domestic sphere, when there are domestic problems’9.  
If this is the case, then we should expect the birth of a regional international 
society structured around a paradoxical, conflicting logic: legal/political pluralism 
(emphasis on sovereignty, territoriality, borders, diplomacy and state-centric 
international law) and regime solidarity, mutual (tacit) support against common 
threats, authoritarianism as ‘the norm’ in the region to preserve political power, 
development of personal ties and presence of shared values and priorities at the 
individual, personal level).  
Fifthly and lastly, a society of neopatrimonial states will be likely to balance 
                                                 
7 For example, interview with Dosym Satpaev, Political Risk Assessment Group, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 
18 November 2013; interview with Irina Chernykh, expert in Kazakhstan, 14 November 2013; 
interview with Shairbek Juraev, independent analyst, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 28 November 2013; 
interview with Nuria Kutnaeva, independent expert and analyst, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 3 December 
2013. 
8 Interview with Bermet Tursunkulova, Vice-President of Academic Affairs and Professor of 
International Relations, AUCA, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 27 November 2013. 
9 Interview with Official Uzbek source, location undisclosed, 12 February 2014. 
28 
 
different great powers to profit from cooperation with them, and therefore 
multivectoralism and ‘management of great powers’ should be expected (in 
Kreykemeyer’s words, ‘balancing for profit’). Overall, we are likely to speak of an 
‘ideology-driven’ form of international society. In this respect, John Heathershaw 
speaks of ‘neo-sovietism’, meant as the activity of imagining Central Asia and its 
perceived values ‘in ideological terms – having a particular and objective reality 
expressed in dominant beliefs, doctrines and rituals’ (2006: 8, fn. 39). In the words of 
an interviewee, ‘cooling down conflicts and keeping stability is what actually 
presidential power is about in Central Asia: to avoid any conflict both within and 
outside and to allow stabilisation of other presidential powers, stabilisation for other 
presidential regimes, you know, they have so much interest in preserving the status 
quo’.10 As another interviewee working on international politics in the region argued, 
‘Nobody will fight authoritarian regimes in the region, and also Russia will support 
authoritarian regimes. This is what I meant [in the course of the interview] by non-
intervention. All countries want stability, and especially stability in foreign affairs. 
This is why they sustain each other’.11   
This, in sum, requires a re-conceptualisation, or in Acharya’s term, a 
localisation of the usual IR lexicon concerned with ‘state interests’ and ‘state-
security’. When ‘interests’ and ‘security’ are mentioned, these are usually referred 
implicitly to the regimes. Conversely, when leaders speak of ‘the state’, they speak of 
a subject of international law, not a set of social relations between the government and 
the people. As Wilson has pointed out, the ‘state’ in Central Asia is purely 
epiphenomenal or instrumental, a vehicle for keeping hold of power or brokering 
international agreements. Beyond this virtual state lies an inner or real state-system 
found in the informal institutions, networks, and material instantiations of power of 
ruling regimes (Wilson 2005, in Heathershaw 47).12  
The implications of this theoretical discussion on the link between 
                                                 
10 Interview with Zhenis Kembayev, Professor of International Law, KIMEP University, Almaty, 
Kazakhstan, 15 November 2013. 
11 Interview with Zakir Chotaev, Assistant Director at the Central Asian Research Centre - Turkish 
Kyrgyz Manas University, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 3 December, 2013. 
12 Yet, Heathershaw warns us to not dismiss the state entirely: ‘Dismissing Central Asian states as 
quantitatively weak is to disregard the performative processes by which they are qualitatively 
transformed to become globalised polities with relatively strong executives. Equally, to consider 
these states as captured by clans, regional factions, or other nationally confined networks misses the 
importance of the state form as the medium for global, national and local relations’ (2014: 49). 
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neopatrimonial regimes and the structure of the regional international society will be 
discussed again in the course of the thesis, with specific analysis in Chapter 4.8, 
where the position of Kyrgyzstan in this regional international society will be 
considered. 
 
2.5 Relations with the outside world 
 
The literature on Central Asia has been so far discussed in relation to three main 
strands, that of the narrative of the great game, that of the region as a regional security 
complex and that of the specific international relations within the region itself. 
However, an important part of this last strand of the literature has also devoted its 
attention not just to the international politics of cooperation/competition among the 
five Central Asian states, but has also looked, at least preliminarily, at how these 
states manage their relations with the wider international community, at how they fit 
within the normative framework of the international society at the global level and 
how they relate themselves with international institutions and political bodies, and 
how they conceive of the norms and ideas that permeate the normative architecture of 
world politics.  
For example, Kavalski, contra those who argue for the isolation and political 
backwardness of the five republics, reminds us of how ‘the post-Soviet Central Asian 
republics tried to form new bilateral and multilateral relations. Within a short time, the 
Central Asia nations were formally recognized by many countries and established 
with most of them diplomatic ties and exchanged diplomatic missions’ (2010: 309). In 
addition, both Jones Luong (2002; 2004) and Erica Weinthal (2002; 2004) argue that 
Central Asian states, albeit in different manners to different extents have aimed at 
gaining legitimisation and inclusion within international society, looking for the 
approval of the international community in terms of external statehood and internal 
structures, such as institutions and electoral procedures. The recent comparative work 
of Sally Cummings and Raymond Hinnebusch (2011) is another welcome 
contribution to how the norm of sovereignty has been adopted by the Central Asian 
republics, although how sovereignty is played out in the region is not addressed, not 
to mention the other institutions of international society. 
On a more careful and doubtful tone, some authors question the complete 
adherence of the five Central Asian republics to the normative, Western apparatus of 
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international norms, and argue that a closer analysis to understand how these 
countries relate to this normative framework is needed.  
Christopher Waters, for example, when inquiring on the relations between 
human rights norms and Central Asian performance, asks clearly: ‘Do the cultures of 
[Central Asia] have different understandings of rights than the ‘Western’-formulated 
rights found in international treaties?’ (2009: 199); Alexander Warkotsch (2007) has 
been one of the first to analyse the process of socialisation between Central Asian 
states and the Western international society, both from a rationalist and a reflexive 
viewpoint, but only as far as the concept of ‘democracy’ is concerned; Kavalski 
(2010) has analysed the issue of sovereignty and statehood in Central Asia through the 
lenses of socialisation theory, borrowed from Hedley Bull (1977) and Amitav Acharya 
(2004).  
An important contribution in this field of the literature is that of Irina Liczek 
and Jens Wandel (2009), who have also aimed at expanding the understanding of 
socialisation of international norms in Central Asia. While their study is limited to 
gender inequality and only two countries, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, it 
nonetheless addresses a very important point for this thesis, namely how Central 
Asian states relate to the international community and how we should understand such 
a process.  
Relying on previous constructivist ideas and methods (Finnemore 1996; Keck 
and Sikkink 1998), their work brings in a double movement, from the wider 
international society (above) and the pre-existing social texture, Soviet and pre-
Soviet, from below: the internationalisation of norms, and therefore of other 
institutions, goes through a complex process of acceptance and re-interpretation under 
cultural and social peculiarities that somehow bring change to the norm at the 
international level (Acharya 2011). 
As can be seen, the issue of linking Central Asia to the concept (and perhaps, 
more importantly, to the practices) of international society has been dealt with in the 
literature, but only selectively and not entirely satisfactorily. Firstly, how the 
institutions and norms of international society, to which all Central Asian states claim 
to adhere, have been translated, modified and re-conceptualised in their own region, 
remains largely underexplored. The works mentioned above, due to their limited 
scope and focus, have addressed only the concepts of statehood, democracy and 
(certain) human rights in some countries, thus without presenting a comprehensive 
31 
 
framework to regionally assess the legitimacy and the (re)-interpretation of the whole 
bundle of international norms and institutions. 
Moreover, while the impact of international norms and actors has been studied 
from the perspective and the influence-side of external regulatory bodies and 
institutions, or from the viewpoint of the outer international community, little has 
been said from the perspective of the states enmeshed in such process of socialisation, 
therefore preventing the disclosure of a (forming) regional international society 
possibly based on different understandings of the international norms (Neumann 
2011). 
 
2.6 How are Central Asian states seen on the world stage? 
 
At the beginning of this chapter, it was said that not only would an account of what 
the literature has said on Central Asia be given, but that a detour on how the region 
has been seen in most of the works produced so far would also be offered. In this way, 
it is possible to identify the theoretical shortcomings of such works, and to locate the 
present research in a better-defined niche in which it can be more usefully exploited. 
At a very general level, it must be said that the literature on Central Asia has 
not been benign towards it. Due to its landlocked position in the inner part of the 
Eurasian continent, its postcolonial status and very recent experience of state-
building, the five states forming the region have been considered ‘romantic, 
dangerous and arcane’ (Cummings 2012: 1), far from our common understanding of 
international politics and a location prone to chaos (Rashid 2008), instability, disorder 
and unpredictability.  
Jones Luong has spoken of Central Asia as a region commonly located at the 
periphery, at the margins of IR (2002); in the same year Rumer spoke of the ongoing 
political developments in Central Asia as a ‘gathering storm’ while Menon (2003: 
189), in assessing the domestic and regional politics of the five states, argues that 
‘Central Asia is a region of instability and ubiquitous corruption’ and Kavalski shows 
how Central Asia has been almost always eponymous with ‘otherness’ in Western 
literature (2012; see also Laruelle and Peyrouse 2013 who speak of a persistent 
‘peripheral status’ of Central Asia in world politics). 
However, in recent years, a few authors have begun to contest this common 
portrayal of Central Asian politics. Kavalski, for example, proposes the overcoming of 
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the ‘clichéd imagery of “land of discord”’ and ‘the disparate and anarchic theatre of 
global geopolitics’ (2010: 3), deeming that in reality these five republics are quite 
different from being ‘backward, violent and fatalistic’ (2010: 7), whereas Olivier Roy, 
in a more colourful way, argues that ‘these new states [of Central Asia] are far from 
banana republics’ (2000: 200).  
Moreover,  John Heathershaw and Nick Megoran (2011), by analysing the narratives 
of different Western studies, papers, books and reports on the region, have concluded 
that much of the scholarship produced on Central Asia is biased, due to a 
preconception of it as a ‘dangerous place’, ‘obscure’, ‘oriental and Afghanistan-prone’ 
and ‘fractious’ (2011: 594-604). While the authors agree that ‘representations of 
Central Asia as dangerous are important [since] they are not just superficial reflections 
or distortions of deeper realities, but part of those realities’ (Heathershaw and 
Megoran 2011: 605), we should nonetheless try to challenge such hegemonic, 
dominating discourses, by adopting different methodologies, by telling different 
stories and by focusing on different issues ‘to read and write Central Asia’s place in 
global politics differently’ (2011: 612; see also Milliken 1999: 244-245).  
Furthermore, by looking at statehood-resilience, Cummings argues against 
such narratives as well, claiming that, especially in terms of state capacity, the five 
Central Asian states perform better than some of their African counterparts, and that if 
one makes an exception for Tajikistan (1992-1997), Uzbekistan (2005) and 
Kyrgyzstan (Cummings 2002, Temirkulov 2010), ‘Central Asia [contra the common 
narrative] have been relatively more stable than comparable post-colonial countries in 
the immediate aftermath of imperial collapse’ (Cummings 2012: 6; see also, with 
specific reference to Tajikistan, Heathershaw 2008).  
What this treatment of the region reveals is an entrenched, accepted narrative 
according to which Central Asian states are somehow excluded from the basic 
normative machinery of world politics, are somehow ‘pre-modern’ in their 
development and intractable with the usual categories of the discipline of IR. While 
such narratives, as we have seen, have been contested and counter-argued, there is 
still the need for a more sophisticated analysis of how, and in what measure these 
states do fit with the general normative template of international politics present at the 
global level, and of asking to what extent their differences in practices and conduct 
(the negative connotations described above) are, on the contrary, expressions of their 
own regional institutionalisation and socialisation. 
33 
 
2. 7 A tour of the ES 
 
It must be immediately said that this section will not deal with the specificities, the 
canons and the features of the ES and its evolution, but is primarily concerned with 
the written works within the theoretical body, to show what the production under such 
framework has been so far. Therefore, the purpose of this section is twofold. On the 
one hand, it aims not so much to analyse every single work done within the ES 
framework, but rather to give an overview on how this theory has been dealt with and 
applied in the wider academic realm. On the other hand, following the pattern of the 
previous section, it serves to identify a niche, a gap, or an underdevelopment in its 
theoretical contribution to the study of IR.  
Since its first depictions (Bull 1977, Wight 1977), the ES has been concerned 
with the description of both the nature and the working of the so called ‘institutions’ 
in regulating the pervasive conflictual nature of international politics in those years. 
Subsequently, the concept of international society was deepened and put in an 
expansion-contraction dynamic, thus giving birth to the ‘expansion of international 
society’ narrative (Bull and Watson 1984). Simultaneously, and for a long period of 
time, the ES started to deal with the rising issue of human rights (Vincent 1987; 
Wheeler 2003), thus adopting the categories of ‘pluralism’ and ‘solidarism’ which 
were to shape the intra-theoretical debate for the decade to come, while in the early 
2000s there was a theoretical refinement and systematisation of the analytical 
categories used by the theory.  
This systematisation was made possible by the work of Buzan (2004), 
Bellamy (2005) and Navari (2009). The first helped clarify certain terms (such as 
‘international system’, ‘pluralism’, ‘solidarism’), better-specified the nature and the 
characteristics of the concept of international society and expanded the notion of 
‘institution’ dividing them, for a better analytical sharpness, in primary and secondary. 
The second addressed many important criticisms and responded to several questions 
that the previous authors had left unanswered. The third dipped into one of the most 
contested areas of the theory, that is, its methods and methodology, two terms very 
much underdeveloped and controversial in the ES (for a sharp critique of ES 
methodology, see for example Finnemore 2001).  
The last years have seen an innovative turn in the production of the ES. In line 
with Ayoob (1999), Buzan (2004) and Hurrell’s (2007) suggestions, it has detached 
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itself from the analysis of international society institutions at the global level to 
devote itself to the study of established or ‘in formation’ regional international 
societies. Yet, while this work is ground-breaking both in its aims and in its challenges 
to face, it has been so far little developed, as noted in the previous chapter.  
Two issues arise here: the first one is ‘geographical’, while the second one is 
methodological. As far as the first one is concerned, while other regions have been 
and are being covered by this recent use of the theory, such as Latin America and East 
Asia (Merke 2011, Buzan and Zhang 2014a), it is evident that similar work is to be 
done for the post-Soviet regional space, in particular in those regional clusters such as 
the Caucasus and Central Asia. This seems quite astonishing, since alongside the 
Balkan states, they may be regarded as the newest product of the last wave of 
‘decolonisation’, or better of the collapse of a former federal super-structure. Even in 
Buzan’s and Zhang’s book on East Asia, the latest product of regional ES, the 
literature review ignores the lack of any systematic ES analysis of the post-Soviet 
space (Buzan and Zhang 2014: 1-8).  
The only exception is the very recent work of Georgeta Pourchot and  Yannis 
Stivachtis (2014), which describes the CIS as a regional international society. While 
this article is a very much welcome contribution, it presents two main shortcomings. 
The first one is the unusual and loose geographical scope of inquiry, as they define 
‘Central Asia’ as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, thus conflating different 
sub-complexes, histories and political as well as institutional realities. The second one 
is that, due to space constraints, the authors cannot develop a thick, deep and solid 
analysis of how norms and institutions work and are interpreted in the region, limiting 
themselves at observation and use of secondary sources.  
As far as the methodological issue is concerned, instead, the work carried out 
so far on the ES on a regional basis is lacking a rigorous methodology in assessing the 
degree to which the states forming the region have recognised and share the validity 
and the meaning of the institutions binding them.  
In Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pealez’s work, for example, there is no discussion 
on how the authors have linked the states under investigation to the institutions of 
global international society, and the possibility for them to share or not share a given 
norm or code of conduct is treated in a descriptive, intuitive manner. This, in fairness, 
is considered a puzzle by the authors themselves (see Buzan 2009: 43). When 
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discussing the institution of territoriality, for example, Gonzalez-Pelaez argues that 
‘there is a general acceptance of this global institution’ (2009: 98), but how this 
acceptance is manifested or conveyed to observation is not specified.  
The same methodological problems are visible in the works of Latin America 
and East Asia: the main sources for these projects come from secondary literature, and 
words from the region, collected either via fieldwork or in other qualitative ways, are 
seldom present. This, of course, is due to the novelty of the project, to the difficulty of 
applying a theory on a new ontology and to the limited scope of the work. However, 
this can be seen also as a challenge, or even the main challenge, for this research, and 
presents questions and puzzles that this works seeks to answer and solve through 
more rigorous methods and more specified techniques. 
 
2.8 What niche(s) for this research? 
 
Now that the main strands of the literature have been presented, analysed and 
contested, and that a short account of the historical development of the theory has 
been provided, it is time to sum up the major findings this survey has brought to the 
surface. From the review above, it is clear that the following concerns have not been 
addressed by the present-day literature: 
 
 Despite the fact that it has been recognised that Central Asian states were 
‘catapulted to independence’ (Olcott 1992), their process of joining the 
international arena has been surprisingly neglected: how, after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, did these countries manage to access the international 
community? How did and do they incorporate norms, institutions and codes of 
conduct? How are they now dealing with such prescriptions? How are global 
norms seen from a regional perspective? How have the historical-political 
inheritance(s) of such countries affected their international relations? Are these 
understandings sufficiently common to allow us to speak of a regional 
international society?  
 
 The prevalence of the neo-realist paradigm adopted to explain and depict the 
international dynamics of the so called ‘New Great Game’ has created the lack 
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of sound theoretical work on the region. Amanda Wooden and Christoph 
Stefes show their concern when saying that we currently miss ‘the connection 
between rigorous theoretical work and applied political or policy analysis. 
Often these two approaches are treated as separate and distinct. […] [T]his 
demonstrates a general failing in our field to communicate complex thoughts 
[…] to other scholars and students as well as to decision-makers in need of 
greater regional understanding’ (2009: xiii);  
 
 The conflict-cooperation debate, while certainly useful to understand the 
complexity and the multifaceted relational dynamics within the region, has 
failed to fully understand why they are both so consistently present, and why 
such constant competition, which is certainly higher than cooperation, has not 
led to inter-state conflict or major clashes among the five Central Asian 
republics. Moreover, such a bipolar and clear-cut approach to intraregional 
relations does not do justice to the various configurations that such ties and 
bonds can take, sometimes conflicting, sometimes overlapping, always 
coexisting, never apart; 
 
 From a theoretical perspective, we have seen in the review of the theory that 
the ES has been seldom applied to the regional level and, where it has been, or 
is being applied, it is to regions in which the Western presence has been 
significant, and with a rather descriptive methodology. There is therefore the 
need to verify its multi-applicability and theoretical soundness, and with 
possible norms and institutions shared in different context but nonetheless 
equally legitimate: as Neumann has recently pointed out ‘international 
society’s norms and practices are variously anchored throughout the system’ 
(2011: 467); 
 
 Still within the ES realm, it seems that there is the need to expand and 
complete the regional agenda recently inaugurated. For example, Buzan and 
Zhang have recently complained about the fact that ‘there have as yet been 
insufficient studies of modern regional international societies to enable either a 
full global sketch or any systematic comparison’ (2014a: 13), and have 
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affirmed that ‘we still need more studies of the regional level in order to 
compose a fuller picture of what is out there, and […] the approach through 
primary institutions provides a powerful method for doing this kind of work’ 
(2014: 223). Therefore, this thesis directly addresses their concerns expanding 
the scope of the regional agenda of the ES, contributes to our understanding of 
a sociology of international relations and provides new ground for future 
comparative studies across regional international societies, focusing on 
similarities as well as differentiations between them; 
 
 The literature on Central Asia as a (potential) RSC has shown how scholarship 
on Central Asia needs to better understand the ‘social dynamics’ of these 
countries, and not just those linked to their security concerns (although the two 
can be possibly linked, as the RSC theory prescribes). Moreover, recent works 
on Central Asia as a RSC have pointed at the possible ‘communitisation’ of 
the regional space under a Shanghai Spirit (Lanteigne 2006, Ambrosio 2008), 
therefore urging an inquiry on the relationship between RSC theory and the 
concept of regional international society; 
 
 The literature on the place of Central Asia within international society, as 
shown, oscillates between considering it at the very margins of the world 
community of states to interpreting its membership in various international 
organisations as a clear sign of its entrenchment within the global normative 
framework. A clear analysis of its place within international society and the 
consideration of an incipient regional international society in the making 
among the five republics, therefore, is not only of interest from a theoretical 
and academic perspective, as expanding our understanding on the region and 
providing a new framework for analysis, but also, from a policy-making 
viewpoint, clarifying the practices and the values that underpin such 
hypothetical regional cluster of norms and institutions. 
 
The questions and puzzles identified above should not be seen as mutually exclusive, 
but rather as different facets of the bigger conundrum, i.e. whether Central Asia is 
assisting in the formation of a regional international society.  
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To conclude, this trip through the literature on Central Asia has shown that, while it is 
certainly true that there is a plurality of ideas, voices, opinions and perspectives, the 
scholarly community, as well as those interested in the region, are still in the need of 
answers to particularly relevant questions if they are to historically and politically 
understand in toto both the international relations and the intra-regional relations of 
Central Asia. Key facts, both theoretical and practical, remain under-explored and in 
the need of a new perspective. 
The purpose of this chapter has been that of setting out these questions and 
puzzles through a comprehensive survey of the most recent literature on the region 
and on the approach of IR to the region. The next one, may be considered the 
keystone of the whole work, as it is devoted to the creation and the explanation of the 





































This chapter offers a conceptual map, whose primary scope is to clarify the terms and 
the ideas that will inform the whole research. In order to perform this task in a 
satisfactory way, however, the main puzzles of the present work must be recalled: is 
an international society present in Central Asia? If yes, how does it relate to that 
present at the global level? Is it pluralist or solidarist? And are there specific norms 
and institutions different from those at the global level? 
 From the four questions above, one may identify a few key terms, which may 
be said to constitute the pillars of the whole architecture of the present research: 
regional international society Central Asia, global level, pluralist and solidarist 
character, norms and institutions. It is important to stress the fact that these terms, or 
concepts, have not been chosen for explanation arbitrarily by the writer, but have in 
fact been selected due to their wide misunderstanding in the IR literature (Jones 1981; 
Finnemore 2001; Buzan 2004; Bellamy 2005; Qoraboyev 2010; Cummings 2012). 
Therefore, their clarification, refinement and careful conceptualisation, in addition to 
their justified use, are of utmost importance if the work is to be understood in proper 
terms, without falling into the trap of misjudging it just for the misuse or 
misinterpretation of its conceptual, theoretical and methodological premises.  
Sound theory is sound explanation, and sound explanation is sound 
understanding. To understand well a term, a concept, or a particular expression, 
especially when it constitutes the red thread of a work like the present one, ensures 
not only internal consistency, but also external validity. It is like holding a compass: 
only if we know what the four letters mean and the direction whereto they point are 
we able to safely find our way through what may constitute for us an unknown, 
unexplored place. And, given the novelty of the present work, the metaphor seems 
indeed suitable.  
The structure of this chapter, which from the discussion above may be said to 
constitute the taxonomical keystone of the research, is the following: it will be divided 
in three sections, where the first one deals with the concepts inherent to the theory 
used, that of the ES. Such concepts have generated much confusion within the IR 
literature (Buzan 2004), and therefore the purpose of such subsection is that of 
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avoiding wrong uses of them, and to contest the notion that they have acquired an 
‘anything goes’ meaning. Especially with respect to the concept of ‘international 
society’, one should bear in mind that its meaning is so widely misunderstood that to 
use it means, essentially, to play with fire (Jackson 2010). Therefore, if, as 
Wittgenstein warns, meaning is use, then showing how these concepts are used and 
are applied is a necessary step to understand the meaning of such terms and, 
consequently, the wider significance of the present research.  
The second section, conversely, inquires as to the significance of ’Central 
Asia’, and its ‘regionness’: what do we mean by Central Asia? What are the states 
forming it? Why not others? What makes it possible to talk of it as a ‘region’ in ES 
terms and to justify such choice? These questions are important in two respects. On 
the one hand, in a wider sense, they help clarify one of the most contested parts of the 
world in terms of definitional labels, especially from an IR viewpoint. On the other 
hand, in a narrower sense, they set the boundaries within which the theory will be 
applied and tested, thus identifying a precise sub-level under the global one.  
The third and last one, instead, is concerned with the methodology and the 
methods of the research. After discussing the theory used in this project and the 
particular region on which it is going to be applied, the presentation of the approach 
and the methods with which the two are connected seems a perfectly logical move. 
Again, the need to devote a section to methods and methodology responds to a double 
necessity, one wider and one narrower. At a wider level, it has been widely recognised 
that a sharp distinction between methods and methodology is an essential part of any 
research design, and that their usual conflation, as if they were synonyms, inhibits 
much of research’s potential (6 and Bellamy 2011). At a narrower level, in particular, 
given the difficulty of dealing with ES methods and methodology already noted in the 
introduction and the literature review, a new methodology for the theory will be 
discussed, and its potential benefit and pitfalls assessed. Finally, the conclusion will 
summarise these three sections and will set up the purposes for the subsequent 
chapter. 
 
3.1 The ES and the concept of international society 
 
It is widely recognised that the ES, from an ontological viewpoint, relies on a well-
defined tripartition: that of international system, international society and world 
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society (Bull 1977; Wight 1977; Dunne 1998; Little 2000). Despite the simplistic 
temptation of treating them as separate ontologies and distinct realms with their own 
patterns of relations and peculiarities, these three configurations of international 
relations have in fact to be looked at as mutually inter-penetrating, mutually 
reinforcing and simultaneously coexisting. However, the concept of international 
society may be said to be the hallmark of ES theory (Suganami 2002; Bellamy 2005; 
Linklater and Suganami 2006).  
We have already defined international society in ‘Bullian’ terms in the 
introduction. However, given the pre-eminence of this concept in the whole work, it 
may be advisable to recall it again, and to pair it with that of Bull and Watson 
(1984:1). According to Bull (1977:13), and international society exists 
 
when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and 
common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations 
with one another, and share in the working of common institutions, 
 
while according to Bull and Watson (1984: 1) an international society is 
 
a group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent 
political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense 
that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of 
the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent 
common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and 
recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements. 
 
A third definition is that of Buzan (2004: 121): 
 
[an international society] is about the instrumental norms, rules and 
institutions created and maintained by states (or independent 
political communities), whether consciously or not, to bring a 
degree of order into their system of relationship. 
 
Now it is time to compare these three definitions and to see what their common traits 
are. The first common trait may be ontological. In all three definitions, the main actor 
is the state. The reference to ‘independent political communities’ is, however, of the 
utmost importance if we consider international society in an evolutionary perspective, 
and therefore starting before the Westphalian concept of sovereign state was adopted. 
In ES terms, the state is usually conceived as the well-known subject of international 
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law, and therefore as a territory with clear and defined boundaries, a population 
present on it, a government ruling on that territory and a capacity of conducting 
relations with others. In a more encompassing way, however, the state is also ‘any 
form of post-kinship, territorially-based, politically centralised, self-governing entity 
capable of generating an inside-outside structure’ (Buzan and Little 2000: 42).  
 The second common trait is the emphasis on institutions. The concept of 
institution, as it may be expected, is a controversial one. It may refer to what in IR 
theory are usually known as regimes (Krasner 1983), i.e. designed organisational 
agencies with the specific task of favouring, fostering and enhancing the cooperation 
among like-units (states) in a given area of international relations. Following this 
definition, therefore, the UN is an institution; the European Central Bank (ECB) is an 
institution; the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is an institution.  
Another meaning of institution, however, less organisational/procedural and 
more sociological/constitutive, is what lies at the heart of the concept of international 
society. The meaning used here is that of practices, habits, rules of conduct, close to 
what Searle (1995) calls ‘institutional facts’, i.e. facts created ‘when a social function 
and status are allocated to something but which do not reflect its intrinsic physical 
properties’ (Buzan 2004: 166), such as marriage, or money, or funerals.  
 Another definition which comes close to the meaning intended by ES theorists 
is that of the so-called Stanford School, which defines institutions as ‘cultural rules 
giving collective meaning and value to particular entities and activities, integrating 
them into larger schemes’ (Thomas, Meyer et al. 1987).  
Far from being synonymous with ‘regimes’ as described above, therefore, the 
ES refers to institutions as to those rooted, durable but by no means eternal codified 
practices which channel the behaviour of the states (or, in general, actors) forming the 
society, giving a sense of order and predictability to their actions. Institutions are 
rooted and durable, but not eternal. Without looking at IR, and referring simply to 
history and sociology, one would certainly note how slavery was an accepted practice 
in ancient Greece and Rome (and even later), and how polytheism was widely diffuse 
before the advent of the great monotheistic religions. In IR, several institutions have 
arisen quite recently, such as sovereignty and nationalism, whereas other have 
declined after a long persistence, such as colonialism and inequality of people 
(Mayall 1990; 2000a; Buzan 2004, Holsti 2004). The next question is: what are the 
institutions of present-day international society?  
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In 1977, Bull provided a list for those that, according to him, were the most important 
regulative institutions of international relations: diplomacy, meant as the ability of a 
state to establish and maintain peaceful relations with other states through the creation 
of embassies, consulates, representative bodies and through the use of treaties, 
conventions and notes; international law, i.e. the acceptance and the validation of the 
basic legal norms that support the coexistence of different states in the system, such 
as sovereignty rights, non-intervention and respect of agreements (pacta sunt 
servanda); balance of power, that is to say, the principle by which states prevent the 
equilibrium of the system from being disrupted through the matching of relative 
capabilities, either via alliances or via domestic empowerment; great power 
management (GPM), i.e. the acceptance that, despite the constitutional and 
ontological equality of states in the system, some states, by virtue of their capabilities 
and resources, are entitled more than others to the preservation of order and of the 
respect of all the other institutions; finally, war, meant as the ultimate means of 
resolution for conflicts, the extreme action to disrupt and at the same time re-establish 
order among the units.  
 Other authors have, more recently, made some amendments to this list, 
especially given the changed nature of the international context in which states now 
are said to operate. Kalevi Holsti, for example, adds trade and territoriality (2004), 
while James Mayall brings in the new concepts of self-determination and nationalism, 
non-discrimination and human rights (2000b).  
However, in a major re-thinking of ES theory, Buzan has modified the former 
list of institution, by introducing ‘sovereignty’, defined as the condition of not being 
subjected to any other supra-ordinated entity and by introducing a double distinction. 
On the one hand, we now have the distinction between master and derivative 
institutions, based on the simple concept that some institutions are so ‘fundamental’ 
and ‘foundational’ that may be said to include, rather than stand close to, others. On 
the other hand, we have the distinction between primary and secondary institutions, 
the former being the institutions meant in ES terms discussed above and the latter 
being proper regimes and IGOs in neo-liberal terms, which may be said to be the 
representation and the application of the fundamental principle contained in the 
master/derivative institutions.  
 With respect to the previous institutions, it may be noted that some of them are 
downgraded to a ‘derivative’ status (such as international law, derivative of 
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sovereignty, and war, derivative of GPM) and others have been added, such as the 
market and environmental stewardship (Mayall 2000b; Falkner 2012).  
The new list of institutions that results from these distinctions and add-ons 
represents the international institutions of the contemporary era, and it is presented 
below: 
 
Source: adapted from Buzan (2004: 187). 
 
The third trait that binds together the three definitions of international society 
provided above is the total absence of the concept of cooperation. This fact has 
actually to be recognised, since the very concept of international society has been 
Primary Institutions Secondary Institutions 
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recently (and mistakenly) referred to cooperative practices and progressive integration 
(especially at the regional level, which is what is of our interest here).  
For example, Mohammed Ayoob stresses the fact that ‘the distinctive features 
of a regional society [against those of a regional system] must include an implicit if 
not explicit acknowledgement of its members’ interdependence with each other in the 
realms of both security and welfare. They must also include at least an embryonic 
version of “cognitive regionalism” that can provide a minimum degree of shared 
regional identity’ (1999: 249). Bjorn Hettne and Fredrik Soderbaum speak of ‘an 
“international society” of cooperating states, as used in the so-called English School 
of IR theory’ (2000: 465). Cummings, speaking of Central Asia, argues that  
 
[r]egime preservation has encouraged the pursuit of state interests 
but has primarily discouraged the pooling of sovereignty out of fear 
that an outside power will encroach upon their policy-making. 
Regime preservation has also been the primary reason why regional 
co-operation has assumed only a virtual […] dimension. The sorts 
of shared purposes and common institutions necessary for the 
development of an international society (here regional society in 
English School or rationalism’s terms) does not therefore exist 
(2012: 179, emphasis added).  
 
She then defines Central Asia as a ‘system’, on the basis of the lack of regional 
initiatives and cooperative policies.  
 Now, two things are worth noting. Firstly, such a reading of international 
society misses its original meaning, that of a social configuration of relations mainly 
finalised at the maintenance of order and of some predictability of actions, which by 
no means require domestic isonomy and pooling of sovereignty (on this point with 
respect to Central Asia, see Gleason 1997a: 229).  
Secondly, running the risk of stating the obvious, it must be recalled that an 
international society is a social fact. And given that the notion of ‘society’ per se does 
not carry any positive meaning, it may incorporate different levels and forms of 
interactions. As it has been rightly pointed out,  
 
the term “society” should not be read as in itself carrying any 
necessarily positive connotation. To say that society, in the sense of 
social structure, is more fully developed in one place or time than in 
another is not to say that this is therefore an improvement in some 
moral sense. As Luard (1976: 340) reminds us: “a society may be 
closely knit yet moved by frequent conflict” (Buzan 2004: 15). 
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As history shows, we can have warrior societies, highly conflictual societies, societies 
that aim at coexistence and basic recognition or more cooperative and integrated 
societies. Nonetheless, they all retain a level of ‘societiness’, which may rely on 
conflict, on coexistence or on mutual support and cooperation. Societies that aim at 
coexistence and minimal form of cooperation/interaction may be defined pluralist, 
whereas societies that seek closer integration, more cooperation among their members 
and collective enterprises may be defined solidarist (Linklater and Suganami 2006).  
In a pluralist environment, ‘coexistence is rooted in the self-interest of the 
states composing interstate society. Self-interest certainly stretches to cooperation in 
pursuit of a liveable international order, but it keeps the focus on differences among 
the states and does not require that they agree on anything beyond the basics [...]’ 
(Buzan 2004: 145), whereas solidarism foresees not only that ‘a unity of interests and 
sympathies exists amongst a set of actors, but that this kind of unity is of a type 
sufficient to generate capability for collective action’ (Buzan 2004: 141).  
Therefore, ‘international society’ can be seen as an idealtype resting on a 
spectrum of different exemplifications, from the least cooperative to the most 
cooperative/integrated. It is a matter of what institutions, intentions and interests are 
shared whether a society is more on the pluralist side or on the solidarist one, 
certainly not a matter of the ‘societiness’ of the society. There is nothing like ‘more 
social’ or ‘less social’: this would mean to hold a normative understanding of 
‘society’, based on the assumption that ‘the closer we are, the better it is’. What we 
have, conversely, are different manifestations of objectives, values and purposes, 
some requiring very little common action (pluralism), some collective convergence 
and efforts (solidarism).  
By looking at the common definitions of international society found in the ES 
literature provided above, there is no reason to think that the ‘common goals’ referred 
to should necessarily be something beyond coexistence. Coexistence may indeed be a 
common goal, indeed quite an important one, being it the basis for al the possible 
future solidarist developments (if any) (Buzan 2004; Neumann 2010).  
Therefore, to argue that a group of states do not constitute a society since they 
lack cooperative attitudes and integrative purposes is to misconceive the concept of 
international society itself, pretending to equal a specific type of international society 
(solidarist, cooperative and converging) to international society itself. That conflating 
these two concepts is a mistake is also evident if we look at another definition of 
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international society, this time provided by Brown (1995: 186, emphasis in the 
original): 
 
Society is a norm-governed form of association, but the norm in 
question emerge out of the requirements for social co-operation and 
do not necessarily require commitment to any common projects, 
common interest or common identity beyond what is required for 
social coexistence. 
 
The fourth and last commonality of the four definitions of international society is left 
to be discussed: the absence of any reference to liberal, Western values. As a matter of 
fact, it is important to note that words such as ‘goals’, ‘values’, ‘institutions’, ‘rules’ 
and so forth are voces mediae, that is to say, words devoid of any political 
connotation, which is instead given only by the actor involved in the characterisation 
or use of them.  
 Why stressing this fact? Because in recent years, in the same way as the 
concept of international society has been considered as a synonym with cooperation, 
the concept of international society has been used as a synonym for international 
community, the West and the liberal project (Cox 1993; Gonzalez-Pelaez and Buzan 
2003; Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez 2009).  
This emphasis on the global liberal international society has had three 
consequences. The first one is that it attaches a precise connotation of values derived 
from the solidarist experience of the West to the concept of international society 
which, as it has been discussed, is largely formed by neutral concepts; as it has been 
pointed out, ‘[s]olidarism, like society, is not necessarily nice. Solidarity is about 
shared interests and sympathies, and can encompass a wide range of values’ (Buzan 
2004: 269). Secondly, it assumes that Western solidarism (and the institutions and 
norms attached to it) has successfully spread everywhere, whereas it is not difficult to 
see in many different parts of the world, reactions and resistances to human rights 
activities, reckless financialisation of the economy and democracy-promotion 
projects. Thirdly, and strictly related to the former, it has contributed to the neglect of 
the sub-regional level, and of the analysis of the different conformation that the global 
international society may assume once down-graded on a specific regional scale 
(Zhang in Buzan 2004; Acharya and Buzan 2009). 
This neglect is actually extremely important if one pays attention at the 
inclusive/exclusive social dynamics of globalisation, in response to which cultural 
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and value-related issues assume a crucial role in managing the slow, but nonetheless 
present, world-wide diffusion of given values and norms. For a full understanding of 
the research, therefore, the concept of regional international society is what we have 
to turn to now. 
 
3.2 Regional International Society 
 
A regional international society is the translation of the dynamics of a global 
international society as depicted above on a smaller, regional scale. Following the 
ending note of the previous paragraph, the idea of a regional international society is 
meaningful if three conditions hold: 
 
 the region considered has to be identifiable in theoretical and empirical terms; 
 the alleged international society present there has to be distinct from the one 
present at the global level (for example in terms of institutions adopted); 
 on the same line, the alleged international society present there has to be to 
some extent distinct from other regional international societies. 
 
The first two conditions are discussed in the present thesis, with the first one being the 
subject of the next subsection and the second one being actually the research question. 
The third one, on the contrary, is only potentially verifiable here, since it would 
presuppose a comparative work on the different international societies present in the 
world system, which does not exist at the moment and which actually this work aims 
to be a part of. 
By looking at the second condition, moreover, one understands that a thorough 
inquiry into a regional society must always rely, apart from an assessment of the 
relations within a region (where the specific institutions are found), on the binomial 
relation between the global and the regional international societies (where the 
differences between the two are evaluated). 
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Regional international society 
 
 
While the concept of regional international society has recently gained momentum in 
the literature, quite paradoxically the formation of a regional international society has 
not been widely treated. Here it is presented an indicative model for the formation of a 
regional international society, which does not intend to be definitive and simply 
intends to shed some light on why a regional international society should or may 
exist. 
To create this model, we have to proceed in a clear and logical way: we need to start, 
again, from the second ‘existential condition’ of a regional international society. It has 
been said that, while enjoying some, even many, institutions at the global level, it 
must have a distinct institutional configuration (in the sense that it has different, or 
modified, or missing institutions when compared to the global level).  
The number of institutions shared and accepted may be higher in some regions 
than others, with some regions with such thin ‘institutional borders’ that may be 
considered as a subset of the global level, while some regions may be far more 
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The task is, therefore, to explain the presence in the model of both the dashes and the 
spaces among them, as well as the wide or narrow distance between the dashes (which 
here have been normalised for purposes of simplicity).  
 Here, by integrating Acharya's concepts of norm localisation and norm 
subsidiarity (2004; 2011), it is argued that a regional international society is formed 
by the operation of three simultaneous dynamics: acceptance of the norm/institution, 
modification of it and rejection/substitution of it.  
It may be argued, for example, that a given region shares all the norms and 
institutions of the global, Western international society, since it believes that those 
institutions are not only feasible with its regional normative environment, but 
legitimate as well. This is the case of the EU (Diez and Whitman 2002), which can be 
actually be considered a regional-sized model of what is meant by liberal, Western 
international society.  
However, a region can see a norm or institution of the global level as feasible 
with its local dynamics, but requires a degree of mediation between ‘emerging 
transnational norms and pre-existing regional normative and social orders’, in a 
process which seeks to enhance ‘congruence between transnational norms (including 
norms previously institutionalized in a region) and local beliefs and practices’ 
(Acharya 2004: 241). This may be the case, for example, of those countries that, being 
formerly adherent to a Communist ideology, have turned rapidly to a market economy 
without completely dismissing the presence of state control over the economy.  
Moreover, there can be the case in which a region is mostly impermeable to 
specific norms and institutions, and therefore rejects such norms due to prior social 
and cultural diversities and due to resistance to outside global, more powerful actors. 
In this case, states forming the region (or the bloc) develop their own norms and 
institutions to resist intrusion and penetration from external normative claims, 
incompatible with the interests and the ‘cognitive priors’ (Acharya 2011) and ‘local 
imperatives’ (Adamson 2005) of the region considered. The most visible case is 
certainly resistance to external intervention in ASEAN countries, as well as the 
hindered progress of the human rights agenda in given parts of the world, or, related 
to it, efforts to encourage democratisation and rule of law.  
Therefore, by combining the two concepts of norm localisation and norm 
subsidiarity, a more precise analytical model for the formation and existence of a 
regional international society has been provided.  
51 
 
Now that the theoretical model of the thesis has been presented, explained and 
illustrated, it is nonetheless important to distinguish more sharply the concepts 
employed in the thesis from others that may be similar but not synonymous with 
them, and to reiterate some points for purposes of clarification.  
The first thing to note is that a regional international society is not the same as 
regionalism or regionalisation. By ‘regionalism’ it is usually meant a form of 
association between states, more or less formalised, aiming at the development of 
deeper forms of economic and/or political integration in a specific geographical area 
of the world. In the process of constitution of regionalism, it is believed that, 
especially with respect to the economic aspect of the phenomenon, businesses, non-
state actors, epistemic communities all play a role in the enhancement of regional ties. 
As de Lombaerde et al. argue, ‘civil society is often neglected in the study of 
regionalism, despite the fact that its impact is increasing, as evident in the 
transnational activist networks and processes of civil society regionalisation emerging 
around the world’ (2010: 737).  
From this definition, it is clear that differences from a regional international 
society are at least twofold. First, ‘regionalism’ is a process, an array of practices and 
policies, while a ‘regional international society’ is a collectivity. The former may 
indicate the dynamics within the latter, but it is not ontologically the same as the 
latter. Second, in the notion of regionalism is implicit the notion of integration and 
convergence, or at least of closer purposive cooperation. This, as reiterated above, 
may perfectly be the case within some international societies, but not necessarily all 
of them. It should be remembered that a regional international society indicates an 
environment in which states, that constitutes the main ontology of an international 
society, feel bound by common interests and values in order to sustain their 
environment and to pursue the rights of life and property. However minimal, these 
interests and values are the gist of a society of states.  
The fact that these interests and values may evolve and spur integrative 
dynamics, therefore igniting a process of regionalism, is entirely legitimate, but that 
would be a transformation of a regional international society from pluralist to 
solidarist. In the words of Mohammed Ayoob (1999: 248), a regional international 
society refers to ‘a set of relations that ‘requires a conscious recognition on the part of 
regional states that they have certain common interests which they need to preserve 
despite the existence of differences, even disputes, among them’, paired with 
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cognitive regionalism, that is to say, a self-identification of some states with a specific 
regional environment (Barnett and Adler 1996). In logical terms, therefore, if one 
suggests that a regional international society implies a region, i.e. in the simplest 
terms possible a limited number of states linked by geography and interdependence, 
but not necessarily policies of regionalism. Such policies may develop only when the 
rules and norms sustaining the society are developed enough to allow for higher goals 
than survival and coexistence (in Buzanian terms, a regional international society 
marked by regionalism would be akin to a cooperative regional international society 
idealtype; see 2004: 159-60).  
To clarify even more the plethora of concepts associated to regions, one 
should remember that ‘regionalisation’ is a popular, related term, which is sometimes 
used interchangeably with regionalism, but it refers rather to an increase of regional 
interaction and activity: regionalism refers to policies and projects, regionalisation 
refers to processes (Fawcett 2013: 5). 
To conclude this first differentiation, let’s present the argument made above in 
more schematic terms. A regional international society differs from regionalism in the 
following respects: 
 
 different focus: the former looks not just at cooperation and integration, but 
also at order, coexistence and cooperation as well as conflict, while the latter, 
as we have seen above, is more concerned with integrative and cooperative 
policies and projects; 
 normative reading: both concepts are related to the normative side of 
international politics, but in different respects. The former is interested in the 
norms adopted by members of the region to manage their common space, 
while the latter is ‘normative’ in the sense of being prescriptive, given its 
inherent teleological approach to regional integration; 
 norms rules and institutions: as stated above, the focus of regional 
international society theory is on social, primary institutions, on durable 
practices and behaviours, while the former is on policies and plans for 
economic and political convergence in the region; 
 socio-structural reading: the two concepts look also at regional relations from 
different viewpoints. The former is concerned with a socio-structural reading 
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of international relations in the regions, looking at how norms and institutions 
constrain, shape and affect how states behave, while the latter look at a more 
micro- and meso-level: how different actors enhance and entrench regional 
interactions; 
 quality of relations: the former concept looks at what forms of relations states 
in a region manage to achieve (coexistence, cooperation, convergence, power-
politics) while the latter assumes the quality of relations as given (cooperative) 
and focuses on the policies and steps to achieve even greater integration. 
 
The second conceptual clarification to make before proceeding is the difference 
between an international ‘system’ and an international ‘society’. This distinction has 
been the object of a dispute within the ES, especially between those who don’t believe 
the difference is useful at all (Buzan 2004: 98-108; see also James 1993 and Jackson 
2000: 113-116) and those who think that a degree of ontological and normative 
differentiation is still relevant for ES theorising to be relevant (Dunne and Little 
2014).  
In the classic ES literature, by ‘system’ is meant that condition in which states 
are in regular contact with one another and where there is sufficient interaction ‘to 
make the behaviour of each a necessary element in the calculations of the other,’ 
while as ‘society’ the forms of relations and arrangements identified above in the 
course of the discussion of the theoretical model. The question is: has a ‘system’, i.e. 
an environment where polities do not share any meaningful contact, ever existed? 
According to Buzan, the answer is ‘no’. All forms of social relations, however, hostile 
and minimal, imply very basic norms of dialogue or contact. Even open hostility and 
conflict, he argues, are still social relations based on social categories such as 
‘enemy’, ‘foe’, ‘competitor’ and so forth. Therefore, his solution is to drop the 
category of the system in favour of a spectrum of international societies (2004: 98-
108).  
Dunne and Little do not agree, pointing to the necessity of a normative 
threshold to distinguish between a system and a society. How can an environment 
marked constantly by conflict and competition be considered as a society? 
Competition and conflict can be social facts, but they are not constitutive of a society. 
Therefore, they point to the conscious awareness of the members of a system that 
some minimal rules and norms are to be followed to prevent the system from 
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collapsing. Instead of an action-reaction relation, they see a shared understanding as 
the basis of a society. In the words of Chris Brown (2001: 427), both societies and 
systems are characterised ‘by the existence of regularities…but in an international 
society these regularities are held to be norm-governed, whereas, in an international 
system, they are understood as the product simply of objective forces’ (what for 
example Waltz expresses in terms of exogenity: it is ‘what may happen’). The 
realisation that ‘maintaining the system pays’ is thus crucial to the structuration and 
organisation of a society.  
There is also another factor to which I would point in order to distinguish 
between a system and a society. If we are dealing with regions that come about after 
periods of colonisation or security overlay, such regions are highly likely to start their 
life as independent communities in the absence of norms and institutions that were 
once laid down by the metropole or the great power. In other words, they face the 
challenge of moving from a system to a society. As we shall see in Chapter 4, the 
newly independent Central Asian states were in search and need of ‘house-keeping 
rules’ to agree on, in order to navigate their way as independent communities. Once 
these norms and institutions had been adopted, the Central Asian republics started 
conforming them in a conscious way, mentioning ‘the region’ as something to be 
protected, national interests aside.  
I argue, therefore, that this awareness and this conscious adoption of rules, 
norms and institutions, as well as awareness of their constraining behaviour, is what 
has marked the shift from a Central Asian ‘system’ to the ‘Central Asian society’. 
Again, following Brown, one may argue that ‘the society of states has a telos, there is 
a reason why we have and need an international society, whereas, from [a system or] a 
neo-realist perspective, the existence of plural political authorities is contingent – it 
just happens to be the case that we have an anarchical system, everything else follow 
from this (2001: 429).  
One last caveat is in order. As the thesis will demonstrate, the society of states 
in Central Asia is far from a Kantian kingdom of ends, or far from fully cooperative 
and converging. Tellingly, despite participating in multilateral formats and speaking of 
a common ‘region’, it took some Central Asian states almost a decade to open 
embassies in other Central Asian states’ territory. Competition, security issues, 
regional uncertainties and antagonism sometimes affect the stability and the 
development of societal dynamics. But as Bull has already argued, ‘it is always 
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erroneous to interpret events as if international society were the sole or the dominant 
element’ (1977: 55). The Central Asian case dealt with in this thesis will show that, 
despite the presence of a societal logic between states, elements of the ‘system’ are 
always present, and sometimes impinge on the development of the society itself. Yet, 
this thesis will also make the case that, as seen in Chapter 2, the literature has placed 
far too much emphasis on the systemic elements, while downplaying significantly the 
societal ones. 
Before concluding this section, the nature of the relations with regional states 
and the great powers should also be addressed. Even if this thesis is purposefully 
concerned with international relations between the Central Asian states, a full account 
of the societal dynamics among states in Central Asia cannot elude the presence, on 
the borders of the region, of two great powers that inevitably have an impact on how 
relations are conducted there: Russia and China. These two great powers are very 
much different in terms of historical ties with the region, priorities in cooperation and 
ways of relating to the region.  
Russia is, quite literally, the former patron, having ruled over the region for 
more than a century, first during the Tsarist empire and then during the years of the 
Soviet Union. The now-independent Central Asian republics were once ‘Socialist 
Soviet Republics’, and constituted territorial units composing the USSR. Especially in 
the years after independence, Central Asian states experienced the pain, both 
politically and socially, of being detached from the former patron (see chapter 4). 
In terms of priorities, despite a recent surge in economic cooperation with the 
establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Russia has always emphasised 
security cooperation over other forms of partnership (Laruelle 2014). The 
establishment of the CST first (1994) and the CSTO later (2002), in addition to 
several bilateral agreements, have served the aim of keeping the Central Asian 
republics under the military umbrella of Russia, thus retaining military and security-
related links predating the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
In keeping ties with the region and in the light of the past shared experience, 
Russia is very much willing to emphasise a common past, common shared 
experiences and ‘brotherly relations’, fostering a language typical of a ‘Gemeinschaft’ 
type of international society (Buzan 2004).  
Moving on to China, differences seem quite straightforward. First of all, China 
is a relatively new actor in Central Asia. It is true that, in a more cultural and 
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anthropological reading, parts of nowadays China, such as Xinjiang, were and are 
considered to be part of Central Asia. Yet, it was not until the late 1990s that China 
started getting involved in Central Asia, and mainly for border-related issues, which in 
turn led to the creation of the Shanghai Five (see, again, Chapter 5).  
In terms of priorities, China stresses economic cooperation, leaving the 
security aspect of regional international relations to Russia. While this is not the place 
to discuss in depth China’s economic engagement with Central Asia, it is worth noting 
that in terms of investments, Chinese money poured into the region amounted to some 
$1 billion in 2000 and by 2013 it had risen to $50 billion (RFERL 2015), overtaking 
Russia in 2009 (Cooley 2015).  
Speaking of political relations with the states in the region, contrary to Russia, 
which as we noted above uses a solidarist language, China stresses political pluralism 
emphasising the usual Westphalian norms of non-intervention and respect of 
sovereignty (one may think that these discourses serve the double scope of 
substantiating arguments about a ‘peaceful rise’ and to not annoy Russia in what is 
presumed to be its ‘backyard’).  
Having now introduced the two great powers bordering Central Asia,13 two 
questions arise: first, are these countries hegemons in Central Asia? And second, do 
they have an impact on the relations between Central Asian states? In this section, 
theoretical arguments will be presented, while empirical answers to these questions 
will be provided in the course of the thesis, in particular in Chapters 5 and 7. A 
theory-informed discussion of hegemony requires, first of all, an analysis of what a 
hegemon/hegemony is, with particular reference to ES theory.  
Within the ES tradition, hegemony is indirectly, albeit inherently, linked to the 
institution of the great powers, which generally ‘serves to simplify the processes of 
international politics.’ It does so because of the inherent power differentials that 
characterize it (Bull 1977: 206). Yet, in his reading of international society, Hedley 
Bull argued that great power management served the scope of preserving a plurality 
of communities. Also Martin Wight (1977) contemplated the possibility of hegemony 
in international society, but as a deviation of the preferable, anarchical plurality of 
states. Focussing on pluralism and on a society based on a multiplicity of states and 
                                                 
13 India’s Prime Minister Modi has recently travelled to all Central Asian countries boosting trade and 
political cooperation with them. Yet, it is too early to assess India’s role in the region as hegemonic 
or typical of a great power. 
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on a consciously operative balance of power (the antithesis of hegemony), it can be 
said that early ES writers were almost ‘allergic’ to the notion of hegemony.  
However, one should remember that the need to conceptualise hegemony in 
international society is all the more relevant in the regional dimension(s) of it, as the 
likelihood of having middle powers at the global levels that exercise the role of 
hegemons/great powers at the regional levels is indeed high (Buzan and Waever 
2003). Adam Watson (1992) provides one of the first, if not the first, informed 
discussion of hegemony in ES theory. According to him, hegemony occurs when 
‘some power or authority in a system is able to “lay down the law” about the 
operation of the system, that is to determine to some extent the external relations 
between member states [of the system], while leaving them domestically independent’ 
(1992: 15).  
The caveat he makes is that hegemony involves ‘continual dialogue between 
the hegemonial authority and the other states, and a sense on both sides of the balance 
of expediency’ (1992: 15). A hegemonic system, in Watson’s thinking, differs from a 
suzerain system in that the latter involves political control over the unit(s) constituting 
the system. This may happen, worth stressing, de jure or de facto (1992: 313), that is, 
in formalised or non-formalised ways.  
Later on, he expands on his definition, arguing that by hegemony is meant ‘the 
material condition of technological, economic and strategic superiority which enables 
a single great power or group of powers, or the great powers acting collectively, to 
bring such great inducements and pressures to bear that most other states lose some of 
their external and internal independence’ (Watson 2007: 90). This, as is evident also in 
his former definition, is a materialist, realist understanding of hegemony, and may 
defy a more nuanced, norm-related reading of the concept as it should be expected in 
ES theory.  
In this respect, the work of Ian Clark (2009, 2011) offers very useful insights 
on how to conceptualise hegemony in international society, and in this subsection I 
will discuss his theorisation of hegemony as a (possible) institution of international 
society with respect to the Central Asian case. Following Clark’s work, I argue that, in 
order to understand Russia’s position (and, to a lesser extent, China’s) in Central Asia, 
one should avoid conflating hegemony and primacy (or ‘predominance’), being the 
latter the mere superiority in material terms over a group of units.  
The clear separation between hegemony and primacy lies in the fact that 
58 
 
hegemony is an institutionalized practice, legitimated within international society by 
its very members, whereas primacy depicts nothing beyond a distribution of power in 
which one state enjoys predominance (Clark 2011: 34). A realist reading of hegemony 
does not embed hegemonic leadership in the society of states, with the result that 
hegemony is not constituted by that society: hegemony remains exogenous to 
international society, and is a function of material resources, and of the willingness to 
use them. This says nothing about how international society chooses to view that 
leadership, or about the basis of any acceptance of it (Clark 2011: 17).  
As a matter of fact, hegemony as understood in ES terms, involves a crucial 
component of ‘social legitimacy’: that is to say, the ability of recruiting ‘followers.’ 
Hegemony, as claimed here, describes an international-order project that confers on 
the great power under examination ‘a leading, but still circumscribed, role, but in 
which the focus is as much upon those followers as upon the would-be hegemon’ 
(Clark 2011: 4). In sum, in ES terms, by hegemony is meant an institutionalized 
practice of special rights and responsibilities, conferred by international society or a 
constituency within it, on a state (or states) with the resources to lead (Clark 2011: 4).  
A main analytic theme is then that hegemony14 does not reside simply in 
indices of concentration of material power, taken in isolation from societal responses 
to it. Instead, to find proper hegemonic behaviour, one should look for episodes 
‘where a concentration of power, at the very least, has not elicited counterbalancing 
coalitions, or active policies of resistance from other states’ (Clark 2011: 6). In sum, 
there must be a constituency.  
In this respect, I anticipate that Central Asia seems to be ‘fractured’ when it 
comes to legitimising hegemonic practices, with some states seeking Russia’s 
protection (mainly Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and others opposing it (Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan, with Kazakhstan sitting uncomfortably in the middle): therefore, we 
cannot speak of proper institutionalisation. Weaker states, as argued, are of course 
more willing to bandwagon, but there does not seem to be a consensual regional 
approach to Russia’s attempts of institutionalisation of hegemony. Russia itself seems 
to be very much aware of this, when for example it shields itself from arguments 
pointing to ‘the return of the Soviet Union’.  
Since, following from the previous discussion, hegemony nonetheless does not 
                                                 
14 References to hegemony in IR are abundant. See, for example, Waltz (1979), Organski (1958), Carr 
(1940), Lake (2009), Gilpin (1983). 
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seem to be incompatible with international society and in fact may even be an 
institution of it, the question to ask, at this point, is the following: if there is a 
hegemonic order in the Central Asian international society, what is its impact on such 
order? The answer to this question, with specific reference to Russia and to a lesser 
extent China, will be provided in the course of the thesis, especially in chapters 5 and 
7.4 as said above. Yet, one may anticipate how the presence of a hegemonic power in 
a regional international society affects order there.  
According to Ayoob, ‘while, on the one hand, [the presence of a great power] 
creates a situation of quasi-hegemony, on the other, the hegemon takes on the 
responsibility of providing collective goods in both the arenas of security and welfare. 
[…] Usually, involvement tends to be instrumental in character and thus remains 
hostage to unilateral calculations made in great power capitals, It, therefore, usually 
detracts from prospects for the construction of regional society’ (1999: 253). As we 
will see, the tendency of Russia to meddle in Central Asian affairs has been quite 
evident, both in legitimate ways (for example during the civil war in Tajikistan, as it 
will be shown in Chapter 4) and in less legitimate, transparent ways (water-
management disputes and the Osh events in 2010).  
The theoretical axiom that seems to come from the (restricted) literature on 
hegemony and regional international society is therefore that, when legitimate, 
hegemony can prove to be a stabilising factor in the regional order and can 
accommodate potential clashes with other institutions of international society such as 
sovereignty and nationalism, as well as legitimising existing forms of order (one may 
think of Thomas Ambrosio’s theorisation of a ‘Shanghai Spirit’ in the region, for 
example [2008]).  
Yet, when hegemony is accepted only partially and is not totally legitimate in 
the eyes of the members of the regional international society, it can prove to be a 
destabilising factor and a divisive instrument to exploit disagreements and 
competitive dynamics between regional states. This is because, in such cases, 
hierarchical relations are driven by geopolitical, self-interested considerations rather 
than being based on a more ‘raison-de-systeme’ logic.  
As Kaczmarska has aptly noted, ‘Russia has been interested ‘predominantly 
with securing the status quo, understood in this case as preventing other actors from 
establishing their political or security presence in the region, and not with the process 
of legitimisation of its power in the region. While there is no doubt as to the existence 
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of common regional security interests, in this case they were articulated mainly by 
Russia, and were not agreed through a social process of interstate relations’ (2014: 
97).  
There are two additional theoretical implications for the presence of hegemony 
in regional international societies. The first one is that we should expect more 
intrusion and interference in postcolonial contexts, particularly if 1) the newly 
independent states are in the phase of consolidation and 2) the former metropole is 
geographically contiguous (Vanderhill and Aleprete 2013). This would render the 
international society in the region ‘open’, with porous (social) boundaries, and prone 
to see external powers involved in politics.  
Second, in cases of contested hegemony and resistance to primacy and taking 
advantage of their weak, open character as a society of states, regional actors will 
institutionalise a diversification of foreign policy leading to a ‘management of great 
powers’, thus bandwagoning with powerful states at the global level but enhancing 
their sovereignty. However, as already stated, empirical manifestations of these 
theoretical insights will be discussed in the course of the thesis. 
For the moment, it is sufficient to say that 1) (the possibility of) hegemony has 
to be considered in the Central Asian context, that 2) this (potential) hegemony has an 
impact on how regional international societies are conducted, and 3) that this 
(hegemony) has to be considered as legitimate to be considered as such. Otherwise, 
we would fall back on the notion of a ‘system’ where relations between states are 
managed mainly via coercion and without normative content and shared 
understandings. 
 
To conclude, let us summarise the main assumptions we have made so far: 
 
 an international society, as well as its regional variant, need neither be liberal 
nor cooperative to exist: liberal values are just many of the values possibly 
upholding a society, and cooperation is just one of the many social dynamics 
that can define a social environment; 
 an international society, as well as its regional variant, is subject to historical 
change, expansion and/or contraction. It is therefore the task of the researcher 
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to include historical nuances if he is to comprehensively portray the (regional) 
international society he is investigating; 
 a regional international society is far more likely to feature hegemons and 
great powers than the global one due to the stronger position in the region of 
those states that at the global level are middle or would-be great powers. 
Therefore, ES researchers are more likely to deal with institutionalisations of 
forms of hegemony working on regional domains than on the global one. 
 
3.3 Central Asia: a definitional chimera? 
 
If dealing with international society is like playing with fire, dealing with Central Asia 
is certainly no less risky. This geographical concept, simple to define only in 
appearance, has been contested and opposed in many ways and with many 
motivations, and it is frequently subject to semantic re-negotiations.  
We have assumed in the introduction that the region labelled ‘Central Asia’ 
comprises the five republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. This short-cut, however, cannot elude two impelling questions: are these 
five republics the only members of this ‘region’? And, do these five republics actually 
form a ‘region’? These two questions are made more difficult by the fact that, when 
dealing with regional international societies, ES theorists are not clear in what they 
mean by ‘region’.15  
Here, it is argued that combining historical, cultural and material factors, 
rather than viewing the region through each of these ‘lenses’ separately, a 
comprehensively positive answer can be given to both questions. Therefore, let us 
proceed in order, and let us provide exhaustive answers for these two questions which 
constitute the first ‘existential condition’ for the existence of a regional international 
society. 
In the literature, it is not uncommon to see ‘Central Asia’ uncritically used as a 
synonym with the five republics listed above (see, among others, Mandelbaum 1994; 
Gleason 2001; Abdullaev 2002; Burnashev 2002: 140; Polat 2002: x; Rahimov 2007; 
Pomfret 2010; Cummings and Hinnebusch 2011; Kavalski 2012; Laurelle and 
Peyrouse 2013), listing economic transition from centralised to market-driven 
                                                 
15 For a recent discussion of ‘region’ in the ES, see Costa Buranelli (2014a). 
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mechanisms, ethnic tensions, environmental degradation, presence of Islamic and 
Soviet traditions and authoritarianism as a general method of rule as regional 
characteristics.  
Abdullaev, despite recognising the different level of Islamisation, development 
and economic performance of the Central Asian republics, maintains that ‘Central 
Asia can nonetheless be regarded as a distinct region’ (2002: 246), adding that ‘they 
are all secular, moderate-nationalistic, conservative, and closely tied to the figure of 
their creator – the leaders of the state’ (2002: 282). Cummings, in her admirable 
treatment of the slippery notion of Central Asia, argues that ‘in contemporary usage 
the Central Asian, Russian and English understandings of the term more often than 
not refer to the five independent republics’ (2012: 2).  
On the same note, Robert Cutler affirms that the five republics constituting 
present-day Central Asia form a core regional sub-system autonomous from others 
(2007) and, paying attention to their common history and cultural traits, Gleason 
affirms that ‘[p]resent-day Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan shared common languages, historical traditions and values that bound 
them together as inheritors of common cultural traditions’ (1997a: xv).  
 However, authors such as Vadim Volovoj recognise that ‘[t]he boundaries of 
Central Asia as an international region are extremely ill-defined’ (2009: 100). Akiner 
seems to agree, noting that ‘[h]istorically speaking, Central Asia is an amorphous 
concept’ (1998: 187). Lewis, in addition, clearly states that Kazakhstan is not part of 
Central Asia (2008).16 The notion of ‘Central Asia’, as a matter of fact, is said to 
encompass a wider part of the world, stretching from the Caspian Sea to North-East 
Iran, Northern Afghanistan, Mongolia and the Chinese province of Xinjiang. 
Especially in historical and cultural terms, these territories enjoy strong 
commonalities and common traits which make possible to include them under an 
overarching definition of Greater Central Asia (Starr 2008).  
Some authors (Amineh and Houweling 2005) even enlarge the scope of the 
definition and speak of a Greater, Central Eurasia, including also the South Caucasus. 
However, as far as this second definition is concerned, one should consider the fact 
that local issues are usually framed in terms of ‘Caucasian’ and ‘Central Asian’ 
(Allison and Jonson 2001), and therefore maintain a certain discriminatory degree. 
                                                 
16 More recently, however, he has included it in the region (2012).  
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Going back to the Greater Central Asia definition, one could argue, however, that the 
five republics that are part of this greater region have experienced the territorial, 
cultural and socio-economic inclusion into the Soviet Union, a colonial experience 
that the other parts of Greater Central Asia have not undergone (Anderson 1997; 
Glenn 1999; Bogaturov 2011) 
 Clearly, this additional historical heritage, imposed on their common cultural 
traits, have influenced their late development as sovereign states, sovereign 
economies and sovereign societies, thus distinguishing them from the other 
components of Greater Central Asia (Glenn 1999).  
In addition to this, one has to bear in mind that the Central Asian leaders 
themselves, in 1993,  ‘imaginatively’ created the Central Asian region, adopting the 
expression Tsentral’naya Aziya instead of Srednaya Aziya, showing also that 
Kazakhstan was (and is) inextricably linked with the rest of Central Asia historically, 
religiously and culturally (Olcott 1994a). This top-down definition of the region given 
by Central Asian leaders continued also in the late 1990s and, with less emphasis, in 
the 2000s as well. 
Moreover, inter-security and inter-societal factors help characterise the five 
independent, post-Soviet republics as the constitutive actors of the Central Asian 
region. Persistent disputes over unevenly distributed natural resources (Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan possess water, which Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan do not 
have, but lack natural resources, hydrocarbons, oil and gas, which the other three 
have), concerns over trans-national threats such as radical Islam especially in the 
Ferghana Valley shared by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, drug-smuggling 
from Afghanistan through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan towards the northern states, 
environmental degradation, border disputes among virtually all the republics and 
potential inter-ethnic conflicts spread all over the region (especially between Uzbeks 
and Kyrgyzs, Uzbeks and Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens and Kazakh and Uzbeks) all 
inextricably link the five Central Asian states in what may be called a regional 
systemic configuration.  
Even President Karimov of Uzbekistan, famous for his recent anti-
integrationist positions, has come to recognise that ‘the stability of Tajikistan is the 
stability of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. The stability of Kazakhstan is 
the stability of all remaining member countries [of Central Asia]’ (Karimov in 
Nazarbayev 1996: 234; see also Burnashev 2002: 143).  
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With specific reference to natural resources, it may be said that they provide the 
strongest ‘relational substratum’, given their role in shaping Central Asian intra-
regional relations. Interestingly, it has been said that ‘Central Asian borders do not 
represent natural jurisdictions if one bears in mind that the area’s natural resources are 
inherently international’ (Cummings 2012: 133). 
Certainly the problems presented above have different degrees of 
securitisation in the five states but, as they are present in each of them, one may point 
to their significance on a regional scale (Bobokulov 2006; Volovoj 2009; Canfield 
2010). Indeed, it is probably the intermingled, overlapping and interconnected 
patterns of security that may be said to constitute the ‘regional glue’ of Central Asia. 
According to one of the most common definition of a region as a coherent territorial 
space, in it ‘national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one 
another’ (Buzan 1983: 106; see also Buzan et al. 1998). 
 If, in addition, one considers the fact that Xinjiang is a region of sovereign 
China, that the Caucasus structures itself as a weak sub-regional complex around the 
secessionist claims of some Russian-speaking regions and the Armenian-Azeri cold 
war, and that from an RSC theory perspective the nuclear issue with Iran has dragged 
it into the Middle-Eastern complex and that Afghanistan acts as an insulator between 
Central Asia, Middle East and South Asia, the argument of considering the five 
former Soviet republics as the only members of a specific Central Asian region 
appears more defensible.  
The second question is related not to the geographical concept of the term 
‘region’ but to its ‘regionness’, which may be defined as a region’s perceived sense of 
coherence and comprehensiveness, and as the output of a process of regionalism. The 
lack of dialogue, cooperative dynamics and authentic Central Asian regional 
institutions among the five states has led to a disintegrative discourse (Qoraboyev 
2010, Zakhirova 2012), therefore making implicitly two assumptions: that the 
regionness of a region is operationalised only by intra-regional regimes and regional 
association and, related to the former, that cooperation is the only viable dynamic for 
a successful regionalisation. However, two considerations must be made, one 
concerning the nature of the region itself and one the inherent meaning of 
regionalism/regionness. 
A common mistake, especially made by Euro-based and Euro-centric scholars, 
analysts and commentators, is to assume that the European integration experience is 
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exportable and applicable also to other regional contexts. If torn states, devastated by 
a world-wide war, have successfully managed to integrate themselves and to concede 
part of their constitutive sovereignty to achieve greater benefits and a higher level of 
cooperation, why should not other states be successful?  
 The profound conceptual mistake, here, is to forget that the European logic of 
integration was a gradual consolidation towards a core (formerly the EEC and later 
the EU), while the Central Asian region formed as a consequence of a sudden 
detachment from a previously existing core (the Soviet Union), thus configuring itself 
as a post-unitary regional system (Colombo 2006; Fumagalli 2007).  
In such a system, given the very recent independence of these countries, and 
their fragile condition of statehood (to some extent still today, but especially in the 
early 1990s) the refusal to pool sovereignty to pursue higher and common goals is 
normal practice. Quite the opposite, the decision to pursue regional objectives on the 
basis of common values and institutions without putting in common one's sovereignty 
(which is one of the values in play) has been viewed by the Central Asian states as a 
new form of regionalism, which may be defined as conservationist (Kimmage 2005).  
The second consideration, as it has been said, relates to the concept of 
regionalism itself. As Hurrell warns, regionalism (or ‘regionness formation’) is ‘a 
blanket term covering a range of very different developments and processes’ (2007: 
130). The phases of this processes have been outlined by Hettne and Soderbaum 
(2000): 
 
 regional space, where two or more states find themselves interacting due to 
territorial proximity; 
 regional complex, where contacts, interactions and trans-local relations (both 
positive and negative) shape the relations within the region, providing a basis 
for further and deeper interaction; 
 regional society, where states start cooperative projects (note the diversity with 
the concept of regional international society discussed above); 
 community, when cooperation and integration become even deeper, and 
 regional state, when the region ends up being a de facto federal entity. 
 
If one looks at these different phases, one notes that the five Central Asian republics, 
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while lacking strong cooperative attitudes on many common issues, nonetheless enjoy 
constant contacts, interactions and both international and trans-national relations 
(especially in the inter-ethnic realm), which strongly shape the character of the region.  
Using a telling description of their intraregional relations, one may say that 
they are ‘united in culture, divided in politics; united in traditions and heritage, 
divided by circumstances; united by geography, divided by geopolitics’ (Tolipov 
2010: 112).  Rather than a clear-cut depiction of a region as necessarily cooperative, 
therefore, a region may present itself in an early stage of development, what here has 
been presented as a regional ‘complex’. Of course, this ontological condition is not 
fixed, as a region can feature greater cooperation as well as competition and rivalry. 
 Therefore, a region is not necessarily ‘less region’ because of its lack of 
integration. Far from meaning absence of regionness, not only is the lack of 
integration just a lower, less institutionalised level of regionalisation, but can well be, 
as it has been discussed supra, a form of regionalism per se, especially if one keeps in 
mind that ‘[r]egionalism cannot be exempt from the hard reality of economic viability 
and the cold logic of power and interest’ (Hurrell 2007: 146).  
In his recent study on IR Theory and regions, T.V. Paul has recently 
challenged these precise assumptions, calling scholars working with norms and 
institutions to focus on regions in which enduring rivalries and conflict are taking 
place, since it is obvious that such rivalries and conflictual dynamics are rooted in 
ideational and normative structures as well and also to focus on those regions in 
which, despite weak levels of cooperation, we still do not see war (which seems to be 
the case of Central Asia; see Paul 2012: 5, 15). 
Before discussing the methodology and the methods of the present research, a 
final note on Central Asia and international society should be stressed, with specific 
reference to the ‘chronological stretch’ of the research. While by following the most 
established literature on international relations in the region this thesis is concerned 
with the dynamics of Central Asia as a regional international society after 
independence, one may argue that societal dynamics between these states (and, 
arguably, these peoples) started during the Soviet period, or even earlier. This is 
indeed very relevant, as this hypothesis would substantiate the argument made by 
Wight (1977: 33) and more recently by Ayoob (1999) that a common culture is 
necessary to underpin an international society (and even more a regional international 
society, due to territorial contiguity and arguably more dense interactions).  
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With respect to the former, i.e. the Soviet period, the present research could not 
address it due to space limits and time constraints, despite the fact that this would 
constitute a valuable research project for the future. In fact, a new research project 
involving Yannis Stivachtis, Georgeta Pourchot and the present author is looking 
exactly at this. Research on this would for example focus on how and if Central Asian 
SSRs (then divided administratively in Kazakhstan and Middle Asia) started 
perceiving commonalities linked to socio-economic conditions during the years in 
which Moscow used them as a showcase for newly assisted states in Africa.  
In addition, I conducted some research on the last years of the Soviet Union 
(roughly 1985-1990) to trace the emergent ‘we-feeling’ that would imbue the would-
be independent republics a few years later, as it will be discussed in Chapter 4. In 
particular, I traced how emerging discourses of sovereignty, diplomacy, 
environmentalism and international law were already present in those years, and how 
a Central Asia ‘consciousness’ was rising in the political circles of the Kazakh and 
Central Asian SSRs as well as societies.  
Also, one may also advance the argument that the origins of this international 
society could be tracked back, for example, even to the pre-Tsarist period (XIX 
century), and in fact research has been conducted on this (Costa Buranelli 2014d). It is 
clear that the international context in that period was very different for a variety of 
reasons: first of all, the political units constituting the ‘system’ were remarkably 
different from sovereign states. The units were, on the one hand, city states and 
khanates, administered by an absolute ruler under the patronage of the Ottoman 
Empire; on the other hand, units were hordes of nomads and tribes that, despite not 
being sedentary and territorialised, nonetheless interacted quite frequently with the 
city states.  
Second, Islam was a major factor of unification, and the moments in which 
solidarist claims were made between the units (for example to challenge the Russian 
invader) were based on Islamic brotherhood (something that is not valid nowadays).  
Third, as specified above, these units were not independent polities but were 
rather under the ‘protection’ of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, the degree of autonomy was 
quite substantial, and it should be remembered that the Ottoman Empire did not send 
any military help to the city states during the Russian conquest. Last, it should be 
remembered that these units, given their premodern character, did not adopt the 
institutions of borders and defined territoriality, with the consequence that war was 
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pretty much institutionalised due to clashes and disagreements over territories and 
lands.  
However, despite these differences, current Central Asian states, as we will see in the 
course of the thesis, do refer to this past as a common one. In particular, despite at that 
time a ‘Central Asia’ did not exist (even during the Soviet period the region was 
named ‘Middle Asia and Kazakhstan’) still nowadays there are common references to 
‘Turan’, ‘Mawarannahr’ (Transoxiana, or ‘Land Beyond the River) as examples of 
peaceful relations between Central Asian peoples back in history. In fact, several 
interviewees, reflecting on the disputes that nowadays affect Central Asian states, 
argue that they ‘used to be one people.’17  
A third way to look at a possible ‘ancestor’ of international society in Central 
Asia is to look at the pan- movements and at the Basmachi revolt (1916-1934 ca.), 
informed by pan-Turkic and Islamist ideas and led by Enver Pasha with support of 
several Jadid exponents.18 These events projected a feeling of ‘we-ness’ linked to 
culture and religion, and a sense of ‘colonial subalternity’ with respect to the Soviets, 
who were considered as invaders in the same way the Tsarist forces were. As a proof 
of the efficacy of these events and ideas on the minds of the people, these pan-
movements had their revival moment immediately after independence and constituted 
a challenge to the established borders and newly independent, nationalising regimes. 
Yet, these movements were swiftly quelled, and the new independent republics could 
develop inter-state dynamics fully following the Buzanian, structural scheme of 
independent communities adopting norms and institutions to manage their regional 
space.19  
So, even if direct correlation cannot be established in a positivist way, traces 
of a common past and a common culture have certainly played a role (even if just 
                                                 
17 Interview with Official Uzbek source, location undisclosed, 12 February 2014; interview with Mars 
Sariev, Analyst and Leader of Experts Club, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 3 December 2013; interview 
with Bulat Auelbaev, KISI, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 15 November 2013. 
18 The Jadids were Muslim modernist reformers, pushing for widespread educational reform and 
envisioning a unified nation for all Turkic, Muslim peoples. See Khalid (1998). 
19 ‘There were idealistic factors, with annexed projects. There were so many, believe me! Pan-Turkic, 
pan-Turanianism, the Grey Wolves from Ankara even drew the maps of this confederation! This 
idea, if I remember well, was quite popular, especially in Kazakhstan, due to ethnic factors, you 
know. Even moderate Islamic parties proposed integration. And they were peaceful, you know, but 
not very popular. However, as I said, the issue of recognition was prominent. At those times, there 
great pressures to revise the borders. Very strong. The presidents, quite swiftly, realised the danger. 
I remember there where even forces for a Greater Uzbekistan.’ Interview with Official Uzbek 
source, location undisclosed, 12 February 2014. 
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‘mnemonic’) in giving birth to a Central Asian international society after 
independence. These narratives, in fact, are performative and constitutive of a reality 
that, even if it might not have fully taken place, creates a discourse of unity that 
informs relations in the present. Nonetheless, one should remember that it was exactly 
the Soviet experience that gave these polities the bureaucratic, diplomatic and 
territorial to ‘order anarchy’ after independence (Roy 2000). It can be therefore said 
that, while the cultural and the historical elements (the ‘Wightian’ component) of the 
Central Asian international society may be traced back to these past events, the 
functional, institution-based and pluralistic creation and management of (the ‘Bullian 
element’) it is to be found after 1991.  
 
3.4 Locating International Society theory in methodology: the research 
design 
 
In one of the few methodological debates that have pervaded the School and posed it 
against mainstream methodologies, we are told that the ES follows a ‘classical 
approach’ (Bull 1966), i.e. one based on the study of history, philosophy and 
international law rather than on scientific, quantitative measurement of defined 
variables conducted in a positivist, ‘trial-and-error’ format.  
This position was maintained against what was known as the ‘behaviouralist 
revolution’, a shift towards quantitative methods and variable-oriented studies of 
international politics, which was taking place with great success in the US at that 
time. Indeed, Bull was so ardent in the defence of what he dubbed ‘the classical 
approach’ that according to him, if the behaviouralist conduct of inquiry was to be 
followed, ‘there [was] very little of significance that [could] be said about 
international relations’ (1966: 361).  
 Yet, in more recent years, in the light of the lack of any explicit 
methodological positions, the School has been criticised by several American 
scholars, who argued that the School was suffering from a ‘methodological quietism’ 
(Spegele 2005: 97), and was in the need of a more thorough clarification and 
definition of its methods if it was to be accepted in the golden group of the proper 
theories of international relations (Finnemore 2001; Copeland 2003). The ES was not 
immune from criticism on the Eastern shores of the Atlantic as well, with Andrew 
Linklater and Hidemi Suganami invoking a refinement and a conscious reflection on 
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what the methods and methodological premises of the theory were (Linklater and 
Suganami 2006).  
 
Nevertheless, the School has attempted a clarification of its methodological stances, 
although these are not always coherent. Linklater (1990) and Roger Epp (1998), 
following Bull’s definition of the classical approach, have argued that the ES 
methodology is better understandable as a form of hermeneutical interpretivism, 
which heavily relies on language and discursive categories. Conversely, Richard Little 
has stressed its methodological pluralism, correlated with its ontological and 
epistemological diversification: a positivist methodology to inquire into the 
international system, a more interpretive one when dealing with international society 
and a critical, normative one when assessing world society (2000), while Jackson has 
recently described the classical approach as a ‘craft discipline’ (2009), meant as 
‘observation, discernment, interrogation, diagnosis, and  explication’ (2000: 81).  
 A different view is taken by Buzan, who has tried to ‘positivise’ the ES and 
therefore to make it more rigorous analytically (Buzan 2004; Glavind 2009).20 It must 
be said immediately that the positivism claimed by Buzan is not, strictly speaking, 
natural-science-like positivism. According to him, ‘positivism’ should be meant as 
‘finding sets of analytical constructs with which to describe and theorise about what 
goes on in the world, and in this sense it is a positivist approach, though not a 
materialist one’ (2004: 14). It can be said that his positivist approach is a watered-
down one, i.e. one in which the mind-world dualism is maintained (the first part of the 
definition) but where ideas and ideational factors are still prevalent over the more 
materialist ones (second part of the definition).  
 In this research, the methodology adopted is a variant of interpretivism, 
namely ‘pragmatic interpretivism’. Following the ES tradition, this research will rely 
on the interpretation of words, facts and actions of representatives of the countries 
involved, in order to disclose the presence of an international society which is 
deemed, nonetheless, to be something intelligible and observable. Therefore, what is 
proposed here is a mind-world monism in the mind of the statesmen, since it is they 
who ultimately feel bound by the norms and institutions of a given international 
society, but a mind world-dualism in the mind of the researcher, since through the 
                                                 
20 I am grateful to Dr Johanne Glavind for having allowed me to read and quote the draft of her paper. 
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interpretation of diplomats’ words, documents, statements and through the 
interpretation of empirical material it is possible to recognise structures and patterns 
that allow us to theorise about the world (or, in this case, the region) out there.  
In combining these two approaches, the first borrowed from Manning and the 
interpretivism of the ES and the second from Buzan, it is therefore argued that a soft 
version of positivism is definitely compatible with the general interpretive and 
historical tradition of the ES. The result, in sum, will be an observable international 
society (if present) made visible through the interpretation and the discussion of 
words, documents and actions. In this way, this study can be classified as an 
international sociology of second order societies, that is, those of states.  
Overall, this methodological qualification of the present research help us 
define it as an inductive, qualitative, inferentially descriptive and interpretive21 
research on how the norms and the institutions of international society are framed 
regionally in Central Asia.  
The inductive approach, rather than a more deductive one, has been chosen 
because of the very simple notion (here agreed on) that theory should be inferred from 
facts. As has been recently said, ‘all too often social science begins with an elegant 
theory and then searches for facts that will confirm it’ (Fukuyama 2011: 24). In order 
to avoid even sub-conscious mismanagement of data, here it is deemed that an 
inductive approach serves better the scope of inquiry.  
It is qualitative since it does not rely on numerical data,22 nor on natural-
science like experiments. Rather, it relies on words, institutionalised discourses, 
meanings and interpretation, focusing on ‘behavioural findings’ (Finnemore 1996: 24; 
Milliken 1999; Neumann 2008).  
It is descriptive and interpretive since, on the one hand, it aims at providing a 
comprehensive framework in which the international relations of Central Asian states 
can be evaluated and assessed from a socio-structural point of view and, on the other 
hand, it also aims at disclosing how these states see the current constitutive norms of 
global international society, and to what extent they adhere to them.  
 
                                                 
21 ‘Interpretation can […] be regarded as a special case of descriptive inference, because its purpose is 
to describe a state of affairs that cannot be directly observed’ (6 and Bellamy 2011: 232 emphasis in 
the original). 
22 In this respect, Chapter 6 of this thesis is different. I refer to it for a discussion of the methods used 
in that particular section. 
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This latter point raises the question about the methods to be used. As a matter of fact, 
‘if social research is going to be taken seriously, then social researches need to use 
methods and tools not because they have been used before, but because they are fit for 
the task at hand’ (Greener 2011: 50; for the relationship between methods and theory, 
see also Finnemore 1996: 26). The methods, it follows, may be referred as ‘the set of 
techniques recognised by most social scientists as being appropriate for the creation, 
collection, coding, organisation and analysis of data’ (6 and Bellamy 2011: 9).  
The main methods used in this research are oral semi-structured interviews 
with diplomats, state representatives, Central Asian members of international and 
regional organisations and experts, as well as interpretive analysis of diplomatic 
documents, leaders’ declarations and speeches, transcripts, press-conferences, 
memoirs, announcements, resolutions, their behaviours on the international stage and, 
of course, historical analysis of archival material when dealing with the recent history 
of the region: the whole array of ‘sayings and doings’ (Jackson 2000: 96; Gillham 
2005).  
The methodological rationale for these methods is that in order to depict a 
regional international society, motivations, interpretations, discourses and intentions 
of state representatives are crucial. As can be seen, the ‘word’, the ‘discourse’, the 
‘narrative’ is crucial to identify an international society. Dialogue is at the very heart 
of an international society. As Robert Jackson maintains, ‘in politics talk is not trivial; 
on the contrary, it is fundamental. Written or verbal discourse is the main vehicle of 
political activity. Without discourse there could be no politics in the ordinary meaning 
of the word. Without international discourse there could be no international relations’ 
(Jackson 2000: 37). What is sought in these discourses through these methods, as a 
matter of fact, is ‘the self-conception of the actors who are participating in the process 
that constitute international [or regional] life’ to discover their practices in an 
interpretive process close to a participant-observer stance (Navari 2009).  
It should be remembered, once more, that the purpose of this thesis is to verify 
the presence of an inter-national society in Central Asia, and to investigate its 
mechanisms and underpinning norms, rules and institutions. Epistemologically, at a 
very basic level, what is needed is to know what a Central Asian state thinks is right 
or wrong to do when relating to other Central Asian states. And given the 
impossibility of interviewing a state, the researcher needs to rely on its 
representatives, or at least with people acquainted with its international behaviour 
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(Jackson 2000: 29-32). In addition, the best case is when primary sources are 
available, either in Russian or in English and other European languages. However, 
secondary sources are used as well, provided that they are consistent, reliable and 
valid when related to the research question.  
 As far as the number of interviews is concerned, it should be stressed that a 
precise number is not required for two reasons. The first one is that, being the subject 
of interviews the state representative is not so easily approachable and therefore, in 
his or her absence, more importance will be attached to diplomatic written sources. 
The second one is that while state representatives are many, the state represented is 
one. Therefore, while interviewing many state representatives is a way of enhancing 
and entrenching the supposed existence/acceptance/rejection/ of a norm through a 
polyphony of perspectives able to highlight common stands but also subtle facets and 
differences, a small n of interviews does not affect too much the validity of the 
research (Gillham 2005).  
The number of interviews conducted either in the region or remotely via the 
internet is around 40.23 In the light of what has been discussed above, and in line with 
the ES canons, the sample is heterogeneous, consisting of diplomats, state-
representatives, analysts, foreign-policy strategists, representatives of international 
organisations and academics from the region. This is important to stress because the 
intent was exactly that of acquiring familiarity with what local political actors think 
and believe about ‘the international’ in the region, with their understanding (what, in 
anthropological terms, would be an etic understanding), without imposing a 
framework.24  
These interviews were conducted during an overall 4-month stay in Central 
Asia, from October to December 2013 and from May to June 2014 in Uzbekistan 
(Tashkent), Kazakhstan (Astana, Almaty) and Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek). I could not visit 
Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, due to security, financial and time-related motivations.  
Yet, as specified above, these interviews are part of the research material, not 
the whole of it. Archival (textual and photographic) material collected from the 
                                                 
23 The indicative sample of questions I used in my interviews is available in Appendix 1. I am grateful 
to Dr Yannis Stivachtis, Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez and Dr Linda Quayle for having guided in me in 
drawing up the list of questions in a manner accessible to the interviewees. 
24 This methodological move, focusing on ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ discourses on ‘the international’, 
shows interesting overlaps between ES methods and grounded theory; see Glaser and Strauss 
(2009); Milliken (1999: 248). 
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Bayalina Library in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and primary sources dealing with regional 
international relations collected either in person or from the internet as well as news 
sources are also part of the material used to detect the formation and the operation of 
international society in Central Asia. 
I fully acknowledge that the interviewee sample is somewhat restricted and 
not fully representative from a geographical viewpoint. Both the scope and the 
sampling, in other words, are limited. As a matter of fact, Turkmenistan is not 
represented at all, while I managed to conduct only a single interview (via Skype) 
with a Tajik academic.  
The reason for the sample’s narrow size lies in the fact that I was not able at 
all to contact potential Turkmen interviewees despite the fact that I tried to ask other 
Central Asian representatives to be put in touch with them. I could not travel to 
Tajikistan as, in the only period I could go there (i.e. when financial and time 
constraints were less strict), presidential elections were being conducted. Due to the 
elections and the particular climate surrounding them, several Central Asian 
colleagues advised me to not go to there to conduct interviews, as this would have put 
me in danger.  
This led me to reflexively study alternative strategies to reinforce and enhance 
the research in the absence of first-hand data. I found two alternative routes. The first 
has been to use my Uzbek, Kazakh and Kyrgyz interviewees as proxies (Gillham 
2005) for Turkmen diplomats and academics: ‘what did your Turkmen/Tajik 
colleagues say’, or ‘thought’, or ‘did’ was a frequent question I asked during 
interviews, although this is not to be found in the questionnaire (see Appendix).  
Second, I read as much as possible in printed sources to try to ‘reconstruct’ the 
Turkmen and Tajik approaches to the region, and their fit into the set of regional 
relations. I am conscious that these two strategies cannot equate to an interview with a 
diplomat or a foreign minister. Yet, the hope is that they will nonetheless provide the 
reader with an understanding of how regional politics is conducted by all states. In 
addition, one may note that this limitation of the sample signals difficulties and 
challenges of conducting political research in the authoritarian context of Central 
Asia, and is a demonstration of how conducting fieldwork there is getting more 
dangerous and ethically difficult as compared to, for example, the previous decade.25  
                                                 
25 I am grateful to John Heathershaw for an insightful discussion on this. 
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Another fact that I acknowledge, is the limited amount of diplomats and/or state 
representatives who agreed to be interviewed despite several attempts to reach them. 
To my surprise, this happened very much in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, countries 
that are usually considered more open than Uzbekistan. In particular in Kyrgyzstan, 
reaching members of the government proved to be extremely difficult.  
This is another limitation of the sample that had to be corrected with  
extensive research on media sources (past and present) and cross-interviews with 
scholars, academics and professionals of international affairs (such as international 
lawyers). What this shows is that the context of political research in Central Asia is 
somehow changing, becoming more restricted, and that the events in Crimea have 
certainly played a role in diminishing Western researchers’ liberties (at least in this 
field) and raising the level of suspicion. 
 Another point that needs to be addressed is: how is the presence of/adherence 
to/opposition to a norm verified and ‘operationalisable’? This question, it may be said, 
is what made many suspicious of the new ‘constructivist turn’ (Checkel, Finnemore et 
al. 1998) and of the general comeback of norms, beliefs and institutions in much of 
the rationalist strand of IR Theory (King, Keohane et al. 1994). How can we prove, 
how can we measure, how can we explain when somebody is sticking to a norm? 
Here, two prominent constructivist theorists, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 
provide a sort of ‘conceptual guide’ to answer such questions:  
 
We recognize norm-breaking behaviour because it generates 
disapproval or stigma and norm conforming behaviour either 
because it produces praise, or, in the case of a highly internalized 
norm, because it is so taken for granted that it provokes no reaction 
whatsoever (1998: 892).  
 
Indeed, through justifications and reprimands one can identify not only the ‘reference 
group’ whom the actor deems it belongs to, but also to detect ‘deviant’ practices. It is 
therefore these linguistic escamotages (disapproval and stigma, praise, no reaction) 
the researcher has to look at when dealing with words (spoken or written) concerning 
the degree of acceptance of a norm, or an institution.  
Pointing at violations of a norm, of a socially accepted practice, and at the 
justification for such violations in the words of statesmen is also another method to 




[i]deas may or may not have behavioural implications; norms by 
definition concern behaviour. One could say that they are 
collectively held ideas about behaviour. This is not to say that 
norms are never violated – they are – but the very fact that one can 
talk about a violation indicates the existence of a norm (Finnemore 
1996: 22-23; 141). 
 
Last but not least, the chronological dimension of the research should be addressed. 
Following the vast majority of works on Central Asia from an IR perspective, this 
research will trace the existence and the evolution of international society in the 
region from the early 1990s to present. It will take the reader from the very early days 
of independence to the most recent political developments in the region, showing how 
the relations between regional states have been in these some twenty years and how 
norms, rules and institutions have been adopted, used and interpreted.  
While I am perfectly aware of the important role played by the Soviet Union 
in preparing the Central Asian republics to their life as independent states (one may 
think of how the institutions of borders, territoriality and government were 
transplanted from Moscow to them from the 1930s onward), this is currently being 
researched elsewhere (Seagle 2014). Also, as explained in the introduction and in the 
literature review, the intention of this research is to fill a knowledge gap in the recent 
history of the Central Asian republics as independent states.  
 This last section has addressed the methodology and the methods to be used in 
this piece of research. A case has been made for a ‘pragmatic interpretivism’ aimed at 
re-conciliating the two different strands of the ES, and it has been argued that 
interviews and Verstehen-based interpretation of diplomatic sources will be the best 
methods to defend the methodological choice adopted.  
The operationalisation of the existence of a norm has been discussed, as well 
as the inductive, descriptive/interpretive, qualitative nature of the research itself. 
These specifications, albeit technical, are nonetheless important, since on the one 
hand this allows the reader/user of this research to easily follow it, while on the other 
hand it encourages other ES scholars to discuss their methodological assumptions in 
their research, engaging in what it has been called ‘methodological explicitism’ 
(Glavind 2009:19). 
 In this chapter, the concept of (regional) international society, what is meant 
by Central Asia and the methodological choices as well as the research methods have 
also been discussed. As was stated at the beginning, a precise and sharp definition of 
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this concepts serve as an ‘orientative’ map in order to prevent the reader from getting 
lost in this thesis. Now that the compass has been provided, our trip to discover 
whether an international society has been forming and operating in Central Asia since 





















































4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter is focused on the period after the independence from the Soviet Union, 
and seeks to understand whether the five newly born republics had a sense of regional 
affiliation which was potentially conducive to a fully-fledged international society, i.e. 
an environment where rules, norms and institutions are present, felt and observed. The 
purpose of this chapter is by no means a single one. Instead, several puzzles and 
questions will be presented, and answers to all them will be provided.  
The years considered here are those from the early 1990s to 2000 circa, and 
this is not without reason. Firstly, it is exactly in this period in which the Central 
Asian republics, now independent states, underwent a proper phase of what I would 
call ‘Westphalisation’: having not ever been independent states with functioning 
machineries to conduct foreign relations and monopolise extractive and military 
functions, in these years the five republics had a first encounter with what 
independence in foreign relations meant.  
Secondly, it is in this period in which different regional arrangements of the 
political space of Central Asia took place, thus signalling the attempt to ‘construct’ a 
‘Central Asia’ from within the region itself.  
Thirdly, at the end of the XX century this regional scheme of weak 
coordinative policies underwent a major restructuring (from the CAU to the CACO, 
which will be dealt with in the following chapter) and, moreover, the whole regional 
environment suffered a systemic blast after the intervention in Afghanistan in 2001. It 
is therefore a matter of contingency that the chronology and the political trajectory of 
regional relations is divisible in such a precise manner. 
As noted in the literature review, it is usually thought that the five Central 
Asian republics, once independent, either were not interested in cooperating with one 
another (Hyman 1993: 298; Olcott 1994b, Chenoy 1997) or shook off their legacy to 
exercise full, substantive independence thus focusing on their domestic problems and 
the international arena and not on their region. Other narratives, while recognising 
attempts to cooperate at the regional level and to forge a pan-Central Asian identity 
79 
 
(Spechler 2002, Bohr 2004: 485-486, Linn 2007, Allison 2008: 190-191, Libman 
2011, Cooley 2012: 149-153) quickly dismiss the 1990s period in Central Asia as a 
series of unsuccessful attempts at integration, a series of ‘failures’ (Laruelle and 
Peyrouse 2013) and thus do not provide sufficient attention and analysis of how and 
why Central Asian states tried to forge such relations.  
In addition, as stated many times in the course of the thesis, no attention has 
been paid to the norms and rules that Central Asian states adopted to manage their 
relations with each other, and whether these norms and rules were significantly 
different from those at the global level to allow analysts to speak of a Central Asian 
international society. In this chapter, I argue that taking advantage of ES analytical 
tools and conceptual vocabulary, it is possible to shed light on those years and on 
those experiences, revealing new facts and new attitudes in the intra-regional relations 
of Central Asian states.  
The aim is therefore twofold: first, to verify if the states of Central Asia, once 
independent, adopted the commonly held institutions of international society, and how 
they used these institutions to ‘organise’ their regional space and to manage their new 
environment. This has to do with what I have called above ‘the creation of Central 
Asia’, i.e. a coherent regional space where norms and rules of conducts, as well as 
institutions and habiti were followed, adopted and internalised in relational behaviour 
and regional regimes.  
Second, to verify whether there was any significant difference in the 
adoption/interpretation of institutions borrowed from the global level, and therefore 
whether it is appropriate to speak of Central Asia as a specific, discernable regional 
international society as argued in Chapter 3.  
Therefore, the research questions informing this chapter are the following: 
How did the five independent republics regulate their proximity and their relations as 
sovereign states? What were the norms and institutions that constituted their 
relational web? Did they form a distinct regional international society as explained in 
Chapter 3, and therefore with norms and rules different from the global level, or 
rather an international society highly conforming to the global level? How were 
conflicts resolved? And how did they regulate their interactions? What was the 
degree of cooperation and competition? Did the republics speak of themselves as 
forming a clear-cut region called ‘Central Asia’? What was the role of the Great 
Powers, most notably Russia?  
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The chapter is divided in four macro-sections. The first section addresses the origins 
of a Central Asian international society already in the late 1980s, and shows how 
already before independence, feelings of commonalities were perceived by the would-
be independent republics. I then begin the second macro-section by focusing on how 
the Central Asian republics as sovereign states structured their regional space.  
In the third section, I analyse those situations in which the working of regional 
relations and mechanisms was tested. For the purpose of the chapter, the situations 
identified which best reflect the social nature of relations in the region are the 
establishment of the CAU, the civil war in Tajikistan (1992-1997), the institution of 
an international fund for the Aral Sea and the creation of a Central Asian nuclear-
weapons free-zone (CANFWZ).  
In the fourth macro-section, I try to trace elements of an international society 
in the shared authoritarian character of the region as well. In the concluding part, I 
will recapitulate what has been done so far and set out the plan for the future chapters. 
In the final part of the chapter, I will also make the case for describing 1990s Central 
Asia as a dead-letter international society (Murden 2009), where the lack of concrete 
results was, nonetheless, accompanied by a strong sense of communal identity and 
solidarist will to tackle regional problems in a concerted matter. The gap between 
intentions and results, I will argue, was the product of concerns with state-building 
and national security (Ayoob 1995).  
One last point should be made before starting our analysis, and it is precisely 
that of utility. What is the contribution of this enterprise? This is a fair question, 
especially given the fact that we are not asking, as stated in the Introduction, ‘why’ 
questions, but rather ‘how’ ones. It seems, however, that the contribution of this 
chapter to the literature both of Central Asia and of the ES is threefold: 
 
1. it aims to show that Central Asia, far from being fragmented and antagonistic, 
was in the early years of independence a dynamic, thriving although imperfect 
and weak, international society; 
2. it seeks to apply new categories of analysis (normative and institutional) to a 
region known more for its role as a passive player in international politics, 
thus disclosing potentially new forms of political action and relations. In this 
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way, a novel narrative of how these states have entered global international 
society (something that is still missing)26 is provided; 
3. it seeks to provide a different reading of the region stressing those factors that, 
in previous and contemporary research, have been marginalised in order to 
shed light on the competitive, realist and ‘disintegrative’ aspects of Central 
Asian politics. 
 
We can now start looking at the process of independence of the Central Asian 
republics not just qua process of independence, but also as an attempt to form a 
regional international society. 
 
 
4.2 The bases for speaking of ‘Central Asia’ and proto-diplomatic 
cooperation among the republics  
 
 
It may be said that, to some extent, the creation of an international society in Central 
Asia preceded formal legal statehood obtained in 1991. Or, at least, that the basis for 
it was created before international legal recognition was acquired. It may be the case 
that, while formally speaking these states adopted the pivotal institution of 
sovereignty in that year, the cultural, historical and identity-related ideas that usually 
underpin an international society were developed earlier.  
Thus, I argue that the ‘structuration’ of Central Asia as a post-unitary regional 
group may be said to have started before the independence. It is important to focus on 
the period previous to formal legal statehood, as it is in the late 1980s, I argue, that a 
sense of renewed commonality and ‘we-feeling’ arose among the southern, Muslim 
republics of the still-existing USSR.  
By relaxing the notion of international society from a mere structural 
interpretation and re-taking into account ‘Wightian’ identitarian and cultural 
narratives of self-depiction as a coherent group tied by historical ties, rules, norms and 
institutions, it is possible to trace the development of a preliminary form of 
                                                 
26 While the ES has always been sensitive to questions of order, change and evolution of international 
society, the developments in the post-Soviet space in the early 1990s have been surprisingly 
marginalised. With respect to the entry of new states (or ‘members’) in the global international 
society, one has just to read ‘States in a Changing World’, edited by Robert Jackson and Alan James 




international society already in the late 1980s. What happened in those years is crucial 
to understand the future developments of the region vis-à-vis the Slavic component of 
the Soviet Union (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus).  
A major role was certainly played by the notorious cotton scandal in 
Uzbekistan27 and the ‘Russification’ of the southern republic via the substitution of 
local party leaders with officials chosen by Moscow.28  
As Olivier Roy argues (2000: 122-125), in the early 1980s the Russians started 
considering and treating the southern republics with contempt and disrespect, 
considering them as a haven for mafia and corruption on ethnic and cultural bases. In 
particular, attacks on Islam and a deteriorating economic situation (with economic 
subsidies from the centre to the periphery at their lowest ebb) contributed to 
resentment and feelings of marginalisation among the Central Asian republics. This 
created a psychological rift among the republics, pushed at the very frontiers of the 
Union.  
Thus, for the first time, the cadres in those republics ‘no longer recognised 
themselves in a Soviet model that had become exclusively Slavic’ (Roy 2000: 127). 
And while this does not necessarily mean that strong national feelings were bred in 
the republics at those times, it certainly indicates that a commonality of self-
perception as exploited, vexed, marginalised, Islamic (as opposed not to Christian but 
to Slavic) started linking the local cadres in the different Central Asian republics. In 
sum, as Roy argues, the political and economic mistreatment of the southern republics 
in the 1980s  
 
generated an ethnic solidarity between cadres who up until that 
point had lived their lives entirely as Soviets. These cadres now saw 
the Muscovite elite no longer as comrades in arms, but as the 
expression of a chauvinist current operating classic Stalinist 
techniques and using the argument about corruption as a means to 
other ends (2000: 129).  
 
                                                 
27 Between 1976 and 1983, under the leadership of Rashidov, the Uzbek Socialist Soviet Republic 
(SSR) met the increasing demands for cotton from Moscow with production, harvest and efficiency 
records. This led to huge flows of subsidies to Tashkent from the centre. Later, however, the figures 
provided by Rashidov were shown to be false, and he ended up committing suicide in 1983 (Clark 
1993: 189). 
28 Satin became the first secretary of the Gorkom in Tashkent in 1983, while Kunayev in Kazakhstan 
was replaced by Kobin, thus sparking riots in Alma-Ata in December 1986. Changes took place 
also in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, although not with Russian exponents of the Politburo but with 
personalities favoured by Moscow, such as Masaliyev and Mahkamov. 
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This perceived sense of solidarity, commonality and bonded-ness, I argue, will be 
present in the early years of independence of the republics, thus affecting their 
peculiar interpretation of the institution of sovereignty and therefore contributing to 
allowing to speak of Central Asia as an international society.  
As argued in Chapter 1, the year 1993 is usually taken as the founding date of 
‘Central Asia’ as a distinct geographical area of the globe in emic perspectives, i.e. as 
recognised as having valid ontological status on the basis of culture, history and 
geography by its members. However, already in 1990 an important meeting among 
the leaders of the five republics took place, symbolising the already intent of unity 
and commonality that would serve as a basis for international society later.  
As a matter of fact, on 26-27 June 1990, leaders from the Central Asian 
republics and Kazakhstan met in Alma-Ata to discuss the future trajectory of the 
region, considered as a unique and distinct part of the Soviet Union, deserving special 
treatment and attention in light of the serious economic, ecologic and social problems 
that member countries were facing. The meeting was attended by delegations of all 
Central Asian republics.  
Karimov, Mahkamov, Niyazov, and Masaliyev all attended the summit as First 
Secretaries of their respective National Communist Party. Nazarbayev was there as 
well, welcoming his fellow colleagues. Proving the importance and the expectations 
of the meeting was the fact that the First Secretaries were accompanied by the 
Chairmen of the Councils of Ministers of their respective republics and the Chairmen 
of the State Planning Committees.29  
In line with Mokhira Suyarkulova (2011: 131) and David Lewis (2011), who 
argues that the notion of sovereignty was already in the mind of Central Asian states 
in the form of organisational and bureaucratic authority within their boundaries, I 
argue that this meeting was a further manifestation of their embryonic 
institutionalisation of sovereignty, and of the recognition of other republics as 
sovereign (essential condition for an anarchical society) and of the adoption of 
instruments of international law as primary means to communicate and sign 
agreements.  
In these meetings and in the words that surrounded them a clear demarcation 
of ‘Central Asia’ as something distinct from the wider USSR and soon-to-be-formed 
                                                 
29 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 June 1990. 
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CIS is visible. The perception of being left behind, of being a periphery, of being at 
the margins of the bigger political game was evident in Nazarbayev’s word in his 
speech on 7 July 1990, at the 28th CPSU Congress. Noting the persistent marginality 
of the Central Asian republics within the developing context of the restructuring of the 
USSR and of Perestroika, he argued that the only way to survive politically, was to 
take into account the new reality of sovereign republics in the Central Asian region, 
which contra to the immobility of the rest of the Union were already going in the 
direction of managing their relations on a new level: 
 
It seems to us that even now it is possible and necessary to conclude 
at republican level agreements between governments on economic, 
scientific, technical and cultural co-operation. Such an agreement 
was recently signed in Alma-Ata by leaders of the republics 
of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.30 
 
Moreover, in another meeting on 24 November 1990, the two leaders of the Uzbek 
Republic, Karimov, and of the Tajik Republic, Mahkamov, pointed to the 
marginalisation suffered by the Central Asian region in the process of definition of the 
political architecture of the new confederation that would substitute the USSR. 
According to Karimov, the latest version of the treaty proposed for the creation of a 
confederation ‘[did] not take account of a single one of [their] proposals. Not to 
mention the chief one - on the parity and equality of all entities in a future federation’, 
while, according to Mahkamov, the situation would continue to deteriorate because 
the republics often saw the centre’s decisions ‘as something alien and foisted on 
them.’31 
The republics were therefore perhaps catapulted to independence in terms of 
paraphernalia, as Martha Brill Olcott maintained (1992), but certainly they saw the 
moment of independence advancing towards them. 
As a matter of fact, several documents and protocols were discussed and 
signed during the Alma-Ata summit, all concerned with the deepening and the 
development of the relations of the republics in the expectation of the imminent 
collapse of the Soviet Union. It was already noticeable that economic and 
environmental matters were paramount in the minds of leaders. At that meeting, the 
intention was to set up a regional investment bank to finance promising economic 
                                                 




programmes. The leaders also focused on matters relating to the development of the 
consumer market, the production of consumer goods and the co-ordination of action 
in the sphere of external links. All of this, it was said, was targeted at the creation of 
conditions conducive to the transition to regulated market relations.  
Moreover, as regards the Aral Sea disaster, the participants in the meeting 
agreed to set up an inter-republican commission to co-ordinate the efforts to resurrect 
the Aral Sea. Significantly, they also intended to appeal to the President, the Supreme 
Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers to declare the Aral region a ‘national 
disaster zone’ and to draw up a state programme to restore the ecological balance in 
the Aral region in the period up to the year 2000 with the involvement of institutions 
of the UN, UNESCO and the WHO.  
Technical and cultural, as well as scientific aspects of cooperation were also 
touched upon, and led to the signature of the Agreement on Economic, Scientific, 
Technical and Cultural Co-operation between the republics of Central Asia and 
Kazakhstan. This agreement provided for actions to be co-ordinated to develop the 
economic independence of the republics and to implement an effective economic 
strategy and tactics taking their mutual interests into account. 
Yet, another interesting factor to note about this meeting was that although the 
areas of cooperation were multiple and mainly regulative, all the leaders present were 
already reasoning as if they were already independent, thus committing to principles 
of uti possidetis and territorial status quo in a pluralist fashion, rejecting supra-
republican identities and solidarist convergences among Central Asian states. There 
was no need for a confederation, especially because the Central Asian states were not 
opposed to ties with the Soviet Union in principle.  
As a matter of fact, all the leaders present at the summit rejected the 
supposition that the June 22-23 meeting of leaders of Central Asian Republics and 
Kazakhstan in Alma-Ata might be the first step toward a confederation. Nazarbayev, 
Karimov and Mahkamov confined the significance of the meeting to promoting 
cooperation. They emphasized the sanctity of existing borders. The Tajik leader, 
Mahkamov, said a united Turkestan was out of the question.32 
Nonetheless, the diplomatic, cultural and organisational significance of this 
summit was noted in political circles of the West. In a report for the Heritage 




Foundation written by the Sovietist Leon Aron, it is possible to read that, although 
there were examples of competition and rivalry among the republics, especially due to 
ethnic and territorial issues,  
 
an important step toward this [common regional order] was taken at 
the June 22 to 23 gathering of the leaders of five Central Asian 
republics in Alma-Ata. Among other documents calling for Central 
Asian solidarity, they signed an ‘Agreement on Economic, 
Scientific, Technical and Cultural Cooperation.’ This envisions a 
kind of Central Asian Common Market to facilitate direct trade 
between the republics, bypassing Moscow and spurring regional 
economic autonomy. This Central Asian summit created a 
permanent coordinating council, to be based in Alma-Ata, which 
could become the nucleus of a future political confederation of the 
five states (Aron 1990). 
 
Moreover, in the same period there was another meeting, this time listing independent 
movements and organisations from the republics, in the format of a conference. The 
only republic not represented was Turkmenistan (then Turkmenia), due to clashes 
between the delegates off to Alma-Ata and the police.33 
During the conference, participants discussed ways to reduce inter-ethnic 
conflicts in Central Asia, particularly the fight over land between the Kyrgyz and the 
Uzbeks in the Osh region of Kirgizia (present-day Kyrgyzstan), sought to improve 
cooperation between organizations in the different republics and regions of Central 
Asia and adopted an ‘Appeal to the Peoples of Turkestan’, the name of Central Asia 
before the imposition of Soviet power. The ‘Appeal’ emphasised the common 
religious, linguistic, and cultural background of the peoples of Central Asia and calls 
for them to cooperate in search of a better future for the region. 
While in sum there was a peculiar tension between a demand for sovereignty 
(meant as the ability to carry out political, economic, diplomatic and bureaucratic 
actions in an inter-republican framework) and a desire to maintain a sort of political 
unity within the Soviet boundaries, Central Asia was already constituting itself as an 
area where a common understanding of the problems, the challenges and the needs of 
the republics were shared and perceived.  
The very need to call for a summit among those five countries was already 
indicative of their perception as a regional grouping, although the tasks set in the 
meeting were perhaps too high for not-yet-independent republics. 
                                                 




The solidarity between the Central Asian republics (and notably, always with the 
participation of Kazakhstan) continued through the year 1991, when it was evident 
that the five states saw themselves as a clearly different region from the rest of the 
USSR in the need of specific reforms, arrangements and solutions to indigenous 
ecological, economic and social grievances.  
An agreement on economic coordination and consultation was signed among 
by all the five states in August in Tashkent. The accord called for creation of a 
‘consultative council’ to set economic priorities and planning in the five southern 
republics, comprising about a sixth of the USSR’s 290 million people. Nazarbayev 
clearly saw himself as part of that group of states when stating that ‘this agreement is 
vital to improving the economic situation in our region’, while Karimov said ‘[O]ur 
region needs to defend itself ... The standard of living in Central Asia is unbearably 
low. It is our duty to raise it.’34  
Even visually and ceremonially, the signature of the agreement had all the 
facets of an international society in the making. Flags of each of the five republics 
hung behind the leaders as they signed the document at the end of the two-day 
meeting in Tashkent. Furthermore, a banner hung nearby bearing a green silhouette of 
a five-branched tree, a symbol of the new pact. 
The tightness of the states of the region, bond to a perceived sense of 
peripheral marginality, reached its apex on 17 December 1991, when the statement by 
heads of state of the republic of Kazakhstan, the republic of Kyrgyzstan, the republic 
of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the republic of Uzbekistan was released.35 In this 
statement, the five heads of states noted that the decision of Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus to set up a Commonwealth of Independent States ‘came as a surprise’ to them, 
and that 
 
The Centre’s short-sighted policy has produced a deep economic 
and political crisis, has ruined production and has resulted in a 
catastrophic downslide of the living standards of practically all 





                                                 
34 The Associated Press, 14 August 1991, emphasis added. 
35 Official Kremlin International News Broadcast 18 December 1991. 
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In addition, the five Central Asian leaders reiterated that the aim for the centre was  
 
to take into account in these documents, decisions and agreements 
the historical and socio-economic realities, existing in the republics 
of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, which, unfortunately, were not 
reckoned with during the drafting of the Agreement.36 
 
 
If we pay attention to the words used by the five heads of states, we notice significant 
lexical choices. The ‘centre’, as opposed to an imaged ‘periphery’, was seen as a sort 
of ‘other’ which marginalised and pushed aside the poorer and underdeveloped 
republics. The reference to ‘our society’, linked to a commonality of historical, 
economic and cultural traditions and features is also interesting. They also mentioned 
‘realities’, referring to precise and discernable characteristics (in political, economic, 
social and cultural terms) that contributed to mark the Central Asian republics as 
somehow distinct form the Slavic centre.37 
As these words, thoughts and declarations show, two things are noteworthy. 
First, the basis on which the Central Asian republics perceived their commonality and 
similarity (if not in terms of internal features certainly in terms of political and 
economic placement in a wider system of international relations) were already nascent 
and evident even before their juridical sovereign character. This perceived 
commonality, I argue, served as a springboard for regional initiatives and policies 
which will be analysed later. Second, despite the geo-administrative convention that 
considered Kazakhstan as separate from Central Asia, Nazarbayev and the political 
entourage of the Kazakh SSR considered their problems and fate as inherently linked 
and tied to that of the Central Asian republics, thus constituting, at least at the 
discursive level, an unicum in social, economic and political terms.  
                                                 
36 Ibidem. 
37 Feelings of being ‘discarded as a burden’, ‘abandonment’, of being different from the Slavic 
component of the USSR, of the need to create a group to have ‘more bargaining power’ vis-à-vis 
Russia and ‘needs to keep the existing common economic, political and social ties’ were the factors 
mentioned as determining the decision of the Central Asian states to seek cooperation and 
integration in the late 1980s and early 1990s also in several interviews conducted in the region. 
Among others,  interview with Uzbek Source 1 and Uzbek Source 2 at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 7 November 2013; interview with Kazakh Professor at KIMEP, 
Almaty, Kazakhstan, 13 November 2013; interview with Bulat Auelbaev, KISI, Almaty, 
Kazakhstan, 15 November 2013; interview with Official Uzbek source, location undisclosed, 12 
February 2014; interview with Shairbek Juraev, independent analyst, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 28 
November 2013; interview with former Kyrgyz Diplomat now Member of the Diplomatic Academy 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 2 May 2014. 
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In sum, already before their formal independence, the four republics of Central Asia 
and Kazakhstan acted in concert to face their common problems and challenges, 
showing that: 
 
1. The republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan had already a thin, perceived 
sense of commonality of fate, of necessity of cooperating, of urge to co-
ordinate their various movements to preserve the status quo in that part of the 
Union; 
2. There was already a sense of shared identity and commonality. Being at the 
margins, being left behind, being the periphery of the USSR, at least at the 
discursive level was a clear marker of a proto-regional identity, which worked 
as the basis of future inter-republican projects and attempts to future 
coordination and cooperation; 
3. The republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan recognised also that they were 
linked by problems that affected all of them, and that therefore common 
solutions or at least common approaches and consultations were needed to 
maintain the regional situation stable; 
4. While still SSRs and by no means independent sovereign states, they already 
adopted postures of multilateralism, inter-republicanism and moreover 
stressed the need to maintain the communities distinct and discrete. 
 
The next question to ask is: How this commonality and sense of shared interests was 
maintained in the process of gaining formal, legal sovereignty? 
 
 




The Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan declared their formal independence in 
1991. Kazakhstan declared itself independent on 16 December 1991; Kyrgyzstan on 
31 August 1991; Tajikistan on 9 September 1991; Turkmenistan on 27 October 1991 
and Uzbekistan on 1 September 1991. On 21 December 1991, following the official 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, they all entered the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS).  
The reality of independence meant two significant facts. First, that the newly 
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born states entered a system of relations, where geopolitical imperatives, economic 
hurdles and physical elements consisting of transportation routes, shared territories 
and natural resources made the behaviour of each state necessary in the calculation of 
the others. Second, they also had to create a society to manage these heritage, left by 
the former Soviet polity and now a matter of the independent republics. That is to say, 
they had to consciously devise mechanisms for managing, regulating and ordering 
their regional space in a manner conducive to coexistence and stability. According to 
Bulat Auelbaev, Head of Department, Foreign Policy Analysis and Strategy Research 
at KISI,  
[Central Asian states] wanted a union because these states 
recognised the importance of having housekeeping rules. After the 
Soviet Union the situation was really chaotic, there were no 
mechanisms to live together, every country was free to do what it 
liked. The intention was that of creating some mechanisms to live 
together.38 
 
Being now sovereign entities with the possibility to conduct independent foreign 
policies and the faculty to enter bilateral and multilateral agreements under 
international law, the Central Asian republics needed legal instruments to accede those 
agreements and to incorporate them within the domestic legislative environment. 
Moreover, laws concerning the adoption of international law were necessary to 
establish diplomatic relations with themselves and other states.  
The tripartite adoption of de jure sovereignty, diplomatic instruments and 
representations and international legal instruments necessary to establish ties and 
bonds with other actors in the international system (be they states, international 
organisations or relevant economic actors) are the three cornerstones on which an 
international society can be built and maintained. As Barry Buzan and Richard Little 
(2000) and Buzan (2004) remind us, in the mutual recognition of sovereignty and in 
the exercise of legal and diplomatic dialogue is implicit the admission of being part 
not just of a mechanical system of relations based on a logic of consequences, but also 
of a society, where a logic of appropriateness operates (March and Olsen 2004; Merke 
2011).  
While diplomatic and legal relations in Central Asia, in the very first years, 
were conducted via exchange of notes and protocols, soon the need of official legal 
instruments to sign, adopt, reject and amend treaties became impellent. Turkmenistan 
                                                 
38 Interview, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 15 November 2013. 
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adopted the law ‘On the order of execution, performance and denunciation of 
international treaties of Turkmenistan’ on 15 June 1995; Tajikistan adopted on 25 June 
1993 the law ‘On the order of detention, ratification, implementation and 
denunciation of international treaties of the Republic of Tajikistan’; Uzbekistan 
adopted the law ‘On international treaties of the Republic of Uzbekistan’ on 22 
December 1995; Kyrgyzstan adopted the law ‘On conclusion, ratification and 
denunciation of the international treaties of the Kyrgyz Republic’ on 7 September 
1996; Kazakhstan implemented the law ‘On the order of execution, performance and 
denunciation of international treaties of the Republic of Kazakhstan’ on 12 December, 
1995.39 
While diplomatic relations were immediately established, formal embassies 
were opened with slightly more delay in some cases.40  
The first official diplomatic relations established in the region were those 
between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, with an official exchange of notes on 20 October, 
1992. 1993 was the year when most diplomatic relations were concluded: Tajikistan-
Kazakhstan (7 January), Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan (8 January), Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan 
(14 January), Tajikistan-Turkmenistan (27 January), Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan (16 
February), Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan (19 May), Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan (23 
November). 
Diplomatic protocols and exchange of official notes were the two most widely 
used instruments for establishing formal and legal diplomatic relations. Embassies 
and consulates, whose functioning is regulated by the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, 1961, were opened between almost all the republics in a mutual 
manner.41 For example, Tajikistan opened its embassy in Kazakhstan in June 1993, 
while Kazakhstan opened its own diplomatic mission in 1998 (updated to full 
embassy status in 2000). In 1995, Tajikistan also opened its embassies in Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan, while Kazakhstan opened its embassy in Kyrgyzstan in 1993 and 
Uzbekistan in 1998. Turkmenistan opened its embassy in Kazakhstan in 1999.  
In addition to establishing diplomatic relations, the most impelling issue for 
the new states was, without a doubt, the issue of border delimitation and demarcation. 
                                                 
39 This laws were retrieved from http://cis-legislation.com/ on 14 May 2013. 
40 For the creation of foreign ministries, see Abazov (1999a). 
41 Mukhtar Shakhanov, Kazakh ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, said that since independence more than 
thirty diplomatic documents were signed by the states of the region as acts of recognition. Slovo 
Kyrgyzstana, 24-25 October 1995, ‘Druzhba – tozhe talant’. 
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The borders of the five republics were traced in the period 1926-1936 when Stalin 
carved out the five republics following the principle of titular nationalities (Megoran 
2010). Political narratives of chaos and disorder were used to justify arbitrary 
delimitation and demarcation of boundaries, and the ethnographic knowledge of the 
time was not sharp and comprehensive (Tishkov 1997: 30-33; Smith 1998: 67-72, 
139-141; Polat 2002; Akçali 2003; Dagiev 2013; Ubaidulloev 2014). The result was 
that several minorities (sometimes even great proportions of the total population) 
found themselves, at the moment of independence, in a republic which was not their 
homeland. 
The risk of inter-ethnic feuds and skirmishes was extremely high.42 Conflict 
among Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in Osh occurred already in 1990; cultural and nationalistic 
forces coming from Tajik nationals based on narratives of restoration of historical 
justice operated in Samarkand and Bukhara, once Tajik cities, in Uzbekistan;43 
contested territories were also among Kazakhs and Uzbeks, Turkmens and Uzbeks. 
How then this potential regional conflict was avoided? I argue that, from an 
international society perspective, a crucial role was played by the adoption of the 
institution of uti possidetis, which is widely accepted in post-unitary/post-imperial 
environments.44  
The uti possidetis principle (Luard 1970; Ratner 1996; Hensel et al. 2006) 
goes against the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination, and argues that 
‘as you possess, so you will possess’. When the principle is adopted, the frontiers 
established by the former colonial patron are deemed to be sacrosanct, whatever the 
national demands and aspirations of minorities are, thus consigning irredentist 
nationalism to the past. It is a principle conservative in nature, which aims at 
warranting the survival of the units, their territorial integrity, limited peaceful 
coexistence among them and the avoidance of future territorial wars.  
                                                 
42 It should be remembered that several post-unitary and post-colonial environments had to face 
similar problems. The Balkans and South-East Asia, for example, once independent, had to regulate 
their inter-ethnic and border-related conflicts ex novo.  
43 Tajik historian Kamoluddin Abdullaev told me ‘The issue of Samarkand, for the Tajiks, is vital. 
Would you imagine a France without Paris?’ Yet, later, he added also that ‘the leaders of Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan have been so far wise enough to avoid the politicisation of the issue’. Interview, 15 
January 2014, Skype interview from Milan, Italy. 
44 Latin American, African and Middle Eastern countries, for example, all have adopted the institution 




In adopting the institution of uti possidetis, the five republics demonstrated a fair 
acquaintance with the instruments that the institution of international law offered 
them to mitigate conflict and to regulate their regional environment. Had realist logics 
prevailed, it is likely that the early 1990s would have observed bloody and violent 
interstate conflict in Central Asia on a massive scale, something that despite the 
several predictions (Hashim and Rashid 1992, Hyman 1993, Akçali 2003) did not 
occur.45 The perception of the importance of inviolability of borders is evident, for 
example, in the words of the Uzbek president Islam Karimov, who already in 1992 
stressed that the issue of borders had to be resolved by sticking to the present situation 
without altering the status quo. Here below is the text of the interview where he 
affirmed this principle: 
 
My view on [Uzbeks in Tajikistan] is unequivocal. Uzbeks live there. 
We will be with them, body and soul, we will protect them, but 
Uzbeks now reside within Tadzhikistan and are citizens of 
Tadzhikistan. They must obey its laws and Constitution. If we fail to 
stick to these basic principles, chaos will set in here. I have 
repeatedly stressed -- and was last compelled to speak about it at 
the news conference in Bishkek -- that those who wish to break up 
Central Asia talk about borders. About artificial borders which were 
arbitrarily drawn back in 1924. Those borders failed completely to 
reflect national, natural or ethnic demarcation lines. But when 
someone wants confrontation between republics, he speaks about 
borders. I am categorically opposed to such talks and believe that 
the leaders of Central Asia can reach an agreement among 
themselves. There are no problems in this.46 
 
 
During the bloody clashes in Osh in 1990, which could have led to other territorial 
claims, nationalistic forms of revanchism and therefore to a pan-regional conflict, it 
was the Kyrgyz President himself, Askar Akaev, who recognised that the choice of 
Uzbekistan to stick to the norm of uti possidetis and of the inviolability of borders 
was paramount in preserving (at least) inter-state peace: 
 
I acceded to the presidency immediately after the Osh tragedy, 
when, in the space of two days of interethnic carnage, hundreds of 
Uzbeks and Kyrgyz died senselessly. By some miracle, we spared 
                                                 
45 See also Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet 
Press), n. 1, Vol.45, 3 February 1993, pp.: 5-5. 
46 Official Kremlin International News Broadcast 1992, emphasis added. A few years later, at a 
conference of Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Uzbek intellectuals, Nazarbayev solemnly affirmed that 
‘[Kazakhstan] did not and will not lay any territorial or other claims against anyone’ and that 
‘[t]here are none and must not be any disputes between the Central Asian states’ (Interfax Russian 
News 29 September 1999). 
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the republic a second Karabakh. President Karimov’s clear position 
helped, the conflict was successfully localized and smothered, and 
the outbreak of civil war was prevented.47 
 
The sanctity of borders and the non-permissibility of territorial modifications were 
also stressed in the Bishkek conference held on 23 April 1992, where the five heads of 
republics agreed to recognise the territorial integrity of one another as well as the 
inviolability of their borders.48 In the words of Sultan Akimbekov, Director of the 
Institute for World Economy and Politics (Almaty, Kazakhstan),  
 
in the early 1990s there was an understanding of not trying to 
change the borders. Borders was the element of stability, it gave the 
possibility to make the situation unchangeable, unchangeable! And 
borders gave also legitimacy, not just under former Soviet law, but 
also from the international community [sic].49 
 
The process of the ‘construction of Central Asia’ continued well after the 
independence of the five republics, and proceeded also along multilateral lines. One 
of the most important meetings, as far as the creation of the region is concerned, was 
that in Tashkent on 27 February 1993. This multilateral event (with the participation 
of Turkmenistan as well) was indicative of the same feelings that were present in 1990 
and 1991: hostility and resentment towards Russia, need to form a coherent position 
towards the management of the CIS, institutionalisation of regional politics under the 
umbrella of sovereignty, diplomacy and international law to allow the republics to 
survive the difficult transition from a unified politico-economic system to one 
anarchic made up of sovereign states. According to contemporary sources,  
 
A split is widening in the former Soviet Union between the 
democratising ferment of the Russian-dominated west and 
                                                 
47 Interfax Russian News, 14 October 1994. 
48 Russian Press Digest, 24 April 1992. The uti possidetis principle in Central Asia was then 
‘internationalised’ by submitting to the UN the Declaration on the Inviolability of Frontiers, doc. 
A/48/304-S/26290, 11 August  1993.  
49 Interview with the author, 20 November 2013. In this respect, insightful are the words of Zhar 
Zhardykhan, Professor of International Relations at KIMEP University: ‘In Central Asia, border 
change would break the rules of the game. At the interstate level, at the international law level, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, any other Central Asian countries would not accept border 
change. No annexation, no irredentism, […] this is how problems are solved’. Interview, Almaty, 
Kazakhstan, November 15, 2013. Another interviewee stressed that ‘We have some 
principles…principles that…are showed towards others, that borders can’t be changed. It’s very 
important for us’. Interview with Rustam Burnashev,  Professor of International Relations at the 
Kazakh-German University of Almaty, Kazakhstan, 16 November 2013. 
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conservative, old-style Central Asia, where five potentially well-off 
Muslim states are reluctantly preparing to strike out on a path of 
their own. Crippled by imported rouble inflation, suspicious of 
Moscow's intentions and left out of decisions by the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Central Asia has 
reason to be unhappy. Speaking of Russia, the Uzbekistan 
President, Islam Karimov said that to one of his main newspapers, 
Pravda of the East, “in this days and age, you don’t invade with 
swords and horses. But there are civilised methods no less 
aggressive and effective.” 50 
 
Putting aside antagonisms, the leaders said they would now work together for regional 
security, better economic ties, a shared television station, a joint newspaper and to 
help save the drying Aral Sea. Karimov argued that ‘Central Asian states are 
traditional neighbours, which share a common culture, traditions, language, and they 
will go their way. This is without doubt’, while Akaev, following Nazarbayev, 
expressed his preference for a Central Asian format rather than an ineffective CIS one 
and Ednan Karabayev, Foreign Minister of Kyrgyzstan, declared that the meeting ‘hit 
the mark’. In addition, Central Asian leaders declared uncomfortable with the 
democratic outpouring in Russia and the national-democratic government in 
Azerbaijan, the sixth Muslim republic of the former Soviet Union.51 
Contrary to what it is usually believed and argued, it was in this meeting at 
Tashkent (and not in Ashgabat) that Kazakhstan officially accepted for the first time 
that it was fully part of the region with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and the 
new government of Tajikistan.52  
Summing up the atmosphere of the regional summit, Ahmadjan Loukmanov, 
Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, said:  
 
Our roots are one, our languages similar, our religion the same. The 
Soviet Union cut us into five pieces. These five states will remain. 
But relations should be as strong between them as one state. Tactics 
may differ, but the strategy is one.53 
 
                                                 
50 The Independent (London) 27 February 1993. 
51 Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 7 January 1993, ‘Tashkent porodil dobrye nadezhdy chuvstvuya lokot’ drug 
druga’; Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 22 January 1993, ‘A. Akaev: “Sudya po itogam goda zhizni 
Sodruzhestva, ono nichevo konstruktivnovo uzhe ne mozhet dat’…nado izmenit’ evo formu”’. 
52 Mokhira Suyarkulova argued that ‘there was a meeting in Almaty in 1989 and the term [Central 
Asia] was used to identify a bloc within the USSR’. Yet, I could not find other sources to back this 
information. Interview, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, November 29, 2013. 
53 The Independent (London) 27 February 1993. 
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The same diplomat, however, downplayed the attempt of Central Asia to radically cut 
off themselves from Russia:  
 
The January meeting did not make a new Turkestan. It is not yet 
even a Central Asian common market, though we want that. We are 
still part of the CIS.  
 
Thus, realistic considerations on political, economic and security concerns (especially 
towards Islamic radicalism potentially spilling over from Tajikistan and Afghanistan) 
did not lead to abruption, but only to soft detachment.  
The process of building some kind of regional coordination and solidarity was 
thus advancing on the lines of protection of Westphalian sovereignty, diplomacy and 
international law. While economic and security ties with Moscow were acknowledged 
(Burnashev 2002; Rumer 2002), the Central Asian states were determined to carve out 
their own regional space to implement more viable policies of development.54 
At the Tashkent meeting, an agreement was reached on working out a concrete 
mechanism for regularly monitoring the implementation of interstate and 
intergovernmental treaties and agreements. The participants unanimously agreed that 
it would be a good idea to hold meetings of the region’s heads of state and 
government on a regular basis, thus reinforcing the institution of summitry. 
The identity of the region was still revolving around the notions of 
abandonment and marginalisation. Still in 1993 during a press conference the five 
presidents argued against the fact that 
 
certain people are very keen to see us as younger brothers, as in the 
past. How else can one explain the fact that the Central Asian 
republics and Kazakhstan are still in ignorance of the reasons for the 
transfer of the Minsk meeting of heads of the CIS? 55 
 
This feeling of abandonment by the former master, Russia, continued to pervade the 
Central Asian region for all the year 1993, and this led to the adoption of concrete 
decision that were finally translated to deeds from papers. While there was talk about 
the creation of a Central Asian common economic space (which would have been 
                                                 
54 Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet 
Press),  No. 1,  Vol.45, February  03, 1993, page(s): 3-4; Current Digest of the Russian Press, The 
(formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press),  No. 1,  Vol.45, February  03, 1993, page(s): 
5-5; Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (formerly The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet 
Press),  No. 1,  Vol.45, February  03, 1993, page(s): 1-1. 
55 Mayak Radio, Moscow, 4 Jan 1993. 
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made more concrete from 1994 onward), Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan agreed for 
example to introduce their currencies simultaneously to avoid additional shocks 
caused by the ‘ousting’ from the rouble zone.56 According to Karimov and 
Nazarbayev, the forcible ousting of the Central Asian countries from the rouble zone 
is a directly opposite process damaging the historical ties of these nations with 
Russia.57 
The two presidents also signed a package of agreements on their countries’ 
mutual commitments and support, on bilateral economic and trade cooperation in 
1994, and a protocol on the intergovernmental program of bringing closer the 
economies of the Central Asian states until the year 2000. 
Two other experiments of regional coordination took place before the more 
substantive Central Asian Union. In 1991, the five states set up the Inter Country 
Advisory Council republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, while in January 1993 
the Commission Branch for grain, cotton, energy, water and other resources was 
launched in Tashkent. Both experiences, however, remained on paper and did not 
have any significant development (Pyadukhov 2000). All in all, this perception as 
marginalised and abandoned, paired with solidarist attitudes in overcoming the 
material difficulties caused by the end of the Soviet experience led to the creation of 
the CAU.  
 
Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 14 January 1994. All pictures and articles from ‘Slovo Kyrgyzstana’ are 
archival material found at the Bayalina Library in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Permission obtained for all 
the material present in the thesis. 
                                                 
56 Kommersant 11 November 1993, p. 3, in Russian Press Digest November 11, 1993. 
57 Russian Press Digest 11 November, 1993. 
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4.4 The realisation of the secondary institutions 
 
 
After several coordinative and consultative meetings, on July 8, 1994, the three 
leaders of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan agreed to form an interstate 
council with a permanent executive committee based in Alma Ata, and move toward 
closer political and economic integration. This new organisation was called Central 
Asian Union (CAU).  
 
 
Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 18 June 1994.  
 
There was a mimicking logic in this. The Central Asian states, weak in political, 
economic and environmental terms, were looking for an organisational model that 
could somehow restore the previous inter-linkages and commonality of resources, 
instead of relying on their own resources which were limited and, were existing, of 
difficult extraction.  
The international context may help to reinforce this hypothesis. As a matter of 
fact, regional solutions at the beginning of the 1990s were the norm within the 
international system. A quick glance at the regional projects throughout the world will 
make it easier to understand why the Central Asian states, while adopting different 
state and societal institutions, tried to embark on a project which had integration as its 
own cornerstone.  
In 1989 APEC and the free-trade area between Canada and the US were 
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established (which in 1994 with Mexico became NAFTA); in 1991, the OAU set to 
create an African economic community by 2025, and the OECS between Caribbean 
states and Latin America was founded; in 1992, ASEAN countries decided to set up a 
free trade zone, while in 1993 the European Single Market was launched.58 For 
example, commenting on these regional experiments in the world, Rustam Burnashev 
recalled that ‘from the world, especially the EU, we had a very important message, 
“integration is the end”. In our states, at that time, that message was very meaningful, 
“you need integration, integration is good”. And you know, we had many common 
problems, so why not?’59 
 
The defining institutional features of the Central Asian Union were the following: 
 
 the presence of a permanent interstate council with an executive committee; 
 the setting up of a Central Asian Bank of Cooperation and Development, with 
a founding capital of $3 million from each state; 
 a memo on migration to allow free movement between the three states, and 
discussed ways of implementing the free trade agreement signed by them 
earlier this year which calls for free movement of goods, capital and labour; 
 three separate councils of prime ministers, foreign and defence ministers to 
discuss economic issues, coordinate foreign policy, and work toward 
preserving stability in the region (Pyadukhov 2000). 
 
This organisation has been highly criticised in the literature for being mere 
paraphernalia of the Central Asian authoritarian regimes, being ineffective and 
                                                 
58 In a letter to the Interstate Council of the CAU, Turdakun Usubalev, Kyrgyz MP, asked ‘Our peoples 
have never been indifferent to each other. Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tajiks and Turkmens have 
lived for centuries as neighbours and brothers. Can we forget that our peoples have much in 
common in their history, way of living, traditions and customs, great similarity of material and 
spiritual culture and language? […] Dear Presidents, why do not our states use the experience of the 
European Union?’ Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 31 October – 1 November, 1995, ‘Kak podelit’granitsami 
dushi narodov?’. 
59 Interview with the author, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 16 November 2013. Other accounts mention this: 
interview with Shairbek Juraev, independent analyst, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 28 November 2013; 
Interview with a Central Asian representative of the UNRCCA, Central Asian capital, 29 
November, 2013; interview with Payam Foroughi, Researcher at the OSCE Academy, Bishkek, 
Kyrgyzstan, 30 November 2013; interview with Emil Juraev, Professor and Analyst of International 
Relations, AUCA, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 2 December 2013.  
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essentially non-cooperative in nature (Olcott 1994b; Kubicek 1997; Allison 2008). 
However, an international society approach to it may reveal some important aspects.  
To begin, we should recognise that the experience of Central Asian 
regionalism is even more interesting to analyse and research if we consider the 
general trend of cooperation/conflict within the CIS. As Yulia Nikitina rightly argues 
(2013:1), disintegration and not integration was the main objective of the vast 
majority of the states forming the CIS. Moreover, the integration of the Central Asian 
republics is even more noteworthy if we consider that the period 1991-1994 in the 
CIS was characterized by a sharp inter-state, intra-and inter-ethnic conflicts 
(Azerbaijan and Armenia, in Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Tajikistan).  
Furthermore, the news of the newly created Union was a shock for all post-
Soviet politics. The CAU was thus the first, substantive attempt to pursue regional 
cooperation and integration, and it tried to do so specifically relying on a Central 
Asian we-feeling detached from the rest of the CIS.60 Cooperation was intended to be 
in economic and military terms. ‘The most important thing is that […] we three 
countries have created an economic and defence union’ said Nazarbayev. ‘[This] is 
only the first step and we will go further but you can only imagine how far that will 
be’, he added. Diplomats said the new bloc was aimed at strengthening the former 
Soviet region's bargaining power with Russia, and was a move to pool economic 
resources.61 
At least at a declarative level, integration was proceeding smoothly. Islam 
Karimov, with the visiting foreign ministers of the neighbouring republics of 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Kasymzhomart Tokayev and Roza Otunbayeva, made 
significant references to ‘Turan’ and ‘distant past’ to describe the friendly nature of 
Central Asian interstate relations: 
 
The good-neighbourly relations of friendship and cooperation 
between the peoples living on the ancient soil of Turan go back to 
the distant past […] Their cultural and spiritual unity provides an 
opportunity to develop this cooperation to the full in various sectors 
of the national economy.62  
                                                 
60 Alibek Dzhekshekulov, Deputy Foreign Minister of Kyrgyzstan, argued that the CAU was not a 
threat to the CIS, but that was undeniable that the cultural, economic and ‘spiritual’ similarities 
between the countries made diplomacy, dialogue and cooperation between them more efficient. 
Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 30 January 1997, ‘Tsentral’naya Aziya: potentsial integratsii’. 
61 The Guardian, 9 July 1994. 




The Union was a highly formalised body. It consisted of an inter-committee of the 
presidents of the three founding members, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan, as well as an inter-committee of the Prime Ministers of the same states. 
The increasing solidarity of the three states was the natural ending point of the 
intensive phase of cooperation that preceded the agreement before 1994: cooperation 
over the war in Tajikistan (see next section), common positions vis-à-vis Russia and 
perception of commonality of fate all drew the three state to overcome their pluralist 
stances and to push for a solidarist experiment.  
A non-participant in this solidarist experiment was Turkmenistan, who had 
since independence begun to reiterate its status as a neutral state. Therefore, the 
participation of Turkmenistan was only visible in those meeting where cooperation on 
economic and political issues was absent from the talks.  
However, despite the proclaimed solidarism, strong pluralist elements 
underpinned the functioning of the CAU. In its founding Charter, we read that  
 
The activities of the Inter-State Council and its institutions are 
carried out on the basis of mutual recognition and respect for state 
sovereignty, equality and non-interference in internal affairs, 
peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for human rights and 
freedoms and the conscientious fulfilment of its obligations and 




Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 12 July 1994.  
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Alongside the decision to create a single economic space in Central Asia it was 
decided to create a Central Asian Bank, with the aim of financing common regional 
projects aimed at increasing the economic viability and the investment attractiveness 
of the region. The need for the bank stemmed out of ‘recognizing the need for the 
organization and implementation of multilateral inter-state settlement of trading, non-
trading and other transactions.’63 The very word ‘recognising’ indicates, indeed, the 
conscious will of the states to coordinate and ordinate their mutual economic 
relations.64 
The Bank had a defined structure as well. The supreme body was the general 
meeting of the bank shareholders (Assembly of Representatives). Governing body of 
the bank was the Bank Council, which included one authorized representative of the 
Parties, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Inter-State Council of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan and the 
President of the Central Bank Cooperation and Development.65 Article 3 of the statute 
of the Bank explained the functions:  
 the organization and implementation of multilateral settlement of interstate 
trade and other transactions provided by intergovernmental agreements;  
 to assist in the organization of joint ventures and expansion of their activity, 
regardless of ownership;  
 crediting the strategic programs of the Parties;  
 financing of a region-wide use;  
 study and analysis of the economy of the Parties and to prepare proposals and 
recommendations of the banks of the Parties.  
 
This regional experiment led to some improvement in the economic condition of the 
region. Far from being ineffective, the Bank in fact financed a number of major joint 
projects. Its activity required, in 1996, a recapitalisation of $9 million due to the large 
activities implemented (Pyadukhov 2000: 5).66  
                                                 
63 Soglashenie mezhdu Respublikoj Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzskoi Respublikoi i Respublikoi Uzbekistan ob 
uchrezhdenii Tsentral’noaziatskogo, 1994, preamble. 
64 Bazanov, president of the Bank, argued that the main problems in coordinating economic policies 
were with Uzbekistan given the government’s tight control on the currency and liquidity. The also 
stress, though, that the Bank had institutional relations with all Central Asian central banks, also 
Turkmen and Tajik. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 26-27 December 1995, ‘Vmeste s bankom budem vmeste’.  
65 Article 1.2. 
66 Mambetov, deputy chairman of the executive committee of the CAU, argued that the projects 
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A few years later, asked on the efficacy of the CAU as an experiment of integration, 
as an incubator of agreement and consensus among the parties and as an effective 
political-economic mechanism of regional governance, Nazarbayev replied 
The Central Asia Union is a working entity. We have the Central 
Asian Bank. Each of the three states has a deposit in it, 9 million 
dollars. The bank attracts up to 100 million dollars in investment 
and 52 projects in three states are currently being implemented, 
including the Sea of Aral. And it does not hinder anyone, it 
contributes to trust among the neighbours and to stability in our 
states. So, replying to your question, I must say that some CIS states 
feel that the formation of twos and fours is not good for the CIS. 
But everybody is entitled to have his own opinion.67  
 
  
1997 was a year in which the solidarist impetus received new lifeblood. In January, 
during a meeting in Bishkek, the three presidents signed a Treaty of Eternal 
Friendship among their countries, thus diplomatically and legally enhancing the 
cooperative character of the CAU. It was the first treaty of this kind in the whole 
CIS.68 
 
                                                                                                                                            
financed by the Bank were more than fifty, and that this was possible also thanks to the 
institutionalisation of meetings of economic analysts and specialists from the three CAU countries. 
Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 3-4 May 1996, ‘Edinoe ekonomicheskoe prostranstvo. Realii i perspektivy’. 
67 Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast 22 January 1998.  
68 Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 27-28 December 1996, ‘Sosedsvo – dobroe; druzhba – vechnaya’; Slovo 














Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 3-4 May 1996.  
 
The tones of this treaty are highly solidarist, emphasising mutual support in the 
prevention of territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence (Article 2); joint 
defence measures against external attacks (Article 3) and coordination on regional and 
international issues (Article 4). According to the Uzbek political scientist Farkhod 
Tolipov, the spirit and letter of the Treaty ‘On Eternal Friendship’ in fact described a 
strategic partnership, an alliance, and a strategy for integration (Tolipov 2006: 178; 
Tolipov 2013). In addition, the presidents reviewed the performance of the CAU in 
terms of intra-regional trade development, noting that over the last two years (1994-
1996), the combined volume of trade within the group had almost doubled despite 
political difficulties.69 
In March, the three presidents and prime ministers met again in Bishkek to 
review the current phases of the integration project and to sign new agreements, such 
as agreements on the free movement of workers, broader integration of anti-monopoly 
policies and other documents. Akaev noted that  
 
 
                                                 
69 Rabochaya Tribuna, 17 January 1997. 
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The Central Asian union has passed from words to deeds […] Trade 
turnover between the three nations doubled last year, a sign that our 
union is working very successfully.70 
 
At the meeting, an innovation in the field of regional communication was also 
decided. The Prime Ministers of Kazakhstan (Kajegeldin), Kyrgyzstan (Djumagulov) 
and Uzbekistan (Sultanov) on behalf of the Executive Committee of the Interstate 
Council of the CAU jointly decided to publish the magazine ‘Central Asia: problems 
of integration’.71 
This is something that even the EU did not have at that time. It was a monthly 
magazine, and while the main editorial office was located in Tashkent, two other 
offices were opened in Astana and Bishkek. The journal was published in Uzbek, 
Kazakh and Kyrgyz as well as Russian.  
With respect to the merits of this initiative, two things are noteworthy. Firstly, 
the creation of a monthly publication showed once more the intention of Central 
Asian governments to try to mutually adjust their national policies in terms of 
economic development and modernisation, presenting problems and plausible 
solutions to problems of integration with the help of experts and academics.  
Secondly, from an ES perspective, it showed how there was an attempt, albeit 
unsuccessful, to include in the process of integration the Central Asian world society, 
i.e. the peoples, the businesses, the economic circles and the relevant economic actors 
that played a role in the economic integration of these countries. The expenditures of 
its production and printing were so divided: 
 
 Kazakhstan - 35 %; 
 Kyrgyzstan - 20 % 
 Uzbekistan - 45 % of total expenditure, other than expenditure undertaken by 
the Republic of Uzbekistan for the organization of the publisher. 
 
The first paragraph of the editorial concept of the magazine clearly stated that  
 
By creating a monthly magazine, the founding states are confident 
in the ability of this publication to promote a mutual understanding 
of the most pressing questions of the relationship between them, 
                                                 
70  Associated Press Worldstream, 14 March 1997. 
71 Reshenie Soveta Prem’er-ministrov Mezhtosudarstvennovo soveta Respubliki Kazakhstan, 




which meets the interests of the peoples living in these states.72 
 
§ 3 clearly stated the solidarist aim of the project, again, fostering cooperation in the 
information, cultural and editorial spheres. According to the concept and therefore to 
the governments of the CAU,  
 
the basis of the information policy is to promote the development 
and strengthening of the information space of a new kind, where the 
binding force would serve the shared interest of the founders of the 
magazine in the economic, cultural and information cooperation.  
 
The aim was reiterated also in the Charter of the Magazine (§ 2.1), where it was 
written that the aims were 
 
 enhancement of the information support of economic integration of the 
founders; 
 uniform representation on the pages of materials reflecting the close 
cooperation between the Central Asian countries in different areas of life. 
 
Yet, pluralist elements were, as we discussed above, always underlying the solidarist 
logic, and for all the talks about integration and solidarity, territorial, ethnic and 
survival concerns were paramount also in this kind of cooperation.  
As a matter of fact, the closure of § 3 of the concept clearly stated that the 
publication of ‘materials which by their nature are aimed at inciting the population of 
any territory to acts incompatible with the process of integration’ was forbidden, thus 
warning contributors from the three states to write or discuss hot topics (such as 
territorial claims, definition of borders and inter-ethnic strives) which could have led 
to the potential disruption not just of the integration process, but of regional stability 
as a whole.  
Nonetheless, the process of integration was slowing down, and disappointment 
caught the members of the Interstate Council. According to members of the Interstate 
Council, the main reasons were that there were no major sources of capital 
investment, the lack of realism in the projects, in the unresolved issues of mutual 
convertibility of national currencies and the slow creation of the legal framework of a 
single economic space (Pyadukhov 2000).  
Well conveying the idea of solidarism and pluralism simultaneously at play, Alibek 
                                                 
72 Kontseptsiya ezhemesyachnovo zhurnala ‘Tsentral’naya Aziya: problemy integratsii’. 
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Dzhekshekulov, Deputy Foreign Minister of Kyrgyzstan, argued that  
 
[Central Asian states] are far from being able to paint an idyllic 
picture of relations between states. In terms of variable-speed 
transition countries in the region to a market economy affect the 
existing variety of natural, financial, demographic and other 
resources. There is unevenness of development, each country is 
seeking its way.73 
 
Subsequently, after another meeting of Heads of State in July 1997 in Cholpon-Ata 
(Kyrgyzstan), in order to approximate national legislation and the creation of a 
common legal mechanisms of integration, it was decided to establish the Council of 
Parliamentarians of the three states, and the process of integration re-gained 
momentum.  
The speed at which the three republics integrated their efforts to create better 
economic conditions in the region was once again compared by the press to the 
‘inefficiency’ of the CIS, and this once again raises at least some questions about the 
mere declarative character of Central Asian integration. In the Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 
the Cholpon-Ata summit of July 1997 was summarised as follows:  
 
Integration within the Central Asian Union has been developing 
much faster than within the framework of the CIS, the author notes. 
Largely, this is due to the substantial preparatory work. And what is 
most important, all decisions in the Union are adopted by way of 
consensus. […] [E]conomic integration within the Central 
Asian Union will pave the way for strengthening the military-
political ties between the members. […] The Foreign Ministers of 
the three Central Asian republics have discussed the question of 
creating a nuclear-free zone in that region, and this initiative is 
expected to be tabled in the United Nations. On the last day of the 
summit [July 26], Presidents Nurusultan Nazarbayev, Islam 
Karimov and Askar Akaev are to sign a whole package of 
agreements aimed at raising mutual relations between Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to a higher level and intensifying 
integration processes within the framework of the Central Asian 
Union.74 
 
Economic problems in particular those over gas and electricity supplies and payments 
were also discussed at the meeting, and this is again a sign of a working international 
society: settlement of the disagreements was conducted via consensus and diplomacy, 
and new payment plans were set up following the agreement of the three leaders.  
                                                 
73 Slovo Kyrgyzstana, January 30, 1997, ‘Tsentral’naya Aziya: potentsial integratsii’. 
74 Russian Press Digest, 24 July 1997. 
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The Afghan conflict and the possible repercussions on the weak Tajik neighbour were 
also part of the meeting, and this led to the intensification of military cooperation 
among the republics. The solidarity among them was therefore on the rise. Indeed, 
there was a clear perception of the need of regional unity to preserve sovereignty, 
stability and political survival. Incidentally, Russia was not mentioned and was not 
part of the talks: 
 
The development of Afghanistan’s military conflict largely reflects 
the degree of security across the entire Central Asia and requires 
more political activity from countries in the region, Kyrgyz Foreign 
Minister Muratbek Imanaliyev [said]. Karimov and his counterparts, 
Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan and Nurusultan Nazarbayev of 
Kazakhstan will also be discussing the status of a Central Asian 
peacekeeping battalion and a planned inter-parliamentary union, the 
Kyrgyz ministry said.75 
 
Showing commonality of minds and similarity of positions, pushing for a peaceful 
and diplomatic solutions to the Afghan conflict, the Central Asian states proposed to 
host in Bishkek an international peace conference under the auspices of the UN, thus 
showing once again their preference and therefore adoption of the institution of 
diplomacy for the resolution of conflicts, both regional and extra-regional.76 
 Quite interestingly, from an ES world society perspective, the meeting was 
preceded by a forum of intellectuals and exponents of civil society (‘Forum of Central 
Asian Culture’), where it was demanded that processes of regionalism and pursuance 
of different national interests should have been reconciled on the basis of ‘peace, 
harmony and agreement’ between the peoples. In this respect, Kyrgyzstan launched 
the magazine ‘Central Asia and the Culture of Peace’, and it was stressed that the 
regionalisation of this idea could have been a factor of integration and stability.77 
 1998 was a decisive year for the CAU, as it expanded its boundaries in terms 
of membership and almost comprehended the whole Central Asian region under its 
umbrella (with the exception of Turkmenistan who, as we saw, remained out the 
solidarist circle while approaching the Central Asian international society in its 
pluralist dimension).  
                                                 
75 Associated Press Worldstream 24 July 1997. 
76 Xinhua News Agency, 24 July 1997; Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 25-26 July 1997, ‘Mezhtossovet 
ukreplyaet integratsyu’. 
77 Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 18-19 July 1997, ‘Tsentral’naya Aziya – zemlya mira, soglasiya i tolerantnosti: 




Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 19 March 1998. Archival material found at the Bayalina Library in 
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan 
 
At the end of the civil war, which left behind it some 50,000 killed and 500,000 
refugees only in the 1992-1993 period (Horsman 1999: 38), ruined infrastructures and 
left a moribund economy, Tajikistan’s political and economic environment was 
devastated.  
Following contemporary world trends, as we saw at the beginning of the 
chapter, it was believed that joining a multi-lateral organisation whose focus was the 
integration of markets was the panacea for all the evils.  
The Tajik government expressed its desire to join the Union already in 1996. 
As a matter of fact, the Tajik government was admitted as observer (together with 
Russia) at the Alma-Ata meeting on 23 August.78 One year later, it was the Kyrgyz 
Foreign Minister Muratbek Imanaliyev who expressed desire for the Tajik 
government to formally upgrade its position within the Union to full-fledged 
membership. Imanaliyev said the Kyrgyz leadership was ‘extremely interested that 
Tajikistan should become a participant in the implementation of projects within the 
framework of the Central Asian union’. He also expressed confidence that there 
                                                 
78 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 August 1996. 
111 
 
would be no obstacles to Tajikistan’s participation in the Central Asian peacekeeping 
battalion, established by Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.79  
 
 
Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 9-10 January 1998. The meeting, held in Ashgabat, paved the way to 
Tajikistan’s accession to the CAU and formalised Turkmenistan’s status as observer. The Ashgabat 
Declaration, emphasising convergence of foreign policies and respect of international law in regional 
matters, was signed. Russia was not informed of the meeting.  
 
Once all the paperwork was formalised and guarantees on the stability of the country 
had been given to the other members, Tajikistan was formally accepted during the 
CAU meeting in Tashkent as the fourth member of the CAU on 27 March 1998. The 
Protocol on the accession of the Republic of Tajikistan to the Treaty the creation of a 
single economic space between the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and 
the Republic of Uzbekistan on 30 April 1994 was signed.  
 
                                                 




Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 31 March 1998. Archival material found at the Bayalina Library in 
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. 
 
At the press conference following the ceremony of signature of documents, the 
presidents of all four republics described the admission of Tajikistan to this economic 
agreement as an important historical event. Islam Karimov said that ‘this event was 
the long-standing dream of the residents of the region.’80 The usual reference to 
historical roots, commonality and to Central Asia as comprising all the CAU states 
was made after the meeting by the press secretary of the Tajik Presidency, Zafar 
Saidov:  
 
this act is a serious foreign policy achievement by the head of state 
which meets vital interests of the entire people of Tajikistan in the 
difficult transitional period. It should be mentioned that the 
development of regional relations in the framework of the 
agreement is not a show of fashion or an invention. It is not an 
integration for the sake of integration, but is a natural and objective 
process which has deep historical roots.81 
 
The solidarity expressed by Central Asian presidents made it possible to identify also 
Turkmenistan as part of Central Asia, giving him ‘regional titularity’. This attitude of 
seeing the region as comprising the five Central Asian republics is most evident in the 
words of Karimov: 
 
                                                 
80 Tajik Radio first programme, Dushanbe, 27 March 1998. 
81 BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 30 March 1998. 
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Tomorrow Turkmenistan will hopefully join the organisation and 
the Central Asian region will be completely represented. [This 
unification] is not a tribute to the latest trends, not simply an 
organisation, not integration for the sake of integration. [Central 
Asian states] have common historical and spiritual roots and a 
common economic foundation that cannot be ignored.82 
 
 
Nonetheless, all four Central Asian states stressed that their particular historical, 
economic, environmental and cultural conditions were factors that allowed them to 
integrate far faster than the rest of the CIS. Indeed, the keenness and the promptness 
of the Central Asian leaders was perceived as a model for the whole continent. It was 
not uncommon to read in the press that the CAU was much more effective than the 
CIS, and that the CIS should have studied the experience of the CAU to improve is 
integrative potential.83 As said, it is usually claimed that this organisation was only 
declarative in purpose, but in fact it showed unprecedented dynamism. Many 
meetings were held under its aegis, Tajikistan showed its willingness to join it and 
beyond consultations several projects were implemented.84  
Hindrances were present as well, however, and these may be related to the 
underlying pluralist character of the region. Diverging national interests, stronger 
emphasis on sovereignty and autonomous paths to development and effective political 
and economic independence hindered the progress of the solidarist trends, leading to 
conflicts and disagreements (with consequences on the effectiveness of the regional 
organisations). People working in regional politics or researching it at that time 
confirmed this as well, mentioning ‘ongoing, almost unconscious definitions of 
national interests, not always convergent’. 85 
                                                 
82 Interfax Russian News, 30 March 1998. Already in 1997, Dzhekshekulov, Deputy Foreign Minister 
of Kyrgyzstan, said ‘Non-participation in the Union of Turkmenistan, I think, is only temporary’. 
Slovo Kyrgyzstana, January 30, 1997, ‘Tsentral’naya Asiya: potentsial integratsii’. 
83 See, e.g., Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 7-8 May 1996, ‘Soyus trekh nameren ukrepit’sya’; Slovo 
Kyrgyzstana, 18-19 March 1997, ‘Oni delo govorili’; Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 20-21 October 1997, 
‘Labirint soyusov’. 
84 RTR, ‘Vesti’ program, 18 March 1998; BBC Worldwide Monitoring 27 March 1998; 
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda in Agence France Presse – English, 27 March 1998. 
85 E.g. interview with Uzbek Source 1 and Uzbek Source 2; interview with Roman Mogilevskii, 
Director of IPPA, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, November 26, 2013; interview with expert in Kyrgyzstan, 
November 27, 2013; interview with Zakir Chotaev, Assistant Director at the Central Asian Research 
Centre - Turkish Kyrgyz Manas University, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, December 13, 2013; interview 
with two representatives of the Institute for Strategic and Regional studies under the President of 
the Republic of Uzbekistan in Tashkent, location undisclosed, December 13, 2013; interview with 
Kamoluddin Abdullaev, January 15, 2014; interview with former Kyrgyz Diplomat. 
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This tension between solidarism and pluralism was indeed present in the minds of 
Central Asian presidents, and recognised as well. While on the one hand there was the 
attraction to more integration, uniformity and harmonisation from an economic and 
policy viewpoint, on the other hand there were the domestic, national peculiarities of 
each state member of the CAU, which were impeding the realisation of the solidarist 
goals in the economic field.  
For example, the decision of Kyrgyzstan to unilaterally introduce its own 
currency, the som, let economic, fiscal and payment convergence derail. Fitting neatly 
with the pluralist/solidarist mixture explained above, the only Central Asian leader 
who defended Kyrgyzstan’s action, Turkmenistan’s Niyazov, argued that ‘as the 
leader of a sovereign state, Akaev had the right to introduce a national currency 
unilaterally if he chose to do so’ (Olcott 1994a: 39).86 As Karimov said,  
 
I would say that the first thing we need is political will on the part 
of each of us. The second thing: decisions will be decisions, the 
main thing today for us is that we have to get our legislative bases 
closer - without doing so we can not talk about full-blooded, full 
integration […] the countries have their own parliaments to adopt 
laws, but to make the agreements work they need a single legal 
basis This is a very serious question. […] Each country has its own 
economic development model but we should make efforts for the 
benefit of ordinary people, because agreements signed earlier are 
being discredited by bureaucrats. 87 
 
The narrative of these secondary institutions as merely declarative, virtual and void in 
concreteness fail to appreciate the fact that these experiments were indeed realised. It 
is too difficult to follow up an institutions only for declarative purposes. Solidarist 
trends were indeed present, as reiterated by all the presidents and manifested in their 
willingness for economic cooperation. However, it was a solidarism that masked 
several pluralist tendencies, which clashed with desires for unity and cooperation. The 
tasks of nation-building, state-consolidation, regional stability and de jure 
independence/sovereignty from the former colonial power were too strong to fully 
accompany the regional integration processes.  
 
                                                 
86 Here, it is interesting the testimony of Rustam Burnashev: ‘At that time, I was working at the 
Institute of Regional Strategic Studies under the President in Tashkent, and I looked at the situation 
very closely. For Uzbekistan it was shock! […] But in public, Karimov said it was fine, as it was a 
sovereign decision’. After that, however, borders were closed. Interview, November 16, 2013. 
87 Uzbek Radio first programme, Tashkent, 26 March 1998. 
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What should be surprising, conversely, is that actually those experiences had several 
manifestations and actually duration. One should remember, as a matter of fact, that 
while fully-fledged economic integration failed to be achieved among the republics, 
the CAU provided a forum, a hub for the diffusion of tensions, for the ‘concertation’ 
of actions (with respect to Tajikistan and Afghanistan, for example) and a provider of 
regional identity to maintain the appropriate autonomy with respect to Moscow 
(Zhardykhan 2002: 180).  
It is sufficient to remember that the CAU, despite its alleged ‘virtual’ 
character, was appropriately institutionalised in a manner that made the Central Asian 
republics sufficiently distinct from Moscow and the rest of the CIS. According to the 
decision of the three Heads of States in Cholpon Ata in 1997, the Meetings of the 
Board were held, as a rule, on the eve of the Summit of the CIS. In this way, the 
leaders of the Central Asian countries openly suggested that they aimed at developing 
joint positions on the issues submitted to the summits. In ES terms, this is a clear 
example of a concert in fieri (on the way of periodical institutionalisation) 
strengthened by the institutions of international law and diplomacy (with the 
derivative of summitry) in defence of a particular interpretation of another institution, 
that of sovereignty.  
The instrument of consensus itself, which was the legal instrument adopted to 
resolve political conflicts within the CAU, while hindering cooperation by requiring 
unanimity, nonetheless has preserved the regional space and its stability by letting the 
leaders agree on those specific and vital issues on which there was common 
understanding (for example, again, the containment of the situation in Tajikistan).88  
Within the CAU, however, the solidarism expressed was in the common 
economic objectives and in the coordination of common stances on sovereignty vis-à-
vis Russia and the Slavic components of the CIS, but nothing else. In point of fact, 
strong pluralist veins, underlined the regional project. National economic policies, for 
example, supposed to be convergent, were left under national decisions and 
directions.89 Moreover, all the member states were, in their policies, clearly guided by 
                                                 
88 Interview with Kazakh Professor at KIMEP, Almaty, Kazakhstan, November 13, 2013; interview 
with Askar Nursha, independent Kazakh expert, Almaty, Kazakhstan, November 14, 2013; 
Interview with Rustam Burnashev. 
89 An example of such hurdles was when Kazakh Prime Minister Nurlan Balgimgaev announced that 
Kazakhstan would impose heavy tariffs of up to 200% on some imports from Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan in March 1999 in face of massive influx of foreign goods into the country. A Kazakh 
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the provisions of the territorial integrity and inviolability of the existing borders that 
are specifically included in the texts of international treaties signed between 1992 and 
1997 by leaders - members of the Interstate Council, thus preventing joint projects of 
supranational sovereignty or delegation of authoritative principles to other organs. 
Another element of limited solidarism in Central Asia was more technical in 
character, but nonetheless is useful to understand the true character of international 
relations in the region. The states of the CAU, perhaps conscious of the challenging 
tasks ahead (if seen coupled with their national environments) limited every single 
agreement in time, as if they set phases renewable under more favourable conditions. 
Suffice to say that article 15 (to be paired with the preamble) of the treaty establishing 
a single economic space between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was only 
for seven years (1994-2001), as if it left the decision to proceed further with 
integration only if integration met the desires of the founding members.90 This, again, 
may be seen as a rejection of full-fledged solidarism in favour of a more conservative, 
pluralist position. 
After having analysed the characteristics, the role and the institutionalisation 
of the CAU as a sign of international society in Central Asia, we can now turn to the 
effectiveness of the Central Asian international society with respect to three main 
events: the civil war in Tajikistan (1992-1997), the creation of a nuclear weapon free 
zone and the institution of a consortium for the Aral Sea. 
 
 
4.5 The Tajik conflict and the regional actors 
 
 
The military-security aspect of the Central Asian regional society was evident, I 
argue, also in the management of the Tajik civil war and in the containment of the 
Afghan conflict, seen as a menace for the whole region. The basic assumption of this 
section is that the containment and (where and when possible) the resolution of such 
conflicts required a concerted action (and therefore common interests and aims) from 
the regional actors and, wherever it was necessary, of the Great Powers operating in 
                                                                                                                                            
official said the decision to increase the tax rate, although temporary, aimed to protect Kazakhstan’s 
economic stability (Xinhua News Agency, 11 February 1999). 
90 According to Triska and Slusser (1962), the duration of an agreement is indicative of the level of 
confidence of the parties and their mutual trust. The shorter, the more cautious is the approach. 
There is nothing wrong in having short contracts, actually it is symptom of political realism and 
awareness, especially for newly independent states. 
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the region.  
Common understandings among the Central Asian countries, manifested in 
concerted actions, meetings and words, can be seen as the operating facet of a 
regional international society aimed at the preservation of stability and survival in the 
region. As we will observe, there was a first phase where diplomacy and non-
interference were the norms adopted in the region, to then turn to limited intervention 
and external Great Power management in the second phase of the conflict. 
Infringements of sovereignty led to quarrels between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and it 
will be interesting to see how discourses of justification proved the existence of a 
limited, but nonetheless present, normative framework of reference. 
Already in January 1993, when the civil war in Tajikistan had been ongoing 
for nine months, the Central Asian states showed concerns for possible spillovers and 
regional instability coming from their neighbour. Non-interference and diplomacy 
were the norms adopted by the neighbouring republics, following the spirit of their 
previous regional agreements and fearing possible repercussions, should borders be 
violated.  
At a summit in Tashkent in 1993, with the presence of Turkmenistan as well, 
the Central Asian republics the leaders expressed their ‘moral support for the 
constitutional authorities in Tajikistan’ and said they would provide ‘humanitarian aid 
in the form of food, medicine and clothes’ to the stricken republic, but nothing 
more.’91  
Attempts to send auxiliary troops to restore order in the wrecked republic 
came to nothing, and declarations of regional and historical solidarity were paired 
with limited humanitarian aid. Significantly, however, the five republics did not 
oppose the presence of Russian troops on the Tajik soil, namely the motorised infantry 
division, thus de facto legitimising the presence of a foreign country’s army on a 
regional member’s soil. As President Yeltsin argued with reference to the Tajik 
conflict, ‘As a great power, Russia cannot permit a whole nation to perish.’92 
Thus, the institution of the Great Power management (henceforth GPM), 
theorised by Bull (1977: 202) as that condition by which Great Powers are 
acknowledged to have special interests and special privileges to maintain order within 
the international system found its place in the Central Asian normative scheme. 
                                                 
91 United Press International, 4 January 1993. 
92 Interfax, 10 June 1993. 
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Central Asia was still too politically weak to dispense with what in the previous 60 
years had been the provider of political and economic stability and, most of all, to 
create its own indigenous version of GPM93.  
Russia was the only power capable of sending hard power means and facilities 
in the former backyard to preserve the overall stability of the region, and this was 
tacitly accepted by the new independent states. Despite discourses on sovereign 
equality and strong de jure independence reiterated in the period of the creation of the 
CIS, GPM was clearly among the normative devices adopted by the Central Asian 
states to preserve their survival.  
No declaration, no statement and no regional law was adopted against Russian 
presence in Tajikistan, as too evident was the necessity of having a powerful state in 
the war-torn neighbour. Non-interference of regional states and external GPM were 
therefore the normative instruments to prevent breaches of sovereignty and alteration 
of the precarious territorial status quo in the region.  
As noted earlier when speaking of borders, non-interference, international law 
and a strong conception of sovereignty were also present in the mind of Islam 
Karimov when speaking of ‘breaking up’ the region. In this respect, from a normative 
viewpoint it is interesting to note what president Akaev said in Shimkent in a specific 
Central Asian summit on Tajikistan (14 April 1995) when asked about the possibility 
of sending troops to Tajikistan. He said that 
 
any violence between Kyrgyz border guards and Tajik fighters 
would revive memories of the clashes between local people on the 
Tajik-Kyrgyz border in July 1989 over the right to use irrigation 
facilities in which one person was killed and 19 wounded. In 
comparison with the violence reported nowadays the one or two 
people who died in the local conflict then might seem insignificant, 
but someone might at any time recall the tragedy, bringing it to the 
fore. Therefore, no-one can tell what the relations between the 
neighbouring people will be like if someone decides to do so.94 
 
 
Among Central Asian states, diplomacy was still the main institution adopted for the 
management of the Tajik conflict.  A conference in Alma Ata was proposed by 
                                                 
93 With the birth of regional international societies, GPM must be analysed in two ways: as ‘external’, 
i.e. where great powers present at the global level penetrate regional international societies, and as 
‘internal’ or ‘indigenous’, i.e. where regional great powers legitimately manage regional politics. 
We will see in the next chapter that this dovetailed interpretation of this institution is very relevant 
to the Central Asian case. 
94 ITAR-TASS news agency (World Service), Moscow, 15 April 1995. 
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Nazarbayev under the auspices of the UN and with the presence of other CIS 
countries. The military action was explicitly rejected in the joint communiqué at the 
end of the Shimkent meeting, where only mediation was offered.95 In addition, they 
said the Tajik conflict could only be solved ‘by political dialogue and mutual 
compromises.’ 
When it became clear that without a military intervention the Tajik civil war 
would undermine the stability of the whole region, the Uzbek, Kazakh and Kyrgyz 
Presidents agreed on sending troops to a CIS-led battalion (read: Russia-led) aimed at 
countering the insurgence of the anti-government forces on the Tajik soil and 
preventing infiltrations of Islamic fundamentalists from the southern border with 
Afghanistan. However, the participation was extremely limited, and this shows how 
the solidarity expressed by the Central Asian leaders was more in words than in deeds, 
and how they stuck to a strong pluralist interpretation of international relations in the 
region. As James Sherr argued (1994: 59), 
 
[a]lthough Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan each promised 
one battalion to reinforce the Tajik-Afghan border, Kazakhstan’s 
Border Troops are 75 per cent Russian; Uzbekistan refuses to 
confirm whether its contingent has been dispatched, and 
Kyrgyzstan's battalion (originally designated a “special purpose 
brigade”) arrived at half its promised strength of 500, without 
weapons, or bullet-proof vests. What is more, Russian Border 
Troops - 50 per cent under-strength themselves - are now plugging 
holes in the Kyrgyz border post of Sary-Tash in order to compensate 
for Kyrgyzstan’s “contribution”.  
 
The reluctance of Central Asian states to send troops to validate their alleged 
‘solidarity’ on the ground, especially of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, was exemplified 
in the vote that the Kyrgyz parliament expressed against sending more troops on the 
Tajik soil, and on the threat that both Nazarbayev and Karimov made to withdraw 
their battalions in case of failure of political negotiations.96 
What this shows, moreover, is that there is another subtle, normative 
difference between Russia and the Central Asian republics. Russia felt as its ‘moral 
right’, ‘duty’ to intervene in its ‘near abroad’ (Sherr 1994: 57-59; Foreign Policy 
Concept of the Russian Federation, adopted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 
November 1992), while as we saw Central Asian states were at constant search of a 
                                                 
95 Interfax Russian News, 15 April 1995; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 14 April 1995. 
96 Interfax Russian News, 6 June 1995. 
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diplomatic, multilateral solution of the conflict avoiding blatant intervention. 
Yet, with respect to the intervention/non-intervention issue, the role of Uzbekistan 
was more ambiguous, and put considerable pressure on the Central Asian normative 
framework for the resolution of the Tajik civil war.  
In an effort to enhance its regional influence, Uzbekistan vowed to 
help Tajikistan and at least initially committed to the Central Asian principle of non-
intervention97 (Horsman 1999: 38). Yet, it has been widely noted how Tashkent, 
worried about the  possible spread of Islamic fundamentalism, made numerous 
interventions on the Tajik soil to counterfight rebels and to provide assistance to 
Rahmonov’s government, empowering his side with new weapons and military 
support (Gleason 1997b; Horsman 1999). A curious case was that the defence minister 
of the Tajik government, Major General Alexander Shishlyannikov, was born in 
Tashkent.  
The fact that while other Central Asian countries (such as Kyrgyzstan) did 
protest about this persistent violation of Tajikistan’s sovereignty, Tajikistan itself 
subsequently declared itself grateful98 for the help of the Uzbek brother (the raid was 
legitimised by an inter-republic air defence agreement, see Horsman 1999: 39). This 
is evidence of the delicate balance between the principal norm of sovereignty and 
non-intervention and the particularities of the contingent situation, which sometimes 
leads statesmen to defy norms and commonly accepted institutions to preserve the 
greater good of survival and stability. Karimov’s reiterated appeals to the urgency of 
the situation, the danger coming from it and the risk of a regional collapse sound 
exactly like those justificatory discourses that make reference to the validity of a 
breached norm in cases of emergency.99  
Uzbek interference in Tajikistan changed from legitimate to illegitimate over 
the years. Towards the end of the decade, two incidents are salient. Firstly, there were 
allegations that the Uzbek military helped Tajik renegade commander Mahmud 
                                                 
97 ‘It is impossible to solve these problems by force’, said Karimov, adding: ‘force will only lead to 
increased tensions in the near future.’ Agence France Presse – English, 29 July 1993. 
98 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 February 1993; in addition, Rahmonov later described Karimov as ‘a 
father to the people of Kulyab and to the entire Tajik people’. 
99 Yet, it is interesting to note Uzbekistan’s two-month long refusal to sign the Tewzan Protocol in 
April 1997, as a guarantor of Tajikistan’s post-war peace. Karimov argued that Uzbekistan was not 
prepared to take on this role, suggesting that this was responsibility of Russia, the USA or the EU. 
This raises interesting questions about Uzbekistan’s concerns for Tajikistan’s sovereignty, as well as 
about the presence (or not) of an indigenous GPM in Central Asia. 
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Khudoyberdiyev against the government of Rahmonov. This was perceived as an act 
of interference in the territory of an independent sovereign country. Immediately, 
however, the Uzbek government rejected the allegations, claiming to stick to the 
principle of sovereignty and non-intervention.100 The Uzbek Foreign Ministry stated 
that ‘the Uzbek leadership is committed to the principle of non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of neighbouring Tajikistan. This is the official point of view of 
Tashkent’.  
In November 1998, President Emomali Rahmonov accused neighbouring 
Uzbekistan of training Tajik rebels and aiding in anti-government raids, claiming that 
‘it is an aggression on the part of a neighbouring state. […] Uzbekistan has been 
interfering in our internal affairs for six years now. We have enough facts and proof to 
appeal to international organizations.’ Once again, Uzbek authorities denied 
allegations.101  
Secondly, one year later, when Tajikistan was believed to host Islamist 
guerrillas on borders with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the latter conducted bombing 
raids in the neighbouring country, spurring Bishkek’s and Dushanbe’s reactions. This 
event, again, was a clear example of the violation of a norm of a society. On 15 
August 1999, Uzbek warplanes attacked targets in the southern mountainous area 
some 15 km from the Tajik border. While the targets were believed to be in 
Kyrgyzstan, the warplanes entered Tajik territory specifically in Tajikistan’s Jirgatol 
District in a breach of sovereignty.  
Initially, the Uzbek government denied any allegations, and Uzbek officials 
denied taking part in the raids. Fyodor Banin, a spokesman for Uzbek defence 
ministry, stated that ‘it would be stupid to run after this small group of people, chasing 
them in airplanes and bombing. Such a military operation is not being conducted’. 
However, as the targets were believed to be terrorists, the Uzbek Foreign minister 
Abdulaziz Kamilov then spoke of a ‘mistake’ but justified his state’s actions claiming 
that ‘when we speak about an act of international terrorism, we consider it justified to 
undertake adequate measures.’102 The word ‘justified’ itself denotes the presence of 
the violation of a commonly accepted norm of international conduct.  
The Tajik reaction was quick to come: Tajik Foreign Minister 
                                                 
100 Interfax Russian News, 27 October 1997. 
101 Associated Press Worldstream, 12 November 1998. 
102 Associated Press Worldstream, 17 August 1999. 
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Talbak Nazarov handed over a diplomatic note to the Uzbek ambassador in 
to Tajikistan, Bakhtiyor Erjafhev, in Dushanbe on Monday 16 August in connection 
with the Uzbek air force raid. The incident was solved diplomatically. The head of the 
Tajik Foreign Ministry's Information Department, Igor Sattarov, speaking of 
‘bewilderment’ for an ‘unprecedented fact’, said that during the conversation, which 
had taken place behind closed doors, the Tajik side expressed its surprise at ‘this 
action by the Uzbek air force which cannot be justified by anything’ and demanded 
that ‘Tashkent take urgent steps to prevent such things from taking place in the future 
since they were at variance with principles and nature of relations that have developed 
between the two countries and in the region.’103 In the end, the circumstances were 
clarified, and the incident was solved.  
This small incident shows, however, that even if the Uzbek interference in the 
Tajik conflict was a violation of the sovereignty of an independent country, it was a 
legitimate one determined by the gravity of circumstances, which were putting at 
stake the survival of Tajik statehood.104 Help from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, albeit 
limited, showed that while non-interference was the norm, breaches of sovereignty 
were justified in the name of the greater good of order and survival of the region. 
However, the prompt diplomatic vehemence of the Tajik government in reply to a 
mistaken attack that left no casualties and that killed only some cattle signified that 
the institution of sovereignty was well internalised, and re-affirmed the pillar on 
which the region built its order. 
By looking at the wider management of the Tajik conflict, contra Olcott’s 
predictions of an apocalyptic scenario featuring even full-scale invasion from 
Uzbekistan (1994a: 44), its solution relied on diplomacy, international law and the 
derivatives of multilateralism and summitry. The rounds of negotiations that led to the 
UN-backed General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in 
Tajikistan on 27 June 1997 were the product of diplomatic and multilateral efforts 
enhanced and in some cases promoted by Central Asian states themselves. It is 
sufficient to recall that it was Karimov who appealed to the UN Secretary General in 
September 1992, thus de facto starting the UN involvement in the conflict.  
                                                 
103 Interfax Russian News, 16 August 1999. 
104 That Uzbek interference in the Tajik conflict was broadly considered as legitimate in Central Asia 
was confirmed in several interviews with Kazakh and Kyrgyz experts and foreign-policy makers, 




During the diplomatic process of reconciliation between the government of 
Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), the governments of Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan offered mediation and conciliatory presence. Askar Akaev even  
conducted bona officia using personal contacts among the parties which led to the 
Agreement on the Protocol on Political Issues in Bishkek, May 1997,105 while the 
Turkmen president Niyazov and his Foreign Minister Sikhmuradov participated in 
person in the three rounds of talks in Ashgabat. 
This shows how the doctrine of positive did not cut Turkmenistan off from the 
regional aspect of international relations, but actually allowed it to serve as a 
platform, as a participant in the pluralist aspects of it, such as those aimed at 
maintaining the survival, the coexistence and the stability of the region. Akbarsho 
Iskandarov, who served as ambassador to Turkmenistan at that time, remembered that  
 
Turkmenistan, keeping a neutral position, created all favourable 
conditions to make these negotiations [between the parties] 
successful. The negotiations were vital for the Tajik nation. 
Turkmenistan provided accommodation, technical means, computer 
equipment, transport and etc. We held two more rounds of 
negotiations in Turkmenistan later. During the negotiations 
opposing parties adopted mutually acceptable agreements on the 
ways to settle the inter-Tajik conflict. The most important thing was 
that we agreed on ceasing fire and any hostilities. Thus, the 
Ashgabat talks broke the ice of mistrust and enmity and got a long 
negotiation process closer to a successful end’ (Dubrovin undated).  
 
The institution of summitry was visible in the several meetings held in Central 
Asia to solve the conflict, also with the participation of delegates of the OSCE and the 
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) delegates: IV Round in Almaty, 22 May-2 
June 1995, V Round 30 November-22 December 1995, VI round 26 January-18 
February 1996, VII round 26 January-21 July 1996 in Ashgabat, VIII Round with 
meeting with Rahmonov and Nuri in Bishkek, 16-18 May 1997. 
Thus, even if their support was limited and Russia was the most powerful 
actor capable to stabilise the situation, the declarations and summits reviewed above 
well serve the scope of this chapter: the Central Asian states adopted rules, norms and 
institutions to manage and cope with their difficult post-independence environment, 
and acted in concert to solve those problems that could lead to regional conflagration 
and widespread conflict. The commonality of minds, the isonomy in their stance 
                                                 
105 Interview with Kamoluddin Abdullaev. 
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towards the Tajik civil war especially with the help and support of Turkmenistan were 
another sign of their ability to act in concert, to frame together the situation and to 
adopt normative instruments to bring order to the region.  
The military-security side of the Central Asian international society was also 
visible in the attempt to form a regional defensive force to prevent attacks from 
Afghan rebels, terrorists and to settle down the situation in Tajikistan.  
The first ideas about integrating defensive systems and coordinating foreign 
policies in defence matters were already visible in the Bishkek meeting of 28 January 
1994.106 At this meeting, the three defence ministers of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan reached full mutual understanding on the joint use of the installations and 
facilities inherited by the sovereign armies from the USSR armed forces (Marat 
2009).  
In addition, the ministers also discussed mutual relations in the field of arms 
and equipment supplies, the training of officers and specialists, military transport and 
other issues. In line with the solidarist regional spirit analysed above, the good result 
of the meeting led president Nazarbayev to speak of a possible Central Asian peace 
force to guarantee stability and order in the region.  
One year later, during a one-day summit of the Turkic countries held in 
Bishkek in August 1995, Nazarbayev stated that priority should be given to regional 
security, and gave his support to Karimov’s proposal for a permanent conference on 
security in Central Asia under the UN.107 While on the latter point nothing followed, 
with respect to the former he and the other Central Asia leaders favoured the creation 
of a UN battalion for resolving conflicts in the region. Thus, the Central Asian 
peacekeeping battalion (CentrAsBat) was formed on 15 December 1995 by 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, under the aegis of the UN and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Partnership for Peace programme.108  
CentrAsBat was designed to act as a collective rapid-response unit and it was 
created to deal with exactly the kind of forces that were to surface in the region four 
years later - that is, as noted, radical extremists and terrorists. While peacekeeping 
was its primary goal, it could also have curtailed the activities of terrorists and other 
                                                 
106 Russia’s Radio, Moscow, 28 January 1994. 
107 Interfax Russian News, 28 August 1995. 
108 Turkmenistan signed the Partnership for Peace Framework Document on May 10 1994; 
Kazakhstan on 27 May; Kyrgyzstan on 1 June and Uzbekistan on 13 July. 
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extremist groups (Stein 2012: 3). Thus, it can be said that CentrAsBat was set up as a 
preventive measure.  
CentrAsBat conducted military exercises in Central Asia with the U.S. in 1997 
and 1998, and conducted a seminar in the U.S. in 1999.  CentrAsBat ’97 included a 
parachute drop by all three national members of the battalion and members of the U.S. 
82nd Airborne Division.  The units took off from Fort Bragg, North Carolina in eight 
C-17s and flew 16 hours to Kazakhstan.  The exercise opened with a parachute jump 
into southern Kazakhstan followed by an exercise that included checkpoint control, 
vehicle inspections, riot control, mine field clearing and humanitarian aid operations. 
The latter half of the exercise took place in Uzbekistan.  
Yet, absence of legal and military harmonisation, of interstate coordination 
and financial resources contributed to its failure. Thus, it was gradually transformed 
from a peacekeeping battalion into a group of national peacekeeping forces from 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as the countries of the region concentrated 
on developing their own law-enforcement and security-sector bodies (Esenov 2003). 
However, CentrAsBat’s very existence paved the way for multilateral military 
exercises in 1998 and 2000 involving Central Asian, Western and some CIS countries. 
Cooperation between the armed forces of the then Collective Security Treaty (CST) 
member states (renamed in 2002 Collective Security Treaty Organisation, CSTO) has 
improved in part as a result of knowledge gained from these manoeuvres.  
Thus, it can be said that this very experience, although short-lasting and victim 
of the sovereignty/autonomy mantra of the region, was effective in creating a sense of 
shared threats, of needs of common responses, of coordination and regulation of their 
own military activities and an awareness of Central Asia as a sort of RSC (Buzan and 
Waever 2003). The institution of CentrAsBat was dismantled, but it favoured an 
acquaintance with the norm of multilateral defence.  
For example, after discussing the institutionalisation of CentrAsBat, all five 
Central Asian foreign ministers met in the Tajik capital of Dushanbe between 4-5 
April 1997 (and previously in Kazakhstan on 28 February) to devise ways of 
neutralizing the threat they see posed by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, 
and consolidating the peace process in Tajikistan.109  
Also, during a telephone conversation on 17 August 1998, 
                                                 
109 IPS-Inter Press Service, 7 April 1997. 
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Nazarbayev, Karimov, Akaev and Rahmonov were ‘unanimous in the opinion that the 
military conflict in Afghanistan must be discussed in detail from the point of view of 
stepping up security in Central Asia’, a news agency reported that day, quoting the 
Kazakh presidential press service.110 
In another example of regional convergence of defence and security matters, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan held a meeting of their Foreign and Defence 
Ministers in March 1998 to discuss combating Islamic extremism and arms and drugs 
smuggling in the region. After the trilateral talks, Uzbek Foreign Minister 
Abdulaziz Kamilov told the press conference that the three countries ‘cannot help 
being concerned over the instances of Islamic extremism throughout the region and in 
Uzbekistan in particular.’111  
The CentrAsBat spirit continued to inform the regional awareness of Central 
Asia, and increased notably the levels of solidarity among regional actors. As a matter 
of fact, the Defence and Foreign Ministers from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Tajikistan met in Tashkent on 23 August 1998 to discuss ‘possible scenarios, 
measures, and assistance, including military assistance’ among the Central Asian 
states according to Tajik Ambassador to Uzbekistan Tadzhitdin Mardonov.112  
Exactly one year later, following CentrAsBat exercises and joint meeting 
among Defence and Foreign ministries, the four governments implemented the 
potential solidarity in the military field launching a joint military action with a 
complete Central Asian character: Central Asian members operating on Central Asian 
soil.  
As a matter of fact, on 8 August 1999 a group of twenty-one guerrillas seized a 
Kyrgyz mayor and three security officers, but the hostages were freed unharmed after 
several days. Then, some 10 days later, the new wave of rebels fanned out into at least 
two regions of southern Kyrgyzstan, seizing four villages. According to contemporary 
sources, more than 4,100 refugees had fled to the regional centre, Batken, to escape 
the fighting in the mountains. Earlier defence officials said there were 1,000 
refugees.113 In addition, the rebels took four Japanese geologists, their Kyrgyz 
interpreter and a Kyrgyz general and soldier hostage.  
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113 Agence France Presse – English, 28 August 1999. 
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Therefore, on 22 August 1999, the four Foreign Ministers – Kasymjomart Tokayev of 
Kazakhstan, Muratbek Imanaliyev of Kyrgyzstan, Talbak Nazarov of Tajikistan and 
Abdulaziz Kamilov of Uzbekistan – flew to Kyrgyzstan’s largest southern city, Osh, 
on Saturday for a one-day meeting. In the press-statement after the meeting, it was 
said that the Foreign and Defence ministers and national security leaders of 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan ‘[had] worked out a plan of joint 
action to liquidate the terrorist groups.’ The statement said also that the bandits were 
emigrants from Central Asia and ‘a whole series of other states’ who ‘pose a common 
threat to all states of the region.’114  
The very reference to ‘the region’ paired with the agreement of setting up a 
joint rescue mission may well be a sign of a common we-feeling, of a common 
interest in managing regional affairs in a concerted way and to implement solidarist 
actions to reach a higher degree of stability, thus moving further away from a more 
pluralist conception of regional politics as mere coexistence. The joint military action 
was successful, and the hostages were finally rescued.  
All in all, the military side of the Central Asian international society was 
another example of dead-letter solidarism (Murden 2009, see below), where the 
experience of CentrAsBat reflect a common feeling of ‘being on the same boat’ and 
common awareness of the need of concerted actions to achieve the goals of order and 
stability. However, sovereign considerations, such as the will of each republic to 
develop its own army according to its own necessities (Marat 2007), slowed and in 
the end stopped the process of military integration, thus closing the experience of an 
integrated Central Asian military body.  
Nonetheless, that experience proved to be useful in creating a conscience of 
common dangers and on limited, short-termed possibilities of proactive cooperation, 
as the case of Japanese hostages showed. As the CAU in the economic field and the 
long series of diplomatic multilateral summits during the Tajik conflict, this limited 
solidarism created a template, a field for common discussion and socialisation that 
favoured a relatively smooth and ordered way of achieving an acceptable degree of 
order in the regional aspect of their international relations. The same happened in the 
environmental field. 
 




4.6 The Environment and the Nuclear-Weapon-Free zone as signs of a 
regional international society 
 
This section aims at showing how environmentalism115 and resistance to nuclear 
weapons became two institutionalised practices in Central Asia, and how the process 
of institutionalisation was another example of the convergence of Central Asian 
governments and of the birth of a Central Asian order. For the purpose of illustrating 
the operation of a social mechanism among the states in the region, I will focus on the 
tragedy of the Aral Sea.  
The exsiccation of the Aral Sea is largely due to the cotton monoculture, 
which in Soviet times was the main economic activity of the Uzbek SSR, the South-
Western part of the Kazakh SSR and of the Northern part of the Turkmen SSR. Due to 
its natural characteristics, the plant of cotton requires a huge amount of water (and at a 
deep level, since the stem of cotton penetrates deep into the terrain). Since this 
cultivation was boosted, for greater economic profits, with pesticides and chemical 
products, this contributed to further salinization of the sea, which resulted in quick 
drying.  
A few data indicate that the situation could not have been worse: while in 1960 
its surface was 67,500 km2, at the end of 2009 it was 8,409 km, with a loss of 88%. 
Its volume, from 1090 Km3, became 84.5, for a 92% loss. As far as salinity is 
concerned, while in 1960 it was 10 g/l circa, at the end of 2009 it resulted in more 
than 100g/l in the so called Large Aral (Zhurumbetova 2012).  
Concerns over this disastrous situation were present in the region already in 
the early 1990.116 References to the need of joint actions and common plans for 
rescuing the Aral Sea were present also in the common positions of the Central Asian 
states before the set up of the CIS, and always constituted part of the five-way 
meetings between heads of states and state-representatives of the region.  
As far as the institutional framework is concerned, the first step was the 
Statement signed by the Ministries of Water Resources of the former Central Asian 
Republics on 12 September 1991, in which they declared the need in joint 
                                                 
115 Environmentalism has been defined as the ‘ideology that seeks to rebalance the relationship 
between human society and the natural environment and is driven by a concern for the survival of 
individual species and the health of ecological systems overall’ (Falkner 2012: 511). 
116 Shirin Akiner stresses that perhaps the core of the ‘Central Asian identity’ is exactly this 
environmental awareness that, to some extent, cuts the region off from other zones politically and 
socially (1998: 55). 
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management of water resources of the Aral Sea basin. An Interstate Commission for 
Water Coordination (ICWC) was established. The second step was on 26 March 1993, 
when the five Central Asian countries founded the International Fund for Saving the 
Aral Sea (IFAS).  
Moving on to the policy side of the process of institutionalisation of 
environmentalism as a regional norm, we observe how, in the 1990s, several legal acts 
contributed to the entrenchment of a ‘green culture’ in the region, with respect to the 
Central Asian eco-system as well as of the narrower (and more serious) problem of 
the Aral Sea.  
Already back in 1992, the Agreement on cooperation in joint management, use 
and protection of water resources of interstate sources was signed. All Central Asian 
states, including Turkmenistan, are parties of this agreement. One year later, in 1993, 
the Agreement on joint actions to address the problem of the Aral Sea and 
surroundings, environmental improvement and ensuring socio-economic development 
of Aral Sea region was adopted. Again, all Central Asian states are parties. In 1998, all 
Central Asian states (this time with the exception of Turkmenistan) adopted the 
Agreement on use of water and energy resources in the Syrdarya river basin, and in 
1999 the important Agreement on the status of IFAS and its organizations, this time 
again with participation of all Central Asian states.  
In addition, a series of ‘soft law’ instruments composed of declarations and 
statements of IFAS Heads of States, signalling the birth of an aspirational customary 
practice in the field of environmental stewardship, was adopted.117 They are the 1995 
‘Nukus Declaration of Central Asian States and International Organizations on 
Sustainable Development of the Aral Sea Basin’, the 1999 ‘Ashgabat Declaration’, 
plus the 2001 ‘Tashkent declaration’, the 2002 ‘Dushanbe Declaration’ and the 2009 
‘Joint Statement of the Heads of States-Founders of IFAS’. Environmentalism in 
Central Asia was entrenched by the interplay with norms discussed and formed the 
global level, thus following suit and taking advantage of the more general ‘greening’ 
of international society (Jackson 2000: 175-178; Falkner 2012: 511-514).  
International legal instruments adopted and referred to by Central Asian states 
(but not necessarily by all of them, see next chapter) in their regional environmental 
management are the following: 
                                                 
117 On the notion of ‘aspirationalism’, meant in the ES literature as the tendency of states to 
tentatively abide by norms and rules over time, see Wilson (2009). 
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 The UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Water 
sources and International Lakes (Helsinki, 1992); 
 The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Water sources (New York, 1997); 
 The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context (Espoo, 1991); 
 The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (Rio de Janeiro, 1992); 
 The UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus, 
1998) 
 
The process of institutionalisation of the environmental norm within the Central Asian 
international society was visible in the more and more detailed organisation of the 
activities of the five republics in managing and discussing the problem of the Aral 
Sea. The setting up of IFAS, as a matter of fact, resulted in a much more coordinated 
and organised form of collaboration compared to the loose character of previous 
meeting and conferences.  
IFAS is characterised by an Executive Committee, based in Almaty, 
Kazakhstan, which works as a developer of regular and close cooperation with the 
international community and regional states in order to achieve support in the 
implementation of action plans, undertaking work to draw attention to the problems of 
the Aral Sea basin: the conservation of water resources and ecosystems and socio-
economic development.  
While results in environmental protection in Central Asia may have been 
modest,118 the institutionalisation of IFAS (which is a clear example of the generation 
of a ‘secondary institution’ following a ‘primary institution’, see chapter 3) and its 
continuous activity demonstrates that an environmental norm has penetrated Central 
Asia.  
The very fact that Central Asian states still convene to discuss environmental 
problems using this institution is an example of how IFAS and its organizations have 
                                                 
118 Nonetheless, there have been good results recently in terms of environmental protection, especially 
thanks to some mediating and technical role played by the UN Regional Centre for Preventive 
Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA), interview with a Central Asian representative of 
UNRCCA. See also ICWC (2012). 
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become an indispensable political platform for the negotiation process between 
countries, and for the development of bilateral and multilateral agreements for the 
joint integrated management of water resources of transboundary rivers in the basin of 
the Aral Sea.119  
At the meeting of Presidents of Central Asia in Almaty on 28 February 1997, 
the decision for principal reorganization of the governance structure of IFAS was 
taken. This structure is still active at present: 
 
 
Source: ‘Legal Basis of IFAS’, http://ec-ifas.waterunites-ca.org/about/mfsa/110-legal-basis-of-
ifas.html, accessed on 20 June 2013. 
 
The Central Asian specificity of the institution of environmentalism was visible 
already in the Tashkent Statement of 1991 when the presidents referred to the 
historical community of Central Asian peoples, their equal rights and responsibility 
for ensuring rational water resources use in the region, and recognised that only joint 
actions in coordination and management can help to effectively solve the region’s 
water problems in a context of increasing ecological and social tension. The statement 
referred to ‘indissoluble interdependence and relationship of all region peoples 
interests in common water resources use as a unified whole on the common principles 
and their consumption equitable regulation with regard to the all peoples interests’. 
Some years later, in 1999, President Niyazov argued that  
                                                 
119 Interview with Sultan Akimbekov. 
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Central Asian peoples have common historical, cultural and 
religious roots. […] The Aral Sea problem was inherited from 
Soviet period. Now we bear full responsibility for the fate of our 
independent Central Asian states and for the coming generations 
which will live in the new millennium, and therefore we should take 
all necessary steps to restore the natural equilibrium of the Aral Sea 
basin as well as other areas of the region.120  
 
Yet, despite the intrinsic solidarist nature of the institution of environmentalism,121 its 
slow effectiveness has been permitted by strong pluralist attitudes within it, 
entrenched also in the instruments of international law. This shows how, from and ES 
perspective, the role and adoption of an institution must always be seen in relation 
with other institutions in a complex web of normative prescriptions that may often 
clash with one another.  
As we have had the possibility to observe in the previous parts of this chapter, 
in the case of Central Asia in the 1990s, the paramount institution through which each 
international action was to be interpreted, was Westphalian sovereignty. The ICWC, 
included in the IFAS according to the Decision by the Heads of State of March 23, 
1993, for example is a collective body of Central Asian States acting on the basis of 
equity, equality and consensus. If one member is against a certain policy to address a 
problem in the ecological sphere of water management of saving the Aral Sea, there is 
no implementation.  
Article 1.3 of its statute reads that the ‘main goal of ICWC creation is 
approval of the principles of common water resources management and measures on 
joint programs realization on the base of mutual respect of the Sides interests [sic]’, 
and Article 3.3 foresees the presence of a ‘veto right’ in every decision of the 
commission.  
In the Interstate Council for the Aral Sea (ICAS), designated in 1993 as the 
principal regional organization responsible for formulating policies and preparing and 
implementing programs for addressing the crisis and consisting of twenty high-level 
members, including ministers of water management from each state, each state had 
one vote and the decisions were adopted by consensus (Agreement, § 8).  
Another example can be found in Article 3 of the Agreement between the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan on co-operation in interstate sources’ 
                                                 
120 Turkmen Television, First channel, 9 April 1999. 
121 Interview with Sultan Akimbekov; interview with Kazakh expert 1, November 13, 2013. 
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water resources use, protection and common management each party participating in 
the agreement is ‘obliged do not allow some action within its territory which can 
break interests of other parties and to make damage to them or lead to change of 
agreed water discharges and water sources pollution.’ 
Moreover, Article 13 of the of the same agreement reads that ‘all disputes have 
to be solved by the republican water-economic organizations heads,’ thus without 
foreseeing an institutionalised process of conflict-solve mechanism, and Article 14 of 
the IFAS agreement provides that ‘all disputes and disagreements between 
organizations of IFAS with the Sides, arisen during realization of the present 
Agreement, will be resolved by negotiations and consultations,’ thus de facto making 
the reach of common decision very difficult.  
The greater good of environmental protection is allowed, present and 
institutionalised, but depends from the good will and commonality of interest of state 
leaders. That these aspirational commitments found low application in reality due to 
under-funding and lack of political will was evident also to Central Asian leaders 
themselves. Already in 1995, during the meeting of Central Asian states in the city of 
Dashkhovuz, following those in Kzyl-Orda and Nukus, Nazarbayev pointed at the 
several problems affecting the implementation of regional programs and initiatives to 
save the Aral Sea. He stated that  
 
We simply cannot keep silent about the fact that we, the states who 
founded the fund, are not fulfilling our own obligations to transfer 
our contributions on time, which is delaying the attraction of other 
funds. It is clear that each of our countries can point to objective 
financial difficulties, but in this case I think it is much more 




At the Ashgabat meeting in 1999, Niyazov recognised that the political aspects of the 
Aral Sea problem were ‘becoming a touchstone of our interstate relations and a 
touchstone for us as politicians and leaders’, which could be resolved only via ‘mutual 
consent and political will’. Yet, once again, he stressed the pluralist character of the 
region and the importance of respecting each other’s will in condition of equality: 
‘without taking into account the interests of each state, it is hard to achieve any 
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success at all.’123  
After the set up of IFAS, results were visible in the approval of a World Bank 
(WB) project to manage the water resources and the environment in the Aral Sea 
basin, the cost of which is estimated at $21 million. The states of the region agreed to 
contribute 20% of this total sum towards funding the programme. But overall, despite 
the great number of documents and declarations signed, the absence of conflict-
solution mechanisms and the over-reliance on consensus and on the ‘interest of the 
parties’ prevented the full realisation of what was an impressively institutionalised 
regional scheme of environmental management, especially if different economic 
conditions and technological imbalances are taken into account (Allison and Jonson 
2001).  
Yet, from an ES perspective, the effectiveness of all these initiatives is of less 
importance, and failures should not be interpreted too harshly. What counts here is 
that the durability, the continuous attendance of its meetings, and the structured 
organisation of this institution signals a common commitment of Central Asian states 
to solve what they perceive to be an environmental disaster that can well be a threat to 
their sovereignty and statehood in the near future.  
The creation of specific regimes, the sustainability of meetings and 
consultations, the recognition of problems of economic and political nature and the 
constant reference to international (customary and written) legislation show how the 
norm of environmental protection has found resonance in the Central Asian region, 
especially thanks to those experiences of exploitation and environmental neglect in 
Soviet times which caused a sort of regional norm localisation, i.e., the adoption of a 
norm being entrenched at the global level but that was absent at the regional one. 
Indicative are the words of Karimov: 
 
The entire socialist camp lived off that cotton. They put pressure on 
Turkmenistan, and not only it but also Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to 
produce more and more cotton – let’s have more cotton so that we 
can feed Cuba, Korea and the whole socialist camp with cotton. It 
was this barbaric use of water resources that led to the Aral tragedy. 
Our achievement in the post-Soviet period is that we, as you can 
see, five presidents are sitting around one table. Tell me, could we 
have arranged a meeting of the five republics of Central Asia and 
Kazakhstan, the five heads of these republics, in Soviet times? 
Never. No one would have let it happen. It is precisely the 
conditions of our independence, the conditions which have 
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developed, which have allowed us to appeal to the world public, 
as Nazarbayev said.124 
 
While not entirely efficient on their own, all these regional initiatives signalled the 
adoption of a norm in a region cut off from the normative dynamics of environmental 
stewardship that were taking place at the global level at the moment of independence, 
and also have had the merit to attract the attention of international institutions, foreign 
sponsoring governments and sectors of world society (such as epistemic communities, 
TNAs, funding bodies and research communities) in order to find those solution and 
common grounds for discussion that a mere regional initiative would not be able to 
guarantee.  
Also, from an international society perspective, this environmental concern 
has had the merit to make Central Asian states more acquainted with the instruments 
of international law and diplomacy, joining multilateral treaties, adopting international 
standards of reference and searching for multilateral formats of dialogue and 
discussion.  
As a matter of fact, an analysis of the documents on environmental regional 
protection shows that there is still an adjustment to the provisions of international law, 
as there are many organisational, jurisdictional and legal overlaps among the 
institutions and their legal bases. In particular, it has been noted how the documents 
endorsed  ‘acceptance of the existing situation with regard to the use of water, which 
calls for water apportionment and maximum utilization’ while ‘according to 
prevailing international practice, the concept of water apportionment is replaced with 
that of equitable and reasonable utilization. In addition, the emphasis currently is on 
the optimum, rather than maximum, utilization’ (Caponera in Vinogradov 1996: 411).  
Thus, the creation of joint institutions favoured a slow but nonetheless 
observable move from a period of norm localisation (or rather norm ‘hybridisation’, 
as elements of international law and Soviet practices co-existed in the cooperative 
legal framework for the Aral Sea) to a more substantial norm adoption, which is the 
recognised international practice (in this case exemplified by the norm of optimum 
utilization of water resources) (Vinogradov 1996: 414).125 
                                                 
124 Kazakh Television, Alma-Ata, 5 March 1995. 
125 The emphasis on maximisation rather than optimisation and the solidarist intents ending up in 
pluralist, self-interested results have been also evident in the management of the Naryn/Syrdaya 
basin management. In March 1998, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement 
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Furthermore, the institutionalisation of ICWC made possible to preserve the unified 
water management system in the form of BVOs (Bassejnovoe Vodnoje Ob’edinenie), 
created in 1986, thus at least avoiding a deterioration in water routes and maintaining 
a commonly accepted framework to discuss re-distribution of water quotas 
(Vinogradov 1996: 407).  
Moreover, the multilateral framework for environmental stewardship in 
Central Asia was paired with the mediating role of the CAU, the CAEC and in the 
2000s of the CACO, thus reinforcing the sense of common interests and common 
incentives to provide the region with economic, ecological and social survival and 
development, downplaying competitive attitudes in the sharing of water resources in 
the region and promoting broader economic agreements including trade of 
hydroelectric energy and fossil fuel to promote regional goals (Wolf and Newton: 
2008). 
 
4.7 The Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone 
 
 
Paired with the institution of environmentalism, context-specific derivative norms 
against nuclear weapons and nuclear experiments featured in the institutional 
framework of the Central Asian republics.  
In Soviet times, Central Asia was a site for nuclear tests and nuclear storage. 
In particular several experiments, detonations and tests occurred in the at the 18,000-
square-kilometer Semipalatinsk nuclear site in north-east Kazakhstan (also known as 
STS or Semipalatinsk-21). It has been calculated that from 1949 to 1989, at least 456 
nuclear devices – both atmospheric and underground – were detonated there 
(Najibullah and Bestayeva 2011).  
Nuclear weapons were also believed to be stationed and held in Uzbekistan, 
and it has been argued that the Soviet Union used two Peaceful Nuclear Explosions 
(PNEs) in what is now southern Uzbekistan to seal runaway gas well fires in 1966 and 
1968 (Nordyke 1998). In addition, enriched uranium and other nuclear/radioactive 
                                                                                                                                            
(joined by Tajikistan in 1999) on a barter system including water dispenses and other products in 
exchange of it from the downstream countries. While the compliance with the agreement has been 
extremely high, thus signifying the institutionalisation of environmental and water management in 
Central Asia, performance has been incredibly low. This is because commitments are very low, and 
the management of water was not optimal, reflecting a zero-sum logic on the side of upstream 
countries (Bernauer and Sigfried 2008: 488-494). 
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material had not been removed from Uzbekistan until 2006 (Linder 2006). 
Given the centralised nature of the Soviet government, nuclear activities in the 
Central Asian region were not disputable. The dictates of Great-Powerness admitted 
no concerns for the health of the people and environmental consequences. However, 
consequences for health and biosphere have been tremendous: according to Togzhan 
Kassenova, radioactive fallout from nuclear testing had a direct impact on the health 
of about 200,000 local residents, with specific effects directly linked different forms 
of cancer and thyroid abnormalities (Kassenova 2009). With the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the site was closed and nuclear tests were halted.  
The closure was favoured also by anti-nuclear movements which sprang 
spontaneously in Central Asia in the late 1980s. In particular, the Nevada 
Semipalatinsk movement in Kazakhstan, born on 28 February 1989 and led by the 
poet Olzhas Suleimenov, attracted thousands of people to its protests and campaigns 
which eventually led to the closure of Semipalatinsk.  
Supporters of his movement were to be found in the whole Central Asian 
region and a branch in Bishkek, as well as in Europe and in the US. According to 
UNESCO ‘the people of Kazakhstan undertook the first real step to universal nuclear 
disarmament by stopping tests in the USSR’, and Nevada-Semipalatinsk  
 
played a positive role in the understanding by the general public of 
the necessity to fight against nuclear threats. It gained wide support 
throughout whole world and, became a real historical factor in 
finding solutions to global ecological problems.126 
 
The actions of Nevada Semipalatinsk were of decisive importance for the cessation of 
atomic weapons testing in Kazakhstan as well as it was the gaining of sovereignty by 
the Republic. On 29 August 1991, Nazarbayev signed a Decree on the closure of the 
Semipalatinsk nuclear site. This was the first step to de-nuclearise the region. Soon, 
among Central Asian states a consensus was built to make Central Asia a nuclear 
weapon free zone (CANWFZ).127 The initiative was launched by Uzbek President 
Islam Karimov in his speech at the 48th Session of the UN General Assembly on 28 
                                                 
126 UNESCO Memory of the World Register, Ref. N°. 2004-22. 
127 The creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia is a diplomatic as well as a geopolitical 
success: as a matter of fact, the CANWFZ is the only NWFZ in the northern hemisphere. In 
addition, it is also the first of the NWFZ treaties to require its members to comply fully with 





Uzbekistan is in favour of the total abolition of nuclear weapons. 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will have 
to become a more efficient treaty, unrestricted by any time limits. 
Our Republic will actively participate in preliminary negotiations 
for the preparation of a conference on the prolongation of this 
Treaty. Uzbekistan is a staunch supporter of proclaiming Central 
Asia a nuclear-free zone.128 
 
The process of establishing the CANWFZ was long and not without clashes and 
disagreements (Kutnaeva 2013). What is of interest here, however, as stated many 
times, are the modalities and the procedures by which the five Central Asian states 
created some kind of order to manage what they believed to be a common and shared 
threat to their survival.  
As it can be expected, the institutions of diplomacy and international law 
informed the adoption of shared understandings on nuclear issues in the region. In 
particular, the institution of regional summitry proved to be the preferred vehicle for 
advancing the creation, although negotiations within international institutions were 
part of the process as well. For example, in 1994, at the 49th session of the UNGA, 
Kyrgyzstan voiced support for the establishment of a CANWFZ, and in 1995 joined 
with Uzbekistan in proposing the creation of a CANWFZ at the NPT Review and 
Extension Conference.  
As said, however, it was in the region that the road for the adoption of the 
treaty was paved. The crucial step in the process of moving the CANWFZ from an 
abstract proposal to a concrete policy initiative was taken on 27 February 1997, when 
the five presidents of the Central Asian states issued the Almaty Declaration endorsing 
the creation of a CANWFZ. The declaration specifically placed the establishment of 
the CANWFZ in the context of the environmental challenges faced by all five Central 
Asian states. Significantly, they agreed to call on all states concerned, on the eve of 
the 50th anniversary of the former Soviet Union nuclear weapons test site at 
Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan.  
Two months later, on 7-18 April 1997, at the session of the NPT Preparatory 
Committee, the five Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) agreed to form a working group of foreign ministry 
officials to coordinate activities related to creating a CANWFZ. The group held 
                                                 
128 UN A/48/PV.6 
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meetings in Almaty, Bishkek, Geneva, New York, Sapporo, and Tashkent, thus 
integrating the process of the creation of the CANWFZ within international 
governmental and epistemic structures. These meetings resulted in preparation of a 
draft text of the Treaty for a NWFZ in Central Asia.  
On 14-16 September, the international conference ‘Central Asia—A Nuclear 
Weapon Free Zone’ was held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Among participants were three 
delegations from five nuclear states of the EEC, from African, Latin American and 
Asian countries, from the UN, OSCE, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), the Islamic Conference Organization, NATO, and others.129  
The conference considered lessons learned during the creation of these zones, 
which may be useful for the drafting of a CANWFZ treaty. Following the meeting, the 
Foreign Ministers of the five Central Asian States issued the Tashkent Statement, 
reaffirming their commitment to the establishment of a NWFZ and requested that the 
specialized agencies of the UN establish a group of experts, with the participation of 
experts from the region, to elaborate the forms and elements of preparation and 
implementation of an agreement on the establishment of a NWFZ in Central Asia.  
This regional legal and diplomatic processes culminated in the 52nd session of 
the UNGA, held in September 1997, where the five Central Asian states jointly 
submitted a draft resolution endorsing the CANWFZ initiative.130 The common 
interests and joint objectives of the Central Asian republics were, in the end, manifest 
on the global scene. In the document, the five states  
 
aware of their common responsibility, proceeding from their 
unwavering desire to work together, expressing the united view of 
their peoples, and having signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons […] consider[ed] that the establishment of a 
nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia is consistent with 
national, regional and global security interests. 
 
 
                                                 
129 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 September 1997. 




Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 23-24 September 1997, signatures of the five Central Asian presidents on 
the document submitted to the UNGA endorsing the creation of a CANWFZ.  
 
 
In 1998 (year of environmental protection in the Central Asian region, under the aegis 
of the UN, according to the Almaty declaration of 1997), on 9-10 July, an expert 
working group meeting, held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan and attended by representatives 
from the five Central Asian States, the five nuclear-weapon states (NWS), the UN and 





Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 8 July 1998.  
 
The Communique recognized that the Central Asian States had made some progress in 
drafting the legal document on a NWFZ and that working consultations on basic 
elements of the future NWFZ were necessary. The five Central Asian States submitted 
a document entitled ‘Basic elements of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in 
Central Asia’. The Central Asian States also acknowledged that continued 
consultations of experts from the NWS on the establishment of a NWFZ would be 
very useful (NTI undated).  
As stated earlier, the process was not immune from disagreements and 
stumbling blocks. The two principal loci of disagreement that emerged during the 
negotiations among the five Central Asian states were (1) how the CANWFZ treaty 
would treat the possible transit of nuclear weapons through the CANWFZ; and (2) the 
relationship of the CANWFZ treaty to previous international agreements, especially 
security treaties involving some of the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Tajikistan argued for permissive provisions regarding transit and preserving 
existing security arrangements, while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan favoured more 




Nonetheless, the process of drafting the treaty continued, and disagreements were 
successfully dealt with in subsequent years. As the Uzbek Foreign Minister 
Abdulaziz Kamilov said, the path towards a nuclear non-proliferation treaty in Central 
Asia would be a long one, but he argued that at least the Tashkent conference had 
paved the way.131  
The discourse around the creation of a CANWFZ, however, highlights many 
interesting facts on Central Asia from an ES perspective. Firstly, it shows how in 
matters of survival, security and stability, the Central Asian states recognise their 
regionness in terms of common inheritances, security and environmental 
interdependence and  prospects of development. As stated by the Kyrgyz Foreign 
Minister Muratbek Imanaliyev, Central Asian states reached, via constructive 
dialogue and common interests, 
 
a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament, adding to 
regional and global stability, demonstrating the civilized countries’ 
resolve to reassert the nuclear non-proliferation accord.132  
 
Secondly, it shows how the institution of diplomacy, its derivative of summitry and 
international law have been paramount in fostering regional dialogue, thus serving as 
a solid, reliable ‘relational template’ even if disagreements and confrontation (as the 
case of IFAS demonstrated) were common. In particular, these institutions proved to 
be a solid lane to the global level, thus linking the de-nuclearisation of the region to 
consultation and multilateral advice with global powers and institutions, as the 5+5+ 
UN formula adopted in Bishkek and Tashkent (the five   Central Asian states 
plus the five nuclear powers and the United Nations) shows.  
Thirdly, it shows how the emergence of environmentalism as a primary 
institution (and of its derivative of anti-nuclear weapons) has been possible via the 
powerful role of historical processes and legacies, a common understanding among 
the leaderships of the region and, perhaps most importantly, by the role that TNAs 
                                                 
131 Agence France Presse – English, 16 September 1997. In an interview on 13 April 1999, the Kyrgyz 
Deputy Foreign Minister Dzhekshekulov argued that, in full compliance with international law, the 
zone would be totally conforming to the NPT, and that contra general scepticism and disagreements 
the Central Asian states had to be commended for finding ‘platforms of dialogue’, ‘working 
mechanisms’ to provide ‘diplomatic convergence’ to create the CANFWZ. The final project of the 
treaty was reached in the Tashkent summit between experts of the region on 1-3 February 1999. 
Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 13 April 1999, ‘Tsentral’naya Aziya an uti k zone, svobodnoi ot yadernovo 
oruzhiya’. 
132 Interfax Russian News, 20 July 1998. 
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and sectors of civil society have played in presenting environmental issues as regional 
ones (Weinthal and Watters 2010). In ES language, the inter-state society norm of 
environmentalism and its derivative of anti-nuclear weapons was enhanced and 
supported by relevant sectors of a Central Asian and global world society.  
Thus, before concluding this section, it must be stressed that the Central Asian 
environmental realm is perhaps the most critical in terms of ES analysis, and the most 
interesting from a dynamic viewpoint. To adopt, interpret, localise, ameliorate and 
entrench in the region environmental and anti-nuclear weapons norms, a complex and 
polyhedral interplay of global, regional and local level has been at play.  
Great Powers, international institutions global trans-national actors, regional 
institutions and consortia, as well as summits and meetings, sectors and movements of 
global and regional civil society: all these members of the international system have 
been protagonists in creating a normative framework for discussion, consultation and 
decision on delicate environmental issues which are truly and exclusively regional in 
character.  
 
4.8 A regional international society at the level of Presidents? 
 
 
In this last section, I argue that from an ES perspective, another distinguishing feature 
of the Central Asian international society that was forming in the 1990s was the 
legitimacy given to a specific form of government, that of patrimonial 
authoritarianism.  
While homogeneity of rule is an indicator of a shared and agreed norm in a 
societal (and in this case regional) context (Cummings 2002: 1-10), we still need to 
look at the acceptability, at the legitimacy that such a norm has in the context. We 
need, in sum, to look at those evaluations, assessments, judgments and comments that 
make this norm ‘the right thing to do’ in the context under examination. If we looked 
just at homogeneity, the societal component of the task would be lost, and the whole 
exercise would be only pigeon-hole filling and shallow comparisons.  
Again, words from local and international actors may be helpful in revealing 
the degree of acceptability of the institution of authoritarianism in Central Asia.133 To 
                                                 
133 I follow Linz (1970: 255) and consider an authoritarian regime a political regime ‘with limited, not 
responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive 
mentalities, without extensive or intensive political mobilisation, excepts at some points in their 
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begin, after becoming independent, all five Central Asian states opted for presidential 
forms of government. And for the whole decade, the presidents had been all the same, 
and with the same Communist background: Niyazov had been in power since 1985, 
Karimov since 1989, Nazarbayev since 1989, Akaev since 1990 and Rahmonov since 
1992 (when he became Head of Government; he then became president in 1994).  
Combining increasingly different foreign policies and economic strategies of 
liberalisation, they achieved different degrees of concentration of power: Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan, for example, were more liberal and less authoritarian than 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Tajikistan, as we observed, was struggling with a 
bloody civil conflict and the government had very limited occasions to manifest its 
own nature.  
All of them, however, presented distinct authoritarian traits: limited or almost 
non-existent opposition, very few civil and political rights, an emphasis on the 
provision of economic and social goods and preference for order and stability that for 
liberty and freedom. In this respect, Karimov was categorical: ‘in our republic there 
may be either democracy or order’. According to him, ‘the experience of South 
Korea, Chile, China and even Turkey’ were ‘the best proof of the effectiveness of a 
strong-arm policy in conditions of Central Asian countries’.134  
Due to the difficulties of political and economic transitions, however, and 
because of instabilities at the southern borders of the region, Central Asian presidents 
decided to give their presidential mandate a boost. In 1994, Saparmurat Niyazov 
extended his presidency via a referendum, which gave a positive response by 99.9 % 
of the votes.135 In the neighbouring republics of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, in 1995, 
referendums were held as well to extend the length of the presidential mandate (26 
March in Uzbekistan and 29 April in Kazakhstan). The few months between the 
referendums in the Central Asian republic is a hint of a mutual acceptability of this 
practice in a regional context were Soviet political and bureaucratic identities, 
patronage networks and security concerns requiring immediate and not contrasted 
actions were paramount (Collins 2002).  
In the words of a Western diplomat based in Almaty then observing the 
                                                                                                                                            
development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally 
ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones’. 
134 Moscow News (Russia), 10 September 1993. 
135 Moscow News (Russia), 11 February 1994. 
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practice of referendum in Central Asia and confirming the presence of a commonality 
of minds of Central Asian leaders in structuring the region along precise political 
lines, ‘[a]ll these referendums in central Asia are definitely the result of a dialogue 
between the presidents’.136 Indeed, Karimov was quick in congratulating Nazarbayev 
on his victory in the referendum:  
 
The results of the referendum demonstrated once more not just trust 
in President Nazarbayev, not only trust in his policy and the policy 
of the government. […] The most important thing is that the people 
of Kazakhstan have shown unity, because in these complicated 
circumstances only unity, stability and mutual understanding can 
make those great hopes and thoughts come true, those great wishes 
which Kazakh people want to make come true today.137 
 
 
Although Kyrgyzstan had been characterised a beacon of democracy in Central Asia, 
thanks also to the adoption of brands like ‘the Island of Democracy’ and ‘the 
Switzerland of Central Asia’ (Marat 2007), Akaev followed suit in what was 
becoming a legitimate regional practice. As a matter of fact, no criticism, no 
reprimands came to those leaders who enacted the referendums. On the contrary, a 
process of regional socialisation was underway.  
Thinking of extending his power up to 2001, Akaev, after governing for one 
year by decree and shutting the Parliament, followed suit in the practice of 
referendum, but without success. In spring 1995, following talks started already in 
autumn 1994, a governmental group in Bishkek collected one million signatures, 52% 
of Kyrgyzstan’s voting population in support of holding the referendum. The group 
said the country ‘need[ed] unification around one leader, which might be inhibited by 




                                                 
136 Agence France Presse – English, 29 April 1995. 
137 Kazakh Radio first programme, Alma-Ata, 20 May 1995. 




Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 24 October 1994.  
 
 
Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 28 March 1995.  
 
 
The decision to hold a referendum to ensure power and to prolong it was clearly 
dictated by the regional context: 1994-1995, as we saw above, were the years in 
which the construction of a Central Asian regional project was underway. Better 
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political relations with more powerful and authoritarian neighbours depended also, 
according to Akaev, on a common and shared political regime that would ensure 
stability and security to the region.139 Indeed, the press-secretary of the president 
stated that the referendum was ‘in keeping with the practice of neighbours’ (Huskey 
1997: 275, fn. 91, emphasis added).140 While the hold of the referendum was not 
successful because of the Parliament’s rejection, Akaev held another referendum (this 
time successful) on extending his powers.  
Acting directly on the Constitutional provisions, Rahmonov of Tajikistan 
expanded the post’s duration from five to seven years. By the end of the decade, 
therefore, a true Central Asian ‘club’ of personal authoritarian regimes was 
established (Cummings 2002: 11), and the mutual legitimacy, mutual references of the 
presidents in the region made to each other weakens, somehow, Collins’ argument of 
the 1990s as a phase of regime ‘divergence’ in Central Asia (2002: 140-141).  
The words, the support, the justifications used by Central Asian presidents 
created a regional institution, that of personal authoritarianism, that was more and 
more increasingly shared by all members of the society. The institutionalisation of 
authoritarianism as ‘the rule’ in the region was also facilitated by other factors: all 
presidents had learned a common political language (Russian), received similar Soviet 
era ideological training, and were acquainted with one another as Communist Party 
officials. The legitimacy of the institution relied, therefore, on a strong Soviet 
inheritance which combines bureaucracy, tradition and personalised rule (Matveeva 
2010: 18).141   
Another example of authoritarian solidarity can be found after the Tashkent 
bombs on 16 February 1999, when several explosions took place in the Uzbek capital 
in what was an attack to Karimov allegedly on behalf of the Islamic Movement of 
                                                 
139 At the Shimkent meeting in April 1995, Karimov and Akaev expressed appreciation for 
Nazarbayev’s idea of extending his powers via a referendum. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 18 April 1995, ‘U 
trekh – odna tsel’. 
140 Mokhira Suyarkulova argued that Akaev’s attempt to hold a referendum to extend his powers was 
‘a good example of a regional norm developing, of what is considered normal and 
desirable…yeah…and it happened a lot, this mutual socialisation’. Interview. 
141 Several interviewees mentioned the familiarity, acquaintance, common mentality between the 
leaders as a stabilising factor in the region. E.g., interview with Kazakh Professor at KIMEP 
University; interview with Kazakh expert 1; interview with Irina Chernykh, expert in Kazakhstan, 
November 14, 2013; interview with Dosym Satpaev, Political Risk Assessment Group, November 




Uzbekistan (IMU). On that very same day, President Karimov held telephone 
conversations with Nazarbayev, Niyazov and Akaev, with the latter expressing their 
condolences and deciding to become less rhetorical and more coordinated in their 
fight against oppositionist Islam and in tightening security measures in the region 
(Abdullaev 2002: 265). 
The institution of patrimonial authoritarianism was supported also by regional 
leaders with cultural explanations, referring to a ‘Eurasian culture’ where deference, 
order and stability were key values. Perhaps unconsciously, the regional leaders 
engaged in a process of norm localisation (Acharya 2004), by stating that while it was 
true that they adopted the institutions of democracy as meant in the West, these 
institutions had to be ‘tailored’ and ‘contextualised’ according to the nature of the 
region.142  
This was evident in the words of Nazarbayev on the practice of the 
referendum: ‘Western views of democracy have to be modified in the specific context 
of Asia’.143 The rejection of the global character of the institution of democracy was 
evident in Nazarbayev’s words, when questioned about the practice of referendums in 
the region: ‘Why should people dictate to us how we should behave?’144 In addition, 
speaking of his Central Asian fellows, he stated that  
 
Kazakhstan is less than a century from feudalism, and only 
yesterday did we escape totalitarianism. How can we measure our 
democracy in the same way as the United States or Europe? Western 
models don’t work in our Eurasian space. […] We are Asian 
countries. We have a certain mentality of our own.145  
 
Significantly, at the gala ceremony for Nazarbayev’s electoral victory in January 
1999, both Karimov and Akaev were present.146 The strength of the regional group 
around a personal, authoritarian leadership reached a peak comparable to an almost 
institutionalisation of dynasticism, when Nazarbayev’s daughter Aliya and Akaev’s 
                                                 
142 In order to anticipate possible criticism, it is worthwhile to recall that it is not of importance 
whether they were using these arguments just to support their power, rule and greed or whether they 
truly believed in a Eurasian culture. From an ES perspective, what is important is that references to 
a global-level institution, democracy, have been used to ‘localise’ and ‘specify’ a set of recurrently 
sustained shared practices that led to the adoption of a regional-level institution, patrimonial 
authoritarianism. On the practice of justifications, hypocrisy, window-dressing and smoke-screens 
in international society, see Jackson (2000: 67-68). 
143 IPS-Inter Press Service, 2 May 1995. 
144 The Associated Press, 5 April 1995. 
145 The Globe and Mail (Canada), 1 May 1995. 
146 Agence France Presse – English, 20 January 1999. 
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son Aidar married in Cholpon Ata in 1998.147  
 
 
Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 21 July 1998. 
 
Attending the wedding were also Karimov and Rahmonov, while Niyazov was 
recovering from an operation (BBC 1998). Perhaps more importantly, the wedding 
took place after a Central Asian summit one week earlier, so showing once again a 
degree of solidarity among the heads of states.  
This discussion is inherently linked to what has been dealt with in Chapter 2 
with respect to the relationship between neopatrimonial regimes and international 
society. It makes clear that it is conceptually difficult to follow a purely state-centric, 
conventional ES reading of international society when concepts like ‘security’ and 
‘interest’ are in fact linked to regimes and not to states themselves and people.  
In this last part of the chapter, I expand on the previous discussion focussing 
not just on how an international society is nonetheless conceivable between autocrats, 
but also how regime type functions as a constitutive element of such society, 
                                                 
147 While not part of the questionnaire, this marriage has been interestingly mentioned several times as 
an example of regional solidarity in several interviews. E.g., interview with Emil Juraev; interview 
with Zhenis Kembayev, Professor of International Law, KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 
November 15, 2013; interview with Nuria Kutnaeva, independent expert and analyst, Bishkek, 
Kyrgyzstan, December 3, 2013. 
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demarcating an inside and an outside in which agents can find themselves.  
With respect to the former, the research has shown how societal dynamics 
structured around discourses of non-interference, preservation of sovereignty, 
necessity of strong rule and preservation of authority can very much lead to a state 
(regime)-centric multilateralism focussed on minimal tasks of hard (regime) security 
and preservation (Jackson 2014). In the course of a discussion with a local 
international lawyer very much acquainted with Central Asian legislation on human 
rights and civil liberties, I was told that ‘in terms of internal legislation, they look at 
each other, they look at their behaviour, they mimic each other, they compare each 
other. They try to be at the same level. You can find the same law in all the countries 
with very little time difference. They also look at Russia, but their first referents are 
Central Asian states.’148 This, as discussed in the course of the literature review and in 
the presentation of the theoretical foundations of the thesis, requires us to go beyond 
our Eurocentric normative assumptions of integration on multiple levels of policy 
based on liberal assumptions. In fact, as John Heathershaw argues,  
 
Central Asian international politics are indeed fluid and regionalism 
is weak […] but a Central Asian regional identity very much exists 
among political elites and is based on a neo-soviet ideology which 
is more or less practised and reproduced across the region. The 
identification of neo-sovietism as the basis for a Central Asian 
imagined regional community provides much-need ideational 
context to the lack of institutionalised cooperation and functionalist 
regionalisation (Heathershaw 2006: 19).  
 
This is true even with respect to more contemporary events. Recent revelations on 
Nazarbayev pushing for the restoration of an authoritarian form of government in 
Kyrgyzstan after the 2010 events (CA-News 2015) are an additional proof of the fact 
that ‘the rule in the region is internal stability and regional stability’. This neo-
sovietism or, as it has been called here, elitist/autocratic solidarity, is institutionalised 
in the sense that it is visible in the discourses, in the practices, in the gestures of the 
regional leaders. A local representative of an international organisation told me, quite 
frankly, that ‘in terms of rules of the game, here it is personal relations that matter. All 
these presidents know each other from the past, they understand each other, they can 
even make favours to each other…After the elections, for example, it is really 
important who congratulates you first, and if you are late [by] a couple of days it can 
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be taken as some kind of offence, it’s a present, like at [a] wedding or at a funeral.’149  
This neopatrimonial understanding of international society is in fact very 
important for the regimes, as it not only gives them the possibility to reinforce their 
leadership in a relatively calm regional context, but also and perhaps more 
importantly provides them with legitimacy and recognition. As the political analyst 
Shairbek Juraev told me in the course of an interview, ‘There is solidarity between 
authoritarian leaders in the region…but it is something you cannot really observe, 
because they don’t get together…it is more in the practices…The way they treat 
opposition, how they treat Islamic radical movements, the way they modify the 
constitutions, the readiness to come together when it comes to extremism, separatism, 
terrorism and all those evils’.150  
Concepts such as avtoritet and stabilnost are performed and advocated within 
Central Asia: they are not just political narratives, but real normative discourses that 
inform social relations among regimes in the region. They have the status of values 
underpinning a community of states and leaders interested in preserving their power 
while maintaining peaceful coexistence and relatively low conflict to pursue exactly 
the task of regime enhancement. In this respect, my interview with the expert Irina 
Chernykh was insightful. She told me that ‘during the 1990s and also now, the 
political elites of Central Asian countries securitise neighbours and some problems 
that happen inside [the countries] or between them to keep stability. …During the 
civil war in Tajikistan, for us, internally, in the region and in the countries, it was 
“Tajikisation”. And today it is “Afghanisation”. It is very common practice that 
Central Asian political elites securitise security issues or some problems of 
neighbours. We are at the level of securitisation, but not of violating non-interference. 
This is because all Central Asian leaders are afraid of loss of stability. I remember 
Karimov and Nazarbayev speaking of “Tajikisation” in order to maintain domestic 
stability. “This is democratisation, do you want that?’.151  
With respect to the second point, it is indeed very interesting to discuss how 
authoritarianism became, and still is, the ‘membership criteria’ for the Central Asian 
regional international society, a real ‘constitutive’ norm. As we saw, Akaev felt 
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pressured by the referendums in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and felt the need to keep 
up with the neighbours’ practice in order to be accepted and considered. This is also 
visible later on after the 2010 events in Kyrgyzstan. The demise of the authoritarian 
and neopatrimonial regime of Bakiyev, despite claims to non-interference and 
legitimacy accorded to the new government, was felt as a deviation from the rule. 
Kyrgyzstan was mentioned as a ‘bad example’ in the region by several interviewees. 
Some of them actually referred to international society logics in play. The political 
scientist Mars Sariev, for example, argued that ‘[One] can explain parliamentarianism 
in Kyrgyzstan with the absence of resources. We needed investments, we met the 
conditions of the West. We actually got billions of dollars. But it is still an experiment, 
a project. But we need funds, there is conditionality. But the main actors in the region, 
especially Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, don’t like this, and they look at Kyrgyzstan as 
a sort of white bird (belaya vorona!). It’s a white crow!’152 Nuriia Kutnaeva described 
Kyrgyzstan as ‘the child whom nobody wants to play with’, and stated that ‘this 
difference in regime type is also affecting international relations in the region, since 
for authoritarian states [it] is difficult to deal with Kyrgyzstan’.153  
In addition to this narrative, two official Uzbek sources referred to 
authoritarianism as ‘the rule’, and blessed Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
(‘we were lucky to have such leaders!’) for having strong personalities to resolve 
conflicts: ‘Strong leaders preserve order. Compare Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan to Kyrgyzstan!’154 The performative construction of Kyrgyzstan as an 
‘outsider’ of the Central Asian society of states, as the ‘pariah’, was even more 
evident in the ‘brotherly’ Kazakhstan. As a local expert, who worked on regional 
politics in 2010, told me,  
 
the neutrality of Kazakhstan was like this chaotic Kyrgyzstan is a 
threat”, this image was very much there, and we did not like it 
because…it’s ok if it reflects the reality, but actually they were 
showing [the] population of Kazakhstan, “you don’t want this in 
Kazakhstan”. It was in the interest of the authorities to show the 
very, very negative images of Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan said we were 
a threat so this is why they closed the borders. This was not the 
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reality, but this situation affected us, no interactions, no flows, this 
was forcing our economy to go down […] people lost lots of money. 
With respect to Kazakhstan, because of our unity, the nomads, you 
know, we were expecting support. We expecting support, but we got 
the blame.155 
 
In conclusion, by looking at regional expressions of mutual support among the 
leaders, the cultural contextualisation of indigenous political practices against global 
ones, keeping in mind that in order to be deemed such, an institution  has to be seen as 
‘legitimate’ by the society of reference (Clark 2005, see also Zhardykhan 2002: 168), 
and therefore to involve ‘the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the 
belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the 
society’ (Lipset 1960: 60), the claim that patrimonial authoritarianism was and still is 




Research for this chapter has suggested that in the 1990s Central Asia, far from being 
a locus of stagnancy, plain rivalry and disorder, was a place of active inter-state 
relations conducted in a fairly ordered way. Capillary webs of potential solidarity 
were already constructed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Once independent, these 
states incorporated straightforwardly those institutions that make possible for a state 
to be part of international society, namely sovereignty, international law and 
diplomacy.  
However, regional peculiarities affected the interpretation of numerous 
institutions of the global level, thus making possible, at least for this period of time, to 
speak of a Central Asian international society made up by the former Soviet Islamic 
republics. Because of their nature as poorly domestically legitimised, personalistic 
and patrimonial regimes, the institution of sovereignty has been interpreted in the 
strictest way possible. A Westphalian interpretation of sovereignty, strongly linked 
with a pluralist conception of international society was the one adopted in Central 
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Asia in the 1990s. Regional states have adopted mainly a de jure interpretation of 
sovereignty, and even with weak legitimacy have enthusiastically reaffirmed the 
might of the sovereign state over any other alternatives (be they regional groups, as in 
the case of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, minority groups, as it was the case of 
Kazakhstan or transnational pan-Turkist movements, as it was the case in 
Uzbekistan).  
This created a rift even with Russia, which due to pristine memories of 
grandeur, exigencies of control at its borders or both, tended to favour a more ‘some-
sovereigns-are-more-equal-than-others’ view (Deyermond 2008). There was a 
tendency to see Russia as adopting a relaxed interpretation of sovereignty, not 
equality, while Central Asia was quite ‘hard rock’ and more in favour of equality 
(Ayoob 1995). It was an attempt to resist a larger, CIS-based hierarchical international 
society. Quite tellingly, Central Asian states joined each other in protesting on the 
occasion of the symbolic vote of the Russian Duma annulling the dissolution of the 
USSR in 1996.  
As it is to be expected in ES theory, this interpretation of sovereignty affected 
also the viability of secondary institutions and integration projects. While the states 
recognised that cooperation and integration was in their common interest due to 
Soviet legacies in matters of economic interdependencies, infrastructures, water 
courses and transnational threats, the Central Asian states seldom agreed to cede 
voluntarily parts of their sovereignty, as they were engaged in processes of state- and 
nation-building.  
The adoption of international law was straightforward and did not represent 
major rifts from the global level. Perhaps, as has been noted, a peculiarity of the 
Central Asian context was the contemporary presence of international and Soviet 
practices in dealing with international regulations, as it was in the case of water 
management and optimum utilisation of water quotas.  
Also, the analysis above suggests that while the ‘hardware’ component of 
international law, namely respect of sovereignty, borders and non-interference was 
well entrenched in the region, more regulative and multilateral international norms 
were often violated when in contrast with national interests, therefore suggesting a 
shallow, or progressive adaptation to the institution. 
Diplomacy was an underpinning institution of the region, and did not present 
any significant interpretation different from the global level. Embassies, borders and 
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bilateral/multilateral cooperation were all managed via diplomatic means, and 
president-to-president contacts helped maintain the region stable.  
However, I make the case for introducing a new derivative of it: the derivative 
of summitry, meant as recurrent, although not routinised, summits held outside a 
formal institutional framework. As a matter of fact, a plethora of meeting were held 
by Central Asian state leaders, and often outside the context of secondary institutions. 
Whether to face Islamic militantism from Afghanistan, spillovers from Tajikistan, 
preventing nuclear disasters, debating the ecological status of the region, or simply 
drafting the main priorities for developing the region, Central Asian leaders convened 
summits. In the words of Dzhekshekulov, Deputy Foreign Minister of Kyrgyzstan, 
nine meetings between the presidents took place between mid-1994 and January 1997 
alone, suggesting that multilateralism was an institutionalised format in the 1990s. 
Plus, in his words, there were tens of meetings of other representatives.156 
I consider summitry as a derivative of diplomacy in the light of the fact that 
summits perform also functions that may be not related to diplomacy. For example, 
they may be used to gain legitimacy; to gain visibility on the world stage; to lay the 
ground for proper diplomatic negotiations; to give domestic actors prestige and 
legitimacy.157  
Furthermore, if one pays attention to the geography of summitry, one will 
notice that Ashgabat figured prominently in the list of meeting venues, thus 
weakening the argument that due to positive neutrality Turkmenistan stayed outside 
the management of the region.  
Moreover, interactions with the UN and Great Powers, especially on the Tajik, 
Aral and nuclear questions, showed how diplomacy was used ‘on a double-track 
strategy that combined internal regional interstate channels with external interactions 
between the states of the region and foreign powers’ (Gonzalez-Pelaez 2009: 97).  
This chapter has also made a case for considering authoritarian neo-
patrimonialism a regional institution, distinctive of the Central Asian context in its 
maintenance of Soviet cadres and in its strong, vertical character. While at the global 
level this institution contrasts with those of democracy, equality of people and human 
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rights, at the macro-regional level it also differentiated the region from its former 
patron, Russia, reforming itself after the Soviet experience. The practice of 
referendum, family links and mutual support among autocrats did not find parallel 
episodes in Moscow.  
Given the post-colonial nature of Central Asia, it is not surprising that one of 
the most prominent institutions in the region was that of GPM. The adoption of this 
institution has been visible both in the ‘outside-supply push’ and ‘local-demand pull’ 
dynamics. Russia was simply too important, economically and militarily, to be left out 
of the regional equation.  
Kyrgyzstan held Russian troops stationed along its border with China up to 
1998, Tajikistan hosted the motorised division on its soil during the civil war, as well 
as Russian border troops on its southern border, Kazakhstan hosted on its territory the 
40th division of the Russian army, Uzbekistan concerted its actions in Tajikistan with 
it and Turkmenistan negotiated a military agreement in 1992 on joint control of 
borders and air defence provided by Moscow.  
Regional demands for intervention and help, however, demonstrated the strong 
local acquiescence with the working of the global institution (Gonzalez-Pelaez 2009: 
101). In addition, all states except Turkmenistan signed the Collective Security Treaty 
in 1992, while Kazakhstan expressed the idea of a Eurasian Union already in 1994, 
and Kyrgyzstan joined a Russian-led Custom Union in 1996. Furthermore, it should 
be remembered that Russia was observer also at the CAU (from 1996) and IFAS, thus 
closely monitoring the activities that Central Asian states were carrying out. 
Following what has been said in Chapter 3 on the nature of hegemony as an 
institution of the regional international society, it can be therefore said that especially 
in the field of security (the one most closely linked to the survival of states and, 
therefore, of ruling elites) Russia was accorded legitimacy as hegemon, to the point 
that Russia perceived these states as ‘not quite foreign’ (Page 1994: 789). 
The institution of environmentalism was accepted by all states in the region, 
and became soon a regional feature. As a matter of fact, even if Russia was observer 
at the IFAS, it was often considered the responsible for the present ecological status of 
the region. Water was so important, both in terms of assuring the viability of state 
projects and in strengthening interdependencies among the units that the Aral Sea and 
water management could even be considered as institutions on their own.  
GPM, international law, summitry and diplomacy all played relevant roles in 
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sustaining the cooperative attitude toward the management of the shrinking of the 
Aral sea, and limited policy outcomes can be also seen as the impact of the institution 
of sovereignty on it.  
A derivative of the institution of environmentalism, characteristic of the 
region, is the collective ban of anti-nuclear weapons, exemplified by the diplomatic 
and legal work behind the creation of a CANWFZ. This initiative came directly from 
the five republics, and was successfully brought forward (not without hindrances) 
with the help of the GP and international institutions.  
The research on that derivative institution contributes to the wider body of ES 
literature dealing with regional international societies identified in the literature 
review. As a matter of fact, Buzan and Zhang stress that a NWFZ is a distinctive 
regional institution of the Latin American international society (2014b: 220). Yet, here 
it has been traced the birth, the development and the institutionalisation of the 
CANFWZ, thus showing that also Central Asia features such institution. In this 
respect, therefore, the particularity of Latin America does not hold.  
What, is striking by its absence, is war as an institution. Despite several 
skirmishes at borders, the threats of minorities, presence of enclaves and personal 
animosities, inter-state relations in Central Asia over the 1990s never broke down to 
the level of organised inter-state violence (Abazov 1999b; see also Hinnebusch and 
Cummings 2011: 343). The institutions of diplomacy, sovereignty and ‘iron-
territoriality’ paired to the common intent of the leaders to prevent war and conflict 
helped avoid ‘Balkanisation’. There was no Central Asian Bosnia, nor Kosovo. While 
the role of Russia was crucial in ensuring stability in the hottest years of the Tajik 
civil war, we have highlighted how regional leaders themselves refrained from actions 
that could have sparked conflict in the region.158  
Given this institutional map, what was the character of the Central Asian 
international society in the 1990s? It was certainly an open society (Luard 1970). The 
degree of permeability to external intervention was both a product of its weak 
foundational status as new states and of their necessity to diversify markets, 
investments and foreign actions, factors which affected also the shallow adoption of 
the institutions of (multilateral) international law and environmentalism.  
 
                                                 
158 See e.g. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 7 August 1998, ‘Tsentral’naya Aziya: edinaya i nedelimaya?’, where 
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It was also a ‘concentric’ society, with a pluralist core made up of all five states in the 
region (as a matter of fact all five states shared the institutions described above) with 
a solidarist circle (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, later joined by 
Tajikistan), more prone to economic and political integration projects (explicitly 
rejected by Turkmenistan). The nature of this solidarist circle, however, clashed with 
national and self-interested policies that prevented any delegation of substantive 
sovereignty to supranational bodies.  
The best way to describe an international society that feels the need to 
integrate but it is subject to national and egoistic pulls, has been that of ‘dead-letter 
international society’ coined by Simon Murden (2009: 117-118). According to him, in 
a dead-letter international society ‘[s]econdary institutions reflect common 
aspirations, but do not lead to substantive integration. Concerns about relative gains 
among brethren states are only partially offset by common values’ (2009: 118).  
The dead-letter nature of the Central Asian solidarist circle may be explained 
also by focussing on the underlying relation(s) between primary and secondary 
institutions. As new states, the maintenance of sovereignty, of territorial integrity, the 
fear of transnational threats and the different ways of developing the economy halted 
substantive advancement of the CAU and the CAEC, and did not improve the 
situation of the Aral Sea via the IFAS. The pre-eminence of the basic primary 
institutions, aimed at warranting coexistence and survival of the units contrasted with 
the higher aims of the regional projects.  
Central Asian leaders were aware of this impasse, but they maintained a strong 
interpretation of those institutions that, in a way, have to be relaxed if a regional 
project of economic integration is to be workable (such as sovereignty and borders). 
Thus, Central Asian international society observed two distinctive phases: from an 
initial solidarity, when projects of integration were eagerly put forward, to a dead-
letter one, when the aims of integration were downplayed because of the prevalence 
of territorial and foundational institutions.  
While the literature has explained the failure of integration projects in terms of 
regimes’ rent-seeking and personal enrichment (Allison 2004; Allison 2008; Collins 
2009; Cooley 2012), the suggestion here is that the crucial purpose of the ‘society’ 





Effectively open borders and transnational flows of people and goods, while possibly 
enhancing the economic outlook of the region, were avoided because, in the minds of 
the leaders, they could have disrupted the precarious equilibrium that was achieved in 
the very early 1990s with pledges to territorial integrity, non-interference and uti 
possidetis. For example, comparing Central Asia to the Middle East, Raymond 
Hinnebusch and Sally Cummings argue that  
 
despite some border disputes, borders have acquired a fair amount 
of legitimacy in Central Asia. No minority has to date asked for a 
separate state and no ethnic group has adopted violent irredentist 
practices, although borders have had devastating effects on the 
livelihoods of cross-borders communities and also on the cultural 
cohesion and strength of ethnic groups that are spread across 
borders’ (2011: 343). 
 
The solidarist features of the Central Asian interstate society were derived from 
external events and external shocks (mainly, the collapse of the Soviet Union), 
fostering an ‘externally pushed’ international society. It was ‘reactive solidarism’. 
However, the pluralist attitudes inside the region contrasted these solidarist ones 
creating a mixed, promising but inefficient regional scheme of coordination. 
Paraphrasing a famous article on the difficulty of rejoining pluralism and solidarism 
in the ES, one may say that Central Asian leaders were ‘solidarist of the mind, 
pluralist of the will’ (Wheeler and Dunne 1996). The maximum that could be 
achieved was not proactive solidarity, but only defensive regime solidarity.  
Far from being virtual, it had nonetheless the merit to protect the region, the 
regimes (whether we like it or not) and to create a thin sense of political community. 
We should also remember that  
 
in the 1990s […]  the CIS states had to reconcile the consolidation 
of national sovereignty with the demands of regional integration. In 
the first round, national sovereignty won. That is why the 1990s 
were mainly years of disintegration with attempts to institutionalize 
the processes of multilateral cooperation and subsequent failures to 
implement the signed agreements (Nikitina 2013: 2). 
 
This chapter has therefore made a case for considering Central Asia in the 1990s as a 
regional international society, and has done so by making three steps: observation of 
the events and practices of the states, analysis of such practices and of narratives 
surrounding these practices, conclusions inferred from the observations conducted and 
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the analyses made (Luard 1970).  
By adopting simultaneously the categories of pluralism and solidarism, I tried 
to show how Central Asia in the 1990s embarked on the difficult task of managing the 
delicate phase of transition from federal republics to independent, sovereign states, 
and of creating and sustaining via appropriate norms and institutions its new regional 
environment.  
Also, I tried to show how these norms and rules operated. Since it is important 
also to verify in the words of the leaders a concern towards the society as a whole, and 
therefore a communitarian concern, whenever possible I stressed also narratives and 
examples not just of regional solidarity, but also of regional awareness in an emic 
perspective, thus adhering to the script I set out in Chapter 3.  
Clearly, the picture provided is far from being clean, neat and rosy. 
Cooperation and competition, amity and enmity, agreement and disagreement were 
constantly at play simultaneously, but ironically this multi-facetedness of social 
relations proves the liveliness, the sizzle of the society, not its absence.  
In Central Asia there was perhaps less than the liberal would hope for, but 
certainly more than the realist supposes to find. Far from being ineffective, the 
regional projects of the Central Asian republics perhaps did not lead to full-fledged 
integration (meant as a purpose-oriented sharing of sovereignty) but at least let them 
familiarise with their environment, with the instruments of international relations, 
allowed them to keep the tone cool, and maintain a sort of defensive solidarism when 
it came to regime preservation.  
The kind of analysis conducted here, I argue, has two merits that are seldom found 
in the literature on Central Asia, thus contributing to it: 
 
1. it corresponds more closely to the reality of international relations. 
From the very moment that there is regular communication 
between states, as opposed to occasional chance contacts, an 
embryonic type of society begins to develop;  
2. it is more comprehensive, it focuses on a variety of international 
phenomena that range from economics to territorial management, 
from law to war, from diplomacy to environmentalism. This is 
because the sociological approach of the ES necessarily takes 
account of all the phenomena that are ‘social’. 
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The best place where to see the solidity of an international society is in moments of 
change, and Central Asian states underwent quite a substantive one in 1991. If we 
accept that the stress should be on the ability to engage with change, then we can say 
that for all its shortcomings and weaknesses, the Central Asian regional international 
society well adapted to the new international context, and allowed the units to survive 








































Central Asia in the 2000s:  






This chapter deals with the second decade of independence, until 2014 and the very 
recent developments in the region. In particular, it seeks answers to a number of 
questions: has an international society developed in Central Asia since the year 
2000? If yes, following what path? What are the main differences with the 1990s 
international society? If not, due to what constraints? How have institutions and 
norms been understood in the region in these last some 10 years? Is there anything 
specific, from an international perspective that may allow us to speak of a ‘Central 
Asian order’? If yes, what are the prospects for the evolution of this order? 
 
Before presenting the structure of the chapter, I will briefly convey the whole 
argument underpinning it. In this chapter, I make a strong case for considering the ES 
not just as a useful theory to study, scrutinise and understand international relations in 
Central Asia, but as the most useful one. As a matter of fact, it will be argued that even 
if the region has strong realist connotations from an IR Theory perspective, the role 
that institutions and norms have played so far in keeping the system stable and viable 
for the units cannot and should not be downplayed.  
The problem, as already noted, is what purpose we assign to this society. A 
society can perfectly exist without developing sophisticated, solid and durable forms 
of agreements and cooperation on a gamut of issues. A society can perfectly exist 
even with the sole scope of guaranteeing stability for its members. It is evident that 
the latter form of society is less developed than the former one. Nonetheless, even to 
create such a thin, feeble societal arrangement, it is clear that several norms and 
institutions have to be adopted in order to perform and carry out the tasks linked to the 
idea of stability, survival and common life.  
The chapter is structured as follows: in the next section, I offer a brief account 
of the international developments that took place at the systemic level in the early 
2000s, in particular the post-9/11 developments and the strategic reassertion of Russia 
and China over the region. This will set the scene wherein the context for Central 
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Asian international politics will be put under scrutiny. In the following section, I focus 
on the experience of the Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO), the last 
Central Asian regional organisation, focusing on the norms and values embodied in it, 
as well as the function that it played in the regional system.  
Then, I make a case for considering the end of regionalism in Central Asia as 
something different from the end of societal dynamics. I will focus, in particular, on 
two domains where an international society logic is indeed visible even in the absence 
of formalised, institutionalised regionalism: the Osh events in 2010 and the thorny 
path to water-management problem-solving.  
I will substantiate my analysis with the words and opinions of my 
interviewees reflecting on societal dynamics among the Central Asian states. In 
particular, I will make use of their insights and narratives to argue that several 
informal institutions are indeed in play in the region, and that it is not only thanks to 
this that we can speak of a regional order in Central Asia, but that it is because of 
them that major confrontations and conflicts have been so far avoided. 
In the conclusion, I will sum up the whole argument, will answer once for all 
whether there is an international society in Central Asia and will comment on its 
characteristics. 
 
5.2 The New International Context 
 
 
The relatively calm international context in which, for a decade, the Central Asian 
republics navigated their way through their first experience as independent sovereign 
states received a blow with the terrorist attacks to the Twin Towers in New York on 
September 11, 2001. Up to that moment, Central Asia was in connection with Great 
Powers, but the Tajik civil war aside, the economic, not the (geo)political aspects of 
these connections were the main factor. With the US intervention in Afghanistan and 
the subsequent penetration of Great-Power politics in the region, the whole 
reconfiguration of systemic forces in Central Asia drew up a new set of relations 
(Rumer 2002).  
 In particular, the presence of US troops in Afghanistan meant three different 




1. the provision, from Central Asian states, of facilities to wage war in the 
neighbouring territory of Afghanistan, be they military bases (Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan), transit routes (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan)159 or free-flight zones 
(Turkmenistan);160 
2. the strategic reassertion of Russia and China in the region to contain the 
American presence, to secure economic investments and, in the case of Russia, 
to maintain a close eye on what has been considered a privileged ‘sphere of 
influence’; 
3. the radicalisation of unconventional, trans-national threats spurring from 
Afghanistan, northern Pakistan and other non-controlled areas in the territories 
of Central Asian states. 
 
With respect to the first point, the agreements signed with the US on the one hand 
(Kyrgyzstan on the airbase in Manas and Uzbekistan on the airbase in the Uzbek 
towns of Karshi and Khanabad, 90 miles from the Afghan border) and with Russia on 
the other hand (Kyrgyzstan on the airbase in Kant) embroiled the Central Asian states 
in a series of negotiations, diplomatic consultations and also mutual suspicions (the 
Uzbek government was against the installation of another Russian airbase in southern 
Kyrgyzstan) that effectively, for good or bad, linked the region to the global context 
tightly. This also has led, undeniably, to significant resource- and aid-reception from 
the poorer Central Asian republics (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) in terms of 
foreign assistance packages, updates of their military equipment and security 
machinery (Olcott 2005: 331). 
Even more importantly for the argument of this chapter and, more in general, 
of this thesis, is that the simultaneous presence in the region of three different Great 
Powers with not only different agendas but also different normative orientations has 
created a sort of competing socialisation process, in which the Central Asian states 
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have still to choose which path to follow (Lewis 2012a). 
With respect to the second point, it must be noted that, after initial 
indifference, Russian foreign policy towards the region was re-directed towards the 
‘south-eastern vector’ when Evgeny Primakov became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
1996. Nonetheless, due to the changing international environment described above, 
Russia focused even more on Central Asia after 2001,161 with a reinvigorated and 
boosted emphasis on the notion of Eurasianism (Rumer 2002: 59; Jonson 2004; Kuhrt 
2007; Lo 2008). 
In particular, from a mere military viewpoint, already in the first half of the 
2000s Russia reached important agreements with the Central Asian republics to 
reassert its presence in the region, such as the already noted basing rights for the 
Russian military in Kant, a long-term lease for a base in southern Tajikistan (October 
2004), and increased coordination of Russia’s air defence with that of Uzbekistan 
(Olcott 2005: 333). These activities were carried out either as an actor on its own or 
within the framework of the CSTO, formed in 2002 (Buszynski 2005: 553).  
Furthermore, Moscow expanded its security cooperation with Uzbekistan in 
other ways. In June 2004, the two governments signed a Treaty on Strategic 
Cooperation stating that the ‘sides, based on the separate agreements, will offer to 
each other the right to use the military facilities that are located on their territories’. In 
addition, the agreement also foresees additional Russian military assistance to 
Uzbekistan and the creation of a joint antiterrorism institute (Weitz 2006: 158). 
Also from an economic perspective, Russian–Central Asian trade recovered 
consistently at the beginning of the 2000s and tripled between 2003 and 2007, 
skyrocketing from US$7 billion to US$21 billion, a third of which coming from the 
hydrocarbon sector (Laruelle 2008: 5). 
China intensified its presence in the region as well. In the 1990s, China’s role 
was primarily diplomatic. It recognised Central Asian states’ independence 
immediately in December 1991, and was quick to establish diplomatic relations with 
all of them already in 1992 (Swanström 2005). Furthermore, diplomatic measures 
were pursued in stabilising borders and enhancing their inviolability. Proof of this was 
a treaty signed in 1996 between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
                                                 
161 Indeed, Vladimir Putin affirmed that Central Asia ‘constitutes a major foreign policy priority and a 
zone of Russian national interests,’ reflecting the Russian belief that ‘while the Americans are here 
now, we are in the region for ever’ (quoted in Frickenstein 2010). 
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Tajikistan establishing mutual military confidence-building measures, and situating in 
an international law framework the inviolability of the internationally recognised 
frontiers (Sheives 2006).  
From the early 2000s onward, however, China started to carry more weight in 
the region, both from an economic and a security viewpoint. As a matter of fact, it 
should be considered that ‘between 1994 and 2006 the bilateral trade between China 
and Central Asia grew 30 times to reach 10.8 billion US dollars’. In particular, such a 
rise ‘has been particularly acute since year 2000, when Beijing launched its “Go 
West” policy’ (Kaukenov 2009: 40). Investments in the oil and gas sectors, 
particularly with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and economic activities 
in the hydroelectric sphere in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
delineate the contours of Beijing’s development strategy in Central Asia.  
The more assertive Chinese presence in the region, as said, is also observable 
from a diplomatic and security viewpoint. Already in July 2000, on China’s proposal, 
the Dushanbe Declaration was signed. The ‘Shanghai Five’ members pledged mutual 
help and solidarity against the three evils of terrorism, extremism, and separatism. 
Significantly, the document speaks of threats against Central Asia and China, thus 
linking the region and the Great Power in common security concerns (Swanström 
2005) With the entry of Uzbekistan in 2001, the Shanghai Five became the ‘Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation’ (SCO).  
Already from 4-6 August 2003 the SCO conducted its first multilateral joint 
military exercise termed ‘Cooperation 2003’, emphasizing counterterrorism measures. 
In June 2004, the SCO opened a counterterrorist centre,  the Regional Anti-Terrorist 
Structure or RATS, in Tashkent, furthering the organization’s focus on 
counterterrorism (Sheives 2006: 213). Bilateral security arrangements also started 
taking place, with military aid conceded to Kyrgyzstan, who already in 2005 received 
US$1.2 million worth of military equipment from China, and to Kazakhstan, who got 
US$3 million for communications and for specialized forces (Olcott 2005: 335). 
According to the literature, such a penetration in the Central Asian region 
responded to several factors, among which the most important were constituted by the 
need of keeping the Western province of Xinjiang, historically and culturally linked to 
Muslim Central Asia, outside the influence of terrorist forces. Other factors that have 
been mentioned are the need to engage in bilateral and multilateral constructive 
relations to project on the international scene the ideal of a peaceful rise, the need to 
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secure energy security to sustain the massive internal economic development and, to a 
lesser extent, to counter the US presence in the region due to the conflict in 
Afghanistan (Rumer 2002; Cohen 2006; Sheives 2006; Kavalski 2007: 48; Kaukenov 
2009: 35; Kavalski 2010).  
The most important consequence of China’s renovated and bolstered 
engagement with Central Asia, however, has been that of making the Great Power 
structure around Central Asia more difficult to manage and more complex to interact 
with. 
With respect to the third point (inextricably linked to the two above), Central 
Asian states felt their regional stability to be at stake precisely because of military 
activities in neighbouring Afghanistan. In particular, ideological linkages and joint-
training between the Taliban movement and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(IMU) as well as the Hizb ut-Tahrir movement were a growing cause of concern, not 
only for Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (the former two neighbouring with 
Afghanistan, the latter having suffered from hostile incursions on its territory already 
in 1999) but also for Kazakhstan, which was sensitive to incursions and threats 
coming from the southern flanks of the region.  
The systemic pressures deriving from the US intervention in Afghanistan, with 
the consequent entrance in the region of several Great Powers with (more often than 
not) competing and clashing interests and agendas presented the Central Asian states 
with the difficult task of maintaining a liveable and manageable regional system. In 
the words of a Central Asian representative of the UNRCCA, the task was and still is  
 
to find arrangements for coexistence and mutual relations in the 
region in the light of the pressure of the Great Powers. After 9/11, 
Central Asia became and still is like a circle within a triangle, trying 
to survive as a system and to not be squeezed by one of the sides of 
the triangle and not to pick a side.162 
  
Such words are indeed consistent with another inside characterisation of the region, 
according to which the descriptions of Central Asia by Russian intellectuals as a 
buffer zone, or by US academics as a  cordon sanitaire ‘are unacceptable [to Central 
Asian leaders], because primarily these two positions imply their (Central Asia’s) 
                                                 
162 Interview. The same views were expressed by Sultan Akimbekov, and have been recently 
expressed also by the Tajik political analyst Khudoberdi Kholiqnazarov, Head of the Centre for 
Strategic Studies under the President of Tajikistan (Asia Plus 2015). 
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subordination to the will and actions of external powers’ (Tolipov 2010: 107). 
Therefore, differently from the 1990s when Central Asia could develop as a 
system without being, to paraphrase Olcott, ‘catapulted’ into Great-Power politics, the 
international relations in Central Asia between Central Asian states had now to take 
place in the light of the presence of Great Powers in the region, which of course 
influenced (and still influence) the nature of the cooperation/competition dynamic in 
the region.  
One of the effects of the presence of Great Power logics in the region has been 
what I call, from an ES perspective, a hyper-institutionalisation of sovereignty in the 
region, exactly as a normative protection against foreign penetration, as well as a 
peculiar interpretation of GPM. But more on this will be said below. 
 
 
5.3 The Central Asian Cooperation Organisation 
 
 
In the light of the tremendous changes that the international context was undergoing 
in the first years of the 2000s, the Central Asian states recognised that, despite the 
incipient growing differences between them, closer cooperation not just on economic 
matters, but also and especially on political ones (meant here as related to security, 
foreign policy and diplomacy) were needed and necessary. From the late 1990s to 
2002, the year when the CACO was founded, several inter-presidential meetings were 





Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 13 April 1999.  
 
 





Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 25 June 1999.  
 
This section analyses the birth, the development and ultimately the demise of the 
CACO, the last international organisation purely Central Asian in membership. In 
particular, the analysis presented below attempts to answer the following questions: 
what were the motivations behind the foundation of the CACO? What were the norms 
and rules embodied in it or, in ES terms, which primary institutions were represented 
in this secondary institution? Was it entirely successful in its operation and, more 
importantly, how should we measure its success or failure?  
In sum, this section intends to offer a deeper account of the experience of this 
regional organisation, escaping the usual narrative, already noted throughout the 
thesis so far, that regional experiments in Central Asia were a failure and ‘full stop’ 
(Bohr 2004; Allison 2008; Olcott 2011). We need to dig deeper, to reach intentions 
and motivations, to discover not just whether they were a failure, but more 
importantly why they developed in that way. And again, I think an ES analysis, being 
eclectic, multifaceted and all-encompassing, is more useful than narrower, and 
inevitably partial, purely realist or liberal explanations. 
The need for Central Asian countries to cooperate in the face of the systemic 
forces operating in the region and in the light of the ongoing process of economic 
globalisation was voiced already less than two months after 9/11 by President 
171 
 
Nazarbayev who, addressing a session of the Kazakh National Academy of Sciences, 
argued ‘I regard with enthusiasm the integration in our region’, urging closer 
cooperation among Central Asian states themselves.163 One month and a half later, 
toward the end of December 2001, the four leaders met in Tashkent (28 December) to 
adopt a joint declaration founding the new regional organisation.  
That the development of a new organisation was spurred by the Afghan 
campaign and by the threats deriving from it was also confirmed by the Uzbek 
Foreign Ministry at that time, according to whom participants in the meeting would 
‘focus their attention on threats coming from international terrorism.’164 In addition, 
the four participants at the meeting stressed that the new organization was to provide 
‘a unified zone of security and to develop joint actions on preserving peace and 




Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 27 December 2001.  
 
                                                 
163  Associated Press International, 6 November 2001. 
164  RIA Novosti, 28 December 2001. 




Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 28 December 2001.  
 
The impact of the change of the international environment surrounding the region on 
the institutionalisation of the CACO was also visible in official documents. As an 
example, an official position paper released by the Kazakh Institute of Strategic 
Studies, usually considered as an academic and more informal voice of Nazarbayev in 
foreign policy matters, spoke of the CACO’s foundation as ‘due primarily to the need 
to balance the relationship major players in the region: the US, Russia, China and 
European countries’ (Dzhumasheva undated; Ushakova 2003).  
The format of the meeting, the spirit in which the negotiations were conducted 
and the character of the newly established organisation were described by the Kazakh 
Foreign Minister Erlan Idrissov in a press conference in Astana on December 27. To 
him, the meeting of the heads of Central Asian states did ‘not have a rigid agenda, and 
the conversation [was] going on in the regime of a political dialogue in two major 
directions: regional stability and regional economic cooperation’.166 Islam Karimov, 
during the Tashkent meeting the day after, asked the audience not to call the 
organization ‘a bloc’ but to refer to it as ‘an association’.167 Already in these words, 
we can see how the CACO was different in format, aims and motivations from the 
CAU. 
                                                 
166 Ibidem. 
167 United Press International, 28 December 2001. 
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 CAU CACO 
Format Strong institutionalisation Looser political dialogue 
Aims Regional integration Regional co-operation and 
co-ordination 
Motivations Mainly internal – 
Preservation of Soviet 
structures and ties 
Mainly external – 
Preservation of regional 




At the end of the meeting, the four leaders (Nazarbayev, Karimov, Akaev and 
Rahmon) agreed on the following: 
 
 enhancement of cooperation in political, economic, scientific, technical and 
cultural spheres; 
 development of mutual understanding on the issues concerning creation of a 
common safety zone; 
 resolution of customs barriers and water resources problems; 
 support to the US-led coalition in Afghanistan and to the interim 
administration of Hamid Karzai, therefore signalling the willingness of Central 
Asian states to escape a purely economic dimension of integration and to deal 
also with international political events. 
 
 
Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 4 January 2002. 
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The organisation was officially founded in Almaty on 28 February 2002, when the 
Heads of State signed the Treaty on the Establishment of the ‘Central Asian 




Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 28 February 2002.  
 
 
Within the treaty, from an ES perspective, several norms and institutions were 
adopted and internalised. As a matter of fact, following the well-known distinction 
made by Buzan between primary and secondary institutions (Buzan 2004: 167) the 
CACO was another secondary institution of the Central Asian region, embodying 
those rules and norms accepted as legitimate by all members. 
The treaty followed the usual pattern of wording, and its preamble closely 
resembles all international agreements formerly signed between Central Asian states. 
References to common traditions, friendship and good-neighbourliness (‘opirayas’ na 
glubokie traditsii druzhby i dobrososedstva’), and to cultural unity and brotherhood of 
the peoples of Central Asia (‘istoricheskoi i kul’turnoi obshnosti bratskikh narodov 
Tsentral’noi Azii’) introduce the aims of the treaty which, as noted, relies more on 
cooperation than on integration (therefore symbolising a shift from the ‘nostalgic 




 economic cooperation (especially in the fields of borders and customs control, 
as well as tariff policies); 
 political cooperation; 
 scientific-technical cooperation (especially in the field of transportation); 
 cultural cooperation; 
 security cooperation (mainly linked to extremism, narco-trafficking and 
terrorism); 
 
all underpinned by respect for (Article 1 and Article 2) 
 
 sovereignty: 
 territorial integrity; 
 members’ equality; 
 international law. 
 
As in the case of the CAU treaty, there was no exclusive membership based on 
‘Central Asian membership criteria’. Rather, the membership was regulated by the 
respect and the sharing of the goals and principles informing the CACO 
organisational structure accepting also its obligation. It was therefore an ‘open’ treaty. 
The main bodies of the newly established organisation were the following, as 
foreseen by Article 4: 
 
 the Council of Heads of State and Prime Ministers; 
 the Council of Foreign Ministers (named ‘the working body’ of the CACO), 
heads of industry ministries and agencies; 
 the Committee of National Coordinators. 
 
The Committee of National Coordinators, a new organ, was established by the 
Position on the Committee of National Coordinators as foreseen by Article 7 of the 
treaty founding the CACO. Its functions were the following (Article 3 of the 
Position): 
 
 ensuring continuous and effective operation of the CACO; 
 ensuring convergence and harmonization of positions at the CACO; 
 strengthening cooperation and deepening integration within the CACO; 
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 promotion of interaction between interested bodies, agencies and 
organizations of the members of the CACO; 
 approval of the agenda and draft documents submitted by the meeting of the 
Council of Heads of State and Prime Ministers and by the Council of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs of members of the CACO; 
 monitoring the implementation of the obligations of states members of the 
CACO, adopted within the framework of the Organization within the 
competence of the National coordinators; 
 analysis of the implementation of the members of the decisions of the CACO, 
the preparation and submission of proposals; 
 drafting and submitting information material to the Council of the Heads of 
State and Prime Ministers and the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; 
 the decision of organizational and technical issues of the organs of the CACO. 
 
To support the activity of the organisation, moreover, the treaty established the 
presence of National Focal Points, appointed on a national basis, with the task of 
coordinating the policies of the country he/she represented with those decided at the 
inter-governmental level within the CACO (Article 7 of the Position). 
As can be seen, the regulatory and implementing bodies of the CACO gave 
state organs much power. No supranational institutions were created. This is another 
difference in comparison with the CAU that, although strongly influenced by state 
structures as well, had nonetheless the presence of supranational institutions such as 
the Central Asian Bank.  
The strong inter-governmentalism, reflected also in the emphasis on the words 
‘cooperation/coordination/consultation’ and in the adoption of the consensus-based 
decision-making procedure, is therefore another sign of a ‘pluralisation’ of the Central 
Asian regional system (Articles 4, 5 and 6). The contracting parties themselves 
referred to the CACO as a ‘more democratic and more flexible’ international 
organisation compared to the CAU.168 
Furthermore, the diminished emphasis on multilateralism and regional 
approach is exemplified by the provision in Article 6 according to which 
extraordinary meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers could be convened only 
                                                 
168 Joint Statement of the Heads of State of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 
CACO Summit, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 5-6 July 2003. 
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by request of at least two Member States and with the consent of all Member States. 
Such strict parameters, of course, had the effect of making bilateral arrangements 
more preferable. The interplay between regionalism and sovereignty, with the 
prevalence of the latter, is also observable in Article 11, where decision-making 
procedures are described:  
 
decisions are taken by consensus by CACO bodies and 
implemented by Member States in accordance with their national 
legislation. Monitoring the implementation of the obligations of the 
Member States adopted within CACO is competence of the 
National Coordinators.  
 
But then, it should be noted that the National Coordinators as well were subordinated 
to the respective Heads of States, and had to rely on the work of their Foreign 
Ministers (Ushakova 2003).  
Again, what is observable here is the difficulty with which Central Asian 
states balanced their national, domestic interests and their own foreign-policy agendas 
with the recognition that the problems and the newly international conditions spurred 
by the Afghan conflict required a concerted, multilateral and collective position.169 
As we can see, therefore, there was already a significant difference between 
the previously established CAU and the CACO, that is, a recognition that the Central 
Asian states, in the light of their different modes of development, were slowly drifting 
apart from each other and therefore were contributing to a ‘pluralisation’ of the 
regional system.  
The notion of integration, so compelling under the CAU architectonic 
structure, was now abandoned in favour of a more detached, pragmatic and short-term 
cooperation, in the interest of the sovereign preferences of member states. The 
‘quartet’, as it was often called in the official press, was in the end giving away a 
more realistic approach to the development of intra-regional relations (Ushakova 
2003). In addition, great proclamations about regional identity, solidarity ties and EU-
modelled hopes were largely downplayed.170  
                                                 
169 A document released by the Department of Media Relations of the Kazakh Senate stated that 
‘political terrorism remain[ed] a serious threat to the security and stability of all Central Asian states 
without exception’. The document also defined Central Asia as ‘our region’. Document released 
before the CACO Summit in Almaty, Kazakhstan, on May 5, year missing. The text of the 
document was kindly forwarded to me by Dr Iqboljon Qoraboyev. 
170 Nazarbayev, while signing the treaty establishing the CACO and after talks with the presidents of 
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The format of the CACO allowed now for strong bilateral relations, in addition to 
multilateral formats of dialogue. This bilateral relations, however, had to be conducted 
within the general normative framework of the 2002 Treaty.  
Comparing the two foundational treaties, it is also noteworthy how in the 
CACO treaty the emphasis is much more on ‘practical’ cooperation, rather than on 
ideological, identity-related or integration-aimed. Therefore, the aims of the 
organisation were lowered to a more achievable level: rational use of natural joint and 
man-made resources, transport, energy, border delimitation and foreign policy 
coordination. Significantly, the aforementioned KISI paper speaks of economic 
integration in the region as ‘abandoned’.171  
This, however, must not be conducive to a whole dismissal of the regional, 
institutional experiment. It would be incorrect, as a great part of the literature does, to 
neglect the small achievements of the CACO precisely only because small and not 
based on shared institutions and integrative measures. Indeed, it signals an initial 
acceptance by the countries of Central Asia that different political and economic 
trajectories may well be a consequential result of the gaining of independence and 
sovereignty.  
In ES jargon, the establishment of the CACO represented the foundation of a 
secondary institution embodying pluralist values and norms, thus moving away from 
a solidarist, dead-letter international society to a pluralist but nonetheless still 
cooperative one (Murden 2009). In structural-relations terms, the foundation of the 
CACO represented a move from a developmental form of society aimed at deep 
integration to a conservative form of society achieving coexistence focusing on 
cooperation. 
Within the framework of the CACO, several examples of cooperation may 
actually be found, thus to some extent disproving the idea that this was another ‘paper 
                                                                                                                                            
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, stated that there was a need for ‘a new approach to our 
regional business’. Agence France Presse – English, 28 February 2002. One year later Akaev said: 
‘We should use the rich experience of the EU, but apply to it to the regional distinctiveness 
of Central Asia, consolidating our efforts on the road to rapprochement’. Agence France Presse – 
English, 6 May 2003.  
171 The original text reads: ‘Otkazavshis' ot idei shirokoy i vseob yemlyushchey ekonomicheskoy 
integratsii, strany “chetverki” sosredotochili vnimaniye na konkretnykh zadachakh’ (‘Abandoning 
the idea of a broad and comprehensive economic integration of the country of “the quartet” focused 
on specific objectives’). 
179 
 
organisation.172 The fact that diplomatic and political dialogue was ongoing within the 
CACO was one of the factors that achieved some of the results listed below, as the 
organisation provided a forum where positions could be discussed.173 
 27-28 December 2001 (on the eve of the first CACO meeting): meeting 
between Karimov and Rahmon to normalise Uzbek-Tajik relations; among the 
measures agreed on, there were the following: 
o twenty-five border points re-opened; 
o decrease of transit tariff for vehicles coming from Tajikistan; 
o Tajik debt reduced by 10% (from $120 million to $108 million); 
o resumption of the work of the Uzbekistan-Tajikistan intergovernmental 
commission (Jonson 2004: 92); 
 August 2002: 70% of the Uzbek-Tajik border had been demarcated;  
 9 September 2002: agreement between Karimov and Nazarbayev inked in 
Astana to ultimate the delimitation of the Kazakhstan-Uzbek frontier; in this 
occasion, Nazarbayev said that ‘with the agreement, no undecided questions 
remained between the two republics’ and that the Uzbek-Kazakh border 
‘would be civilized, and there would be no wire entanglements on it’;174 
 early October 2002: agreement between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 
demarcating the 1050 km-long border, apart from four disputed areas (Jonson 
2004: 92); 
 October 2002: improvement on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border thanks to progress in 
delimitation and demarcation of borders, especially thanks to meetings 
between local representatives from the Batken and Sughd regional 
administrations; 
 16 July 2003: draft agreement on the division of the Caspian seafloor between 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in Astana. The parties also finalized catalogues 
                                                 
172 Interview with Zhar Zhardykhan. 
173 Interview with official Uzbek source. 
174 RosBusinessConsulting Database, 9 September 2002. 
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pinpointing the key spots of the coastline and of the midline dividing the 
Caspian Sea (this agreement was drafted outside the CACO platform);175 
 27 December 2003: agreement on trade, border protection and foreign policy 
matters between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In the occasion of the press-
conference following the agreement, Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Askar Aitmatov 
stated: ‘I hope that the cooperation model to be established by Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan will became an example not only for Central Asian states but for 
the whole CIS’;176 
 29 December 2003: agreement between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan on water 
and energy supply deals. The agreement was negotiated and signed by the 
Tajik Prime Minister Aqil Aqilov and the Uzbek Prime Minister Shavkat 
Mirziyoyev. On that occasion, Uzbek Foreign Ministry spokesman Ilkhom 
Zakirov said the visit by Aqilov and other senior ministers visit signalled ‘the 
mutual desire to finally sit down and discuss a wide range of cooperation 
issues’.177 
Other examples of cooperation and successful coordination, this time in a more 
authentic multilateral format, were the following: 
 5 February 2002: meeting of Central Asian foreign ministers to discuss the 
upgrading of cooperation between the states on foreign issues within the 
framework of the newly established organisation;178 
 5 July 2002: opening of the Regional Ecology Centre (REC), also with 
Turkmenistan, with the aim of creating a single ecology database for Central 
Asia;179 
 5 October 2002: the four presidents signed a joint communiqué at the end of 
the Dushanbe Summit, pledging to contribute to the resolution of priority 
issues in the region, which first of all include the creation of water and power, 
                                                 
175 RIA Novosti, 16 July 2003. 
176 RIA Novosti, 27 December 2003. 
177 Associated Press International, 29 December 2003. 
178 Xinhua General News Service, 6 February 2002. 
179 RIA Novosti, 5 July 2002. 
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transport and food consortiums in consultation with ADB, IBRD, the WB, 
FAO and the UN following Kazakhstan’s proposal, plus draft agreement on a 
common space of television and radio broadcasting in the region to create a 
common information space; 
 
Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 8 October 2002.  
 
 November 2002: first inter-parliamentary CACO forum held in Tashkent to 
discuss harmonisation of legislation in security and anti-terrorism fields; 
 1 August 2003: at a meeting in the southern Kyrgyz city of Osh, the interior 
ministers of the four members of the CACO agreed to harmonise anti-terrorist 
laws, and also signed an agreement to improve interaction in countering 
regional security threats;180 
 5 May 2004: second inter-parliamentary CACO forum held in Tashkent to 
discuss harmonisation of legislation in security and anti-terrorism fields. 
 
As we can see, the situation in Central Asia after 2001 was far from un-cooperative. 
Lena Jonson, in her comprehensive analysis of the changing security environment in 
                                                 
180 Associated Press International, 1 August 2003. 
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Central Asia after 9/11, argues that ‘the stimulus for bilateral cooperation was 
provided by an external actor’ (2004: 92). While there is certainly part of truth in this 
statement, I would say that rather than the stimulus, the US engagement in 
Afghanistan provided the context for cooperation.  
The stimulus came in fact from within. With a decreased level of threat at their 
borders, Central Asian states could devote diplomatic and political resources to face 
their long-lasting common problems, benefiting from the mistakes made in the past 
(mainly, excessive integrationist ambition incompatible with simultaneous state- and 
nation-building processes). The stimulus was endogenous, in the sense that the leaders 
of the region recognised a form of cooperation, or even reciprocal consultation was 
necessary not just to counter the threats coming from Afghanistan, but also, as 
diplomats pointed out, to maintain their regional space free from excessive intrusion 
from the systemic, global level.181 
Also with respect to foreign issues and coordination of foreign policies some 
notable convergence was observable. The Central Asia countries, first of all, spoke of 
themselves as a region. They clearly had a sense of a regional space that had to be 
managed in concert, even if with some difficulties, misunderstandings and mistrusts. 
The ‘paper-organisation’ argument does not explain why these states set up such 
associations. More importantly, the fact that CACO achieved limited successes cannot 
rule out the fact that those successes were present.  
Realist explanations, focusing on power, rivalry and confrontation, have 
difficulties in accounting for the examples of cooperation described above. Liberal 
explanations, on the other hand, cannot find ground as such cooperation was not 
developmental in character, but rather conservative. As it is clear from today’s 
international relations in Central Asia, the establishment of secondary institutions and 
international (regional regimes) has not been successful. Therefore, how to illustrate 
regional international politics at the beginning of the new millennium? The answer is, 
as a regional pluralist international society.  
Such a pluralist international society, as described above, adopted sovereignty, 
international law, thick borders and non-interference as its cornerstones, and the 
                                                 
181 Asked about the presence of foreign powers in the region, Muratbek Imanaliyev, Kyrgyz Foreign 
Minister, said: ‘We felt the need to widen our circle of cooperation ... raise our cooperation to a new 
level’, while Kazakh Foreign Minister Erlan Idrissov stated: ‘There is no alternative to unifying our 
efforts in the region’. Agence France Presse – English, 5 February 2002. 
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solidarist impulses underpinning the renewed attempt to cooperation were not 
sufficiently strong to underpin fruitful multilateral efforts. The experience of the 
CACO, despite the (few) positive results listed above, was brief because of three main 
factors: 
 
 the prevalence of state sovereignty and national interest over regional 
burden-sharing and coordination; 
 the development of clearer domestic agendas that made state leaders 
realise their diverging paths; 
 the awareness that in the light of the above bilateral consultations were 
more preferable and more manageable. 
 
Moreover, issues of inter-personal mistrust, the difficult international context 
described above, the attempts of Russia to re-appropriate itself of the Central Asian 
sphere (demonstrated by the Saint Petersburg Treaty in 2005 with which the CACO 
was merged with the EurAsEC) and financial shortcomings, which clashed with the 
ambition of the regionalist programs, characterised in a negative way the path of intra-
regionalism in Central Asia. 
 
 
Clearly, what is argued here is not that a sudden shift occurred in the way Central 
Asian states have been managing their international relations. The movement along 
the spectrum has been gradual and sometimes even hidden to the protagonists 
themselves. In the words of a Central Asian expert acquainted with the Central Asian 
regionalist experiences,  
 
 
  solidarism            pluralism 
            (1994-2002)              (2002-) 
 
               Dead-letter international                    Anarchical international  
                          society                                                        society 
                                       
                 secondary institutions                             secondary institutions 
              reflect common aspirations                            are primarily for  
         but do not lead to substantive                           communication and 
                       integration                                                coordination 





[state leaders] tried so much to integrate and work together from 
early 1990s until mid 2000s because they did not know they were so 
much different. They realised during the process! I mean, they 
realised in the process of trying efforts, during the efforts of being 
together, solving issues together, creating institutions for different 
purposes, for common purposes, but then they realised they had a 
national interest, which is something they had to operationalise, 
they discovered it in the process! And they decided “no, we can’t 
really compromise our national interest for this regional 
integration”. That’s why they were trying, they were putting this on 
paper, but then the reality was different. Also, and perhaps more 
important, it is what I call the “resource” problem, the know-how. I 
am really materialistic, I mean money! They did not have it!182 
 
 
Furthermore, I had the opportunity to interview behind close doors a former Kyrgyz 
diplomat who used to work in all the Central Asian international organisations. In his 
words the notion of a waning dead-letter solidarism at the beginning of 2000s is 
evident: 
In 2001, there was the Ashgabat expert level meeting on Priorities 
and Principles of the region. The presidents, once more, saw they 
had to do something together. Yes, they of course had the feeling 
they had to be together. Simply, they could not find mechanisms. 
But the feeling was there. The CAU was dealing with integration, 
while the CACO more with transnational threats, less integration. In 
terms of success, however, I would say they were both not very 
effective. I remember we ourselves did not believe in it. We thought 
it would not work.183 
 
 
So, the CACO was nothing but the institutional representation of the change in the 
modalities of relations between Central Asian states, of the surge of a strong pluralism 
that would come to characterise Central Asian international society for the next years. 
The crucial argument made here, however, was that it would be incorrect to 
characterise all these experiences as plain ‘failures’. As we have seen, positive results 
were yielded as well, even if far below the expectations of those who believed in a 
deeper integration between Central Asian states.  
More importantly, they were positive results if assessed within a pluralist 
framework of analysis. For example, thanks to the activities carried out in the CACO 
and to the several platforms for communication and dialogue that this institution 
provided, Central Asian states managed to find common positions within international 
                                                 
182 Interview with Expert in Kyrgyzstan, 17 November 2013. 
183 Interview with former Kyrgyz diplomat, 2 May 2014. 
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forums such as the UN and the OSCE.184 Once again, coordination and 
communication were perhaps not as sensational achievements as deeper economic 
integration and resource-pooling, but nonetheless helped regional states to develop 
and enhance their understanding of norms, rules and values informing their foreign 
policies in a pluralist environment (Ushakova 2003).  
Such understanding has proved, I argue, to be of the utmost importance for the 
resilience of the whole regional system, as I will show below. The term ‘failure’ 
associated to the CACO experience reflects, once more, an unjustified solidarist 
expectation that very young states, still in the process of formation of their state- and 
nation-structures, of their national interests and of their understanding of the 
international environment, would decide to dispense their sovereign rights in favour 
of close and deep integration. 
With the Saint Petersburg treaty of 2005, the CACO was merged with the 
Russia-led EurAsEC, and therefore Central Asian regional organisations disappeared 
once for all. The question now is to try to understand whether the absence of regional 
international organisations is the same thing as the absence of a society of states, 
taken in its minimal meaning of a group of states following shared norms, rules and 
institutions to coexist and maintain order in their environment. I argue that the answer 
is ‘no’, and that Central Asia still shows a degree of ‘societiness’ even in the absence 
of regional secondary institutions. The two case-studies that follow, the Osh events 
and the Rogun Dam will serve as an illustration of my point. 
 
5.4 The Osh crisis in 2010: norms, rules and pluralist practices of security 
 
Arguably, an area where it may be useful to think of an international society at play it 
is usually that of conflict. How conflict is managed, contained, dealt with by the parts 
and framed by the actors can reveal a lot about the social nature of the environment 
where the conflict breaks out.  
The conflict in Osh that erupted in June 2010 between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks 
could have been a paramount example of collapse not just of bilateral relations 
between two states (Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) but also, more widely, of Central 
Asian regional stability (a conflict may well have caused a domino-effect where other 
                                                 




consistent minorities of Central Asian states insist on other states’ territories).185 
Below I give a brief account of what happened in the days of the crisis (roughly 10-15 
June 2010), and then I focus on those narratives at the high level referring to norms, 
rules and institutions that may lead us to think of an international society at play. 
 
5.4.1 Events in Osh: a short synopsis 
 
It must be stressed since the beginning that the purpose of this section is not to 
provide a detailed account of what actually happened in Osh, but rather to give the 
reader a comprehensive summary of those events the management of which makes 
possible to speak of norms and rules at play in Central Asia. For a more detailed 
account of the Osh events, therefore, I point to the relevant literature (Bond and Koch 
2010; Khakimov 2011; Matveeva, Savin et al. 2012; Megoran 2013; Rezvani 2013). 
The inter-ethnic clashes that happened in the southern Kyrgyz city of Osh, 40 
km far from the Uzbek border, need to be analysed in the context of the ousting of the 
Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev in April 2010, when eighty-six people died in 
the clashes. This led to the formation of a Provisional Government (PG) in charge of 
establishing a parliamentary system in lieu of the former presidential one (Matveeva 
2011: 4).  
In the wake of the uprisings and of Bakiyev’s removal, the situation in the 
south deteriorated: while Bakiyev’s supporters tried to cling to power, Uzbeks found 
themselves less protected than their Kyrgyz counterparts due to their under-
representation in security bodies (such as the police and prosecutors). While Uzbeks 
were creating their own security arrangements, Kyrgyz thought the PG would rely 
more on Uzbeks than on themselves. Since the two sides relied on their next kin for 
self-protection, the fight acquired an inter-ethnic dimension. The epicentre of the 
clashes was Osh, and violence spread also to Jalalabad, Suzak and Bazar-Korgan 
(Matveeva 2011: 5).  
Many Uzbeks, mostly women and children, fled to the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border 
hoping to through the frontier. The initial response of Uzbek border guards was to not 
let anyone inside the country. However, as the clashes became more and more violent, 
with a death toll higher and higher, Islam Karimov gave the order to open the frontier 
                                                 
185 The then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Kanat Saudabayev, serving as OSCE Chair, 
stated that the unrest in southern Kyrgyzstan ‘could have a highly destabilizing effect, not only on 
Central Asia, but also far beyond its borders’.  Thai News Service, 19 July 2010. 
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and to provide the refugees with shelter and protection.186  
Relying on Kyrgyz Ministry of Healthcare’s statistics, Anna Matveeva 
concludes that ‘altogether up to 470 were killed (74% Uzbek, 25% Kyrgyz and 1% 
belonged to other ethnic groups). Over 90% were men’ (Matveeva 2011: 6). 
 
5.4.2 Norms and rules in play 
 
After presenting these events, we are clearly faced with a theoretical conundrum: why 
did Uzbekistan not intervene to protect its citizens in southern Kyrgyzstan? While 
Anna Matveeva asks herself why Russia did not intervene (2011: 9), thus implicitly 
assuming the existence of a hegemonic system in Central Asia with Russia as its apex, 
I believe this conundrum is even more puzzling if we apply the usual, often-applied 
realist framework of analysis to the region. Uzbekistan had an overwhelming military 
force in comparison to Kyrgyzstan; the Kyrgyz regime was weak and still in search of 
consolidation after the ousting of Bakiyev; the Osh riots could have spurred other 
riots in border regions of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan; the massacres perpetuated by 
the Kyrgyz in Osh could have been, perhaps through a thorny legal argument, used to 
justify an intervention by the Uzbek motherland.  
In addition, problems of gas deliveries and border delimitation between the 
two countries and fears of social unrest possibly spreading to Uzbekistan (and other 
states, see below) worsened the nature of bilateral relations. A reaction from the 
Uzbek side, therefore, was expected by everyone.187 Yet, nothing happened. Why?  
Departing from Matveeva’s characterisation of Uzbekistan’s inaction as 
‘isolationist’ (2011: 11), I argue that considerations of international law, diplomatic 
conventions, the nature of informal communication in Central Asia and principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention constituted the reliable net of ‘safety mechanisms’ I 
mentioned above. In more general terms, I argue that an international society logic 
was in play during the Osh events, not a plain realist one. According to some sources, 
Uzbek troops were already stationing on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, ready to intervene 
on the Kyrgyz soil. They were just waiting for the mandate from Islam Karimov. The 
public opinion also was stirred by nationalist sentiments and moved by a strong will 
                                                 
186 However, not all the check-points were opened. The border stayed closed in those parts where low-
scale conflict was taking place (Matveeva 2011: 6). 
187 ‘Kyrgyzstan expected Uzbekistan to intervene, we believed it was just a matter of time’. Interview 
with former Kyrgyz Diplomat. 
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to help their compatriots across the border.188  
Yet, it was the personal decision of Islam Karimov not to intervene. In 
explaining his decision, he made references to principles of international law and the 
utmost, paramount rules of a minimal, pluralist international society: the respect of 
each other’s sovereignty and the respect of the principle of non-intervention.  
Indeed, in the whole presidential administration of Tashkent, two logics were 
in play. On one hand, there was mere calculation. Intervention, even if welcomed by 
Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, would have spurred a regional conflict and involved also 
(unwelcome) Great Powers. On the other hand, there was normative belief. During the 
time necessary to decide the course of action, in the government there were 
continuous considerations based on sovereignty, non-interference and international 
law. An interviewee working for the Uzbek administration at that time told me that 
‘even if geopolitical and opportunistic windows were available, we could not do as we 
pleased, we constantly had in mind the norms, the “red lines”, if you want, of the 
international system’. 189 
The prevention of bilateral and regional collapse was prevented, I argue, thanks to 
the interplay of three different mechanisms. These mechanisms reflect a pluralist ES 
logic: 
 
 international law (respect for sovereignty and non-interference); 
 continuous diplomatic interaction both at the bilateral and at the regional level; 
 prevalence of the raison d’état/systéme over the rights of people (‘order over 
justice’).  
 
In the justifications provided by Islam Karimov and the Uzbek establishment for not 
intervening in Kyrgyzstan, we find references to principles of international law, the 
respect of sovereignty, the value of non-interference as a paramount bedrock of 
international relations and considerations of international law as the basis on which 
states should relate to each other (Fumagalli 2010).  
                                                 
188 Interview with Expert in Kyrgyzstan; interview with Marat Kazakhbayev. According to Kyrgyz 
State Border Service Deputy Commander Cholponbek Turusbekov, Uzbekistan sent special units 
from its border guard forces toward the border with Kyrgyzstan to reinforce its protection. Central 
Asia & Caucasus Business Weekly, 15 June 2010. 
189 Interview with Official Uzbek source; similar arguments were made in an interview with two 
representatives of the Institute for Strategic and Regional studies under the President of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan in Tashkent, December 13, 2013. 
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In the Uzbek Foreign Minister’s statement on the Kyrgyz crisis released on 9 April 
2010, the opening line was the following: ‘The events taking place in Kyrgyzstan are, 
first of all, the internal affair of the Kyrgyz Republic’ (UZA 2010). Furthermore, at 
the meeting of the SCO Summit held in Tashkent on June 14, 2010, Islam Karimov 
argued that ‘[Uzbeks] believe this is an internal affair of Kyrgyzstan, and that says 
everything’ (UzReport 2010b).  
Speculations over Karimov’s use of international law have been abundant. 
Three, in particular, could have been the counter-arguments against his professed 
adherence to international law. The first one is that Uzbekistan is already suffering 
from over-population at home. Incorporating Kyrgyz Uzbeks into Uzbekistan’s 
borders would mean to worsen the socio-economic situation of the country, and 
therefore it was in the interest of Uzbekistan to not intervene.  
The second one is that the Uzbek minority in Kyrgyzstan is more liberal and 
open-minded than Uzbeks at home, and therefore their incorporation would have 
constituted a menace to Karimov’s regime from a political viewpoint. Again, it was 
not in the interest of Uzbekistan to intervene.  
The third one is that Karimov understood that such a move might have caused 
a domino effect in the region and that Russia could have taken advantage of it, stirring 
conflict and putting Central Asian states one against each other. Therefore, again, it 
was not in the interest of Uzbekistan to intervene. But all these three counter-
arguments miss a very important point: that to follow a rule because it is in 
somebody’s interest is still to follow a rule.  
As Buzan has shown (2004: 128-138; see also Wendt 1999), a norm can be 
accepted (and implemented) via three, not necessarily exclusive, mechanisms of 
internalisation: coercion, calculation, and belief. These three modalities of 
internalisation of a norm differ in terms of strength, but not of result. The fact that a 
norm is followed because one thinks it is right to do so or because one is forced to do 
so does not mean that the norm itself is not followed. What, instead, differs, is that the 
future commitment to that norm will be far more uncertain in case of coercion and 
calculation instead of in case of belief. But there is more. Karimov decided to not 
intervene while making reference to a body of rules and norms known as international 
law.  
Keeping in mind what we have said in Chapter 3, the fact that he used it as a 
justification for his inaction, for his restraint, tell us that these norms and rules have a 
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validity, a recognition, a meaning in the region. He did not just say ‘I am not 
intervening because this would create disorder in the region’. He did just not say ‘I 
would intervene but I cannot calculate the consequences’. Conversely, he said that he 
was not intervening because of the above and exactly because of a set of norms and 
rules prohibiting him to do so.190 Whether instrumentally or not, the fact that he 
mentioned international law as a constraint tells us that such a constraint is perceived 
in the region as having some sort of power. In the words of a former Kyrgyz diplomat, 
 
Uzbeks were being massacred. But Karimov did not intervene. We 
are still grateful to Karimov, you know. Maybe also for his personal 
interest, but does this matter? He followed a principle of 
international law […] I can tell you, as I was working in the 
security council of Kyrgyzstan at that time, that it was his personal 
decision not to intervene. Sure, it was also a matter of convenience. 
He feared a domino effect you know. He wanted to preserve order. 




Kazakhstan and Tajikistan followed the same principles, and adhered to a strong, 
pluralist conception of sovereignty paired with a clear-cut understanding of non-
intervention.192 Kazakhstan, which nonetheless was actively involved diplomatically 
(see below) and which chaired the OSCE, maintained a position conforming to non-
intervention, as it feared problems with its own Uzbeks in southern Kazakhstan 
province. Therefore, Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks migrating northwards to Russia in the 
aftermath of violence were only discreetly allowed to traverse through Kazakhstan’s 
territory (Matveeva 2011: 8). Bulat Auelbaev, Head of Department of Foreign Policy 
Analysis and Strategy of the Kazakh Institute of Strategic Studies (KISI), recalls how 
 
when there was unrest in Kyrgyzstan, experts in Kazakhstan and 
Central Asia were discussing whether neighbouring countries 
should take lead, even intervene and even protect subjects, or areas, 
                                                 
190 I was told that ‘Uzbek people inside Uzbekistan really criticised Karimov a lot for being inactive, 
for not taking action, because he said “this is an internal issue of Kyrgyzstan, and we won’t 
intervene, we don’t have any official normative platform to intervene”. That is why he was clear on 
it’. Interview with Expert in Kyrgyzstan. 
191 Interview with former Kyrgyz Diplomat, May 2, 2014. 
192 ‘Our position on Osh was diplomatic. Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that we were 
worried, anxious. In any case, we are not ready to intervene, maybe some organisation, like CSTO 
with some of our troops, but for us as a country is better not to intervene, in any case’. Interview 
with Sultan Akimbekov. Also, in an interview with two Official Sources at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, I was told that ‘war was imminent, but everyone refrained from 
that because all states in Central Asia were conscious of the potential risks’. 
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in Kyrgyzstan. This was in 2010. I personally expressed publicly 
that there was no way to intervene because there was a norm of 
sovereignty, of non-intervention, Kyrgyzstan was an independent 
country and therefore no one could take a small nail of it. This 
approach of non-intervention and sovereignty protection proved to 
be the right thing to do, exactly because it’s a principle of 
international law. […] Also Karimov, generally speaking, respected 
sovereignty and international law; he just opened the border for the 
refugees and after some time he returned those refugees and in this 
way they did not break the rules.193 
 
 
Conversely, Tajikistan demonstrated its commitment to non-interference by 
categorically denying involvement in the events in Kyrgyzstan. Answering to 
accusations of direct involvement and violence-stirring moves on the Kyrgyz soil 
moved by Kyrgyzstan against Tajikistan, General Abdullo Nazarov, the head of the 
National Security Ministry’s office in the south eastern region of Badakhshan, said 
that reports were unfounded that he and other Tajiks were either involved in 
fomenting or directly taking part in the deadly violence in southern Kyrgyzstan 
between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz (RFE/RL 2010).   
In an effort to back these theoretical intuitions with words and accounts 
coming from analysts, diplomats and academic acquainted with the Osh events (or 
who even took part in their resolution at the high level), I directly asked several 
practitioners in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan as well as in Kazakhstan about why Karimov 
and other leaders decided to not intervene. All of them, immediately, referred to legal 
and normative consideration. For example, Zakir Chotaev, Assistant Director of the 
Central Asian Research Centre and Professor of International Law at the Turkish-
Manas University in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, stated that 
 
in Central Asia, there are observations of international law rules, 
especially on borders and enclaves. […] We have problems, but also 
restraint. There are negotiations, and Uzbekistan tries to apply the 
rules as well. In Osh, they did not intervene, the elite understood 
that such a conflict would have been against Karimov. Again, 
international law was respected. The rules concerning sovereignty, 
respect of sovereignty, restraints on borders, territorial integrity and 
non-interference are observed in Central Asia. And also, they are 
observed mutually [emphasis in his tone]. There are expectations. 
The rulers in Central Asian countries understand very clear that 
military means can not be used to resolve the problems.194  
 
                                                 




Marat Kazakhbayev, senior analyst at the Institute of Public Policy in Bishkek, argued 
that  
Karimov did not intervene in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 because he was 
oriented towards respecting international law. There were rumours 
that an aggression to Kyrgyzstan had been planned, the troops were 
actually at the border, but he avoided that again because that would 
have constituted international aggression. This is why even now the 
Kyrgyz government considers Karimov’s in the highest esteem, he 
really avoided a major conflict.195  
 
Focusing more on the interplay between interest, calculation and belief, Askar Nursha, 
political expert in Kazakhstan, linked Karimov’s decision to not intervene both to 
legal consideration and the wider regional context: 
 
During Osh, there was a threat that Uzbekistan would send the 
troops. It was believed that ODKB [CSTO] troops would deteriorate 
the situation. In the end, the conflict did not happen because of 
Karimov’s wisdom. They [the Uzbeks] did not send the troops 
because it would mean to send troops in a different country, and 
therefore it would constitute international aggression. Uzbekistan 
did not want to be aggressive. According to many Uzbek experts, 
Uzbekistan also did not intervene because it did not want to give a 
reason for ODKB [CSTO] to intervene.196 
 
The wider, fundamental function that positivist international law plays in the 
international relations within the region is explained by Zhenis Kembayev, Professor 
of International Law in Kazakhstan, exactly making reference to the Osh events:  
 
what I can see is that Central Asia is fully committed to the basic 
principles of international law. That’s what all countries are in 
favour of, what they support and will support, because it is in their 
vital interest. It’s a matter of survival. In the 1990s, all countries 
were preoccupied by their own internal problems, but all countries 
wanted civil war in Tajikistan to come to an end, because it could 
spread to other countries and it was potentially very dangerous. It 
was a real war, with many losses…Osh was a conflict of different 
category, other countries decided to categorise it as internal 
problem. They did not intervene, even Uzbekistan. Because all of 
them, all Central Asian countries, may incur in the same, none of 
them wants other countries to intervene in their domestic affairs. 
Osh was exactly what the Central Asian understanding of 
international law is! It’s bloody, it’s tragic, it’s something that 
should not happen, but they just did not intervene.197 
 






But as said, also respect for sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty (and its derivative 
institution of non-intervention and respect of legitimate borders) in Central Asia 
played a pivotal role in the management of the Osh crisis. According to Irina 
Chernykh, a foreign policy and security expert in Kazakhstan, 
 
in the region with the Central Asian actors we have a mixed 
situation. Of course you remember the Osh and Jalalabad events. In 
this situation, all Central Asian states refused to intervene in 
Kyrgyzstan […] officially to respect the idea of sovereignty. In the 
region, at the very high political level, we still have a common value 
of what sovereignty is. 198   
 
As anticipated, diplomacy is the other institution (in ES terms) that, I argue, helped 
maintain regional order and stability. Against the common narrative of Central Asian 
states as not talking to each other, intense diplomatic consultations were carried out 
daily between the Uzbek government and the Kyrgyz one, especially between Islam 
Karimov himself and Roza Otunbayeva, the Kyrgyz interim president. Karimov held 
also phone conversations with Nurusultan Nazarbayev in order to assess the potential 
regional implications of what was going on in Osh.199 In the words of one of the 
interviewees I spoke to, who worked for the Uzbek Presidential Administration at that 
time, it was exactly because of these diplomatic interactions that a major crisis was 
avoided: 
do you remember Osh events, right? I remember, I was in Tashkent, 
in the administration, everything was very difficult, there were 
different options on the table. Even intervention, you know? But 
intervention would have been difficult, and wrong. To our mind, this 
would have constituted an act of international aggression, therefore 
against international law. In the end, Mr. Karimov decided to 
support Ms. Otunbayeva. There was the famous Bukhara 
Declaration, when he stated ‘Uzbek soldiers won’t stomp [sic] their 
feet outside Uzbek borders’. They wrote each other, there were 
consultations, they exchanged letters. I remember this.200 
                                                 
198 Interview. 
199 Interview with former Kyrgyz Diplomat. He also mentioned possible discussions between 
Karimov and President Rahmon of Tajikistan, but was less sure. Aside from Islam Karimov and 
Nurusultan Nazarbayev, other phone conversations involved Dimitri Medvedev, Roza Otunbayeva, 
Kanat Saudabayev and Zhanibek Karibzhanov (respectively Foreign Minister and Deputy Chairman 
of the lower house of the Kazakh parliament). Russia & CIS Military Weekly, 10 September 2010. 
200 Interview with Official Uzbek source. 
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Karimov himself gave a personal, detailed account of what happened in those days, of 
his diplomatic contacts with Ms. Roza Otunbayeva, of his adherence to international 
law and diplomatic protocol: 
I remember that morning, when Roza Otunbayeva suddenly called 
me early on the morning of 11 June and we talked for a long time. I 
promised, and kept this promise, that no one would cross the border 
into Kyrgyzstan, in any way, and I kept my word. But it was not an 
easy task. This prevented the situation from getting worse, this 
ensured the certain normalization that currently exists 
in Kyrgyzstan…Taking this into account, imagine for a minute [what 
could have happened] if even a single Uzbek serviceman had crossed 
the border. Osh is no more than 40 km away from [eastern Uzbek 
region of] Andijon, only 40 km. And only 15 km away from the 
border. If even one person had crossed the border, I believe, it would 
have caused new bloody slaughter similar to that which took place 
there. Everyone who is present here and listening to me understands 
well that this could have happened. And, with the Kyrgyz president, 
our contribution was that we prevented it.201 
 
 
Another diplomatic move made by the Uzbek side in connection to the Osh events to 
defuse, cool down the tensions was to attribute the conflicts to unidentified third 
parties rather than to the Kyrgyz government itself.  
In a statement issued on June 12, 2010, the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
argued the following: ‘we have no doubt that all this is taking place under the 
instigation of forces, whose interests are totally far from the interests of the Kyrgyz 
people’ (UzReport 2010a), while Islam Karimov, in an interview with the press, said 
that ‘it’s not the fault of Uzbeks or Kyrgyz. It’s sabotage organized and orchestrated 
from outside. The forces that organized this sabotage tried to involve Uzbekistan in 
this conflict’.202 In addition, Central Asian governments and Uzbekistan in particular 
were quick in recognising Roza Otunbayeva as acting President, a move meant to 
define a clear interlocutor and to avoid the perception that in Kyrgyzstan there was a 
void of power, something that could have been used instrumentally by the parties in 
the conflict.203 
The full observance of the institution of diplomacy during the Osh events was 
visible at the regional level as well as the global one, especially thanks to the several 
                                                 
201 BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 13 December 2010. 
Emphasis added. 
202 Russia & CIS Military Daily, 21 June 2010. 
203 BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 30 June 2010. 
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diplomatic ties established by Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan with extra-regional parties 
and international organisations. In particular, the IFRC, the Red Cross, the UN Office 
in Tashkent, the UN Secretary General, and the Field Assessment and Coordination 
Team (FACT) were operating in the crisis, with several members of these 
organisations helping directly on the ground to solve the crisis diplomatically, 
preventing the eruption of an even more violent conflict (UzReport 2010c; UzReport 
2010d; UzReport 2010e). 
Furthermore, at the very end of the conflict and riots, the whole stabilisation 
process was followed diplomatically by Roza Otunbayeva, Islam Karimov, Dimitri 
Medvedev and Nurusultan Nazarbayev, through meetings and phone-calls.204 
The third mechanism I have mentioned is the prevalence of the raison d’état over 
more cosmopolitan readings of regional politics. And this is a perfect example of a 
Westphalian international society in play. The prevalence of order, stability, 
coexistence at the state level was deemed to be more important than people’s lives and 
security concerns. The survival of the regional system itself was more desirable than 
the survival of sub-state actors. By not intervening in Kyrgyzstan, Karimov made 
explicit not only that war is a taboo in Central Asia, but also that the region as a whole 
has the priority over the individuals inhabiting it. This is a state-centric reading of the 
norms of sovereignty and international law, which was supported by regional peers. 
In the end, the Kyrgyz authorities recognised the importance of Uzbekistan’s 
decision not to intervene, and the choice of Karimov to follow international law 
(again, either for interest or for normative belief), especially in its dictates of respect 
of sovereignty and non-interference. Abdygany Erkibayev, chairman of the Kyrgyz 
Inquiry Commission on the Osh events, even recommended that Kyrgyz President 
Roza Otunbayeva present a state award to Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who had 
chosen not to interfere in Kyrgyzstan’s internal affairs during the June 2010 events. 
‘Thanks to Karimov’s policy’, he said, ‘we managed to avoid interstate complications 
and a regional war.’205 Otunbayeva herself showed appreciation of Uzbekistan’s 
                                                 
204 Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), 13 June 2010. Also, a high-level working group for the 
revitalisation of the economic activities in Kyrgyzstan was set up led by First Deputy Prime 
Minister Umirzak Shukeyev which included the heads of the relevant ministries of Kazakhstan. 
Otunbayeva said the Kyrgyz side formed a similar working group. The establishment of the two 
coordinated working groups was coordinated by Nazarbayev and Otunbayeva themselves. Russia & 
CIS General Newswire, 12 July 2010. 
205 Central Asia General Newswire, 11 January 2011; BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit Supplied by 
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, January 11, 2011. 
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international behaviour on that occasion. She said adamantly ‘We are very grateful to 
the government of Uzbekistan and Islam Karimov for their balanced position. He took 
a big, brave step: he saved these people’s lives’ (Kremlin.ru 2010).  
That the acts of Uzbekistan conformed to a shared script, template, canvas of 
norms, and expected behaviour, was evident in the gratitude and admiration of state 
authorities in the region, especially, again, in Kyrgyzstan: 
 
The Kyrgyz government was very grateful. Otunbayeva and 
Atambayev understood the importance of the action of Karimov. 
They used all public statements and speeches to be thankful to 
Karimov. They even said ‘our brother’, ‘our Central Asian brother’, 
you know, these kind of discourses…you could perceive it, it was 
not artificial. It was sincere.206 
 
 
That Karimov’s move conformed to a shared, regional understanding of how 
international law and sovereignty should be played out in the region is demonstrated 
also by Kazakhstan’s attitude towards the current events in Crimea. Karimov’s 
example of non-interference has been recently compared to the present state of affairs 
in Ukraine. In a recent interview on international political developments in Ukraine, 
Askar Nursha affirmed that 
 
It is worth pointing out that Central Asia views the events in 
Ukraine more critically due to a complicated interethnic situation in 
our region; states, except for Kazakhstan, still have territorial 
disputes. Having China as a neighbour, which dominates in the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization with its goal of confronting 
three threats – separatism, extremism and terrorism, has to be taken 
into account. This explains the special approach to sovereignty in 
our region, and deployment of troops for the protection of national 
minorities can hardly be supported. For example, 
Islam Karimov could act in the same way during the Osh events of 
2010 in order to protect the Uzbek minority living in the south of 
Kyrgyzstan, but he did not and was appreciated for that in the 
region and abroad. Violation of these principles may undermine 
trust between states. 207 
                                                 









An important question that arises from the analyses above, and indeed inherently 
linked to it, is what kind of security environment existed in the region at that time. As 
has been argued, ‘the relationship between international rules and norms on one hand 
and the practice/s of security in world [in this case regional] politics on the other 
clearly encourages an investigation of the ways in which the relationship between 
international society and security might be conceived’ (Bellamy and McDonald 2004: 
308). Anna Matveeva, for example, argues that both the CSTO and the SCO proved to 
be purposeless in the management of the crisis, and that such institutions showed their 
security-providing inadequacy in the (non-) management of the Osh riots (2011: 12).  
Yet, if we have to conduct an ES analysis of the security arrangements in play 
in the region, we should not be surprised that the pluralistic, communitarian and state-
centric spirit of the society of states present there did not allow for breaches of 
sovereignty and suspension of the principle of non-intervention for humanitarian 
purposes. As David Lewis has noted, Central Asia is ‘a complex political-security 
environment’, where different organisations with different memberships and agendas 
(OSCE, CSTO, SCO) ‘both compete and cooperate in responding to security concerns 
in the region’ (2013: 2).  
These different international organisations, as said, bring along with their 
membership a different set of ideas, norms and security-related discourses that tend to 
fall in two different, quite opposite, camps: a liberal understanding of security and 
conflict-management (OSCE) emphasising democratisation, human rights and more 
broadly human security, and a traditional understanding of security (CSTO and SCO), 
focusing on state-resilience, state-protection and emphasis on sovereignty and non-
interference (Lewis 2013: 3-4). In the Osh events, this second understanding of 
security was visible in more than one respect. The OSCE, for example, decided to 
send a police mission to attempt to contain and tame the violence, but in the end this 
measure was rejected by the Kyrgyz authorities themselves.  
More importantly for the norm-based narrative of the ES, the human-targeted 
measures proposed by the OSCE  
 
provoked a counter-discourse in which they were portrayed as 
supporting separatism and therefore challenging Kyrgyz 
sovereignty. As a result, they were equally unable to implement 
effective conflict mitigation measures because of fears that their 
presence would undermine the sovereignty of the Kyrgyz state 




Conversely, the SCO, deeming that none of the ‘Three Evils’ present on its agenda 
(terrorism, extremism and separatism) was in play in the events, saw no ground for 
implementing security measures other than diplomatic support to Ms. Otunbayeva and 
dispatch of limited humanitarian aid. The same thing may be said for the CSTO, 
whose charter emphasises respect for the sovereignty of member states and pledges 
respect for the principle of non-intervention (Bordyuzha undated; CSTO 2002). 
Despite Kyrgyzstan’s direct appeal to Russia, the legal basis, the norm-imbued 
environment did not foresee the possibility of intervention.  
Also, while Anna Matveeva argues that the Treaty of Eternal Friendship 
signed by the two parties could have provided a legal basis for a solidarist 
intervention (2011: 9), in fact the treaty states that the parties  
 
will develop [their] relations on the basis of large-scale cooperation, 
mutual trust, mutual support by providing versatile in preventing 
threats to independence, national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, the principles of equality and non-interference in the 
internal affairs of each other (Deklaratsiya 2000).  
 
The Osh riots were considered neither as threats to the territorial integrity of 
Kyrgyzstan, nor as acts of terrorism. The security mechanisms provided by the 
treaties binding the two, therefore, could not be activated.  
Therefore, from an ES perspective, it can be said that in Central Asia during 
the Osh events there were two competing discourses of security, one related to a 
solidarist international society framework and one related to a pluralist one (Bellamy 
and Macdonald 2004: 313; Kreikemeyer 2013).  
The former may be defined as entailing a shift from the state to the individual 
as the referent of security; as defining insecurity largely as a threat to the quality of 
life of individuals; as requiring the active agency of non-state actors; as orienting 
security ‘away from the traditional and, more importantly, exclusive concern with 
armed conflict and the preservation of the state and international society’ (Bellamy 
and Macdonald 2004: 319).  
The latter is defined as purchasing security sometimes also at the expense of 
individuals; as prescribing that boundaries of the state and the community do not 
necessarily overlap (what Karimov had clearly in mind); as a set of rules and security 
practices that, although succeeding ‘in reducing premature deaths caused by inter-
199 
 
state war’, has nonetheless failed ‘to curb the increase in premature deaths caused by 
internal war, poverty and state repression’ (Bellamy and Macdonald 2004: 315).  
In the end, the two different security logics in play in Osh were reflective of the 
pluralist and solidarist conceptions of (regional) international society: order vs. 
justice. As we have seen, the pluralist, prudential logic had the upper hand. The raison 
d’état, or better, the raison de systéme, was deemed to be more important than the 
raison d’humanité. A strongly systemic, state-centric set of norms outplayed another 
set more concerned with individuals and human security.  
While this prevailing logic may be condemnable from a liberal, human-
centred perspective, it cannot be accused of lacking normative content tout-court. The 
referent object, the recipient (and the beneficiary) of the norms were the region and 
the states comprising the region, not its inhabitants (Axyonova 2013). Irrespective of 
whether we accept it or not, a societal dimension, a common concern, a sense of an 
endangered ‘we-ness’ was present during the Osh events. This tells us that an 
international society logic was indeed present at that time, and sustained itself with 
the specific pluralist norms and rules identified and discussed above. 
Last but not least, it is also interesting to see how, in line with the development 
of secondary institutions present at the regional level analysed above (from CAU to 
CAEC to CACO until their complete disappearance), the regional environment in 
Central Asia has been moving from a ‘dead-letter’ solidarism in the 1990s to a 
paramount, almost idealtypical, anarchic pluralism. Ceteris paribus, this movement 
along the spectrum is observable also in the two different reactions to the civil war in 
Tajikistan and the Osh events. Although very different in nature and duration, the two 
events were framed and managed in different normative contexts and on different 
normative bases, as well as different conceptions of sovereignty. 
Before concluding this section, it is interesting also to notice how from an ES 
perspective, the Osh events present also a conundrum as far as the institution of GPM 
is concerned. It was noted in the previous chapter that GPM was a powerful 
institution in the 1990s in the region, fully respected by all Central Asian states. The 
war in Afghanistan in the early 2000s demonstrated once again the commitment of 
Central Asian states to this institution internationally.  
However, it seems that in the region there is a particular understanding of 
GPM, and not even shared by all states in the same way: in Central Asia, GPM seems 
to be legitimate only when problems do not concern bilateral or regional political 
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relations between states. The Afghan conflict, the Aral Sea management, climatic 
issues and broader security-related problems are well framed within a GPM logic. Yet, 
when conflict arises between two states affecting the status of their relations, Great 
Powers are not called upon or invoked. Instead, the issue almost comes within a new 
rubric of ‘Central Asian regional sovereignty’. Indeed, Great Powers are seen as 
potential ‘spoilers’ of the conflict, ready to take advantage of it. According to Rustam 
Burnashev,  
 
Great Power Management as an institution is accepted [in Central 
Asia], but only with respect to external situation. No one would 
accept interference in domestic affairs! When Karimov says 
“terrorism is a problem” he really wants help from the international 
community, but for when it is not in Uzbekistan. In Batken, for 
example, he invoked international support. It’s a question between 
internal and external legitimacy.208 
 
References from all states to ‘third parties’ fomenting the conflict, to some extent, 
conform to this argument. If we assume that GPM and the hegemony that derives 
from it involve ‘the product of legitimacy, of the perception, on the part of other 
social actors, that the exercise of power is rightful’ (Clark 2009: 204; see also Reus-
Smit 2005: 88), and that ‘Great powers can fulfil their managerial functions only if 
those functions are accepted clearly enough by a large enough proportion of the 
society of states to command legitimacy’ (Bull, 1977: 228), in the Osh events the 
absence of such legitimacy was evident in how neither Kazakhstan, nor Uzbekistan, 
nor Tajikistan appealed to Russia to intervene, leaving Kyrgyzstan the only state to do 
so. Conforming to the normative logic in play in the region, Russia decided to not 
intervene.  
Yet, I showed how Russia, while not directly intervening in the conflict, 
played a diplomatic role in managing the transition from Bakiyev to Otunbayeva and, 
in addition, it is also believed that it interfered in the earlier phases of the conflict, 
when Bakiyev was deposed. In addition, rumours about Russia’s role in Bakiyev’s 
ousting and Russia’s manoeuvres behind the scenes take us back to the notion of 
hegemony discussed in Chapter 3. This interference of Russia in the region refers to 
recent research on ‘conspiracy theories’ linked to Russia’s hegemonic role in the 
region (for an overall discussion, see Heathershaw 2011).  




As a matter of fact, after Bakiyev negotiated a renewal deal with the US on the Manas 
airbase despite assurances to Moscow that the base would be closed, Russia reacted 
‘with undisguised fury’ (Blank 2010). The Russian government suspended the funding 
of hydroelectric projects in Kyrgyzstan, it raised the price for gas, and ‘upbraided the 
then Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov for spending money on projects other than what 
they had been intended for’ (Blank 2010), involving China in hydroelectric deals. As 
reported by the Washington Post, in late March, two weeks before the April 7 protests, 
‘Russia’s Kremlin-friendly television stations and newspapers marked the fifth 
anniversary of Bakiyev’s rise to power in the putsch known as the Tulip Revolution 
with unusually tough stories about his rule. One paper compared him to Genghis 
Khan, and Russia’s top television station hammered him with multiple reports 
alleging corruption.’  
Then, after the opposition announced plans for nationwide protests, Putin 
‘provided a final spark by signing a decree on March 29 eliminating subsidies on 
gasoline exports to Kyrgyzstan and other former Soviet republics that had not joined a 
new customs union’ (Washington Post 2010) and shut down some bilateral banking 
transactions, triggering social unrest. ‘Once the fighting stopped and it became clear 
that Roza Otunbaeva’s provisional government was at least partially in charge, Russia 
backed her quickly with 1.5 million tonnes of Russian grain, an agreement on $50 
million of financial aid, and a tantalizing (if ultimately empty) promise of security 
assistance’ (Nixey 2012: 9). This shows how, by apparently ‘staying out’ to respect a 
regional norm, Moscow was actively playing a role in the conflict. 
By looking at these events, one may argue that Russia’s hegemonic presence is 
still observable, albeit indirectly, in discourses of ‘foreign interference’ or foreign 
threat’, which have been highlighted in the course of the chapter. As John 
Heathershaw has recently noted, conspiracy theories and ‘concepts such as […] 
‘foreign interference’ […] reproduce a Central Asian politics in which patron-client 
linkages to Russia are interpreted not simply as business relations, but as evidence 
of the hegemonic position and conspiratorial role of Russia in Central Asia.’ 
(Heathershaw 2011: 628).  
Was this behaviour an example of hegemony in the region, then? Here, I 
argue, the question of legitimacy comes to the fore. Russia, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
seems to rely much more on primacy than on legitimate hegemony. These intrusions 
and interferences, based on direct linkages to ruling elites in Central Asia rather than 
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on institutionalised behaviour, contribute to heightening tensions between Central 
Asian states, thus preventing the regional international society to develop along more 
solid lines. As James Nixey has astutely argued, Russia has genuine security interests 
in Central Asia, but ‘it would be more convincing if it did not play the security card 
when no such threat exists’ (2012: 8).  
This, again, seems to conflate hegemony and primacy. Russia, thanks to its 
financial, political and military means, is indeed able to penetrate the regional space, 
to create distrust among leaders, to weaken existing regimes and to affect the course 
of regional politics. Yet, this kind of intervention is not yet considered legitimate 
regionally, and reflects a more coercive way to manage relations with regional actors 
rather than an attempt to ‘working towards rules formation and legitimation’ 
(Kaczmarska 2014: 98). Nonetheless, these discourses are constitutive and 
performative, a mode of making reality, and point to the particular role of Russia in 
the region. More on this, as anticipated, will be said in the conclusions of the thesis 
(Chapter 7.4). 
 Although more on this will be said at the end of this chapter and in the 
conclusions of this thesis, it is also important to note that the particular understanding 
of GPM in the region has also implications for how other institutions, namely 
international law and diplomacy, work in the regional context. This is clearly visible 
in problems related to water-management and water courses, to which we turn now. 
 
5.5  The Rogun Dam 
 
The second area in which an ES account of Central Asian regional politics reveals 
more than a usual neo-realist framework of analysis is that of water-management, in 
particular with respect to the construction of the Rogun dam in Tajikistan. As in the 
section above on the Osh events, this section is made up of a first subsection where I 
illustrate the basic controversy and a second, longer subsection where I try to identify 
the norms and institutions at play in its dealing.  
5.5.1 The controversy 
 
Water management in Central Asia has been, since 1991, a problem concerning all 
regional states (Sievers 2001; Bernauer and Siegfried 2008; Rakhmatullaev, Huneau 
et al. 2010; Bichsel 2011; Abdullaev and Atabaeva 2012). As noted in chapter 4, 
during the Soviet times there was a centralised (read: Moscow-regulated) system of 
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water distribution, which made possible exchanges of water and energy between those 
Central Asian states endowed with water resources (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and 
those that were endowed with energy resources (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan).  
Once independent, regional states constantly strove to find mechanisms to 
regulate water flows from the Amur Darya and Syrdarya basins in the summer in 
exchange for energy in winter, but all of them failed due to a basic lack of political 
will and trust between the leaders. In recent times, the already difficult relations 
between states in the region have been aggravated by the decision of the Tajik 
government to build a new dam, Rogun, on the Vakhsh River.209  
According to the Tajik government, the construction of the dam is of utmost 
necessity, given persistent shortages of energy in winter times. With the construction 
of the dam, Tajikistan would solve its problems of energy-dependence on what it 
considers as an unreliable neighbour, Uzbekistan, and would allow it to be self-
sufficient in the creation of hydro-electric power in the longer term.  
The Tajik government considers the construction of Rogun as a matter of 
national interest. In this assessment of the necessity of the construction of dams for 
the need of energy auto-sufficiency, Tajikistan is supported by Kyrgyzstan (Avesta 
2013b), which experiences the same problems and has indeed started a similar project 
(although much smaller in scale), Kambarata-1. 
The position of the three downstream countries is different. Water is 
considered as a (regional) public good, and therefore its flow cannot be hindered by 
national architectural projects that do not favour the collective usage of it. In addition, 
downstream countries contest the fact that, while Tajikistan could spare energy by 
building smaller dams and small hydroelectric power stations, Rogun would be the 
highest dam in the world (World Bank 2014b).  
Yet, while the three downstream countries have repeatedly voiced their 
opposition to the Rogun project invoking regional consultations and calling for the 
respect of the interest of all countries in the region, Tajikistan has started the 
construction of the dam. Therefore, the problem illustrated seems a typical realist, 
                                                 
209 Technically speaking, the project is not ‘new’. The Rogun dam was planned already in Soviet 
times, and its construction started back in 1976. The project was interrupted when the Soviet Union 
collapsed and then resumed in 2010, when the Tajik government launched an IPO to aim at 
finishing construction of the project. 
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confrontational example of international politics. Two clashing interests, no 
resolution, no compromise, no agreement: zero-sum politics. According to some 
analysts, conflict will be inevitable (Mambetov 2012; Blank 2012; Shlapentokh 
2012a; Shlapentokh 2012b). 
But is the stalemate managed in a fully confrontational way, or are some 
mechanisms, some practices, some institutions followed, thus taming a violent 
outbreak? I argue that an ES analysis of this so far ‘cold’ conflict reveals that Central 
Asian states are well-aware of the risks of a confrontation on Rogun, and that despite 
the bitter disagreement which exists between the states, certain norms and codified 
behaviours are still observed by all parties. 
 
5.5.2 Taming an inevitable conflict? 
 
Clearly, the positions of upstream and downstream countries differ. Downstream 
countries make reference to customary international water law and UN Conventions, 
while upstream countries make reference to the Harmon doctrine, insisting on the 
sovereign rights on natural resources which a state is endowed with.  
An additional problem for downstream countries, however, is that not all the 
states are signatory parties to such conventions. They make reference to them, but 
because upstream countries have not signed them, technically they are not bound by 
them (see below for a more detailed analysis).  
Yet, the fact that they still refer to them is important for ES theory, because it 
identifies a precept, a script, an institution that in the mind of the actors should be 
followed. That is, references to international law shed light on a framework of 
‘appropriateness’, of what is permissible and accepted by a social group, a standard of 
reference that is to be upheld if members of such group are to live in an orderly and 
predictable way (Jackson 2000).  
There is also the role of diplomacy to be considered. This, as usual, is made up 
of official state visits in regional, neighbouring countries and at summits and more 
technical meetings. In the region the institutionalisation of the ‘Riparian Meetings’ is 
observable, also called ‘Information-sharing and Discussion Meetings on the 
Assessment Studies’ under the aegis of the WB. The institutionalisation of such 
meetings are a continuation of the consultations that the WB facilitated with the 
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riparian countries before the first formal meeting in 2011.210 Governments from 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and also Afghanistan 
participated in consultations in 2008-2009 on the Terms of Reference for the 
Assessment Studies. 
The purpose of the meetings is twofold: to provide information to the riparian 
countries about the current status of the Assessment Studies and the work program, 
and to review the draft inception reports on the two studies; and to seek feedback and 
input from the participants on the program of information sharing and discussions 
with governments and civil society organizations in the region. Each meeting is 
conducted with the participation of representatives of governments of all riparian 
countries (the Uzbek government did not take part in the first meeting in 2011 and in 
the fourth meeting in 2013), and with representatives of civil societies and 
communities from all riparian countries as well.  
The crucial thing to note with respect to these institutionalised meetings is that 
they were first established at the request of Central Asian governments themselves. It 
was they who, conscious of the sensitivity of the issue at stake, decided by common 
agreement to create some sort of ‘routinised discussion’ on the dam project with the 
WB at key points during the study process (World Bank 2014a).  
Importantly, in the last meeting held in Almaty from 14 to 18 July 2014, 
discussing the draft Techno-Economic Assessment Study (TEAS) Phase 2 Summary 
report and the draft Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) Report not 
only were all five Central Asian countries plus Afghanistan represented physically by 
official members of governments, but they also jointly discussed possible measures to 
coordinate dialogue, ameliorate the project and propose feasible alternatives. In 
addition, they also unanimously agreed to have another meeting to discuss the 
possible alternatives and to compare their stances (Akipress 2014c; KazInform 2014).  
There is also another aspect to consider. In fact, the WB Assessment study, 
which mutatis mutandis can be seen as a form of international mediation, is the result 
of an agreement specifically between the Uzbek and the Tajik governments. The 
request for an independent examination came from the Uzbek side already in 2008, 
when in a letter dated 3 February the Uzbek government asked the then Prime 
                                                 
210 The first meeting was conducted on May 17-19, 2011; the second on November 7, 2012; the third 
on February 12, 2013; the fourth on October 17, 18, and 20, 2013, in Dushanbe, Tajikistan; and the 
fifth on July 14-18, 2014. 
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Minister of Tajikistan Aqil Aqilov to consider the issue of undertaking a mandatory 
international independent competent appraisal of the project of constructing this 
hydropower facility (Uzbekistan.be undated).  
On 10 March 2010, after a series of consultations, ‘the WB regional director 
for Central Asia, Motu Konishi, announced in Dushanbe that the bank had found 
funding to carry out a feasibility study and environmental assessment’ of the Rogun 
project, following a request by Tajikistan, which was pressed by Uzbekistan for an 
independent international assessment (Sodiqov 2010).  
The agreement was then discussed by Rahmon and Karimov in person in June 
2010 in the context of an official SCO meeting in Tashkent. Karimov made clear that 
freight cargoes would be released to Tajikistan, on condition that they did not contain 
material to be used for the construction of the dam, while Rahmon renewed his 
commitment to adopt an independent assessment study of the feasibility of the project 
before starting the construction. In addition, both parties agreed to continue contacts 
in order to ensure the openness and transparency of the whole process, also in concert 
with other states (Asia Plus 2010).  
Of the countries opposed to the construction of the dam, Uzbekistan has been 
certainly the most vociferous. Due to its economy being primarily based on cotton 
crops and agriculture, a reduction of water-flow from Tajikistan could severely 
hamper its economic potential and development.  
Uzbekistan’s first reactions to the construction of Rogun resembled a power-
political functioning international society. Despite several justifications and references 
to technical and engineering problems (UzEmbassy 2011), Uzbekistan has been 
accused of derailing, blocking, delaying and hindering transit cargoes to Tajikistan 
containing materials to be used for the construction of the dam and, more in general, 
to sustain the already crippled Tajik economy.211  
Nonetheless, the position of Uzbekistan over the years has been converging 
towards more diplomatic practices, aimed at containing potential conflict and looking 
for a common solution shared by all riparian countries.  
Between September and October 2012, the Uzbek President Islam Karimov 
visited both Astana and Ashgabat to discuss a common position of downstream 
                                                 
211 See, for example, Right Vision News, 16 March 2011; IHS Global Insight, 31 March 2011. For a 
rebuttal to these allegations, see the letter sent by the Prime Minister of Uzbekistan Shavkat 
Mirziyoyev to his Tajik counterpart, Prime Minister Aqil Aqilov (UzDaily 2012). 
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countries with respect to the construction of both Rogun in Tajikistan and 
Kambaratashavk in Kyrgyzstan. Common positions have been found both with 
Nazarbayev and Berdymukhamedov,212 stressing repeatedly the need to observe 
customary environmental international law, that is, equitable and reasonable use of 
water resources and due-diligence obligation not to cause significant harm to 
neighbouring riparian countries.213  
The agreement with Nazarbayev was actually a continuation of a common 
diplomatic position held already in March 2010 in Tashkent, when the Kazakh 
President argued that both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan ‘stand for an international 
examination of water and energy facilities, including Rogun and Kambarata for the 
security of [their] peoples’. On that occasion, Nazarbayev also spoke with Rahmon of 
Tajikistan and Bakiyev of Kyrgyzstan, trying to convince them of the necessity of an 
independent assessment on their hydroelectric projects, and they agreed as then 
demonstrated by the involvement of the WB in the process.214  
Consultations were therefore at play, demonstrating a common willingness to 
find a mutually agreeable solution for this very delicate matter. Unilateral actions 
were already leaving space to more concerted, diplomatic and restrained attitudes, 
exactly with the aim of preserving the region’s stability and order. Prevention of 
conflict became paramount. Just a few months after saying that war could occur in the 
region because of water resources, Karimov stated the following: ‘I would like to say 
that peace should be in the region. Mutual respect should be in the region. We have 
lived together with the Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen, and Kazakh peoples in the region in 
harmony for thousands of years. Nothing can separate us from each other’. 215 
To be sure, this slow institutionalisation of dialogue and self-restraint has not 
played down disagreements and strong opposition from the riparian countries. 
Examples of this are several protests against the Rogun dam voiced in international 
arenas by Uzbek diplomats (Akipress 2012b; Avesta 2013d), as well as (milder) 
protests from Kazakhs and Turkmens. Nonetheless, as stated repeatedly both in the 
                                                 
212 ITAR-TASS, 7 September 2012; IWPR (2012). 
213 While this is not a thesis about environmental international law, it is important to stress that these 
customary norms have been included in the Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (Helsinki, 17 March 1992), entered into force 
on 6 October, 1996. Uzbekistan (4 September 2007), Kazakhstan (11 January 2001) and 
Turkmenistan (29 August 2012) all acceded the treaty.  
214 This fact has been confirmed to me also by Bulat Auelbaev in the course of our interview. 
215 Times of Central Asia, 1 February 2013. 
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literature and in this thesis, the ES does not advocate a fully cooperative picture of 
international relations, but in fact emphasises the constant presence of the two aspects 
of international practice, cooperation and conflict. As Robert Jackson maintains,  
 
It is obvious that international relations can be conducted with little 
regard, if any, for the rule of law and occasionally even without 
much prudence. Nor am I saying that these modalities exhaust the 
normative basis of international society, which clearly is not the 
case. I am only saying that it makes sense to include both of them in 
our international theories because the practical world of 
international relations includes both of them as basic references for 
justifying foreign policies and other international activities. These 
are two interconnected and mutually communicative ways of 
engaging in international relations and thus of theorising those same 
relations (2000: 122). 
 
 
Yet, there are still two important things to note. The first one is that despite the several 
hindrances at the border with respect to freight traffic and cross-border 
communications, Uzbekistan has over the years abandoned those practices in favour 
of a more diplomatic and concerted way of containing the problem.  
At the moment of writing, the traffic on the Uzbek-Tajik borders, is not only 
smooth, but even appears to be on the rise. According to Usmon Qalandarov, deputy 
head of Tajik Railways, ‘the incumbent management of Tajik Railways does not have 
any problems with Uzbek authorities and Tajik trains now pass through Uzbek 
territory without difficulty. All arising issues are solved by one phone call.’ Moreover, 
Tajik and Uzbek railway authorities have agreed to cut tariffs for transit transportation 
(Asia Plus 2014b). In the same way, also the two other downstream countries have 
tried to exercise self-restraint and did not engage in hostile practices against 
Tajikistan, but actually engaged it in a deeper form of bilateral cooperation.  
Also with respect to Kyrgyzstan and the construction of Kambarata, 
conciliatory gestures have been recently made, and the situation looks now far less 
conflict-prone than the one with Tajikistan. For example, Turkmenistan has not only 
engaged in forms of cooperation with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Akipress 2012a) but 
through the adoption of a new Code on Water based on its neighbours’ legislation 
seeks to contribute to deepening cooperation between the Central Asian states through 
the harmonisation of  relevant legislation (Akipress 2014b).  
At this point, it may be interesting and worthwhile to analyse how the Rogun 
case is being managed in Central Asia from an institutional perspective, that is, what 
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practices and norms are being used. This is indeed the focus of the whole thesis. This 
part, of course, will draw on what analysed above.  
First of all, we may consider the role that sovereignty plays here. It is indeed 
paramount, although perhaps a little opaque. The calls for consultations, approval and 
consideration of downstream countries before engaging in the construction of HPP 
and dams voiced by Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan point to how 
sovereignty equality and sovereign rights are inherently adopted in Central Asia.  
Paradoxically, the positions of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are based on 
considerations of sovereignty as well, as they claim it is their sovereign right to build 
such facilities on their territories to overcome energy shortages. Indeed, the legal 
position of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (and here is observable the tight nexus between 
international law and sovereignty), that of the rightfulness of considering water as a 
sovereign commodity, is known in general international law as the ‘Harmon 
Doctrine’, or ‘doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of the upstream state’.  
This doctrine, which as we shall see below does not find legitimacy in the 
body of international law, is visible in the following words of Aqil Aqilov, Tajikistan’s 
Prime Minister, uttered in 2012: ‘All questions of the environment, the water balance 
and the threat of man-made catastrophes are fully taken into account by Tajikistan. 
The construction of such sites [such as Rogun] is a sovereign right of any country 
provided by international laws’ (Tajikwater undated).  
Kyrgyzstan also has adhered to this view. Bazarbai Mambetov, an expert on 
energy and water issues and former deputy Kyrgyz Prime Minister, claimed that ‘in as 
much as the water resources originate on the territory of Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyzstan can 
also declare its sovereign rights on water resources’ (Pannier 2009).  
The whole debate on water-management and water issues, in fact, may be 
framed in the international law/sovereignty discourse of ‘limited sovereignty’ doctrine 
and equal share distribution between watercourse states, according to which each state 
has the right to a fair and reasonable share of the productive use of international 
waters within its territory (Chotaev 2013). 
In the light of this, we can analyse what the role played by international law in 
this (series of) dispute(s) is. Clearly, references to international law here are abundant. 
We have seen how in particular the downstream countries are keen on advocating 
international customary norms on water management in fighting the upstream ones. 
This shows that Central Asian states are, insofar as conventions and customary law 
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are concerned and concern them, acquainted with the instruments of international law.  
Within the region, in the field of water management, there is actually a 
perfectly functioning international agreement between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan on 
use of waters in the Talas and Chu rivers. This document regulates responsibilities of 
two neighbouring states in the use of transnational water flows. For example, 
Kazakhstan agreed to contribute to the exploitation expenses of the distribution 
process in Kyrgyzstan and Bishkek granted to Astana the specific regime for water 
intake and release.216 The bilateral agreement is working smoothly and without 
creating hindrances, and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan even submitted letters of 
endorsement for the project, ‘Enabling transboundary cooperation and Integrated 
Water Resource Management (IWRM) in the Chu Talas river basin’ at the sixth 
meeting of the parties to the convention on the protection and use of transboundary 
watercourses and international lakes water convention, held from 28-30 November 
2012 in Rome (IISD 2012).  
In the same meeting, other positive signs that international law instruments are 
being adopted by Central Asian countries were visible. Turkmenistan, by words of 
Ahmet Muhammedov, Deputy Minister of Water Economy, recognized the 
Convention’s role in improving water management in of Central Asia. He said 
Turkmenistan was committed to IWRM and looked forward to close cooperation with 
all parties. In addition, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan all highlighted the 
role played by National Policy Dialogues (NPDs)217 on improving water legislation 
and water resources management principles, saying that NPDs have become a 
traditional mechanism for discussing and addressing water issues.  
Moreover, Uzbekistan encouraged all other states not parties to the 
Convention, including therefore Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to join it to simplify legal 
processes and cooperation mechanisms, and suggested even a Central Asian 
representative for the Implementation Committee. One month before, during his visit 
to Ashgabat, Islam Karimov welcomed Turkmenistan’s joining the UN Convention on 
the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 
                                                 
216 Ibidem. 
217 NPDs are based on consultations with relevant ministries, agencies and institutions (including 
science and academia), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), parliamentary bodies and other 
national and international organizations. The dialogue process is usually conducted under the 
leadership of a high-level Government representative, such as the Minister/Deputy Minister of 
Environment or the Chairman of the State Water Committee. 
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saying that this would have strengthened their coordination and legal position on 
water-management issues (Trend 2012b). 
Yet, as in the 1990s, there seems to be an imperfect use of international law, or 
at least one that does not fully match with established international practice. To begin 
with, downstream countries have often voiced their ‘historical rights’ of preferable use 
of watercourse, claiming that such rights, having indeed historical meaning, should 
not be altered by new constructions affecting the rivers’ course. However, this practice 
does not find confirmation and/or legitimacy at the international level and in 
international practice.  
Secondly, the already quoted Harmon Doctrine does not find support in 
international practice either There is still a rather shallow understanding of how 
international legal norms, if properly internalised and localised, could help regional 
states smooth their differences. In the words of Shairbek Juraev,  
 
on water issues again there is international law but Uzbekistan has 
its own conventions and Tajikistan has its own conventions…so, 
Central Asia remains an area where international law, as every law 
actually, remains very new…the internalisation of the formal law is 
still not there, we still have our own customs, our habits.218  
 
Thirdly, as noticed, there is a disparity in membership to the several conventions 
regulating transboundary waters, and therefore while some parties are guided by the 
provisions of the treaty, others (notably, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) are guided (only) 
by customary international law. While there are indeed ongoing discussions in the 
region on whether to join multilateral conventions on water law (see below), Central 
Asian states are very cautious in adopting conventions that may limit their economic 
development and national interests, and may scrutinise international treaties for 
years.219 
Fourthly, there is the almost total reluctance of Central Asian states to defer 
the controversy to an arbitration court, most likely the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) or an ad hoc organism. For example, Article 33 of the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses foresees the deferral 
of the contentious issue to a party acting as mediator, bona officia provider or, 
ultimately, to the ICJ. The same does Article 22.2 of the Convention on the Protection 
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219 Interview with Official Uzbek source. 
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and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, to which 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are parties.  
Interestingly, while all the five Central Asian states are entitled, qua members 
of the UN, to apply to and appear before the ICJ (Article 93, paragraph 1 of the 
Court’s Statute), none of them has yet recognised its jurisdiction as compulsory. This 
has severe implications, since the Court can only deal with a dispute when the States 
concerned have recognized its jurisdiction. No State can therefore be a party to 
proceedings before the Court unless it has in some manner or other consented 
thereto.220 
The WB in fact acts as a technical mediator, and does not enter into the legal 
or political nature of the dispute (but on the political side neither could do the ICJ). 
Tajikistan once appealed to Russia for mediation (Akipress 2014a), but downstream 
countries have categorically denied this possibility. In fact, there is a general request 
from downstream countries (and Kyrgyzstan as well) to solve the problem internally, 
within the region, without interference of third parties that could handle the dispute in 
their own favour.  
As in the case with the Osh conflict in 2010, and the Tajik conflict in the early 
1990s, appeal to international organisations and most notably the UN seem to be the 
only form of external ‘interference’ or ‘mediation’, accepted as legitimate by all the 
states of the region. This is evident in the words of the Uzbek Foreign Ministry’s 
statement released on 14 April 2009,221 stressing how ‘third countries’ interference in 
Central Asia’s water and energy problems is inadmissible’, but then adding that there 
was a ‘need to carry out an international examination of all hydro-energy projects on 
trans-border rivers without fail, under UN aegis’. Islam Karimov’s words are perhaps 
even more instructive: 
 
No one will tell that it is a subversive act but say it is an aid. It 
means acting as a mediator. Do you know where a mediator is 
needed? He is needed at a bazaar to go between traders. But in the  
 
 
                                                 
220 ‘Contentious jurisdiction’, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1, accessed on 
17 July 2014; ‘States entitled to appear before the Court’, http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=1&sp3=a, accessed on 17 July 2014; ‘Declarations 
recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory’, http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3, accessed on 17 July 2014. 
221 ‘Central Asia draws water battle lines’. 
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politics do you know what a mediator does? He pursues his own 
interests.222  
 
This particular understanding of arbitration/mediation has also hindered what could be 
called ‘regional’ mediation, that is, mediation exercised by a regional state. 
Kazakhstan, by virtue of Nazarbayev’s well-established international position and 
consideration within the region as one of the wisest and oldest presidents, has 
assumed more conciliatory tones with upstream countries, and has tried consistently 
to conciliate the contesting parties, especially Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, in particular 
through meetings and summits. Nazarbayev also acts as an informal mediator in the 
various meetings of the IFAS, and when discussing water issues with Uzbekistan, 
reportedly consults also with his Kyrgyz and Tajik counterparts.223  
Furthermore, already in 2009, Miroslav Jenca, Director of the Ashgabat-based 
UNRCCA, told diplomatic representatives that he hoped Kazakhstan could play a 
leadership role at the upcoming conference. He noted that President Nazarbayev 
played a key role in pressing for water and energy cooperation in 2008 and bringing 
the Central Asian leaders together at an October summit in Almaty to discuss these 
issues.  
He also noted that downstream Kazakhstan’s position on water issues is very 
‘moderate’ in comparison to that of downstream Uzbekistan. The very fact that the 
WB meetings with official representatives from all riparian countries are held in 
Almaty can be seen as an indirect effect of Kazakhstan’s attempts to find the most 
diplomatic solution possible to the problem. Indeed, Jenca’s office chose Almaty as 
the venue because of support from Kazakhstan Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin, 
Kazakhstan’s moderate position as a peace-maker on these issues, and its convenient 
location (Wikileaks 2009). 
Yet, Nazarbayev cannot be effectively considered as a mediator recognised, 
‘institutionalised’ by the parties involved (not last because Kazakhstan itself is part of 
the controversy), and has so far failed to bring at the same table Karimov and 
Rahmon, or to convene a high-level meeting with all the countries.  
In fact, Kazakhstan’s official position itself is against outside mediation and 
even participation to water projects in the region. Nazarbayev has made this clear 
when speaking both with Karimov in Tashkent in June 2013, saying that 
                                                 
222 Times of Central Asia, 1 February 2013. 
223 Interview with Bulat Auelbaev. 
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a great deal depends for our future on how [Central Asian states] 
cooperate and trust each other and together resolve our questions 
without hindering other states. […] And we want to send a friendly 
message to our neighbours that we ourselves have to resolve these 
questions (Lillis 2013),  
 
and with the Kyrgyz president Almazbek Atambayev in Bishkek, arguing that ‘There 
is a need for an open dialog on water issues in the region. Nobody will solve the 
problems for us. We have to come to a consensus ourselves’ (Tengri News 2013). For 
Kazakhstan, ‘water resources can not be managed by investors. If the main 
shareholders would be the investors, they would be managing water resources in the 
way they want. So they don’t want foreigners managing water.’224  
In a more recent email interview with a prominent local expert on the matter, I 
was also told that ‘although, strictly speaking, Kazakhstan is not a riparian party to the 
Amudarya river basin, any developments on the Amudarya will affect it also. This is 
due to close interconnectedness and interdependency of water and energy networks in 
the Aral Sea basin as a whole. Because of its own interests at stake, I don’t see 
Kazakhstan serving as a neutral mediator on this issue.’225 In the words of Rustam 
Burnashev,  
 
In this region, countries do not want to give power to other 
(regional) countries. Kazakhstan could mediate even more 
effectively on Rogun, but this would not be accepted. Also because 
Kazakhstan has interests. […] A mediator can be an international 
body, you know, the WB, or the UN, although imperfect, but not a 
country, especially a neighbour.226 
 
Ashgabat has not been successful either, despite the bona officia played in the 1990s 
in resolving both the Tajik conflict and inter-state quarrels between Central Asian 
presidents. This (non-) practice of mediation and arbitration is inherently linked, I 
argue, with the interpretation of the GPM institutions discussed above with respect to 
the Osh events: insofar as help is aimed at facing international challenges such as 
transnational crime, terrorism or climate change, then for Central Asian states GPM is 
indeed a paramount legitimate institution.  
However, when problems arise between states in the region, considerations of 
a ‘sovereign Central Asian’ space and sovereign prerogatives act as a shield against 
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226 Interview with Rustam Burnashev. 
215 
 
interference even if, understandably, smaller states such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
are keener to seek the support of Russia in dealing with their more powerful 
neighbours. Another good indication of this is given by Payam Foroughi from the 
OSCE Academy in Bishkek: 
 
They [Central Asian states] don’t go to the ICJ over Rogun because 
both of them know they could be wrong…Tajikistan went to a legal 
court in London, not the international one, on this TALCO 
issue…against this company in Russia….but they lost all cases! […] 
So I believe both countries realise they could be wrong, they are not 
ready…but there is also this sovereignty understanding of these 
states…it’s like “we are in charge!”…why should we have an 
intruder? […] Central Asians do not have that kind of experience.227 
 
 
Before concluding this digression on international law in Central Asia, however, it 
should be noted that international legal uniformity in water management, even if 
difficult and thorny, is an aspiration in Central Asia (Wilson 2009 ), not utopia.  
With reference to water-management, for example, small, multilateral 
commissions are starting operating in the region working on the legal harmonisation 
between the limited agreements reached in the region and international law.228 
Furthermore, we have seen already that Uzbekistan has welcomed 
Turkmenistan’s accession to the UN 1992 Convention, and has encouraged 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to do the same. In addition, the joining of the UN 1997 
Convention is still an option on the table for the whole regional countries, given that 
Uzbekistan is the only country that has already joined it.  
Curiously, during the Convention’s adoption by the UNGA in 1997, none of the 
Central Asian nations voted against it. While Kazakhstan voted in favour and 
Uzbekistan abstained from the vote, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan were absent from the voting process.  
Kazakhstan is the most likely candidate to join the convention soon, especially 
since it has already committed to all water-related UNECE Conventions and that it 
shares with Uzbekistan a normative convergence on these issues.  
Turkmenistan is another downstream country considering joining the UN 
Convention. An official representative of that country stated at a 2011 international 
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228 Interview with Kazakh expert 1, November 13, 2013, Almaty, Kazakhstan. 
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water conference in Tashkent that preparatory procedures to join the Convention were 
under way (Ziganshina 2011; Ziganshina 2014).  
The head of the Kyrgyz delegation to the same conference stated that his 
country may consider joining the Protocol on Water and Health under UNECE Water 
Convention as a first step.  
Very interesting is the case of Tajikistan. Tajikistan’s existing legal 
commitments could facilitate its joining the Convention. For example, under the 1998 
CIS Agreement on Transboundary Waters, Tajikistan agreed to take into account the 
provisions of the 1966 Helsinki Rules, on which the UN Convention is largely based, 
and of the UNECE Water Convention.  
In addition, on 17 February 2004, Tajikistan promulgated Decree of 1287 on 
Accession to the Espoo Convention. However, the Depositary of the Convention has 
not yet received the ratification documents.229 If Tajikistan completes the ratification 
process for the Espoo Convention, it will be a party to another instrument largely 
aligned with the procedural norms of international water law.230 
The institution that perhaps has played so far the most prominent role in dealing 
with the arising water conflict is, like in the 1990s, diplomacy, with its derivative of 
summitry. How and where do we see diplomacy operating in the Rogun case? 
According to my findings, my answer is ‘in several cases’, and I say so after 
empirically investigating the words and practices of state representatives, meant as 
‘craftsmen’ of politics (Jackson 2000), as well as interviewing them.  
Was not, even if harsh and heated, the exchange of letter between the Uzbek 
and Tajik Prime Ministers a diplomatic exchange using the diplomatic instrument of 
the letter to defend their own positions? Are not, even if categorically hostile, 
speeches at the UN a diplomatic practice aimed at making the international 
community more aware of the problem and therefore raising the bar for a possible 
conflict? Are not summits institutionalised in Almaty, thanks to the WB, an instrument 
accepted by all Central Asian governments to multilaterally find non-violent solutions 
to the problem, taking the interest of all countries into considerations?  
                                                 
229 Ibidem. 
230 The Espoo (EIA) Convention sets out the obligations of Parties to assess the environmental impact 
of certain activities at an early stage of planning. It also lays down the general obligation of States 
to notify and consult each other on all major projects under consideration that are likely to have a 
significant adverse environmental impact across boundaries. This Convention would be clearly an 
appropriate legal for the management of the Rogun case (UNECE undated). 
217 
 
And we should avoid labelling such meetings as ‘talking shops’. Even if big decisions 
or agreements are not taken, such summits have the function of diffusing tensions, of 
allowing the parties to present their stances, of having the possibility to discuss. In the 
course of an interview with Uzbek officials, I was told that ‘it is exactly thanks to 
diplomacy that Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are still able to avoid conflict, in particular 
inter-agency ones. These contacts are behind closed doors, though, because of the 
fragility of the situation’.231 The same point was made by a Central Asian 
representative of the UNRCCA, with specific reference to agreements reached by all 
regional states on early-warning mechanisms and data-collection procedures in the 
field of water-management.  
We should remember that, in conflictual regions such as Central Asia, ‘talking 
shops do provide important pre-planned opportunities for communication and 
negotiation (side chats among foreign ministers) that can alleviate friction and 
contribute to confidence-building’ (Khong 2014: 163).  
In the words of a local expert, who preferred to remain anonymous,  
 
there are various interactions between the countries in search for 
solutions. This process is not smooth and easy – and it cannot be 
with such a complicated and fundamental matter for all countries of 
the region. […] Diplomacy to foster mutual understanding does not 
work very well, but at least they manage to maintain peace.232  
 
The several bilateral meetings held on water-management resemble a strange form of 
‘multilateral bilateralism’, here defined as a diplomatic practice of a community of 
states (or an international society) through which problems concerning all parties are 
treated in a series of bilateral meetings between the parties rather than in a (shorter) 
series of meeting with all parties present at the table.233 These meetings, so far, had 
the effect of diffusing tensions and keep the regional system manageable with respect 
to water issues.  
Even if behind closed doors and therefore not directly accessible to the public, fruitful 
                                                 
231 Interview with two representatives of the Institute for Strategic and Regional studies under the 
President of the Republic of Uzbekistan in Tashkent. 
232 Email interview with local expert on the matter. 
233 This, to me, is a particular institutional arrangement (derivative of diplomacy) that takes place 
when a dynamic of strong rivalry exist between the parties at the systemic level, such that a 
multilateral solution is unlikely to yield results but not such to prevent possible meeting of minds at 
the bilateral level. The sum of the positive results of the bilateral meetings, even if not included in a 
single framework of cooperation, then ameliorate the general, systemic environment.  
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negotiations on water-quota allocations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan take place 
regularly. As two interviewees put it,  
 
Western perceptions are wrong. They talk about disintegration, but of 
course we are different states. They however do not perceive that the 
mentality and the objectives are the same. I mean, even with Tajikistan, 
there are examples of cooperation, especially on, guess what? Water! We 
get the amount of water we agreed on, and we pay regularly. 234 
 
Moreover, it was not just Karimov who actively travelled around the region (Astana 
and Ashgabat) to consolidate the front of downstream countries, but also Kazakh 
Foreign Minister, Erlan Idrissov. At the end of March 2013, he visited both 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to try to find out common approaches to the Rogun issue, 
and to defuse tensions. The mission in Uzbekistan paved the way for the 
institutionalisation of the shared position of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan on the matter, 
as water management, as it became part of the new Strategic Partnership Agreement 
between the two countries (Assenova 2013). In Dushanbe, Idrissov met with President 
Emomali Rahmon and Foreign Minister Hamrokhon Zarifi, and they all reaffirmed 
their commitment to coordinate and mutually support their foreign policy initiatives to 
advance their shared interests.  
Yet, he did not refrain from voicing Kazakhstan’s official position on the 
matter, based on customary norms of international law and diplomatic resolution of 
controversies: 
 
The states in the upper waters should not violate the rights and 
economic interests of the states located in the lower waters, and vice 
versa. There are international conventions according to which the 
two sides should sit at the negotiating table and work out a mutually 
acceptable scheme for the usage of water resources.235 
 
 
Upstream countries as well have voiced their intention, in what would seem to be an 
international society logic in play, voicing their concerns for downstream countries 
and the importance of their needs and claims.  
Already in 2012 Tajik Prime Minister Aqil Aqilov said in an open letter to his 
Uzbek counterpart Shavkat Mirziyoyev that Tajikistan would consider the 
                                                 




environment and water balance in building the Rogun hydropower plant and will 
never do anything to harm its neighbors.  
As we can see, international concerns and responsibilities, or, to use Robert 
Jackson’s phrase, ‘prudential norms’ have been indeed in play, if not always 
adamantly. Indeed, on this delicate issue, national and international responsibilities, 
realist and rationalist logics, are constantly at play. This is exemplified by Aqilov’s 
words themselves: 
  
As to the essence of this problem, I would like to stress the 
unwavering position of Tajikistan. Not a single project we 
implement is targeted against another country, and we are 
ready for the closest cooperation with neighbors with due 
account of national interests (emphasis added).236 
 
 
Both the former Tajik Minister of Foreign Affairs Hamrokhon Zarifi and the Kyrgyz 
Prime Minister Joomart Otorbayev have stated that in no case would their projects 
harm downstream countries. As we have stated above, an international society 
conception of world politics should entail the consideration of ‘international 
responsibility’, that is, the concern, the worries, the thoughts for the other members of 
the social group where an actor lives and acts. Should these responsibilities not be 
present, or even considered and, worst case scenario, should their absence not be even 
justified, we would have a plain realist logic and the absolute prevalence of a 
‘national responsibility’ modus operandi. But international responsibilities are indeed 
present in Central Asia, even on such tough matters as water management and 
transboundary dams.  
In winter 2012, at the meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Dublin on 6 
December, the then Tajik Foreign Minister Hamrokhon Zarifi stressed the importance 
for Tajikistan of the principles of diplomatic conduct, openness and ‘in the interest of 
all countries in Central Asia’ (Avesta 2012).  
In the summer of 2013, the Permanent Representative of Tajikistan at the UN, 
Shirodjidin Aslov (now Minister of Foreign Affairs), made references to the interests 
and the concerns of all the countries of the region, and emphasised diplomacy and 
consultations as the primary means to resolve the dispute between upstream and 
downstream countries (Avesta 2013c).  
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In July 2014, the Kyrgyz Prime Minister Joomart Otorbayev pledged that Kyrgyz 
hydropower facilities will not leave downstream countries without water, therefore 
fully respecting their interests, their needs and the basic provisions of international 
law. Furthermore, the Minister of Energy Osmonbek Artykbayev assured that the 
technical and economic assessment for Kambarata was prepared by an international 
company with consideration of interests of all riparian countries (Akipress 2014d). 
From an international society perspective, what this indicates is that there is an 
international responsibility felt by the two upstream countries, and a societal logic that 
requires them to take into account others into consideration. Maybe it is not sufficient 
for full-fledged cooperation, but it simply can’t be dismissed. Were only realist logics 
in play, it would be clear that blatant national interest would prevail and the needs of 
neighbours would be ignored.  
This is in line with Robert Jackson’s argument (2000) that in realism (or 
‘Hobbesianism’, or ‘system’) we observe national responsibilities, in the ES (or 
‘Grotianism’, or ‘society’) international responsibilities, and in liberalism (or 
‘Kantism’, or world society) humanitarian responsibilities. What we observe in 
Central Asia in the water-management sector is therefore a complex interplay between 
the realist element of the system and the societal element of…the society.  
To be sure, national interests and power-politics logics have been in play. We 
have reviewed the actions from the Uzbek sides,237 we should not forget and 
downplay the fact that Karimov even hinted at war to prevent the construction of 
Rogun, claiming that ‘[Rogun] is a serious confrontation. It may even become a cause 
of war in the region’ in the longer term (Trend 2012a) and we may recall that 
President Rahmon has repeatedly stated that Rogun will be built, no matter what, no 
matter how. On 23 April 2014, addressing a joint meeting of both chambers of the 
parliament in Dushanbe, he stated that the construction of the Rogun hydroelectric 
power plant ‘is the fateful project for Tajikistan’ (Asia Plus 2014a; Menga 2014).  
Yet, the purpose of this whole narrative is to show that there is more than that. 
And that diplomacy and dialogue, contrary to a vast part of the literature on Central 
Asia reviewed at the beginning of the thesis, are indeed complex, alive and pervasive. 
                                                 
237 From an ES perspective, justifications from the Uzbek side revealed that a norm, albeit violated, 
was in play. Otherwise, there would not be need for justifications. The norms in play were that of 
good-neighbourliness, right of passage, right of access for goods destined to Tajikistan. On 
justifications, see Jackson (2000: 49; 67-68) and, in particular, Finnemore (1996: 23-24; 141). 
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In the words of an Uzbek anonymous source,  
 
[With Tajikistan], the problem is very specific. It’s water 
management. And as the word says, it’s management. The problem 
is manageable. There is constant inter-agency dialogue and you 
know, it is not true that we don’t talk to each other. Far from reality! 
Karimov and Emomali [Rahmon] talk at meetings: CIS, SCO, you 
know…they talk. Sure, it is very difficult. We would like to have an 
institutional, bilateral meeting between the two. We are thinking of 
it, but there must be conditions. There is an understanding, mutual 
understanding on the UN and the WB. On that, we found common 
ground. The meeting will happen, sooner or later. We need to know 
what they think in Dushanbe. You ask about other options? Of 
course, bilateral solutions. We try to avoid Great Power 




It is testament to my interviewee’s words that the much-awaited meeting between 
Rahmon and Karimov finally took place on 12 September 2014, on the sides of the 
SCO meeting in Dushanbe. The talks had been scheduled on 22 July 2014 during a 
bilateral meeting between the Uzbek and the Tajik Foreign Ministers, Abdulaziz 
Kamilov and Shirodjidin Aslov. In it, a new phase of Uzbek-Tajik relations was 
ignited, stressing the expansion of friendly and good-neighbourly relations. Problems 
between the two neighbours were divided in three categories: those of immediate 
solution, those more difficult to solve and those that would require much more time to 
solve.  
It is important to note that the meeting was preceded by other conciliatory 
gestures, namely that of leaving borders open in the occasion of Tajik Independence 
Day (9 September) and a telegram from Rahmon to Karimov on Uzbekistan’s 
Independence Day (1 September) stressing the need of giving renewed dynamism to 
bilateral relations, something considered as one of Tajikistan’s foreign policy 
priorities. Two weeks after the meeting, Zafar Rahimzanov, Counsellor of the Uzbek 
Embassy in Dushanbe, stated that Uzbekistan expected and hoped for significant 
changes in the bilateral relations between the two countries.  
Following the already noted conciliatory trends between the two republics, 
after this meeting there have been other examples of cooperative behaviour. Murodali 
Alimardon and Rustam Azimov, Vice Premiers of respectively Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan, met on 28-29 October 2014 in Tashkent on the sides of an IFAS meeting 
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to discuss bilateral cooperation in the water-management sector.  
Furthermore, after almost fifteen years, resumption of direct flights between 
Dushanbe and Tashkent were agreed on, although not yet formalised. One day later, 
Tajik Ambassador to Uzbekistan Muzaffar Huseinov was received by Uzbek Foreign 
Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov to discuss the status of bilateral cooperation. In early 
January 2015, Dushanbe and Tashkent officially agreed to give dynamism to bilateral 
relations. 
At the time of writing, it is not fully possible to predict what the situation will 
be if Rogun is built. Too many variables, mainly economic and political, are still in 
play to give a safe assessment of how regional politics will be affected by this. The 
WB has recently released its preliminary report where it appears that the Rogun 
project is feasible, and therefore can go ahead (World Bank 2014a).  
How downstream countries, and especially Uzbekistan, will react, will be a 




Through the analysis of these two case studies, this chapter tried to demonstrate that, 
far from being uncooperative and confrontational, Central Asian intra-regional politics 
is indeed a sizzling environment, a mosaic of dialogue, practices and norms, which 
range from the power-political spectrum of international society to the coexistence-
cooperative one (Buzan 2004). The value of the ES approach adopted above is exactly 
that of keeping together the hostile and the friendly, the negative and the positive, the 
realist brute facts and the liberal hopes.  
It was absolutely far from my intention to give a portrait of the Central Asian 
region as mono-dimensional, as black or white, as either uncooperative or 
cooperative. Rather, one of the aims was exactly that of showing the co-presence of 
realist and liberal elements, of demonstrating that in Central Asian politics, as in every 
social dimension of human life, behaviours, decisions, thoughts and actions are never 
one-sided, but always reflect the complex interplay of national interests and the 
demands of the system of reference, the need to maintain the system working, the 
societal commitments.  
A second aim was to show that the dead-letter international society present in 
the 1990s has evolved not in an a-social regional structure, but in a strongly pluralist 
one. Central Asia, due to the systemic changes and internal processes reviewed at the 
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beginning of the chapter, has moved from a cooperative-integrative model of 
international society to a co-existential, power-political one, where national interests 
are far more prominent than (but nonetheless not overwhelming) external 
commitments to other members of the region.  
The usual argument that the Central Asian states are drifting more and more 
apart from each other and that this is bad may hold in a regionalist framework, where 
integrative and cooperative practices are put under scrutiny, but not from an 
international society perspective. Even if in terms of economic and foreign policy 
they may be taking different directions (something that I try to challenge in the next 
chapter), they still have to manage their common life as neighbours. And the analysis 
above (as well as the one in the former chapter) suggests that this management is 
indeed carried out following some minimal precepts, norms, practices aimed at 
preserving inter-state stability and order.  
It is not by chance that the institutions that we found operating in the region 
are those typical of a pluralist international society: sovereignty, international law, 
diplomacy, summitry, above all. In fact, one may say that the three conditions 
sustaining an international society set forth by Hedley Bull are indeed present in 
Central Asia: limitation of violence (observable in the institution of summitry and 
diplomacy), right of property (non-interference and sovereignty) and respect of 
agreements (international law).  
Even if what follows is a topic I will deal with in the conclusions of the thesis, 
it is worth spending a couple of words on how the institutions above have been 
identified. This is clearly a question of epistemology (how do we know?) and 
methodology (by what set of assumptions do we know?). Barry Buzan has described 
‘international society’ as an ontology that may exist in three different forms (2014: 
18-20): 
 
 as a set of ideas in the mind of statesmen (Charles Manning); 
 as a set of ideas in the mind of political philosophers (Martin Wight); 
 as an analytical construct/set of concepts in the mind of the 
investigator/researcher (Hedley Bull, Alan James). 
 
Although clearly experiencing some difficulties and not claiming at all that my 
investigation has produced perfect results, I have tried to combine all the three 
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‘manifestations’ of international society listed above.  
The third manifestation is actually inevitable. As a scholar familiar with the 
notion of international society and the analytical terms associated to it (pluralism, 
solidarism, institutions, norms and the like), and willing to explore ‘international 
society’ dynamics in Central Asia, there was no way I could avoid applying to the 
region the taxonomy and analytical vocabulary of the theory I am using. In other and 
simpler words, if my aim is to find an international society, I must know what an 
international society looks like.  
Yet, I did not confine myself to my analytical ‘imposition’, but I tried to 
adhere to the premise made in chapter 3, that is, to adopt a Verstehen mode of inquiry, 
an inductive method of analysis to disclose if an international society is present in the 
mind of those participating in it (first point of Buzan’s tripartition). To do this, as 
shown, I relied both on written as well as on spoken sources. In particular, interviews 
with diplomats and practitioners have given those insights that lead us to understand 
whether this ‘international society’ is perceived by the protagonists, by the members 
of it.  
But that was not enough. To cover myself from possible ‘ready-made’ 
answers, from hypocrisy or from propagandistic narratives, I complemented 
statesmen’s discourses with those of strategists, analysts and academics, who can be 
included in the second slot of Buzan’s tripartition. They are acquainted with the 
international relations of the region, they are more critical and more analytical, they 
are from the region and they are not necessarily familiar with the notion of 
international society. This last point is indeed crucial. During the interviews, they used 
a terminology, a vocabulary, a narrative consistent with an international society 
approach, exactly conforming to a Verstehen methodology, to an inductive process, to 
‘something in the mind of political philosophers’ (latu sensu).  
Last but not least, the identification of the practices, of the institutions 
operating in Central Asia has proceeded also via an empirical analysis (Buzan 2014: 
173-178), via direct observation, via information this time deducted from the material 
at my disposal. The purpose of all this was to show that there is something going on. 
It is not that in the region there are no relations, no societal bonds, no social 
considerations, no international responsibilities (Cummings 2012). There are indeed! 




Power-political elements still exist in the region, and constantly hinder the 
development of a full-fledged, more comprehensive and integrated solidarist 
international society. But the key point is that there is interplay, not exclusion. And 
the ES approach that I have decided to adopt was instrumental exactly in bringing this 
interplay to the surface.  
Before concluding this chapter one may ask: is the regional international 
society present in Central Asia anyhow different from that at the global level? And if 
yes, how? 
At first sight, the answers seems to be ‘no’. The institutions of sovereignty, 
non-interference and territorial integrity, international law, diplomacy, 
environmentalism all have a place in the region, and these institutions are exactly 
those that we find at the global level, indiscriminately, across the globe. Structurally, 
they identify a community of sovereign and independent states. Functionally, they 
serve the scope of preserving peace, stability and the ‘workability’ of the system.  
Indeed, we have seen above how the movement from a dead-letter society to a 
more ideal-typical anarchical society in the region has been favoured by a more rigid 
conceptualisation of the territorial institutions of sovereignty, non-interference and 
territorial integrity, backed by more frequent appeals to international law.  
One exception may be GPM. We have already noticed how, for serious issues 
not concerning relations between Central Asian states, GPM is ‘invited’ via inside-
push mechanisms. Yet, when issues arise between Central Asian states, GPM is 
banned from operating, and bilateralism substitutes it. Given the strongly Westphalian 
interpretation of sovereignty in the region, states tend to see themselves as equals and 
refrain from attributing special concessions to Karimov and Nazarbayev, despite their 
seniority and their material power. An indigenous, institutionalised GPM has yet to be 
institutionalised.  
Yet, on 26 November 2014, in a meeting with Karimov, Nazarbayev has 
hinted at a co-dominium in Central Asia, thus implicitly referring to an indigenous 
GPM: ‘People in our nations are paying close attention to this visit, as the stability 
and development of the region depends on the ideas espoused and joint efforts 
undertaken by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’. ‘With warm embrace, Nazarbayev and 
Karimov call for stronger ties between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’ (Bupezhanova 
2014). 
Despite GPM, therefore, if one looks at the institutions present in the region 
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horizontally (i.e. by looking at their mere presence), one does not find significant 
differences between how these institutions are played in Central Asia and in the West 
(or, in Buzanian terms, ‘at the global level’).  
Yet, I argue that if one looks at the Central Asian institutions vertically (i.e. by 
looking at their entrenchment, internalisation in the social structure of the region, and 
adoption), then we have a slightly different picture. To my knowledge, differentiating 
international societies on the basis of the stability of certain institutions is something 
the ES has yet to engage with.  
So far, the regional approach to international society has always looked at 
institutional consonance, surplus or deficit, that is, when the regional society has more 
institutions that the international society at the global level and when the regional 
society has fewer institutions than the international society at the global level (Diez 
and Whitman 2002; Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez 2009; Stivachtis 2013; Stivachtis 
2014). But to differentiate societies on the basis of the entrenchment of their 
institutions is something that is still missing from the English School panorama. The 
shift of the analysis, clearly, goes from the adoption to the practice of the institution.  
To understand this, and to have a feeling of the more informal character of the 
Central Asian international society with respect to the Western/global one, I analysed 
above the strength of institutions and practices informing them, but I also spoke to 
local practitioners and analysts, strategists and academics acquainted with the foreign 
policies and the international behaviour of the state where they are located.  
A content analysis of the responses of my interviewees reveals that the notions 
of ‘learning’, ‘adapting’, ‘readiness’ are very much in their minds, suggesting that not 
only are international relations between Central Asian states still in formation, but 
also that the institutional consonance between Central Asia and the Western/Global 
international society is still work in progress.  
From a structural perspective, and from the point of view of the relations 
enjoyed by the countries in the region, the mixture of formality and informality of 
relations may well explain why Central Asia is still between a power-political modus 
operandi and a pure co-existential one. The institutions of the Central Asian 
international society are not solid enough to make it a security community, but are 
certainly present and operating, thus avoiding a slippery path toward a pure 
confrontational environment. But let us see how the institutions of sovereignty, 
diplomacy and international law are played out in the region.  
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In the words of a Kazakh academic, ‘sovereignty [in Central Asia] has to be studied 
very well from our perspective. In the region there is a shallow understanding, 
primitive interpretation of independence and sovereignty’, claiming that in Central 
Asia sovereignty is very much akin to Stephen Krasner’s Westphalian sovereignty 
(1999), based on strict non-interference and territorial integrity, which are respected 
by all countries in the region.239 This understanding of sovereignty, which is 
contrasted with the more ‘solidarised’ version promoted by the West at the global 
level (and by the EU at the regional one), is well perceived by local practitioners. 
Askar Nursha conveys the idea of a ‘difference’ between the regional and the global 
level very well:  
 
The Central Asian states, governments, do adhere to the norms of 
sovereignty and international law but the problem is that now the 
West has its own interpretation of them! In particular, sovereignty is 
the most prioritized [norm].240 
 
Of the same advice is Zhenis Kembayev: 
 
With respect to sovereignty, what you observe here is the classic 
conception, impermeable, supreme power, which means 
independence from each other. Very Westphalian. Due to this, 
cooperation is potential, but it is based on consensus, on full 
consensus. For something to be implemented, full consensus among 
the presidents must be reached.241 
 
The ‘billiard ball’ approach to sovereignty of the Central Asian states is reported also 
by another Kazakh expert: 
 
They [Central Asian states] have a very personal, their own 
understanding of sovereignty. Due to their Soviet legacy, their 
understanding of sovereignty is very much motivated and inspired 
by Soviet rule and it is black and white. The way in which the 
Soviet system would interpret sovereignty would be based on 
legacies of Stalin and Lenin. The principle in which they understood  
 
sovereignty was ‘you don’t touch us, we don’t intervene in your 
things’.242 
 
An official Uzbek source, who preferred to remain anonymous, arguing that ‘in this 
region, sovereignty is central, and I stress, central, especially for Uzbekistan. […] We 
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won’t cede an iota of it [sic]’.243 Yet, even in the interpretation of sovereignty there is 
still an element of informality, according to a representative of the UNRCCA: 
 
If you ask a politician or me in my official capacity, I would 
certainly say that they are really important, of course, international 
law, UN charter, principles of international…law…I mean, 
everybody knows about them and they would use it in the right way, 
but in reality is not that important…like, I mean, Uzbekistan is not 
invading Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan not because of these principles, 
but for other principles […]. Yes, they are more cultural 
principles…and also…are like, for example…these principles are 
there, but there is something else, more cultural…of course they 
will use these principles in the common language, but we get it, 
because we know that Uzbekistan is such a powerful country in a 
military way, I mean, they can invade Kyrgyzstan and conquer it in 
one day, and we know it, and we have no capacity to resist…even 
the president knows…but still….244 
 
 
And the same interplay between law and personal factors is stressed by another expert 
based in Kyrgyzstan, with working experience in regional diplomacy:  
 
By inertia we entered international society, but the entrance was a 
symbolic action, you know, we want to dictate our existence, just 
imagine, we are member of so many institutions! It’s a performance 
of sovereignty. I would not say there was and is the scholarship, the 
expertise on what does it mean how to exercise sovereignty. I think 
it still needs some time. And with respect to non interference, again, 
I would say it is more informal, like interactions at the borders, the 
elders, the aqsaqals, even presidents themselves, more like ‘you are 
my brother’, it is not merely the respect of a norm, it is, again, 
openly informal discourse. Karimov can say we are not interfering 
in south Kyrgyzstan because we are good members of the UN or 
whatever, of course he can say it, but the region knows it’s not 
motivated by that, it is motivated by the reality of the region, by 
calculations of what it is good or bad for the countries and their 
national interest. […] It is because of circumstances.245 
 
The interplay between the ‘rule’ and the ‘personal factor’ is evident also in the 
analysis that Emil Juraev gives of the notion of sovereignty: 
 
Leaderships of all countries, possibly in every speech they talk they 
mention the idea of sovereignty, famously Uzbekistan, they have 
this topological notion of sovereignty […] same with all other 
countries […] there is a tension with sovereignty, however, when 
states are identified with their particular ruling regime, with the 
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political person at its head. So to understand Uzbekistan’s 
sovereign foreign policy, we have to understand Karimov’s foreign 
policy. In the West, you would understand that state sovereignty is 
much more institutionalised, there is the idea of the state as such, 
while here the president is essentially it. What comes out as a 
sovereign action here is the president. 
 
Let us now observe the practice of international law as studied by practitioners and 
academics. In this subsection, also the practice of mediation will be reviewed, as 
anticipated above. Here, the level of internalisation of the institution is far shallower, 
as it is evident from the vocabulary used by the interviewees. Again, according to 
Emil Juraev,246 
 
Within the region, again, there is a mixture of international law, that 
it is certainly established, and various informal relations, different 
ways of dealing with each other. […] Whenever some serious things 
happen one thing is the attempt of one president to call the other 
president to discuss it at that level, without putting it [the issue] to 
the control of international public law. This kind of amicable 
relations are of course not always working, especially now. But 
these kinds of informal relations are continuing on, and I think when 
they refer to international public law is when it comes to much more 
technical issues, that would not be touching upon sensitivities. It is 
probably understood as a bad sign when the states refer to 
international law, it’s an alien code of behaviour, instead of 
discussing between us…On border issues, when somebody asks the 
UN, or an impartial third party in the world to…to discuss and help 
us, the matter between us, the reaction by most knowledgeable 
people is “you don’t do that, it is an internal thing between the two 
countries, we will decide it our way”, and it is a work of diplomacy, 
is a work of testing, nurturing some kinds of relationships with the 
other party. 
 
Of the same advice seems to be Marat Kazakhbayev,247 
 
When there are problems between countries, in general, they [the 
leaders] consider the informal aspects of politics, personal relations, 
and also international law. Usually international law is more 
frequently used in specific areas, such as economics, or territory, so 
there are international mechanisms, and also in terms of borders and 
water problems as well. But if I had to say which factor is more 
important, I would say that in Central Asia prevails the personal 
factor. There is very much informal diplomacy, we even had inter-
marriages! And of course informal diplomacy is very much visible 
among countries; unfortunately, in Central Asia, personal 
connections, personal factors and informal diplomacy come before 
international law. Documents on their own do not mean anything, 





personal relations inform them. The case of Kambarata is a good 
example, it will be built only if there is consensus among the 
parties, even if Kyrgyzstan is right from an international law 
perspective. My general impression is that if you resort to 
international law in this region, you are not willing to solve the 
issue personally, and therefore that is bad. It’s a third body of rules, 
external to the parties. But of course they point at the basic rules of 
it, there is still the need for them. 
 
 
But perhaps the most interesting words come from a Kazakh international lawyer, 
with proximate acquaintance of how this institution works within the region: 
 
International law in the region is highly informal. I mean, these 
states know international law, there is international law, but at the 
highest level, i.e. dealing with the world. In the region, you have 
something different. […] [The leaders] sign, they celebrate, but then, 
when problems arise, governments have to find ways to regulate the 
situation. It is bargaining, trading. And also, you have to think of 
your neighbour, you cannot do as you please. They know it. In this 
respect, Russia is different, they are more professional, more 
developed, they have an understanding of international law that is 
more legal. Here it goes like this: even if we know we have the rules, 
we can solve things more quickly with a phone call, or quicker 
methods. With European countries Central Asian states would try to 
bargain as well, but they would be unsuccessful as the European 
understanding of international law is much more legalistic. In terms 
of arbitration, there is no tradition whatsoever. There was 
something like that in the pre-Soviet period, with the biis, the elders, 
the aqsaqals, but never at the level of states. It takes time to adapt to 
it, it is an institution, you know…it is also too far, no one knows the 
international court of justice, they have never worked with it, no 
connections, no trust. There is no ownership, and it costs! It is better 
to solve things between themselves, without third parties. It’s easy to 
talk to each other. In the region, you see that it is the national 
interest that prevails, but at least they would explain why they are 
not conforming to international law. To incorporate international 
standards would for sure stabilise the regional structure in terms of 
international relations, but the development of these states is 
preventing it. They are not professional enough, [there is] slow 
adaptation.248  
 
The notion of slow adaptation, professionalism249 and ‘craft’ of such institutions 
resonates also in the words of a former Kyrgyz diplomat: 
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Why international law is shallow here? Look, we have no lawyers at 
the international level! That’s why we lose in arbitration courts, or 
why indeed we are reluctant to go to arbitration. We don’t speak 
English, just imagine! We now have the figure of the “Special 
Representative in International Courts”, thanks to the Decision 89 
[2/2014] of our president, but you see, it was instructed only this 
year!250  
 
Very interesting, and very open and sincere, also the perspective offered by Uzbek 
practitioners, who nonetheless have preferred to remain anonymous: 
 
Even in the resolution of regional matters, we actually do not refer 
that much to international law, it is a Western imposition… [Uzbek 
2]: yeah, it’s a Western….a Western imposition, yeah, I mean, they 
say why you don’t consult the ICJ and so on, but…here is different, 
we rely more on human values, on acquaintances, on personal 
relations.251 
 
And official Uzbek source as well: 
 
With respect to international law, we do refer to it. Just, we highly 
scrutinise it. We don’t want to find ourselves in the situation of 
having our national legislation infringed. And I think through the 
region is the same. If there is a conflict of norms, international and 
national, national interest would prevail. C’mon, where wouldn’t it 
prevail?! What we reject vehemently is international arbitration. 
Why? Because this would infringe sovereignty! As soon as we put 
power on an international institution, we lose sovereignty. Of 
course, on business matters we go to arbitration. But usually, in the 
region we first refer to dialogue, mainly bilateral, public 
information, so on. When we realise it is impossible [to solve the 
problem] we put international law in play. These are regional 
practices.252 
 
The specificity of the regional practices is also reiterated by two other Uzbek official 
sources, when, speaking of sovereignty and international law, they stated that ‘many 
of the norms that regulate international politics were born in the West…we are looking 
at it, but at our pace and with our specificity’.253 Nuria Kutnaeva reports the same 
points, arguing that international law in Central Asia is valid if it does not infringe the 
national interest: 
 
the basic, minimal rules are applied, understood and incorporated, 
but whenever the national interest is infringed, then supremacy is 
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given to national interest, especially when issues of not-well 
specified “national security” are in play. […] Tajikistan turned to 
Russia in order to resolve border problems, this was seen as a bad 
act in the region, both by Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. If you turn to 
a third party, you don’t recognise equality, you break the deal, you 
acknowledge a big brother. You infringe equality, you create a 
hierarchy. No one liked the move, you don’t do this in Central 
Asia.254 
 
The utilitarian aspect of international law in the region and the prevalence of informal 
practices over it are to be found also in the words of Sultan Akimbekov: 
 
In the region, of course they [the presidents] know international law, 
and they declare it. But Realpolitik is Realpolitik. Of course they try 
to decide and resolve things with talks. This is our local situation, 
our local tactics. They use international law for the interest of the 
state. Of course we are new member of the community and maybe 
sometimes we are not ready to commit ourselves to international 
law. Arbitration is not the first instrument we use. Maybe second, or 
third, you know. But not first. First thing is to try to resolve between 
states, between us.255 
 
Azamat Temirkulov, academic and expert of foreign policies in the region between 
Central Asian states, makes a parallel with diplomacy: 
 
Of course in Central Asia you have personal diplomacy, of course! 
Informal meetings, informal connections…in Central Asia there are 
more personal, informal aspects than official diplomatic 
connections. If you take foreign policy of European states, which is 
very well structured, defined, the national interest is clear, you know 
who is responsible…in Central Asia you don’t have it, they don’t 
know what’s the national interest, who is in charge of protecting it. 
Again, it is related to the notion of statehood, state-building. The 
case of Central Asia is completely different. We had experience of 
bureaucratic institutions of course during the Soviet times, but they 
were planned, common, which are different from state ones…so we 
have to adapt to this new environment, we have to learn how to 
engage in foreign relations…we are still learning!256 
 
 
What do all these words reveal? How do they play against the empirical analysis 
made above? They do not contradict the findings. In fact, they back them. In almost 
all the quotes reported here, we find several references to a particular international 
society.  
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First of all, there is the issue of indexicality.257 That is to say, all the interviewees (also 
those whose words have not been reported here) use words such as ‘here’, ‘in the 
West’, ‘for us’, ‘in this region’, ‘among us’ frequently, i.e. indexes, to categorise and 
divide the logic of thought and practice. ‘Here’ it works so, ‘there’ it works 
differently. This, it may be said, created already some sort of boundaries around the 
Central Asian region. I.e., they see themselves as forming a group of actors whose 
rules may be different from those in other places in the world.  
Secondly, there is the issue of formality/informality. The interviewees are not 
saying that sovereignty, international law and diplomacy are non-existent. We have 
seen that indeed these are the norms, the practices that help the system, the region to 
be relatively peaceful and ordered. Also, many of them speak of a ‘background 
knowledge’, of a common and shared practice when basic rules of coexistence are 
demanded and required. What they argue, especially with respect to international law, 
is that their entrenchment is sometimes too soft (as in the case of international law) 
and sometimes too hard (as in the case of sovereignty) to guarantee a solid, stable and 
more cooperative international society.  
International law is known, understood and used by all states in the region, but 
often as an instrument to support national interest rather than as an abstract, and 
impartial, framework or rules valid for everyone. Personal connections, informal 
chats, phone-calls and even dinners and post-conference meetings are, in the words of 
the interviewees, far more effective in regulating relations in Central Asia than the 
abstract, formal instrument of the law. When international law is invoked, in sum, it is 
because something is broken at the inter-personal level. Interestingly, when it is 
mentioned in the region is because things are getting worse (while, at the global level, 
it is the norm). 
This analysis of the informality of some of the institutions of the Central Asian 
international society fits well with the structural analysis conducted above. Given that 
the institutions present there have not been fully legitimised, entrenched and 
‘localised’, their effectiveness in managing order and stability is constantly put under 
strain, placing the Central Asian society in between of a power-political system of 
relations and a more pacific, ‘coexistential’ one. Recall the words of the Kazakh 
international lawyer reported above: ‘To incorporate international standards would for 
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sure stabilise the regional structure in terms of international relations, but the 
development of these states is preventing it’.  
The fact that several interviewees mentioned the presence of personal interests 
and calculation when dealing with norms and institutions, again, fits with the analysis 
above, where I have constantly reminded the reader of the co-presence of competitive 
and cooperative elements in the intra-regional politics of Central Asia (and, indeed, in 
the general ES framework).  
But they do not discard the adoption of norms and rules. The fact that 
governments refer to them, claim that they have to be respected, and point at their role 
in solving controversies signifies their presence and acceptance. The shallow 
interiorisation, or the depth of their understanding/adoption (Wendt 1999; Buzan 
2004) does not exclude a priori the fact that these norms are operating in the Central 
Asian social environment.  
We have also seen that international responsibilities are called for by all states 
in the region, if, again, mixed with strong support for their own national interests. If 
these claims for ‘the neighbours’, ‘the region’, ‘the other countries’ are merely 
window-dressing, why bother with them this much? The references to such terms 
show that, even if very shallow, a societal conception of the region is present in the 
mind of Central Asian statesmen. Worth stressing, by societal conception I do not 
mean cooperative at all. I simply mean that there is consideration, account for others, 
and the search for common rules and norms to find a via media between the different, 
contrasting positions. This is what international society, in its essence, is all about 
(Jackson 2000).  
Also, common references to the region coming from all states forming it, plus 
the use of terms like ‘coexistence’, ‘mechanisms’ and ‘thresholds’ and the entrenched 
term ‘Central Asia’ in my interviewees’ answers all point at the existence of 
something more than a pure realist system of relations in the region. 
Another hint that we find with respect to the ‘shallowness’ of international 
society and its institutions in Central Asia is in the vocabulary used by the 
interviewees. Terms such as ‘inertia’, ‘no experience’, ‘need of time’, ‘informality’, 
‘the West’, ‘more/less institutionalised’, ‘personal relations’, ‘bargaining trading’, ‘no 
tradition’, ‘adaptation’, ‘learning’, ‘no professionalism’, ‘shallowness’, ‘imposition 
[of an institution]’, ‘acquaintances’, ‘human values [as opposed to the rule of law]’, 
‘connections’, ‘new environment’, ‘alien’, ‘our pace’, ‘our specificities’, ‘us’ [as 
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opposed to ‘you/them’], ‘local’, ‘difference’ all reflect a social environment that not 
only is different from the wider environment where it is located (and here we have the 
global/regional dichotomy), but also a social environment in fieri, under construction, 
in the process of stabilisation.  
In the light of this, and by looking at the two case studies analysed above, we 
can advance the claim that in the 2000s Central Asia still constitutes an international 
society on its own, exactly because of the particular understanding and interpretation 
of the institutions of sovereignty, diplomacy and, most of all, international law. I argue 
also that other institutions may well differentiate Central Asia from the international 
society at the global level, such as the Aral Sea, the CANFWZ and neopatrimonial 
authoritarianism as observed in Chapter 4. 
The mixture of realism and liberalism, of confrontation and cooperation, of 
fight and dialogue, of interest and commitment, of prudence and procedure (Jackson 
2000) is a defining feature of this region, in spite of the negative, power-political 
accounts of it (Torjesen 2008). Especially in water-management, we have noticed 
through an analysis of the practices of statesmen that there is a normative, diplomatic 
substratum that, at least for now, is keeping the region resilient and free from conflict. 
Aidos Sarym, a prominent political analyst in Kazakhstan, used a very powerful 
metaphor borrowed from literature (and significantly related to water) to describe the 
present state of affairs in Central Asia: 
 
There are two very good allegories to describe Central Asia, from 
the Book of Jungle [sic] of Kipling: the first one is the law of 
jungle, and the second one is water reconciliation. So if there is a 
drought, all the animals go to the same spring, and drink together. In 
times of drought, you can have the law of the jungle, but water 
reconciliation can prevent it. The five Central Asian countries are 
trying to stay away from the law of the jungle and to seek water 
reconciliation. There is a demand for it; among the elites, among the 
people, there are searches for that.258 
 
 
Having shown that an international society is also at play in Central Asia in the 2000s, 
and that this international society is indeed perceived by its members there, the next 
chapter focuses on the ‘international dimension’ of this international society. That is, I 
investigate the norms and rules endorsed and sponsored by the Central Asian states at 
                                                 




the international level, and I ask whether there is convergence or divergence among 
them. Therefore, we will leave (geographically speaking) Central Asia for one 


















































Central Asian international society at the international level: norms, rules and 





 The thesis has so far dealt with the intra-regional aspects of international relations of 
the Central Asian states. The norms, institutions and rules adopted by them in their 
mutual dealings since 1991 have been identified, analysed and commented on. Also, 
the changes in the structural as well as in the type of the Central Asian international 
society have been discussed and presented, ranging from a dead-letter, solidarist 
international society in the 1990s to a more ‘coexistential’, pluralistic one in the 
2000s.  
Yet, it is believed that in order to show whether there are shared norms, rules 
and institutions in the region, looking at the mere intra-regional dimension is valuable 
but perhaps not sufficient. We need to explore if such shared normative approach to 
international relations is visible also in other loci than the region itself. That is, we 
need to project the international society in Central Asia onto the international stage. It 
is clear that, if there is correspondence between what we have observed in the region 
and what we observe at the international level, then the thesis benefits from additional 
validation, being its argument entrenched not just from one side (the regional level of 
analysis) but from two (the regional and the global level of analysis).  
As we noted while reviewing the literature on the region, it seems that since 
the demise of the USSR in 1991 Central Asia has been caught in two conflicting 
dimensions: victim of its past, hostage of its future. The literature on the international 
relations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan has 
often discussed how the past of the region could mark its future developments, how 
territorial and inter-ethnic strife, silenced under Soviet rule, would affect the intra-
regional international relations in an explosive mixture of chaos and disorder. By the 
same token, the future of Central Asia has often been at the forefront of scholarly 
research on the region: what will happen in future has been the common question 
condemning Central Asia to a perennial status of suspension in the international 
                                                 
259 An earlier version of this chapter has been published as Costa Buranelli (2014c). 
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system: on the edge of, on the brinks of, one step from (Hashim and Rashid 1992, 
Hyman 1993, Jones Luong and Wienthal 2002, Akçali 2003, Kleveman 2003, Rashid 
2008). Therefore, a cornerstone of this thesis has been that very few academic works, 
if any, have highlighted the fact that, once independent, the Central Asian states 
entered a world with not only material structures and geopolitical imperatives, but 
normative and institutional webs as well, where they had to find their 
place. Consequently, an analysis of the international behaviour of the Central Asian 
republics is still missing from the substantive literature on the region, which has been 
more concerned with assessing international influences on the region, rather than on 
how these states ‘see’ the international (see for example Warkotsch 2007, Jackson 
2010, Kavalski 2012, Lewis 2012a). 
The reason why this short digression on the literature has been brought into the 
picture again is that in fact one of the first acts these states undertook, once 
independent, was joining the UN, both to substantiate the de jure character of their 
independence and to participate in the shaping of those norms and rules that regulate 
and inform world politics.260 Thus, the first purpose of this brief chapter is to fill this 
lacuna in the literature on the international relations of the Central Asian republics.  
A second aim of this chapter, as said, is to translate to the international 
dimension the cooperation-competition debate that has characterised the literature on 
regional politics in Central Asia. The literature on intra-regional relations has always 
stressed, with undoubted merits, the basic un-cooperative nature of Central Asian 
intra-regional relations, highlighting patterns of disintegration and competition, 
factors of de- if not of contra-regionalisation (Spechler 2002, Bohr 2004, Linn 2007, 
Allison 2008, Libman and Vinokurov 2011, Cooley 2012: 149-153). Bitter 
disagreements over energy and water resources, border delimitation and territorial 
disputes in the region make even the most optimist analysts doubtful of substantive 
regional cooperation in the near future. And indeed in the course of the thesis it has 
been stressed several times that the presence of norms, rules and institutions has 
tamed, but not eliminated, the overall underlying confrontational, antagonistic nature 
of the regional environment. 
Yet, it is believed that given what has been discussed in the thesis, that is 
                                                 
260 On March 2, 1992, all the five Central Asian states completed their procedure of admission to the 




Central Asian states’ common historical legacy, common political background and the 
fact that the physical, geographic system presents them with the same, serious 
political, demographic and environmental challenges, at the international level there is 
possibly more agreement among them than within the region itself. This discrepancy 
may be explained by assuming that while at the international level norms and rules are 
only professed and supported, within the region decisions have to be taken, thus 
running the risk of challenging personal interests and sovereign rights (Collins 2009).  
Setting out the premises of this chapter in a slightly different way than the 
previous ones, instead of proceeding with a narrative of events here I present four 
hypotheses: 
 
• H1: given their general condition as third-world countries (Ayoob 1995; 
Abdullaev 2002: 245) and their past political, social and economic 
experiences, their normative orientation on the international scene is highly 
convergent;  
• H2: given their still incomplete process of state-building, the norms endorsed 
by the Central Asian republics are those typical of a pluralist, Westphalian 
inter-state system, and therefore we should expect correspondence between the 
findings presented here and what has been discussed in the rest of the thesis; 
• H3: given H1, Central Asian states have used the international stage to act in 
concert to address several problems in their own region; 
• H4: given H1 and H3, Central Asian states present themselves as a coherent 
regional group in world politics. This should be especially true for the 1990s, 
when the Central Asian international society was structured as a dead-letter 
solidarist international society, and disproved after the mid-2000s, when the 
regional environment became more and more coexistential/pluralistic. 
 
To verify these hypotheses, this chapter sets the task of analysing the present state of 
the behaviour of Central Asian states within the UN, in particular within the General 
Assembly (UNGA), thus in line with recent literature discussing ‘regional 
positionality’ on international issues (Luif 2003, Hosli et al. 2010, Häge and Hug 
2013, Bailey et al. 2013, Strezhnev and Voeten 2013, Burmester and Jankowski 2014, 
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Ferdinand 2014).  
This is for multiple reasons. Firstly, all Central Asian states are members of the 
UNGA, and therefore an extensive analysis of their normative stances is possible.  
Secondly, they are not members of the Security Council or of other voting 
institutions; when this happens, such as membership of Turkmenistan in the ECOSOC 
or of Kazakhstan in the Council of Human Rights, the other Central Asian republics 
are not represented, and therefore an analysis of the whole group of states is not 
possible.  
Thirdly, if the aim is to highlight and disclose the normative orientation of 
Central Asian states in world politics, shedding light on their attitude on normative 
issues with respect to problems of world governance, then the UNGA can be seen as 
the main arena where normative positions are held, explained, contrasted and 
challenged (Kim and Russett 1996). As a global deliberating body, the Assembly 
appears to be ‘well suited to discussing the general principles and norms that do or 
should govern international relations’ (Peterson 1986: 259). The deliberative process 
of the UNGA is ‘a process of distributing desired symbolic and material values among 
members of society’ (Peterson 1986: 7).  
Furthermore, considering the already noted trend in the literature, votes in the 
UNGA have become ‘the standard data source for constructing measures of state 
preferences as they are comparable and observable actions taken by many countries at 
set points in time’ (Bailey et al. 2013: 1). In sum, the UNGA, like all other 
international organisations, is one of the elements that affect the process of world 
politics by providing the norms and institutions within which states and other actors 
interact in pursuit of their various goals (Peterson 1986: 5; Luif 2003: 13). Even if (or 
perhaps exactly because) resolutions are not binding, and are rather indications, 
suggestions, manifestation of the world’s Zeitgeist in a particular moment on a 
particular issue of world politics, the vote and the justification for that vote are 
important harbingers of  what norms, beliefs and rules a country, or a group of 
countries, abides by. 
 
6.2 The analysis of words and votes in the GA: a worthy exercise? 
 
In one of the best discussions on the utility of analysing voting behaviour within the 
UNGA, Robert Keohane has addressed the important point of supporting an analysis 
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of voting behaviour of states with the political processes of negotiations and tit-for-tat 
behind the scenes to substantiate the meaning of votes themselves (Keohane 1967). 
According to him, a single vote or group of votes cannot speak for itself, and rarely 
are variables per se. More often, if not always, votes within the UNGA are the output 
results of endless negotiations, meetings, challenges, agreements and disagreements in 
the rooms behind the curtain, where states put their cards on the table and play 
according to their will, whether following their mere interest (in supporting, balancing 
on rejecting a given resolution) or following a normative commitment: ‘Important as 
the understanding of individual and group voting behaviour undoubtedly is, such 
analysis does not provide us with comprehensive knowledge of General Assembly 
politics’ (Keohane 1967: 221; see also Kissack 2007). His target were those scholars 
who employed statistical techniques to simply find correlation between group 
composition and voting outcomes, without being interested in why certain groups 
supported (opposed) a given resolution or how that support (opposition) was created 
and sustained.  
On this point, I agree with Keohane that a mere binomial correlation between 
states and votes does not demonstrate much. This is why, for the purpose of this 
chapter, I conducted preliminary research to find those press conferences and bilateral 
meetings where heads of states stressed the need to continue to cooperate within 
international institutions and the UN in particular that may be a sign of consultations 
and discussion on common positions to adopt within the UNGA (Avesta 2013a; 
KazInform 2012; KazInform 2013; Trend 2012c; Trend 2013; UzDaily 2012b; 
UzDaily 2012c).261  
In addition, this chapter adopts the use of speeches and declarations of political 
leaders as its method to give a tentative framework of discussion and consultation 
where to put the statistical component of voting behaviour in the UNGA. This move 
can also serve to reduce methodological biases deriving from ‘chance voting’, i.e. 
voting convergence driven by chance rather than by coordination (Häge 2011). 
However, while Keohane focuses on impact, and on how small states may 
influence the outcome of a resolution, in this chapter I focus more on what a vote in 
the UNGA signifies from a mere normative viewpoint, in full line with the ES 
                                                 
261 I also came to know about dialogue and consultation in UN bodies between Central Asian states 
through personal communications with official Uzbek sources in Tashkent.  
242 
 
approach adopted since the beginning. As a matter of fact, it is assumed that to vote 
for a specific resolution or on a specific theme is not only a reflection of a state’s 
interests, but it may well represent a support/endorsement for a given norm/rule in 
international relations as well. This is particularly true for small states and newly 
independent states, which having the advantage of holding the majority in the UNGA 
may oppose and contest norms that would hinder their development, infringe on their 
sovereignty and silence their cultural peculiarities.  
In sum, while there is awareness that the UNGA ‘is not a comprehensive 
reflection of the full range of foreign policy concerns of all states, or of the balance of 
priorities of individual states, […] voting cohesion there is still a very good indicator 
of common positions on the widest range of global issues’ (Ferdinand 2014: 3, 
emphasis added). 
Since in this chapter the stress is more on norms and rules rather than on 
material capabilities and physical dynamics of world politics and the intent is to show, 
to the extent that it is possible, the normative convergence of Central Asian states in 
the UNGA, being consistent with the rest of the thesis I deem that to make use of ES 
categories of international society, pluralism, solidarism and institutions is a 
convenient move to grasp the complexities of Central Asian behaviour in the 
Assembly.  
I decided to maintain this theoretical framework also in this chapter because, 
as said, I mean to shed light on two related aspects of Central Asian international 
politics, if at the global level (and not at the regional one any more): whether the 
mainly competitive nature of regional politics is reflected also at the international 
level, and, if not, what the norms shared among them are (whether pluralist or 
solidarist). Having traced the evolution of the Central Asian international society from 
solidarism (1990s) to pluralism (2000s), the chapter expects to find the same 
developments at the international level as well. 
The ES, being a via media between realism and liberalism, allows us to focus 
on this relational, normative dimension of international relations while not dispensing 
with the mainly non-cooperative behaviour at the regional level. This would then 
contribute to the literature on regional cooperation dealt with in the introduction, as it 
would focus on a peculiar situation: cooperation and normative convergence at the 
global level but poor record of mutual understanding regionally. An ES reading of 
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Central Asia’s attitude in the UNGA, therefore, allows to consider those norms and 
institutions that inform the international relations of Central Asian states, discloses the 
perspective that Central Asian states have on global international society and offers an 
alternative view on why, despite their poor record of regional cooperation and indeed 
growing competition, these states have managed so far to coexist in their regional 
space.  
In addition, and no less importantly, the attempt of this chapter to apply an ES 
reading on Central Asia  expands a new theoretical agenda that has been inaugurated 
only very recently (Costa Buranelli 2014c, Kaczmarska 2013, Pourchot and Stivachtis 
2014). 
 
6.3 Methodology and methods 
 
 The next step to make is to determine the right methodology and methods to disclose 
the presumed normative convergence in the UNGA and, therefore, at the international 
level. In line with an ES approach, I opted for a qualitative, interpretive analysis of 
two kinds of sources (Navari 2009).  
The first are the official documents from 1992 to 2012 retrieved from the UN 
online archives and web databases submitted by Central Asian governments, alone or 
in common, to the UN, whether to the Secretariat or to the UNGA directly.  
The second is the whole array of declarations, speeches, interviews, press-
conferences and addresses made by Central Asian government representatives within 
the UN itself, where the intention to abide by specific norms and institutions of 
international society is advocated by the speakers (on behalf of the state they 
represent) during general debates and/or inaugural speeches. Due to space constraints, 
here I analyse the discourses of Central Asian statesmen for the last four years only 
(2011-2014). Dealing with these two kinds of sources, I code those terms, phrases and 
expressions that signal, contain or simply make reference to a specific norm or 
institution of international society. 
Yet, in order to substantiate my claims and to strengthen the validation of the 
hypotheses set above, in this chapter I tried to engage in a triangulation of methods 
opting for a multi-method research (Mason 1996: 25, 42). Methodologically speaking, 
this is a (hopefully) valuable departure from the main qualitative route set at the 
beginning of the thesis, and followed since then. While the first two groups of sources 
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are scrutinised in a qualitative way, I have also adopted a quantitative analysis of a 
third group of sources, which is the similarity of positions in the UNGA among 
nations expressed in votes on a single issue over time, from 1992 to 2012. To analyse 
this third group of sources, I relied on the Index of Affinity of Nations (Strezhnev and 
Voeten 2013). This index calculates the similarity of positions among nations within 
the UNGA, posing it on a (0-1) scale, where ‘0’ represents the greatest disagreement 
and where ‘1’ represents the highest agreement and convergence.  
The added value of integrating the qualitative strategies adopted in this paper 
with this quantitative tool is the possibility to verify that the normative convergence 
of Central Asian states is expressed not just on paper and verbally, but is also 
translated in documented outcomes. The multi-perspective corroboration of the 
hypothesis, at least in this chapter, was thus sought via an integrative, multi-faceted 
methodology based on interpretivism and descriptive statistical correlation.  
While the use of such a quantitative technique may not fit well in a paper that 
claims to follow an ES approach to sustain its claims, I believe there is nothing that a 
priori prevents the mixing of methods to present more nuanced and more rounded 
conclusions (Greener 2011; 6 and Bellamy 2011). As a matter of fact, while relying on 
mere qualitative analysis would prevent me from verifying how and to what extent 
this convergence is played out in the UNGA, the mere quantitative aspect would 
prevent me from knowing on what norms there is convergence. This is why I endorse 
a multi-method analysis to disclose possible normative isonomy among Central Asian 
states in the UNGA.  
With respect to the last, quantitative part, it should be noted that contrary to 
Peter Ferdinand (2014) I employ only one index of convergence, and not three. This is 
because this chapter does not intend to be a quantitative analysis of voting 
convergence. Rather, one of its aims is to show a perhaps less precise but more 
rounded picture of normative convergence among Central Asian states, and therefore 
deems appropriate to be methodologically extensive and not intensive. In addition, I 
am aware that the use of these different methods does not provide a perfect picture of 
the normative convergence of Central Asian states within the UNGA, and some 
problems are still left out.  These problems, however, will be dealt with in the 





The chapter is structured as follows: in the first section, I offer a brief historical 
account on how Central Asian states joined the UN. Subsequently, I scrutinise and 
analyse the norms endorsed and supported in the official documents submitted to the 
UNGA by Central Asian states as a group.  Therefore, in this section I will also focus 
on the ‘regionness’ of Central Asia, meant as the ability to act on the world stage as a 
coherent group of states capable of acting in concert and presenting a common 
identity to the world over the years. This section, in sum, will offer a collective 
overview on their normative convergence. In the next section, conversely, I will offer 
a discrete overview of their normative convergence. I code declarations and speeches 
of each Central Asian state-representative to see what norms are adopted and 
embraced by singular leaders. As it can be expected, the hypotheses listed above will 
be validated if both the collective and the discrete overview will bring the same 
results. In the fourth section, I make a quantitative shift, and I discuss the normative 
convergence of Central Asian states in voting sessions in the UNGA to verify if this 
convergence is also sustained at the decisional level. In the conclusions, I discuss the 
findings of the research presented in this chapter and the position of Central Asia in 
the global international society. 
6.4 Central Asia joins the UN – A Brief History 
The early 1990s were a period of intensive turmoil in the geopolitical area covered by 
the USSR; the Gorbachev experiment of reforming communism while retaining it, did 
not stop the wave of protests and dissent across the Soviet territories. With the USSR 
on the verge of dissolution, many attempts were made to retain a sort of con-
federational structure that allowed the republics to be sovereign while being formally 
part of the Soviet superstructure (Kulchik et al. 1996, Hiro 2009).  
The Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan were clearly the least willing to 
see the Soviet Union dissolve: being the least developed republics and the main 
supplier of raw materials to the core of the centralised, planned economic system, a 
disruption of the unified system would wreak havoc, and would leave them 
unprepared for a life as independent countries, something they had never been. 
Nonetheless, Central Asian governments agreed that a greater degree of autonomy 
from Moscow was desirable, especially in economic matters.  
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Thus, following the general trend, the Soviet Central Asian republics declared their 
sovereignty as Soviet Socialist Republics, giving pre-eminence to national laws over 
Soviet ones but still remaining within the USSR framework. Uzbekistan declared its 
sovereignty in October 1990, Turkmenistan in August 1990, Kazakhstan in September 
1990, Kyrgyzstan in October 1990 and Tajikistan in August 1990. However, already 
in June 1990, the Central Asian republics plus Kazakhstan had already started 
consulting each other on economic coordination, cooperation and reciprocal 
consultation, signing agreements on economic matters and setting up a consultative 
council to analyse future prospects of cooperation (Hiro 2009).  
In terms of participation in international organisations, there were rumours at 
that time that the Soviet Union, still alive, was planning a sort of re-Ukrainisation or 
re-Belarusisation of the UN, proposing to have seats for each sovereign republic while 
retaining the USSR seat in the Security Council, a new ‘X-matter’, to use Stettinius’ 
expression.262 Between the declaration of sovereignty and the final demise of the 
Soviet Union, as a matter of fact, there was still the possibility that Moscow would 
retain a major control on the more ‘sovereign’ activities of those republics, among 
them the management of foreign affairs. 
Central Asians’ willingness and desires notwithstanding, the Soviet Union fell 
apart in December 1991 and, in prevision of this, the Central Asian republics had 
declared their independence as sovereign states, as we saw in Chapter 4.  
Aware of the fragility of their new-born international status, however, all five 
Central Asian republics sought to enhance and entrench their sovereignty on the de 
jure side, by formally applying to the UN to gain international legitimacy and 
recognition as sovereign states. In a surprisingly quick adaptation to the institutional 
environment of world politics and showing steady knowledge of the instruments of 
international law, the five newly independent states submitted a letter to the 
Secretary-General in full compliance with Rule 134 of the Rules of Procedures of the 
UNGA.263 Such letters, then, would be submitted from the Secretary-General to the 
                                                 
262 Edward Stettinius, US Secretary of States at Dumbarton Oaks (August 1944), used to refer to the 
Soviet proposal of having a Soviet seat in the Security Council plus 16 seats for each Soviet 
republic as the ‘X-matter’. A compromise was reached in Yalta (1945) with the admission for the 
Soviet Union, Ukraine and Belarus as founding members. 
263 The full procedure to admit a new member state to the UN is a combination of the rules of 
procedure of the General Assembly and of the Security Council, linked by the Secretary General. It 
is the following: a letter containing a formal application and a formal commitment to accepting all 
the obligations contained in the Charted should be sent to the Secretary-General (Rule 134 GA); the 
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Security Council for a preliminary scrutiny, which would be ratified in a second phase 
by the UNGA with a two-thirds majority vote.  
The application was extremely quick: Kazakhstan sent his letter already on 31 
December 1991, so in the same month in which it gained full independence 
(S/23353); Kyrgyzstan on 6 January 1992 (S/23450); Uzbekistan sent its letter on the 
same day as Kyrgyzstan (S/23451); Tajikistan sent its letter on 16 January 1992 
(S/23455), while Turkmenistan applied formally on 20 January 1992 (S/23489 and 
Corr. 1). On March 2, 1992, all the five Central Asian states completed their 
procedure of admission to the UN, being accepted as full members with unanimous 
votes of the General Assembly at its 82nd plenary meeting (Kazakhstan 46/224; 
Kyrgyzstan 46/225; Uzbekistan 46/226; Tajikistan 46/228; Turkmenistan 46/229).  
Before concluding this section, a short digression on the nature of their 
admission is in order to fully grasp the importance that such an admission played for 
the newly independent states.  
After diplomatic and legal negotiations within the UNSC, the Russian 
Federation was accorded the right to take over the Soviet seat, and the other former 
members of the USSR were allowed to apply for their own membership. The Central 
Asian states, having signed the Commonwealth Accord in December 1991, agreed 
that Russia would take USSR’s seat in the Security Council, but also insisted on their 
right to apply to the UN as independent states (Scharf 1995: 45). From a legal 
perspective, the ‘new states’ of Central Asia were subject only to customary law with 
respect to State succession involving new states (Mullerson 1993: 474). Therefore, 
due to the Soviet Union having ‘officially ceased to exist’ and former SSRs’ internal, 
federal administrative borders having been recognised as international borders by the 
international community (Rich 1993),264 the Central Asian states were therefore 
                                                                                                                                            
Secretary-General presents the application to the Security Council, which sends it to the Committee 
for the Admission of New States (Rule 59 SC); the Security Council decides whether the State 
under scrutiny is a peace-loving one and ready to fulfil its obligations under the UN Chart and, if 
the outcome is positive, passes its recommendation over to the General Assembly (Rule 60 SC); 
following the Security Council's recommendation, the General Assembly votes with two-thirds of 
its members the admission of the new State (Rule 136 GA). If the outcome is positive, the Secretary 
General informs the Applicant State with the decision of the General Assembly (Rule 138 GA). 
264 The same recognition of internal frontiers as international borders (based on the uti possidetis 
principle) was applied to the former Yugoslav Republics (Opinion 3 of the Badinter Arbitration 
Committee), whose path to recognition was nonetheless less straightforward, more debated and 




obliged to go through the usual procedures of application for membership (Blum 
1992: 832). 
According to the rules of procedures and to the requisites for states to become 
members of the UN (see Article 4(1) of the Charter and Rule 60 of the SC Rules), an 
applicant must: 1) be a state according to international law; 2) be peace-loving; 3) 
accept the obligations of the Charter;265 4) be able to carry out those obligations and 
5) be willing to do so. For the UN, the main criterion to define a prospective member 
as a ‘state’ was statehood as defined by the Montevideo Convention (article 2, 1933). 
However, if the main criterion for UN admission was statehood according to 
international law and the capacity of applicant states to implement the provisions 
prescribed in the Charter and to guarantee peace and security, then the newly 
independent Central Asian republics barely met those standards.266  
As noticed in Chapter 4, none of them had previous experience not just of 
independence, but even of formal diplomatic relations. In addition, the economic 
system, once tied to Moscow, was now completely disrupted, none of them had an 
independent, state-led military and borders were very porous and feeble, although all 
the five state leaders agreed to adopt the uti possidetis principle and to not alter the 
geographical spatial configuration of the republics. The already noted inter-ethnic 
frictions in the region, such as those among Uzbeks and Mekshetian Turks in 1989 
and Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in 1990 in Osh, as well as tensions among Tajiks and 
Kyrgyzs and between Russian and Kazakhs in northern Kazakhstan left few hopes for 
a peaceful transition.  
Then, why did the UN bestow membership on them? Following O’Keefe on 
the ex-Yugoslav states (2001), I argue that the UN gave priority to the peaceful 
process of independence that realised the statehood of these states and that, on the 
                                                 
265 For example, in the request for admission from the Kazakh government we can read ‘on behalf of 
the republic of Kazakhstan and as head of state, I [Nazarbayev] have the honour to submit the 
present application for membership in the UN’ and that Kazakhstan ‘accepts the obligations 
contained in the charter of the UN and solemnly undertakes to discharge them’ (Xinhua News 
Agency, 2 Jan 1992). President Niyazov of Turkmenistan added that being admitted to the UN was 
‘a matter of priority’ and, to stress the independent character of his country, wrote down the 
percentages of the referendum on independence held on October 27, 1991 (BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 21 Jan 1992). 
266 A good example of this is that it was the Russian Ambassador Yuli Vorontsov who delivered to the 





other hand, it believed that an entrenchment of a de jure sovereignty could have 
pacified the de facto political environment in Central Asia. Thus, potential irredentist 
claims, inter-ethnic feuds, border skirmishes would have been framed as conflicts 
among full sovereign states, and thus incorporated in all those rules and procedures 
that serve to regulate conflict among states and to bring order to potentially disruptive 
situations. The criterion was therefore a relaxation of the interpretation of full and 
active statehood, in order to satisfy the higher requirement of international peace and 
security.  
The rationale was that, although tenuous and weak, these states were legally 
independent, as they were no longer republics of a non-existent federation. The 
maintenance of peace and security thus had a sort of constitutional primacy in their 
admission. What we observe is therefore a flexible approach to the formal criteria that 
we find in Article 4(1) of the Charter motivated by legal, but also by political and 
security reasons. We can read their admission as a way of the UN to achieve and 
entrench order in the post-Cold War period. Thus, the fact that independence was 
achieved peacefully was a good point for the new states, as well as for the UN. To 
paraphrase Hersch Lauterpacht, the admission of post-Soviet space states was more 
permeated with law and principle than is currently assumed (Lauterpacht 2012).  
After 2 March 1992, all five Central Asian presidents started engaging with 
the organisation they were new members of, striving for visibility in the new 
international context. In the light of what said above, it is therefore not surprising that 
the Central Asian states plus Russia first approached the UN with a legal document 
concerning the already encountered uti possidetis provision with respect to their 
borders. The Declaration on the Inviolability of Frontiers was submitted to both the 
UNGA and the Security Council immediately one year after admission to the UN, 
thus to legitimise and ‘sanctify’ the territorial aspect of the newly gained sovereignty 
(A/48/304 and S/26290, 11 August 1993).  
  
6.5 Normative convergence in UN Documents submitted by Central Asian 
countries 
  
The first examples of normative convergence and societal attitude among the five 
Central Asian states date back to the mid-1990s and the end of that period, when the 
CAU was still alive (1994-1998). Despite the already noted neglect of the literature on 
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the matter, that period and that experience proved to be significant in terms of 
defining and sharpening the normative directions of Central Asia in world politics.  
For example, in the document ‘Towards a Culture of Peace’ (A/52/558 31 
October 1997), the five Central Asian governments presented a roadmap of how, 
according to them, international relations should be conducted. References to 
multiculturalism and pluralism (§ 6: ‘We are unanimously of the view that mankind's 
cultural diversity is an essential prerequisite for the maintenance of alternative paths 
to the further development of mankind’ and § 13: ‘The meaning of civilization is 
multiculturalism. This is the only acceptable and realistic idea of the present and the 
future. The cultures of small peoples are equal and irreproducible in their unique 
distinctiveness and the multiplicity of their hues’), sovereignty equality (§ 7: ‘to 
devise a new world order in which, on the basis of equality of rights and mutual 
respect, account would be taken of the interests of all peoples’), international law and 
diplomacy (Annex II: ‘The development of bilateral inter-State relations on the basis 
of the norms of international law has become a guarantee of the successful conduct of 
[our] policy’) were endorsed and reiterated.  
One year later, in the A/53/62 Document, the five Central Asian states 
reaffirmed their normative convergence on the world stage professing strongly 
pluralist values and norms. For example, the values and institutions of sovereignty, 
non-interference, international law and diplomatic resolution of conflicts take a whole 
paragraph of the document: 
 
Reaffirming their commitment to the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations, desiring to deepen the ties among their countries 
and peoples on the basis of the principles of respect for 
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity,  inviolability of 
borders, equality, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, 
rejection of the use of force or threat of force and rejection of 
economic or any other means of exerting pressure, conscientious 
fulfilment of their obligations, and compliance with the universally 
recognized norms of international law. 
 
 At the same time, the institution of GPM is evident in the five states’ assessment of 
the Afghan peaceful settlement: ‘[the sides] reaffirmed their readiness to continue 
their joint efforts to settle the situation in Afghanistan under the auspices of the UN, 
with the participation of neighbouring countries, the Russian Federation and the 
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United States of America’. In addition, the regional identity of Central Asia267 was 
entrenched and enhanced, signalling that all regional states adhered to those norms 
and principles:  
 
the leaders of the five States noted their States' enormous historical 
potential and common historical roots, the interrelatedness of their 
destinies, their traditions of  friendship, the similarity of their 
cultures, customs and mores, and the stability of  their good-
neighbourly relations. […] Bearing in mind the similarity of their 
goals and objectives with respect to the independent development of 
their countries, consolidation of their statehood, and their 
international recognition as full subjects of international law. […] 
The sides unanimously noted the usefulness and timeliness of the 
Ashgabat meeting, which helped strengthen mutual understanding 
and confidence, and clarify positions on key issues concerning 
relations among the five fraternal countries. 
  
Interestingly, however, application of the pluralist values of sovereignty equality, non-
interference and coexistence are to be found in the region itself, especially when 
stressing  
 
[Central Asian states’] determination to consolidate their political 
and economic independence and their unwavering commitment to 
deepening friendly, equitable and mutually advantageous relations 
based on a long-term partnership and consistent with the national 
interests of all five States, and to security and stability in the region. 
  
 
In a third document, the A/53/96,268 which followed the Tashkent Declaration signed 
on 26 March 1998, the parties emphasised once more the value of sovereignty and 
non-interference (‘[we] regard the integration of the States of Central Asia as a natural 
and objective process which is conditioned and determined by the vital interests of 
each country’), of international law as the main and indeed only mean of 
communication among nations (exemplified by the long list of agreements made and 
by their commitment ‘[t]o ensure the strict implementation of the joint  agreements 
adopted [in the region]’) plus the common references to peaceful coexistence and 
fraternal ties (which would imply a commitment to diplomacy when dealing with 
potential interstate conflicts and disagreements). Also in this case, the construction 
                                                 
267 Already one year earlier Uzbek Foreign Minister Kamilov stated that ‘We [Uzbeks] continue to 
believe that Central Asia has its own characteristics’; he also made reference to a ‘regional identity’, 
although he did not explain what he meant (A/51/PV.21).  
268 Letter dated 9 April 1998 from the Permanent Representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the UN. 
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and the perpetuation of a concrete regional coherence are visible:  
 
On the basis of the common history and culture of their peoples, the 
Heads of State of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. […] They regard the integration of the States of Central 
Asia as a natural and objective process. […] [The parties] 
emphasize that they would also welcome the participation of 
Turkmenistan in a form acceptable to it. […] The Presidents declare 
their firm resolve to do everything possible to strengthen eternal 
friendship and cooperation between the peoples of Central Asia, 
which are in conformity with their vital interests. 
 
Already from this short analysis of principles endorsed by Central Asian states,  the 
interrelationship between norms and regional context is notable, as well as between 
norms and regional identity: in the words and minds of State leaders, Central Asia was 
a coherent, convergent and distinct region of world politics. Interestingly, these 
international stances are in line with what we observed in Chapter 4, when it was 
shown how Central Asia was a solidarist regional international society (if of the dead-
letter type).  
The trend of normative and regional convergence did not stop with new 
millennium, but actually received more impetus with the setting up of the CACO 
(2002-2006). In the document A/57/614–S/2002/1246,269 for example, we find a clear 
common commitment to the preservation and implementation of pluralist values in 
international relations within the region. Central Asian states are said to be 
 
Guided by their common interest in promoting the stability, security, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the States of the region 
and in strengthening cooperation between the States of the region in 
areas of common interest. 
  
At § 5 we find also a commitment to the norm of environmentalism: 
  
The Heads of State emphasize the need for increased cooperation in 
the area of the protection and enhancement of the environment, the 
prevention of transboundary pollution, and the prevention of natural 
and technogenic disasters in the States of  the region and the 
elimination of their consequences, 
  




                                                 
269 Letter dated 14 November 2002 from the Permanent Representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the UN. 
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[the States] reaffirm the need for coordinated and concerted action 
in that area on the basis of the generally recognized principles and 
rules of international law. 
  
 
As in other documents, however, the use and validity of international law is reinforced 
by that of protection of borders and sovereignty, § 7:  
 
The Heads of State emphasized the importance of the speedy 
completion, on the basis of the rules and principles of international 
law, of the process of the legal establishment of the State border 
lines between their States as a basic element of the sovereignty and 
independence of States. 
  
 
Such principles are also recalled in the Dushanbe Declaration, annexed to the 
document itself. There, we find again support for the rules of diplomacy and 
coexistence in interstate relations: ‘taking into account the interests of all the countries 
of the region and in compliance with the principles of  good-neighbourliness and 
mutual respect’. Regional coherence is also reaffirmed: the signatories present 
themselves as ‘The Presidents of the States of Central Asia — the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the 
Republic of Uzbekistan’.  
In 2003, the Joint statement by the heads of State of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of 
Uzbekistan was submitted to the UNGA and the Secretariat (A/58/131–S/2003/703). 
Again, the usual pluralist norms of coexistence, limited and short-term cooperation 
and respect for sovereignty and international law are professed, while clearly 
identifying themselves as a region. As a matter of fact, the Heads of State addressed 
‘the questions of developing multilateral regional cooperation within the framework 
of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO), the situation in and around 
the region’, thus creating a divide between them, Central Asians, and the external 
realm. Indeed, one should never forget that the fact that these documents submitted to 
the UN were also an attempt to gain international recognition as a group.270  
Again, what we observe is a correspondence between the regional events we 
traced and analysed in Chapter 5 and what is supported and professed at the 
international level synchronically. In fact, it should be recalled that in the first years of 
                                                 
270 For a discussion of ‘recognition of regions’ at the international level, see Ong (2012). 
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the new millennium, Central Asian states still did have a regional impetus to 
cooperate, even if on more and sharper pluralist grounds, emphasising more and more 
the national interest over the common identity of the region. 
Yet, we saw that towards the end of the first decade of the new millennium the five 
Central Asian states lost any sense of regional grouping, being without a Central 
Asian regional organisation representing them. In parallel with the already noted entry 
of Russia in the region,271 pristine animosities especially on border issues, water and 
energy resources, old divides and mutual distrust among the leaders of the republics 
prevented them from presenting themselves on the world stage as ‘Central Asia’ as we 
saw above. Nonetheless, while the regional convergence decreased in centripetal 
form, normative convergence, especially around the pluralist normative bulk of the 
region, has remained present.  
Especially in the field of security and nuclear non-proliferation, the Central 
Asian states have been successful in using the UN as a rostrum from where they could 
prove to be able to successfully bargain matters related to their survival, even 
proposing themselves as an example for other regions to the world.  
The formal setting up for the CANWFZ, as it will be recalled, started already 
in 1997. In the Statement issued at Tashkent on 15 September 1997 by the Ministers 
for Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, then submitted to the UN (A/52/390), the states agreed to sign a treaty 
instituting the CANWFZ, following their common commitment to sovereignty 
equality, use of diplomacy and international law as means for peaceful coexistence 
and stressing those rules facilitating security maintenance and survival among nations.  
The process of setting up the CANWFZ lasted more than ten years (other 
significant documents have been 2005: A/59/733–S/2005/155; 2009: A/63/782; 2012: 
A/67/409). The UN hailed the normative convergence of the Central Asian states in 
the realm of non-proliferation and disarmament, declaring that the Treaty on a NWFZ 
in Central Asia, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the 
region, constituted an important step towards strengthening the nuclear non-
proliferation regime and ensuring regional and international peace and security 
(A/67/409).  
                                                 
271 After joining CACO in 2004, Russia merged CACO with EurAsEC (Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan) at the St. Petersburg Summit of 2005, de facto silencing the only Central Asian 
regional organisation then still alive. 
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In the press conference following the adoption of the CANWFZ Treaty, Nurbek 
Jeenbaev (Kyrgyzstan) stated that the five countries had reached their agreement out 
of a desire to promote regional and international peace and security; Aksoltan T. 
Ataeva (Turkmenistan) said that, while each of the five nations had its own identity, 
they also shared a common history, and Murad Askarov (Uzbekistan) added that the 
signing and quick entry into force of the Treaty was also a clear indication that all five 
countries were fully aware of their role in maintaining international security and 
contributing to a more stable world.272  
Thus, even at a time when Central Asian countries were not supported by (and, 
perhaps more importantly, decided to not support any more) regional projects 
specifically ‘Central Asian’, these states were able to find an agreement and to meet 
each other’s interests following the pluralist norms of coexistence exemplified by 
sovereignty protection, international law and diplomacy. This, again, is in line with 
what has been extensively discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
6.6 Speeches and norms 
 
 This section addresses the norms professed by each Central Asian state in the UNGA 
in the last two years via direct speech. As we have noted, there are no longer any 
Central Asian regional organisations and therefore each Central Asian state on the 
stage speaks only for itself and not on behalf of the regional group. However, the 
analysis shows that while the regional convergence lowered significantly, the 
normative convergence remains high. For the purpose of the chapter and indeed of the 
thesis, the difference is crucial. As anticipated, methodologically speaking I will rely 
on the twenty speeches made at the UNGA Plenary Meeting by the five Central Asian 
representatives from 2011 to 2014. I proceed in reversed order, and start from 2014. 
 
In the 69th General Debate in the UNGA, Kazakhstan was represented by its Foreign 
Minister Erlan Idrissov (2014). He stressed the role of international law in resolving 
disputes (‘we are confident that the Charter of the United Nations and the 
fundamental principles of international law provide the basis for [peace]’, the 
privilege accorded to disarmament and non-proliferation norms in the region (with 
                                                 
272 States News Service, 30 March 2009. 
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several references to the CANFWZ), the presence of environmentalism as an 
institution adopted by his country (‘sustainable development is central to 
Kazakhstan’s ambitions for the future’) and he also made reference to Central Asia as 
a region. Importantly, he also proposed the creation of a ‘regional hub’ in Almaty, 
complementary to UNRCCA, which would serve as diplomatic platform for Central 
Asian governments.  
Erlan Abdyldayev, Foreign Minister of Kyrgyzstan, emphasised similar norms 
and institutions (environmentalism in particular, with several references to the 
Millennium Development Goals). Plus, he made an interesting reference to what in 
Chapter 5 has been defined ‘multilateral bilateralism’, mentioning how standing 
issues between Central Asian countries are being resolved through a subsequent series 
of bilateral agreements among states (2014). 
Kokhir Rasulzoda, Prime Minister of Tajikistan, made references to 
environmental norms as well (2014), while Rashid Meredov, Foreign Minister of 
Turkmenistan, insisted on diplomacy (‘the peaceful resolution of these conflicts must 
be achieved by diplomatic approaches’), international law, disarmament and non-
proliferation (‘we believe that it will be useful to consider the establishment of a 
United Nations subregional disarmament centre in Central Asia’), references to 
Central Asia and to ‘mechanisms’ operating between regional countries to ensure 
stability (‘we propose that serious consideration be given to the idea of convening a 
forum on security and cooperation in Central Asia under the auspices of the United 
Nations as a starting platform for further work in this area’), and to GPM as 
understood by Central Asian states, i.e. operating not regionally but internationally 
(‘The Security Council is called on to assume a special responsibility’) (2014). 
Finally, Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov emphasised 
environmentalism, diplomacy, sovereignty and non-interference. References to 
Central Asia as a region were also made (2014).  
One year earlier, in 2013 (68th General Debate), the representative of 
Kazakhstan was Idrissov again. And again, he emphasised the same norms and 
institutions, stressing in particular international law (‘Kazakhstan is committed to the 
fundamental principles of international law’) and disarmament/non-proliferation, 
mentioning also the fact that Kazakhstan ‘welcomes the willingness of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council to hold a dialogue on the Additional 
Protocol with the five countries in the zone and to provide negative assurances as 
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soon as possible’ (2013). 
Kyrgyzstan was, again, represented by Erlan Abdyldayev. He once more 
stressed environmental, diplomatic and legal norms by making references to the 
authority of the UN in international affairs, and made references to Central Asia as a 
‘region’ as well (2013). 
This time, Tajikistan was represented by its Prime Minister Aqil Aqilov. Once 
more, environmental norms and the role of the UN in ensuring peace and stability 
globally were recognised (2013). 
Rashid Meredov represented Turkmenistan also in 2013. He made references 
to diplomacy and international law (‘at the heart of Turkmenistan’s policies is the will 
to resolve any situation by peaceful, political and diplomatic ways and means, which 
it considers to be the main legitimate resources available within the United Nations’), 
to sovereignty, to environmentalism (‘our country would like to launch an initiative 
aimed at the establishment of a specialized entity, a subregional centre on 
technologies relating to climate change in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea basin’) 
and to Central Asia as a region. In particular, Meredov mentioned the possibility of 
creating a permanent regional forum to contribute ‘to the elaboration of consensus-
based approaches to finding solutions to the most important issues relating to the 
present and future development of Central Asia and its neighbouring regions’. 
Moreover, ‘the forum could become the basis for the establishment of a consultative 
council of the Heads of State of Central Asia’ (2013). 
Finally, Uzbekistan emphasised the norms of sovereignty, diplomacy, 
international law and environmentalism through its Foreign Minister, Kamilov (2013). 
Dealing now with the 67th General Debate in the UNGA, 2012, the first 
speaker was Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov for Kazakhstan (2012). In his speech he 
emphasised Kazakhstan’s commitment to security, reform of the UN System in favour 
of reinforced sovereign equality (‘multipolarity...trust and political tolerance’), non-
proliferation (‘Kazakhstan fully supports the proposal by the UN Secretary-General to 
adopt a nuclear weapons convention’), international law and diplomacy (‘new 
principles [...] should be enshrined in [...] the entire international law system; we call 
upon the Governments to adhere to their international obligations to protect 
diplomatic representatives in their countries’), non-interference (‘we believe that it is 
fundamentally important to ensure strict adherence to the principle of non-interference 
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in international affairs of States’).  
Other norms and institutions mentioned were sovereignty (‘[t]he principles of 
sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs must be respected’) and 
environmentalism (‘Kazakhstan will actively promote the development of a project of 
sustainable development goals’).  
The second speaker was Asylbek Jeenbekov, Speaker of the Kyrgyz 
Parliament (2012). He made reference to respect and inviolability of international law 
(stressing ‘commitment to international legal obligations [in international relations]’), 
more equitable order, protocols of diplomacy (‘we also reject the use of force against 
diplomats of every country’), non-intervention (‘Kyrgyzstan is advocating an open 
international dialogue between the forces [in Syria]’), and GPM. Furthermore, there 
were references to reform of the UN to strengthen sovereign equality (‘reform of the 
UN is still a priority’), sovereignty (‘one can clearly see the sanctity of our 
fatherland’) and more equitable and democratic order (‘we propose to expand the 
membership of the UNSC to make it more representative, transparent and 
democratic’), as well as environmentalism (‘Kyrgyzstan made its choice of its future 
route towards long term sustainable green development and green economy’).  
For Tajikistan spoke its Foreign Minister, Hamrokhon Zarifi (2012). We read 
about the importance of the UN (‘it is impossible to address global and regional issues 
without strengthening the central role of the UN’), reform of its system (‘it is 
necessary to carry out a rational reform of the Organisation’), sovereignty, pluralism 
(‘Tajikistan is convinced that respect for cultural and religious diversity...is essential 
for global peace and understanding’), non-interference, international law (‘it is 
necessary to behave according to international treaties’), environmentalism (‘in 
Tajikistan special attention is given to effective, rational and protective use of natural 
resources that constitute the main dimension of the “green economy”’).  
In addition there were references to norms of good neighbourhood, diplomacy, 
pacta sunt servanda (‘we expect...parties in the region will abstain from hasty and not 
thoroughly thought out statements and actions that can run counter to the existing 
international agreements and spirit of friendship, cooperation and good 
neighbourhood’).  
The Turkmen representative, Rashid Meredov (2012), made reference to 
environmentalism (‘The UN Conference on Sustainable Development “Rio +20” held 
in June this year clearly identified the need to consolidate efforts on ecological issues 
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and environmental protection’) and international law (‘Turkmenistan seeks to act in 
accordance with international law and the resolutions of the UNGA’). 
Finally, the Uzbek speaker  Abdulaziz Kamilov (Kamilov 2012) followed on 
the same lines on non-intervention and sovereignty (‘the problems of Central Asia 
must be addressed by the countries of the region without interference of external 
powers’), international law (‘we are deeply convinced that al issues and energy 
problematic in our region […] must be considered in line with universally recognized 
norms of international law […] Uzbekistan calls on to be guided by these principles 
and norms’) and a pluralist vision of world order (‘Uzbekistan proceeds from 
addressing all outstanding political, economic and ecological problems of the region 
on the basis of mutual consideration of interests, constructive dialogue and norms of 
international law’).  
Finally, moving to 2011, we see that some of the protagonists have changed, 
but again the discourses of State representatives are not different from the other years 
considered. 
This time, the Kazakh speaker was the president himself, Nurusultan 
Nazarbayev (2011). Norms endorsed were non-proliferation (‘we have become one of 
the world’s first newly independent non-nuclear states’), environmentalism 
(‘Kazakhstan has called for the adoption of a Global Energy and Environment 
Strategy and has put forward an ambitious “Green Bridge” environmental initiative’), 
sovereignty, non-intervention and international law (‘the principle of the national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity is often exposed to erosion. […] Today, it is 
essential to upgrade the norms of international law concerning the national 
sovereignty of States’).  
For the Kyrgyz Republic, the speaker was Roza Otunbayeva, the interim 
president (2011). She professed the values of democracy, which she considered a 
Kyrgyz peculiarity in a region populated by authoritarian states, but also those norms 
such as international law, non-intervention (‘external intervention should remain a 
measure of the last resort and be used only and exclusively with the sanction of the 
UN Security Council’), diplomacy, environmentalism (‘Kyrgyzstan is concerned with 
the decline of the world community’s attention to the issues of global climate 
change’), non-proliferation as foundational norm of the region (‘Kyrgyzstan as one of 
the initiators of creating a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia and as the 
depositary of this treaty, which entered into force on 21 March 2009, considers 
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important the promptest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty and strengthening of the universality of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’), 
plus references to Central Asia as a region, sovereignty, pluralist world order passim.  
The speaker for Tajikistan was, again, Zarifi (2011). He supported the institutions of 
diplomacy, sovereignty, market economy (‘we believe that the system of international 
trade must remain open, fair, based on agreed upon rules, predictable and non- 
discriminatory. Guided by these principles, Tajikistan is currently holding negotiations 
on joining the World Trade Organization’), environmentalism (‘it is widely known 
that in the second half of the 20th century the Central Asian region faced a severe 
ecological crisis that is degradation of the Aral Sea. It was irrational, careless and 
irresponsible use of the natural resources that caused actual death of the Aral Sea’), 
references to Central Asia as a region, international law, GPM, reform of the UN for a 
more equitable order (‘It is impossible to address global issues and most urgent 
regional tasks without strengthening the UN system’). 
Another presidential figure present at the General Debate was Gurbanguly 
Berdymukhamedov for Turkmenistan (2011). In one of his rare appearances on the 
world stage, he endorsed the norms of diplomacy (‘Turkmenistan attaches paramount 
importance to the regulation of any situations by peaceful means and methods’), de-
institutionalisation of war (‘we absolutely reject military forces as an instrument of 
foreign policy and intergovernmental relations’), plus a declaration on priority 
introduction of political and diplomatic tools in solving international issues, 
references to Central Asia as a region (he advanced the proposal for an Advisory 
Council on peaceful development in Central Asia), reform of the economic order and 
environmentalism (‘The environmental sphere is the priority direction of international 
cooperation of Turkmenistan’). 
The last speaker was Elyor Ganiev, Foreign Minister at that time (2011). He 
made reference to sovereignty (‘in all 20 years passed since the time when the 
Republic of Uzbekistan became an independent state and joined the ranks of full-
fledged members of the United Nations’), reference to Central Asia as a region (‘the 
tragic events in Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 became a serious challenge to peace and 
stability in the Central Asian region’),273 diplomacy (‘there is no military solution to 
                                                 
273 The references to Central Asia as a region, even during its pluralist developments, show how 
despite the fact that Central Asia lost its ‘actorness’ (as a regional group) it still exists in the mind of 
statesmen as a ‘potential region’, as a field of closely interdependent relations. This was confirmed 
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the Afghan problem’), non-interference (‘it is our firm belief that the Afghan people 
must resolve their country's problems on their own’), environmentalism (‘the socio-
economic development not only of our country but the entire Central Asian region is 
influenced by the environmental disaster of the Aral Sea’), international law (‘any 
action on using the resources of transboundary rivers must take into account the 
interests of all states located in their basin and on the basis of international law’; ‘the 
position of our country not only fully goes in line with the international law and the 
rules in this area [water-management], but not least, comes out of them’), 
multilateralism, at least at the global level (‘Uzbekistan fully shares the importance of 
strengthening the multilateral mechanisms to ensure a stable and just world order’) .  
What does all this reveal? Bringing together the various declarations of 
Central Asian state representatives made from the UNGA rostrum, it is possible to 
have a preliminary map, although certainly partial and imperfect, of their normative 
orientation in world politics.  
They all seem to endorse all those norms and rules associated with a pluralist 
account of international society (sovereignty, non-interference, international law, 
diplomacy). In addition, speaking in ES terms, they all seem to advocate the 
institution of GPM, although sometimes this poses difficulties in matching it with the 
norm of non-intervention (as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan 
exemplify).274  
Furthermore, all Central Asian states adopt a multicultural, pluralist and 
democratic vision of global order, rejecting the supremacy of the more developed 
countries at the expenses of the poorer ones, both in terms of resources and 
representation in institutional forums. Last but not least, all Central Asian states seem 
to endorse the principle of multilateralism in solving global issue, although this can be 
also seen as a derivative of their vision of international society as a 
pluralist  environment. Unilateralism is explicitly rejected, and the role of the UN in 
ensuring multilateral arrangements in the security, economic and environmental fields 
is constantly stressed.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
to me in all the interviews with experts, analysts, academics and diplomats that I conducted during 
my fieldwork. 
274 We have noted already that in Central Asia there is a peculiar interpretation of GPM, which seems 
to be legitimate globally but not regionally.  
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Thus, even if Central Asian states no longer present themselves as a regional 
actor, they present a substantive degree of normative convergence, in some cases a 
real symmetry. And it is worth stressing again that there is correspondence between 
the international and the regional levels of analysis. The official speeches made in the 
period 2011-2014 reflect the strong pluralist environment identified and mapped in 
Chapter 5, with a strong emphasis on the Westphalian norms of sovereignty, 
international law and diplomacy. The question to ask now is: is this normative 
convergence empirically observable in the UNGA? 
  
6.7 Votes and Convergence 
 
 This third and last section seeks to discover whether the normative convergence 
analysed and contextualised above is reflected in the voting practice in the UNGA. 
Before presenting the data, however, I need to specify some conditions, not last the 
method I use. 
Firstly, I make clear that I look at those resolutions that 1) require a vote275 and 
2) do not concern the organisational structure of the UN, but actually concern issues 
of world politics such as questions about sovereignty, nuclear weapons, economic 
order, environmental issues, peaceful settlements of conflicts, human rights and so 
forth. 
Secondly, I consider each vote in the GA as a support/rejection for the norm 
and /or institution embodied in the resolution under debate. Although this move has 
been endorsed in the literature (Keohane 1967, Peterson 1986, more recently Puchala 
2005, Boockmann and Dreher 2011, Voeten 2012),276 it may still require explanation. 
There is reason to believe that a vote can be linked to a normative stance especially 
given that 1) states are aware of the one-head-one-vote rule, and therefore are not tied 
to regional or global hegemons, and 2) most of the votes have a non-binding nature. 
Given that resolutions are not binding, therefore, states are more inclined to vote for 
what they deem to be right rather than for what they think may be useful.  
                                                 
275 Following Ferdinand (2014: 3), I do not consider resolutions adopted by consensus. This, however, 
is a very (methodologically speaking) sensitive issue in scholarship on UNGA voting. For a 
comprehensive analysis of the problem of ‘consensus voting’ in the UNGA, see Häge and Hug 
(2013). 
276 Referring to votes on Human Rights, Boockmann and Dreher refer to the ‘expressive nature’ of 
voting in the UNGA as opposed to an ‘instrumental’ one (2011: 462). 
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We should also clarify the method adopted. As anticipated, I use the UNGA Voting 
Dataset, which contains also the Affinity of Nations scores (Strezhnev and Voeten 
2013). To calculate the degree of convergence among Central Asian countries in the 
UNGA, I have used the variable ‘agree3un’ (Voting similarity index) using the 
interval (0-1) – computed using three categories of vote data (1 = ‘yes’; 2 = abstain, 3 
= ‘no’).277 Abstention, therefore, is counted as half-agreement with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
vote. I considered the ‘agree3un’ variable since 1992 (first date available) and 
computed it for each dyad of Central Asian countries (10 dyads) and then calculated 
the mathematical average value for each dyad over the years. Detailed voting 
convergence data are in the appendix (see Appendix 5). However, in what follows I 
focus on the most striking similarities between the Central Asian countries. 
Two possible objections may be made to this analysis. Firstly, one may argue 
that the normative convergence among Central Asian states is meaningless because 
they may share a high degree of convergence with other countries as well (on this 
point see, e.g., Stavridis and Pruett 1996: 4). Clearly Central Asian states share many 
concerns of their post-colonial peers in world politics (Ayoob 1995), and this is 
demonstrated, for example, by the fact that these states are sympathetic with the 
demands and normative stances of the Non-Aligned Movement (of which 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are members and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan are observers). But this misses the point made at the beginning of the 
chapter, when it was stressed that given the present-day literature on the centrifugal 
character of the Central Asian region it was necessary to focus on the region itself to 
have more room for problematisation.  
We should not forget that the focus of this chapter, and indeed this thesis, is 
specifically on the five Central Asian republics and on their convergence at their 
regional and international level. The fact that Central Asian states share a high degree 
of normative convergence with other states does not go against the fact that Central 
Asian states share a high degree of normative convergence among themselves, and 
this is particularly important since, as noted, they are usually considered in the 
literature as incapable of agreeing on most issues.  
Secondly, there is the question of Great Powers. They may influence Central 
Asian states’ votes. To what extent do Central Asian states show normative 
                                                 
277 I follow Boockmann and Dreher (2011) in maintaining ‘abstention’ and ‘vote against’ as separated. 
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convergence with Russia and China, for example? On the utility of this question, the 
previous answer may still work. However, it is interesting to see that, while the data 
for China have not be computed yet, dyads with Russia show a statistically lower 
degree of agreement for all the five republics. Clearly we are in the realm of 
agreement and convergence, but figures are lower than among Central Asian states 
sometimes with significant (low) peaks (see Appendix 5). Task for future research, 
however, would be for example to understand and show on what issues the Central 
Asian republics and the former patron disagree the most (sovereignty and territorial 
integrity seem to be good candidates, as well as nuclear matters).278 
For the 1992-2012 period, all dyads of Central Asian states show a high degree 
of convergence, with the highest value of 0.953 of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan and 
the lower one of 0.895 of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. It is interesting to see how 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, commonly considered reciprocal foes in the 
region, have nonetheless quite a strong record of convergence (0.914 and 0.916 
respectively), with indeed a rising trend over the last five years.  
With respect to Russia, there is convergence as well, but less than among 
Central Asian states themselves (see Appendix 5). All values are below 0.88 on 
average, with significant low ebbs over the years (0.66 with Turkmenistan in 1996, a 
0.70 with Kyrgyzstan in 1994 and a 0.68 with Uzbekistan in 1997). Perhaps not 
surprisingly, given their high dependence on military supply, security provision and 
economic investment, the two countries that enjoy the highest affinity with Russia are 
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan (0.86 and 0.87 respectively).  
Going back to common voting behaviour among Central Asian states, recent 
examples of unanimity are to be found on equitable development (A/67/455 on 
Durban); sovereignty and auto-determination (A/67/456; A/61/442 on Palestine; 
A/67/444), matters concerning globalisation and cultural diversity (A/67/457/Add.2; 
A/66/462/Add.2); unilateral coercive measures in case of infringement of human 
rights (A/67/457/Add.2); right to development (A/67/457/Add.2; A/61/443/Add.2); 
equitable international order (A/67/457/Add.2; A/61/443/Add.2; A/66/462/Add.2); 
security and nuclear matters (A/67/406; A/67/409) thus in line with the analysis 
conducted on the other two group of sources. A thorough analysis of the precise issues 
on which there is unanimity, however, has yet to be done. 
                                                 
278 For example, on issues concerning recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, all five Central Asian 
states voted exactly the opposite of Russia. 
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6.7 Findings and Conclusions 
  
In this short chapter, I have tried to set out four hypotheses. Here, I discuss their 
validity. An accurate, scrutinised analysis of speeches, documents and voting 
convergence in the UNGA has revealed that, consistently with what has been shown 
in the rest of the thesis, also at the international level the five Central Asian republics 
endorse the same norms and agree on a number of them.  
Referring often to environmental problems, security-related issues, possible 
ethnic clashes and fearing domination from the Great Powers, they support strong 
pluralist norms and values of international relations: territorial integrity, Westphalian 
conceptions of sovereignty (that is, emphasis on non-interference and constitutional 
insularity), reliance on international law and diplomacy as the sole modes of conflict 
resolution, an equitable global economic order, plus a common solidarist concern on 
the environment.  
The very interesting, preliminary finding of this chapter is that while at the 
regional level the five republics may struggle to find a meeting of minds, at the 
international level they speak the same language, and abide by the same institutions. 
With the appropriate caveats, and bearing in mind the weakness of the society present 
in the region noted in the previous chapters, this seems to be in line with what other 
senior scholars have said of the region, namely the presence of a Central Asian ‘club’ 
(Cummings 2002: 11) or of a ‘Central Asian standard’ (Cooley 2012: 151).  
Thus, the first two hypotheses seem to be correct. A task for future research 
will be that of bringing to the surface the reasons for this regional-global divide of the 
Central Asian Weltanschauung, as well as possibly enhancing the arguments made in 
this chapter with additional fieldwork data and even more interviews with UN Central 
Asian bureaucrats.  
In addition, as noted several times in the course of the thesis, the UN has been 
called upon by Central Asian countries several times to back and arrange regional 
cooperative arrangements, as  was the case of the IFAS and the CANWFZ. The 
common appeal to the UN has been made possible by a normative convergence on the 
realist values of security, stability and survival, and their common interest in 
preserving their sovereignty, statehood and territorial integrity has stimulated 




However, the findings do not suggest in any way that there is something specific to 
the way that Central Asian states conduct their international relations at the 
international level. Thus, the fourth hypothesis seems to be the weakest one. Given 
the analysis presented above, at the international level there is hardly something that 
can lead us to think that there is a distinct, identifiable Central Asian identity, meant 
as a set of political, normative and cultural features that distinguish this region from 
others. Rather, the chapter has shown how Central Asian states have adopted and 
endorsed the most common pluralist norms of international society, thus favouring a 
world order based on the values on peaceful coexistence and limited co-operation.  
It should be noted that the emphasis of the chapter was on cooperation among 
Central Asian states at the international level, and therefore on their normative 
convergence, not on their normative distinctiveness as a group. This has been already 
done in the previous chapters, where the peculiar understandings and adoptions of 
global norms and institutions in relations with each other has been discussed and 
brought to the surface.  
Analytically speaking, the importance of this chapter is exactly that of 
showing that we may have different understanding of global norms depending on the 
level of analysis. The very same norms, rules and institutions that inform the global 
texture of international politics may well be reconsidered and re-interpreted in a given 
regional environment without necessarily being disputed when states from that given 
regional environment have to act on the global scene. And here we go back to what 
was stated in the introduction, that is, that the ES has yet to fully engage with norm 
localisation(s) and diatopical (literally ‘across places’) interpretation of institutions: 
what is valid here may not be valid there.  
In the end, it may well be that while at the international level we have 
idealtypical normative constructs (‘sovereignty’, ‘international law’, ‘market 
economy’ and so forth) in regional spaces we have the factual, concrete transposition 
of such idealtypes in particular practices. It is a matter of polysemy of institutions, 
that is to say, the different meaning/practice that they assume in different contexts.279 
Chapter 5, for instance, has discussed how sovereignty, GPM and international law 
are used and understood in the Central Asian context, but in this chapter very general 
references to them have been made, thus suggesting that there is an interpretative 
                                                 
279 On the polysemy of institutions and the ES, see Costa Buranelli (2014b).  
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discrepancy between regional and global contexts. 
In Chapter 3, it was noted that one of the purposes of this thesis was exactly 
that of investigating the binomial relationship between the global and the regional, 
that is, how norms and institutions are played out within a regional context in 
comparison with a global one. 
 






                                                  Regional international society 
 
While Chapters 4 and 5 have addressed the two rounded arrows around ‘regional 
international society’, providing an idiographic account of the regional context, this 
chapter has addressed the linkage(s) between the rounded arrows and the straight, 
vertical one. That is, the relation between the institutional regional context and the 
global one. And the findings have suggested that Central Asian states, while adopting 
specific interpretations of global norms and rules regionally, do not replicate them at 
the global level. 
In sum, if any, the differences from the global level are in how institutions are 
reframed and localised internally, in the region, as noted in the previous chapters, but 
not in how the rules of the game are played internationally. It may have been the case 
during the 1990s, when environmental problems inherited from the USSR, the ethnic 
split among the republics, their new entry in the market economy and their ‘autocratic 
solidarity’ to counter instability and regional conflagration were voiced at every 
international occasion as special features of the region. Common references to 
‘Central Asia’ in the UN documents discussed above prove this.  
After 2001, however, the trend is that of a region which is still perhaps existent 
in terms of a weak RSC (Buzan and Waever 2003), but not as a coherent group of 
states that are linked, internationally, by strong normative or political peculiarities, 






convergence on numerous issues, but this convergence is no longer framed in a 
‘regional narrative’. This finding is quite an important one, since it departs from the 
conclusions drawn by Ferdinand on the ASEAN case, claiming that ‘[vote similarity 
in the UNGA] suggest[s] a coherent regional identity on the global stage’ (2014: 14).  
Disproving the hypothesis made in the introduction, the analysis above has 
shown how among Central Asian states there is strong convergence on several 
pluralist norms of international society, but this convergence is no longer imbued with 
‘regionness’. Notably, this finding comes from the multi-method adopted: having 
looked not only at the quantity of the normative convergence, but also at its quality, I 
was able to describe how the normative convergence was played out by the actors, 
whether alone or in group. And, once again, it is worth stressing that the analysis here 
confirms what has been discussed in the previous chapters, that is, a socio-structural 
re-configuration of the regional space from a dead-letter solidarism to a strong 
pluralism based on coexistence.  
Where from here? Once again, this chapter did not intend to describe Central 
Asian states as highly cooperative. This, in fact, has not been the purpose of the thesis 
either. Converging voting patterns ‘do not necessarily mean comprehensively close 
foreign relations, still less coordinated political action’ (Ferdinand 2014: 16; see also 
Russett 1967: 60, Bailey et al. 2013: 30-31).  
Rather, this chapter has made a case for considering voting behaviour and 
behaviour in general in the UNGA as an indicator of the pluralist, defensive normative 
position of the Central Asian states, thus shedding light on their sociability as actors in 
global international society and value-laden position in it. An ES reading of their 
position in the UNGA has revealed that these states agree on common norms and rules 
typical of a pluralist international society, and that despite their disagreement and 
competition in the region they endorse similar positions at the international level. 
Even if in relative conflict with each other, Central Asian states have managed to live 
together for the last twenty-two years advocating, adopting and implementing those 
international norms and rules that guarantee survival, peaceful coexistence and 
common life. It is not by chance that several diplomats and analysts I met during my 
fieldwork referred, among other factors, to ‘informal mechanisms to prevent major 
conflicts’, ‘bona fide rules’ and ‘normative thresholds’ to explain why in Central Asia 




The main aim of this chapter was indeed to focus on the international cooperation, or 
rather, dialogue, between Central Asian states, for convergence in international 
organisations 
 
is a reality and it is a constant and under-considered element in 
foreign policy-making. It establishes parameters for cooperation 
inside as well as outside the region. It can counterbalance nationalist 
excesses. It shows that there is more common ground on broad 
foreign policy between the states in [Central Asia], and therefore the 
basis for closer potential cooperation, than accounts of the territorial 
disputes usually allow (Ferdinand 2014: 16). 
 
Central Asian states’ pluralist normative stance, as explained and illustrated by the 
findings, is the product of the recent birth of these states, of their precarious position 
in a challenging regional environment and of their historical, economic and political 
legacies. Confirming the findings of Chapter 5, if cooperation among Central Asian 
states is achievable, then it is likely to be effective only if based on the pluralist norms 
and institutions discussed in this chapter, and it will be, at least in its initial 
manifestations, short-termed, pragmatic and on specific issues. The value of the ES 
approach has been exactly that of shedding light on this via media between pure 
competition and pure cooperation, which have been the most common lenses of 
analysis to study international relations in Central Asia. 
In a world that is speaking in increasingly different languages, especially when 
it comes to principles, norms and rules, to map and understand what states think is 
appropriate in international  relations may be a useful point of departure to preserve 
order and predictability in an increasingly fragmented international society. And even 
if they are not as fashionable as Great Powers, Central Asian states are no exception. 
And having now addressed both the regional and the global aspects of the Central 
Asian international society, as well as their interaction, we may proceed to the 











Theoretical implications of the study and conclusions 
 
 
A piece of research should be assessed on the basis of its contribution to the wider 
literature, its theoretical premises and of its stated aims, and not on the basis of the 
readers’ hopes. Therefore, before discussing the merits of this research, one must keep 
in mind what this research was not about. 
First of all, it was not a study based on cause-effect relationships. It has not 
sought to discover causal patterns for events in Central Asia, nor has it been interested 
in foresight and positivism-nuanced prediction. It has not been a normative study 
either: moral judgments, contestations of the state of affairs in Central Asia and 
suggestions for change have not been offered. It has been, consistently, with the 
premises, an interpretive, thick description of the social mechanisms that have kept 
relations between Central Asian states at a manageable level. In this respect, in a full 
ES spirit, this thesis has provided more of a theory of norms than a normative theory.  
Furthermore, its aim was not to discover patterns of regionalism, of economic, 
legal and value-based convergence, nor to claim for a regional solidarity that, as it has 
been stressed several times, is not clearly visible after more than twenty years of 
independence. As it has been said, an international society is something different both 
ontologically and normatively. Rather, the aim was to shed light, to bring to the 
surface and to discuss the rule-based and institutional practices that have managed to 
channel, order and sustain relations between Central Asian states from independence 
until now, as well as their evolution, their utility and their perception by statesmen and 
experts in the region.  
We started this journey through the socio-structural characteristics of the 
Central Asian region willing to discover whether an international society is present 
among the Central Asian republics. We reviewed the literature to build a springboard 
from which the analysis could start. The springboard was mainly a negative one: not 
only is competition the main driver in the region, but an absence of dialogue is indeed 
the main marker of the social structure of the region (in IR terms). Dis-integration is 
the leading trend, disagreement and realist logics are in play and there is no space for 
rules, norms and institutions. The analysis conducted above, that spanned three 
chapters, has sought to verify whether these statements represent the ‘last word’, the 
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truth on Central Asian intra-regional politics.  
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 have shown, to the extent that the sources allowed and the 
research material displayed, that since the demise of the Soviet Union and their birth 
as sovereign states in the international system, the Central Asian states have always 
adopted rules and norms of coexistence and co-operation to address regional crises 
and events.  
It has been also stressed many times that, despite their increasing individuality 
and autonomy in terms of economic development and foreign policy action, standards 
of conduct and norms-guided actions have always been present in the management of 
relations between each other. Perhaps these norms and institutions that have been 
identified are not fully developed, fully entrenched and not inherently linked to a 
developmental, regional political construct, but they have so far worked successfully 
in preserving inter-state peace and communication among the actors.  
In addition, Chapter 6 has also shown how the endorsement of norms, rules 
and institutions is not just to be found at the regional level but also on the 
international scene.  
Perhaps more importantly, the thesis has not analysed the socio-structural 
conformation of the region in a temporal vacuum, but has taken into consideration the 
temporal dimension, not just to consider the presence of an international society in the 
region, but also its development. Through the analysis of primary sources, interviews, 
and governmental documents, and by constantly keeping an eye on the evolution of 
the international context, the thesis has shown how in Central Asia there has been a 
shift from a dead-letter solidarism to a far more marked pluralism: minimal, basic but 
nonetheless existent and effective.  
In these conclusions, I will address the following three and last research 
questions: what is the core of the Central Asian order, if any? How can this research 
help understand the region better? What is the place of Russia in the region? After 
answering these questions, I illustrate how the dialogue between the ES and Central 
Asia has been fruitful, indicate some directions for further research and bring this 
thesis to an end. 
 
7.1 Is there a core Central Asian order? 
 
 
To discuss the core of the Central Asian order means to assume that there is a Central 
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Asian order. And that was one of the purposes of the thesis. That is, to verify whether 
international relations in the region are guided by some principles, procedures and 
minimal rules rather than by accident, mere power-politics and unpredictable actions 
in a way distinguishable from adjacent international societies and that at the global 
level.  
Yet, we still need to make one step ahead. As a matter of fact, as it is 
nowadays, the Central Asian international society is a sub-element of two larger (and 
in part overlapping) regional international organisations (and therefore, it may be 
argued, societies): the CIS (and its military offshoot, the CSTO) and the SCO on the 
correspondence between regional international organisations and regional 
international societies, see Buzan 2004; on the CIS as a regional international society, 
see Pourchot and Stivachtis 2014; on the SCO as a regional international society, see 
(Aris 2010).  
From an analytical perspective, therefore, this may pose two problems. The 
first problem is: if, following Buzan, a regional international society is manifest in 
regional international organisation, then how can we claim that there is a Central 
Asian international society if there are no purely Central Asian international 
organisations? The second problem is: if states forming a region are member of more 
than one regional organisation, with overlapping norms and rules, then what are we to 
make of regional international societies?280 
As far as the first problem is concerned, it may be recalled that an answer was 
suggested in Chapter 2. That is, I do not believe that a regional international society 
must necessarily be reflected in the existence of a regional international organisation 
(adopting the ES jargon, we may say that there is no necessary correspondence 
between primary institutions and secondary institutions). I concurred with Diez and 
Whitman (2002) that a regional international society can indeed exist on its own 
without necessarily being represented by an international organisation.  
Here, it is argued that what defines regional international societies is the 
presence of norms, rules and institutions that bind all members of the sub-systemic 
group and that differ from those at the global level in terms of interpretation, quantity 
or quality. Historical international societies prove this point. During the expansion of 
the European international society in the XIX century, several regional, localised 
                                                 
280 I am very much grateful to Dr Yannis Stivachtis for the scholarly discussions he has held with me 
on this point in the final stages of the research. 
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international orders came close to each other, and clashed. But these several 
arrangements were not mirrored by corresponding regimes. Should we then dismiss 
their existence only because of the absence of more formalised political supranational 
arrangements? 
With respect to the second problem, things get analytically more difficult. The 
international society in Central Asia, the CIS and the SCO all have a strong pluralist 
architecture, emphasising sovereignty, international law, non-interference, territorial 
integrity and diplomatic resolution of controversies. In terms of membership, the 
Central Asian states are members of both of them. Turkmenistan, as usual, is the 
exception in both: associate member in the CIS, guest observer in the SCO. So, is 
there any meaningful indicator that the Central Asian order is something identifiable 
and autonomous with respect to the two aforementioned international organisations?  
After the examination of the intra-regional international relations in Central 
Asia, and after discussing the norms, rules and institutions underpinning them, the 
verdict of this research is the following: there is an international society in Central 
Asia, but it is perhaps too early to claim for the existence of a Central Asian 
international society. The analysis of regional events, the historical narrative adopted, 
the interpretive examination used to understand the presence of normative structures 
in the region from the words of practitioners have revealed that yes, Central Asia is a 
social environment (in IR theory terms), where states manage and channel their 
intercourses in normatively imbued tracks, even if sometimes these tracks seem weak 
and feeble. 
Even if national interest is still paramount, these institutions, these norms, 
according to the findings, do play a role in preventing escalations, relations from 
worsening and the so much feared (for years, but not borne out by events) ‘descent 
into chaos’ (Rashid 2008). More important, from a methodological and 
epistemological viewpoint, is that this research, by directly engaging foreign policy 
makers, diplomats, analysts, strategists, scholars and experts, shows that there is an 
awareness of the operation of these norms and institutions, which the literature has so 
far neglected.  
Yet, institutional differentiation from the wider macro-regional level and, more 
importantly, from adjacent regions and from the global level is still too weak to claim 
for the existence of a strong, discernible and identifiable Central Asian order. Partly 
because of the open character of the region, comfortable with allowing the penetration 
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of great power politics, partly because of the states’ need to escape their landlocked 
position for trade, and partly because of their recent birth, the international society 
there is still weak, in flux, in formation, as indeed argued by practitioners there.281 
This point was already made in Chapter 5 when speaking of the ‘informality’ of 
institutions in Central Asia. 
While some institutional differentiation has been pointed out (strong 
Westphalian sovereignty, state-reinforcing nationalism, informal understanding of 
most of international law, prevalence of personal diplomacy, omni-balancing, 
management of great powers instead of great power management), membership 
criteria, a clear inside/outside dynamic with respect to regional/non-regional states 
and a core institution that distinguishes the region from the wider environment are 
still lacking. This is exemplified, as noted, by the spaghetti-bowl regional 
institutionalisation in the region, with the CIS, the SCO, the CICA, the OIC, the 
OSCE, all institutions with different mandates and comprising most of the Central 
Asian states, overlapping.  
However, this should not be a cause of despair, and for three reasons. First, 
there is still a clear sense of a ‘Central Asia’ among these states, despite rising 
competing discourses, and researchers both from area studies and IR theory should 
continue to make sense of these discourses and of how they structure and form 
regional spaces and regional interactions.  
Second, another reason why this lack of differentiation should not be a source 
of despair is the fact that the comparative branch of the ES regional agenda is still in 
its infancy. We need to know much more about the CIS in general, South Asia, East 
Asia the Middle East and how Iran and Afghanistan fit into these structures to know 
with more certainty whether a Central Asian order can be distinguished from its 
neighbours or not. Clearly, this research is the first step in this direction, since works 
from an international society perspective on the region have been missing so far.  
Nonetheless, a preliminary comparison with other regional contexts may seem 
appropriate to better specify the place of Central Asia in international society. 
Keeping in mind that this form of socio-institutional comparison in ES scholarship is 
still in its infancy, we may tentatively draw the following parallels: 
                                                 





 Middle East: despite having being described as an international society in its 
own respect (Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez 2009, Gol 2015) scholars such as 
Katarina Dalacoura (2010) and Hoffmann (2015) have pointed to the 
weaknesses of such a conceptualisation of the region, in particular pointing at 
how endemic war, penetration of great power, the porosity of borders and the 
big rift dividing Sunni and Shiia populations have in fact prevented the 
emergence of a regional international society. Therefore, in this region, the 
very existence of a regional international society is put into question despite 
the presence of several secondary institutions such as the League of Arab 
States (LAS) or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). More tellingly, some 
Central Asian interviewees made reference to the Middle East as an arena of 
conflict and struggles for power, something that they denied to exist in their 
region (Murden 2009). 
 Central Africa: the Central Asian international society identified in this 
research, albeit as said being in flux and weak, is different from the social 
realm one may find in Central Africa. And, worth stressing again, this was 
recognised in the course of some interviews. In terms of borders, state 
capacity, respect of minimal rules of international law and respect for the 
authority/authoritarianism, the two regional contexts can be differentiated 
quite markedly, also thanks to the Soviet experience when it comes to state 
apparatuses. In the interviews, these differences were interestingly framed in a 
very much premodern reading of international society. 
 South Asia: here, differences between the two regional societies are both in 
terms of primary institutions and secondary ones. With respect to primary 
institutions, one may say that management of nuclear weapons features very 
prominently in South Asia (hosting two nuclear nations such as India and 
Pakistan), while Chapter 4 of this dissertation has traced the creation of a 
nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. The presence of nuclear weapons in 
the hands of the two hegemons of the regions has of course repercussions on 
how relations are managed in South Asia: mainly distrust, enmity and hostility. 
In addition, long-lasting territorial disputes, which in Central Asia have been 
successfully silenced at least at the inter-presidential level, have sometimes 
brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war and mutual denial. Having 
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reviewed international relations in Central Asia, one may conclude that despite 
the predominantly un-cooperative relations between states in the region, rules 
of coexistence and short-term cooperation are indeed more stable and 
interiorised than in this context. In terms of secondary institution, one may 
note that South Asian states are grouped in a specifically regional international 
organisation, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC), which is something not to be seen in the Central Asian context. Yet, 
again, this organisation has not been able to contain rivalry between the two 
powers, thus resulting in a dead-letter international society (akin to the CACO 
in the early 2000s). 
 North East Asia: with respect to Central Asia, North East Asia appears to be a 
more developed international society, especially thanks to stronger and more 
enhanced economic ties and market integration (Buzan and Zhang 2015). Yet, 
a disputed balance of power between the two poles of the region (China and 
Japan), the still unmanaged framework for the development of nuclear 
technologies in North Korea, the persistence of aggressive nationalism and 
hostile readings of history of the region adopted by the leaders themselves plus 
the weak role of international law when it comes, for example, to territorial 
and maritime disputes make us think of a more competitive environment than 
Central Asia, or certainly one where competition is more visible and overt 
when it comes to serious political issues. However, when it comes to business, 
North East Asia is capable of fostering economic cooperation and integration 
in a way still unknown to Central Asia. 
 The (South) Caucasus: here, perhaps, is where differences are starkest. The 
Caucasus featured prominently in several interviews as ‘the other’, as 
something not to become similar to. Here, the over-institutionalisation of 
sovereignty, territoriality, borders, and nationalism, paired with the dispute 
over Nagorno-Karabakh have led to a situation in which the society of states 
resembles most visibly a Hobbesian scenario, where total enmity, mutual 
denial and absence of diplomatic channels are the norm. ‘Yes, we are 
competitive, but we respect each other, look at the Caucasus’ was a very 
widespread narrative in my interviews with Central Asians. The Caucasus has 
in fact been quoted in several interviews as ‘what Central Asia is not’, i.e. as a 
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place where diplomacy, informal cooperation and minimal coordinative 
understandings are simply, for now, not possible. 
In sum, in Central Asia there is a raison de systeme that in other contexts seems to be 
weaker, or framed differently. It is true that cooperation in Central Asia, as in fact has 
been reiterated several times in the course of the thesis, should not be 
overemphasised. Yet, when it comes to interstate relations and high politics, leaders in 
Central Asia seem to have been playing according to the rules of the game, if with 
difficulties and complications. There is a conscious, shared understanding that some 
thresholds and norms have to be followed and respected if the system is to be 
maintained.  
It is worth stressing once more that it is clear that cooperation and 
convergence should not be overstated. This thesis wants to assert the degree of 
socialisation between Central Asian states by starting from facts on the ground, not by 
imposing a framework to see desired results. What has been found in the course of the 
research is that despite the markedly realist character of the region, minimal 
cooperation, agreements, compromises and common understandings can be reached. 
Also, it is important to stress the fact that, contra most structural readings, actors’ 
words matter. An in the Central Asian context, as we have seen (see also Appendixes), 
the interviewees and the sources employed do make reference to socialisation of 
states.  
Another aspect to consider, already reiterated, is that this work will add to a 
literature which is only in its infancy. The comparative exercise which is being made 
here is, and can be, only superficial, due to the already noted infancy of the 
comparative dimension in the ES. Nonetheless, the short comparison presented above 
should serve to ‘relativise’ the Central Asian context, and to carve out a niche in 
which politics in this region can be analysed in its own merit.  
In addition, one should remember that, following the main theorisation of 
international societies (Buzan and Gonzalez Pelaez 2009) a regional international 
society is deemed to exist not just when shared norms and institutions are found 
between states (otherwise that would amount to characteristics of interstate relations 
in general), but when these norms and institutions are recognised by the actors, are 
deemed to be legitimate and are filled with a specific (regional) meaning. This is why, 
from a linguistic perspective, I found extremely interesting and relevant how several 
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of my interviewees, without even being acquainted with the ES and its terminology, 
used words and concepts mostly associated to it. In this respect, I invite the reader to 
consult Appendixes 3 and 4 at the end of the thesis.  
As the research has demonstrated, I believe it is not appropriate to characterise 
Central Asia as a full Hobbesian scenario, as rules of coexistence are not only 
recognised and considered legitimate, but may also have a different content or 
interpretation. There must be also the sense of ‘regional understanding’, of ‘regional 
awareness’, which of course may be more or less perceived by the actors involved. 
Certainly the society present in Central Asia is a coexistence-based one with traces of 
power political elements, but their presence should not obscure the fact that not only 
rules are in play, but are also recognised by the actors. 
Moreover and lastly, we should also keep in mind that a regional international 
society, to exist, must not necessarily be much different from other regional contexts 
in terms of competition and/or cooperation, but may be legitimately differ in its 
interpretation and practice of certain primary institutions. While this is not the place to 
reiterate such different interpretations, as they have constituted the bulk of significant 
parts of the whole research, I nonetheless once more argue that how international law, 
great power management and neo-sovietism affect and regulate social relations 
between Central Asian states is an indication that specific institutional facts mark off 
Central Asia from other regional groupings of states. 
Finally, the weak differentiation from the global level compels ES theorists to 
clearly define what the global level is. Is it the post-colonial order? Is it the post-
WWII order? Is it the post-Cold War order? What institutions can be said to be truly 
‘global’, given that even sovereignty is undergoing profound changes in its practice 
(Costa-Buranelli 2014b)? Competing cosmological and taxonomical views do not 
make the analytical distinction from global and sub-global international societies easy. 
Therefore, while the regional agenda of the ES should not lose its momentum, an eye 
should be kept on the terminological and conceptual opaqueness of the starting point 
of such agenda, i.e. the global level.  
One can even tentatively argue that paradoxically, multi-membership in 
international organisations, in particular in the SCO, the CSTO and the CIS, can be 
seen as a derivative of the Central Asian primary institution of omnibalancing, that is, 
the mandate to prevent a single and only great power to penetrate the regional space. 





7.2 The utility of the enterprise 
 
Having reached the final stage of the research, we should also ask whether the 
enterprise just carried out has an inherent utility. In the introduction we explained why 
this research was deemed to be necessary. But do the results obtained enhance our 
understanding of the region? In the light of the findings, I deem that it is fair to 
conclude that this research entrenches and ameliorate our understanding of the region 
in four main respects.  
First, it has shown that between Central Asian states there are thresholds, 
limits and directions of behaviour that, even if weakly established, provide guidance 
and order to their intercourse. Even if these norms of conduct are violated from time 
to time, this does not infringe their value, their existence and their presence. 
Therefore, the first merit of this study has been to make the existence of these 
discursive and normative structures visible and evident.  
Second, it has added to two bodies of literature at the same time: it has 
enriched the literature of area studies by providing a socio-normative reading of the 
region, the first work of its kind, and it has added to the literature of regional 
international societies by focusing on quite a neglected domain in the ES, that of the 
post-Soviet space (here, part of it).  
Third, by focusing on norms and institutions, this research provides a template 
for Western states and analysts to understand how relations between Central Asian 
states are likely to be in the near future, and to understand how to successfully engage 
them and on what bases.  
Fourth and lastly, the value of this research is in that it shows how 
international relations and the concepts informing them, such as sovereignty, 
international law and diplomacy, are not a monopoly of the West, but are indeed 
subject to interpretation, redefinition and re-contextualisation in different parts of the 
world (here, Central Asia). 
 
7.3 Mutual nourishment 
 
 
At the beginning of the thesis, it was said that one of the purposes of the research was 
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to establish a dialogue between the theory used and the geographical area 
investigated, between the ES and Central Asia. It was also hypothesised that the 
relation between the theory and the region was not univocal, but in fact biunivocal, in 
the following way: 
 
 
                  sheds light on 
                           
English School     Central Asia 
                                                            
           questions 
 
 
It was exactly one of the aims of this thesis to avoid an uncritical application of a 
theoretical lens to discover new facts. In fact, in the previous chapters, it has been 
shown how several peculiarities of Central Asian international politics act as a ‘stress-
test’ for some of the main tenets of the ES, and indeed from a variety of viewpoints: 
methodologically (how ‘society’ has to be discerned), analytically (what elements 
should we look at to infer the existence of a ‘society’) and ontologically (what a 
‘society’ actually is).  
I believe that the ES can contribute to our understanding of Central Asia in at 
least six ways that other theories may have difficulty in offering. At the same time, I 
also believe that Central Asia has six ways to enrich the intellectual and theoretical 




7.3.1 What does the ES tell about Central Asia? 
 
1. Intra-regional relations are more dense than expected 
 
Often considered as a non-existent region where dialogue between states is almost 
absent and where states look always outside for their relations (Gleason 2001; Libman 
and Vinokurov 2011; Olcott 2011; Cooley 2012; Cummings 2012; Zakhirova 2012), 
this thesis has revealed that in reality there is much more dialogue going on in Central 
Asia than is usually believed: witness the present author’s conversations and 
interviews with practitioners and diplomats. The fact that this dialogue is often about 





visible, and therefore the cognitive shortcut adopted in the majority of Central Asian 
studies is that of certifying the absence of it.  
Yet, it has been shown how bilateral visits, phone-calls, meetings, diplomatic 
notes, allusions in public speeches and indirect references are very often in play. As  
was explained in the previous chapters, especially in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5, these 
narratives have been provided not only by people making foreign policy and 
international relations in the region (often under conditions of anonymity), but also by 
people studying foreign policy and international relations in the region. In particular, 
the latter have been very helpful in pointing at growing connections between scholars 
and analysts in the region, as well as think-tank and institutional activities aimed at 
fostering dialogue on regional issues.  
In addition, contrary to one of my interviewees who stated that ‘we [Central 
Asians] do not have a common information space’282 necessary to enhance, if not 
regional identity, at least regional awareness, it may be said that platforms for 
regional news and for knowledge of regional issues are indeed being born. Virtual 
information spaces such as CA-News, Akipress, UZMetronom, Asia Plus and Avesta, 
to name a few, all have tabs called ‘Central Asia’ where news from all the five 
regional states are presented and discussed (in UZMetronom the specific regional 
section is tellingly called ‘brat ‘a’, Russian for ‘brothers’).  
Again, the important factor to consider is that these information platforms are 
endogenous to the region and not Western- or even Russian-funded/directed. While 
this was not a direct concern of this thesis, the existence of these ties at the academic 
and professional level, as well as these shared information spaces, may reinforce the 
notion of an ES Central Asian ‘world society’ (Bull 1977; Buzan 2004; Navari 2013; 
Kang 2014) in the region, but more on this will be said below.  
 
2. Cooperation and conflict are always present 
 
This has been perhaps the main finding of the thesis. While realist depictions of intra-
regional relations have focused only on their competitive character, the ES approach 
adopted in this research has brought to the surface several examples of restraint, 
common understandings, meetings of minds and compromises in the region.  
 
                                                 
282 Interview with Kazakh Professor 1 at KIMEP. 
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The two case-studies analysed in Chapter 5 (the Osh events and the Rogun issue), the 
behaviour in the UNGA as analysed in Chapter 6 plus the whole Chapter 4 have all 
shown that, even if conflict is a structural, underlying feature of the region, successful 
mechanisms for preventing major disruptions and the collapse of the whole regional 
system have been always present and supported by the continuous use of the three 
main institutions operating in the region: sovereignty, international law and 
diplomacy. 
 
3. Disintegration does not mean absence of dialogue, but rather dialogue is even 
more important 
 
And here is the second major finding of the thesis. Far from being a fragmented 
region, there is much more social interaction between states in Central Asia than one 
may think. Chapter 4 has shown how during the 1990s the ‘dead-letter solidarism’ 
favoured calls for summits, meetings, conferences, common projects that even if 
mainly ceremonial in character (Olcott 1994a) had the merit of taming the negative 
effects abrupt independence acquired in 1991. The definition of different national 
interests and the hyper-institutionalisation of sovereignty, which nonetheless was 
progressive and not immediate after 1991, functioned as stumbling blocks for deeper 
cooperation.  
But to state that these stumbling blocks have silenced dialogue in the region is, 
in the light of the findings, a simplistic overstatement. ‘Dis-integration’ must be 
contextualised and defined. If we are speaking of economic fluxes, bilateral and 
multilateral trade, foreign policy convergence (which is different from the normative 
convergence noted in Chapter 6), then the literature has already said a huge deal on 
this (Collins 2009; Pomfret 2009; Cummings 2012; Mogilevskii 2012; Laruelle and 
Peyrouse 2013).  
Yet, if we speak of disintegration as absence of relations, then this is both 
discursively and empirically not true. Simply, relations are aimed at ensuring 
coexistence and limited, ad hoc cooperation on given matters (transit of goods, water-
sharing, definition of borders, limited trade, diplomatic resolution of skirmishes, 
intercultural programs), and not at full-fledged integration. As one interviewee 
argued, ‘even if we are not a deeply integrated region, we are still close neighbours, 
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and we have to deal with each other’.283 Also, it is perhaps not by chance that in 
several inter-presidential meetings, as well as in the words of many of my 
interviewees, we can read the following expression: ‘a good neighbour is better than a 
distant relative’. 
One of the aims of the present thesis has been actually to show that the 
presence and the use of international (primary, in ES terms) institutions is what has 
made possible for these states to dialogue, coexist and live together. It is exactly what, 
aside from proximity and common historical ties and legacies, has made it possible 
for them ‘to deal with each other’.  
Also, as stated above, we cannot speak of absence of dialogue because of its 
very informal nature in the region.  
As I have had the possibility to discover through interviewing senior 
diplomats, analysts and regional experts during my fieldwork, dialogue is indeed 
incessant and constant in the region - between governmental agencies, between 
experts, between think-tanks, between institutions. It is simply that, due to the 
sensitivity of the problems dealt with, the dialogue is often behind closed doors. And 
therefore, from a Western perspective, it may seem that these states prefer 
unilateralism in foreign policy. 
Furthermore, a senior Uzbek diplomat has agreed on this view stating that it is 
exactly because there is dialogue, even if hidden, that the region can sustain itself. He 
has further added that bilateral meetings between the presidents, also those very 
informal or at the margins of wider CIS, OSCE, SCO meetings, are indeed crucial to 
discuss several issues of mutual importance.284  
This statement runs against current work done on the region analysing the 
degree of ‘regionness’ by counting state visits over time (Zakhirova 2012). In an 
attempt to ‘positivise’ and make visible a ‘Central Asia’ which is presumably ‘out 
there’ and ‘identifiable’, she counts the number of high-level states visits between the 
Central Asian republics, but dismisses wider meetings (such as those mentioned 
above), as she bases her analysis on bilateral meetings only (2012: 31).  
 
                                                 
283 Interview with Kazakh Professor 1 at KIMEP; a narrative found also in an interview with an 
international lawyer in Kazakhstan; interview with Irina Chernykh; interviews with Uzbek sources 
1 and 2. 
284 Interview with official Uzbek source. 
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Zakhirova adds that ‘[v]isits solely for the purpose of attending a multilateral meeting 
are dropped from the dataset, unless there was a clear indication that bilateral relations 
took place on the sidelines’ (2012: 31). Yet, she does not explain how this ‘clear 
indication’ is to be found, and neglects the role of informal, loose dialogue that occurs 
between Central Asian presidents/representatives even when meetings are not 
scheduled, as confirmed to me by several diplomats form the region. Zakhirova 
herself seems aware of the problem when shortly after presenting her methodology 
she states that ‘[u]sing dyads may potentially blur the distinction between local 
interactions and the more comprehensive interactions among the [Central Asian] 
states’ (2012: 31).  
Therefore, exactly because, and not despite, Central Asian states are taking 
different positions in world politics, dialogue, respect of certain norms of coexistence 
and adherence to some of the institutions of international society are of paramount 
importance in the region: to live close to each other, to preserve order and 
manageability of the regional system and to give predictability to their intercourses. 
 
4. Turkmenistan is part of the region 
 
An ES reading of the region, with its focus on norms and institutions, has shown that 
Turkmenistan has indeed followed the principles of its declared neutrality adopted in 
1995 under Niyazov, but that this was slightly different from pure isolation. 
Turkmenistan has often literally ‘embodied’ the institution of diplomacy in Central 
Asia. Indeed, major talks to put an end to the Tajik civil war, several meetings on the 
status of the Aral Sea, multilateral meetings to face challenges and even resolutions of 
bitter disagreements among leaders took place in Ashgabat.285  
In addition, we noted in Chapter 5 how regional states as well as the UN itself 
deemed appropriate to choose Ashgabat as the site of the UNRCCA. While 
Turkmenistan continues to be less active than its neighbours in terms of joining 
multilateral platforms, under the presidency of Berdymukhamedov Turkmenistan has 
adopted several institutions of international society more consistently. For example, 
diplomatic activity in the region is on the rise. Ashgabat has recently opened its 
                                                 
285 For example, on 8 April 1999, Ashgabat was chosen as site for a CAEC meeting also because of 
tensions between Rahmon and Karimov. Niyazov proposed himself as mediator, and the rather 
informal nature of the meeting helped diffuse tensions. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 9 April, 1999, 
‘Ashgabat zhdet gostej’, archival material from the Bayalina Library, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. 
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embassy in Kyrgyzstan, and Berdymukhamedov has met Atambayev for the first time 
in November 2014. Several official meetings have taken place since then. Bishkek has 
also opened a new, bigger embassy in Ashgabat, thus signalling the will to enhance 
bilateral ties. There is now a concerted position with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on 
water-issues.  
In addition, Ashgabat has been consistently calling its Central Asian 
neighbours ‘fraternal states’ and strategic partners, and considers them as the priority 
of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy.286 Other institutions adopted are international law 
(as illustrated in Chapter 6 with respect, again, to water-issues), environmentalism, 
slow and cautious adoption of market economy principles. 
Turkmenistan has also intensified political consultations with Kyrgyzstan 
(Turkmen MFA 2014), Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In particular, with 
respect to the latter, the meetings have acquired the character of a ‘regular summit’ in 
Central Asia, in the words of the Press Service of the Uzbek Presidency (UZA 2014). 
 
5. A region  does (still) exist 
 
This is another major finding of the thesis, and it goes to the core of the thorny 
question, present both in Area Studies and in International Relations more widely, 
presented in Chapter 3: does a Central Asia exist? As discussed, a realist framework 
of analysis, focusing mainly on rivalry and competition, has consistently argued that 
Central Asia is not a region. In the same way, due to the lack of integrated markets, 
international organizations and sustained, thick movements of people and capitals, 
Central Asia is not a region in a liberal sense either.  
Yet, this thesis goes beyond these ‘bumper-stickers’ applied from outside, and 
has tried to see how ‘Central Asia’ is seen from within the region, inductively. The 
findings (to be observed in the narratives of the interviewees, as well as in official 
documents) show that Central Asia still exists as a powerful explanatory geographical, 
cultural and political shortcut held by Central Asians themselves to identify the five 
states forming the region (see Appendix 2).  
Several elements can substantiate this argument. To begin with, all regional 
states, in their official doctrines and documents, identify ‘Central Asia’ as a matter of 
                                                 
286 This happened on 12 December 2012, when Berdymukhamedov approved the concept of 
Turkmenistan's foreign policy for 2013 – 2017 (RIA Novosti 2012). 
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priority, if not the priority, of their foreign policy.287 This, arguably, would not occur 
if a ‘regional sphere of action’ did not exist. Secondly, diplomats, analysts, strategists, 
academics I interviewed affirmed that while it is true that Central Asia refers to the 
early 1990s when a common identity and a common legacy were more marked and 
prominent, and while it is true that the relational norm seems to be bilateralism rather 
than multilateralism, the term has still a clear validity in the political discourse of the 
five states.  
In particular, this has implication for the recent Eurasian discourse sweeping 
the post-Soviet space and, most notably, for Kazakhstan. One of the questions of my 
interview questionnaire was exactly ‘do you consider Kazakhstan as a Central Asian 
country?’, thus, in fact, asking two hidden question: ‘where does Kazakhstan belong?’ 
and ‘is there a Central Asia which it can belong to?’ Answers can be studied from two 
different perspectives: from the non-Kazakh side and from the Kazakh side. All the 
non-Kazakh interviewees agreed on the fact that Kazakhstan is a Central Asian 
country. Culture, norms, linkages, common problems and mentality were cited as 
major ties (see Appendix 2).  
Even more interestingly, Kazakhstan was considered Central Asian by most of 
the Kazakh interviewees. Again, they stressed common heritages, common mentality, 
common habits and solidarity ties among the leaders. With reference to the Central 
Asia/Eurasia divide, two answers, in particular, are worth stressing. The first one, 
given by Bulat Auelbaev, maintains that Eurasia and Central Asia are not mutually 
exclusive for Kazakhstan. In fact, Central Asia becomes necessary exactly in the light 
of the existence of Eurasia.288 According to him, ‘since we [Kazakhs] are not the 
leader in the Eurasian Union, we need Central Asia to be leaders!’  
The second answer was given to me by a diplomat who preferred to remain 
anonymous. He mentioned that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kazakhstan, until 
last year, used to have a ‘Central Asian’ administrative division, which was 
subsequently closed due to the more rapid pace of the Eurasian integration project. 
                                                 
287 We have discussed Turkmenistan above. For Kazakhstan, see ‘Kazakhstan Foreign Policy Concept 
2014-2020’ http://www.slideshare.net/kzembassyusa/kazakhstan-foreign-policy-concept-for-2014-
2020, accessed on 4 December 2014; for Kyrgyzstan, see ‘Foundations of foreign policy of 
Kyrgyzstan’,http://www.kyrgyzembarabia.kg/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&
id=20&Itemid=36, accessed on 10 July 2013; for Tajikistan, see Tajik MFA (2014); for Uzbekistan, 
see Oliy Majlis (2012). 
288 Interview with Bulat Auelbaev. 
287 
 
Yet, according to him, there are thoughts to reopen it, exactly because of the enduring 
and growing ties with the southern neighbours289. He also stressed that  
 
Central Asia is one of our priority vector, if not the priority 
vector…our government considers relations with Central Asian 
states at the highest level, our Foreign Minister constantly refers to 
this. They are all of the utmost importance, it is important to have a 
solid regional environment…take into consideration also that one of 
our biggest embassies is in Tashkent, we have now a consulate in 
Osh, a big embassy in Ashgabat…these are all signs that we are 
indeed active part in and of the region. 
 
Whenever Central Asian high ranking officials meet, when dealing with foreign 
issues, they often if not always stress the importance of ‘regional problems’ and 
‘regional matters’. Border problems, transit routes, water-management, enclaves, as 
well as problems related to terrorism and security, even if dealt with at the bilateral 
level in the region, still tie the states in a dense relational framework. 
 
6. Norms, rules and institutions are in play 
 
This is the whole content of the thesis. Challenging a dominant (neo)realist 
framework of analysis of the region, the research has brought to the surface norms 
and institutions that confer a certain degree of order in Central Asia. Indeed, I can 
claim that this is the first work of its kind in the field of IR in Central Asia.  
As noted in the introduction and in the literature review, not only analyses of 
intra-regional relations have been largely downplayed, but when they have been 
conducted they have dismissed any possible presence of normative dynamics. 
Referring to Zakhirova once again, one may indeed state that  
 
the relationship among the five Central Asian states have not been 
fully or systematically studied. Thus, two decades after the Soviet 
Union’s collapse and despite the urgency of such international 
issues as regional security, border disputes, and conflict over natural 
resources, we know very little about how the CentralAsian states 
interact at the regional level to resolve various regional problems 
(2012: 26, emphasis added).  
 
While Zakhirova’s work is perhaps the most recent in terms of intra-regional 
focus in IR, she fails exactly to answer the indirect question she is posing. Her 
analysis, as a matter of fact, does not show how Central Asian states interact, but only 
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whether they interact or not (with all the limits noted above).  
My research, conversely, has aimed exactly at filling that gap, providing a 
thick description of how relations are managed in the region, and through what 
mechanisms. Constant references to sovereignty, diplomacy, non-intervention 
principles, international law, as well as to more informal practices such as president-
to-president dialogues, problem-solving phone-calls and seniority-based relations 
among the elites are indicators that a template, a web of normative dynamics is in 
play, and helps the region sustain itself.  
Indeed, it seems that this avenue of research fills some of the gaps of the 
realist literature: if in Central Asia there is so much competition and problems are so 
intractable, why is it the case that this is the only region in the world that has yet to 
experience an interstate conflict? Academics from the region knowledgeable about 
intra-regional relations have actually endorsed a move to the study of norms and 
institutions in Central Asia. According to Farkhod Tolipov, ‘realist and liberal 
readings of the region have not been very much productive. An approach similar to 
constructivism may be more valuable’.290 In addition, Azamat Temirkulov has, albeit 
indirectly, positively assessed an ES approach to the region: 
 
Here international relations are more eclectically 
explained…countries sometimes violate international law, which is 
not binding, but also they don’t always behave in power politics 
terms…there is also something else…and this something else can be 
found absolutely in Central Asia…This framework explains the 
exact relations that you see in Central Asia, not just at the level of 
cooperation, but explains also questions of peace and conflict, also, 
why there is no large conflict…it explains lots of things.291 
  
 
Once more, this research has shown, contra Cummings (2012), that the Central Asian 
states do form an international society, albeit perhaps a weak one, still in flux and 
formation. From a theoretical viewpoint, however, the important thing is that, in the 
light of the narratives above, Central Asia does not constitute a mere ‘system’. In the 
words of the protagonists, norms are always in play, they make foreign policy 
decisions more difficult and thornier, they prompt justifications when infringed and 
they help to avoid major interstate conflicts and the collapse of the entire region. 
                                                 
290 Interview with Farkhod Tolipov, Director, Bilim Karvoni Education Institution, Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan, 6 February 2014, Skype interview from London, UK. 
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If this is what an ES approach reveals about Central Asia, it is also true that 
Central Asia tells a lot to the ES.  
 
7.3.2 What does Central Asia tell the ES? 
 
1. Rediscovery of the fieldwork 
 
As it was argued in the introduction, this thesis has departed from the strict 
analyticism inaugurated by the New ES (Buzan 2004), the attempt of which is to 
‘“soft-positivise” the ES, claiming that international society is something visible “out 
there”, in the implementations and sustainment of institutions and norms by the actors 
involved’ (Costa-Buranelli 2014a: 25).  
The problem with this mind-world dualism (Jackson 2010) is that we, as 
analysts, run the risk of over-imposing our concepts from the outside without grasping 
the essence of social relations at play in a given region. Therefore, universals like 
‘sovereignty’, ‘international law’, ‘diplomacy’ and the like lose their several facets, 
regional specificities and become one-size-fits-all concepts (Costa-Buranelli 2014b).  
Thanks to the fieldwork carried out in the region, and thanks to the patience, 
the availability, the relative openness and the expertise of my interviewees, I have 
been able to understand from within how institutions play, and following what 
practices. From a mere analytical perspective, I would not have been able to grasp, for 
example, the very informal reading of international law in Central Asia, nor the 
Westphalian conceptualisation of sovereignty, not to mention how arbitration is (not) 
considered or that dialogue is held constantly among agencies behind closed doors. In 
relying on the witnesses of the insiders, I followed the inductive, qualitative strategy 
defended in Chapter 3.  
Therefore, the case of a Central Asian international society tells the ES that, to 
grasp regional institutional specificities and how regional international societies are 
formed and played out, taking into account the words and the opinions of those 
forming the societies themselves is of utmost importance. As I argued elsewhere,  
 
a researcher in the ES domain should adopt those methods that are 
most capable of revealing the perception, the acceptance and the 
“internalisation” of those institutions that are said to constitute the 
regional international society: interviews, fieldwork, exploration of 
archives and hermeneutical analyses are […] the most relevant 
techniques to discover the etic aspect of the society under 
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investigation, thus having the possibility to account for the different 
understandings/interpretations of some globally established 
institutions and the presence of those rules and norms peculiarly 
regional that are adopted by states (Costa-Buranelli 2014a: 36).  
 
In sum, especially in regions where institutions, norms and international 
political facts are new, the ES should abandon analytical arm-chair theorizing. If the 
aim is, following Jackson, to treat international relations as a form of international 
anthropology (Jackson 1995), studying the norms and the customs of different 
(regional) groups in the international system, then it is better to get one’s hands dusty 
in the archives and feet muddy in the field.292 
 
2. The state, as a unit, needs to be better conceptualised 
 
If there is one thing that the ES shares with (neo)realism it is the assumption that the 
international system is anarchic and that the main unit of analysis in it are states. This 
is still the case despite recent attempts to move from the notion of interstate society to 
more comprehensive international society (Buzan 2004).  
In an English School framework, states are the main actors engaging in 
socialisation, and the main enforcers and followers of norms and institutions. Yet, the 
Central Asian context poses problems to this apparently simplistic assumption. And in 
fact, this research is guilty of state-centrism. Due to parsimony and simplicity, in this 
research I have treated the state as a unitary, Westphalian actor, thus downplaying and 
silencing the complexities, the dynamics, the peculiarities and the idiosyncrasies of 
‘the state’ in Central Asia.  
Why is this important? Because, although hypothetically, a relationship can be 
established between the kind of state that populates a system and the norms and 
institutions professed by the aforementioned state. The weaker the states, the more 
pluralist, protective, minimal will be the society. This, again, hypothetical correlation 
was indirectly hinted at by some respondents, who linked the relative inter-state 
peaceful environment in the early 1990s exactly because leaders were too concerned 
in gaining domestic legitimacy and running newly acquired, but very shaky, state 
machineries.  
This research has focused solely on the structural/systemic level, trying to 
                                                 
292 As one of my interviewees put it, ‘to understand these dynamics [international relations in Central 
Asia], you have to come here, to read here, to speak here, to study here. You see Filippo, the fact 
that you came here gives you already a different understanding’. Interview with Aidos Sarym. 
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identify what norms are in play in the region and what function they perform in it. 
Yet, how and if weak domestic institutions, social structures, checks and balances and 
formal political procedures play a role in how the state behaves at the normative level 
has been unexplored, and this is valid for the ES literature in general (Ba 2014). More 
on this, however, follows below in the ‘Directions for further research’ section. 
 
3. Institutions vary according to regional contexts 
 
Much has been said on this in Chapter 5 when speaking of the ‘polysemy’ of 
institutions, so there is no need to prolong the discussion here. Yet, it is worth 
stressing that this research has shown the ES that what it calls ‘institutions of global 
international societies’ are actually far less global than one may think. Sovereignty, 
diplomacy and international law, as we have seen, have quite a different meaning in 
Central Asia, and are adopted in quite a different way from the European international 
society.  
As discussed in the ‘fieldwork’ section, once analyticism is dismissed in 
favour of interpretivism and more qualitative strategies, how institutions are 
conceptualised and practiced by statesmen and diplomats in the region becomes more 
accessible, and helps create the basis of a sociology of international relations based on 
socio-behavioural differentiation on a regional basis.  
 
                             
                                   Source: Costa Buranelli 2014a: 38. 
Once again, though, I refer to the ‘Directions for further research’ section to discuss 
how an institutional sociology of international relations may look like in future. 
 
4. Formality and informality can differentiate regions as well 
 
In the course of the research it has been noted several times how interviewees and 
practitioners from the region more in general tend to consider the Central Asian 
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region as a realm where things are done informally and following more personal 
relations. Diplomacy and international law, it has been noted, have very few formal 
characteristics in this region, and rely more on personal dispositions, informal 
contacts, pragmatic devices than abstraction, procedures, formality and principles.  
As noted, proof of this in the region is the reference to treaties and 
conventions, not to better regulate affairs among states, but rather as leverage when 
things get worse. To my knowledge, this is something new to the ES regional 
theorising. It has been said that three ways of regional differentiation from the global 
level exist in the theory as it stands (see Chapter 3):  
 
 institutional surplus; 
 institutional deficit; 
 different interpretation of a global institution. 
 
Yet, I believe this research has laid the first stone to consider differentiating regions 
(both among themselves and from the global level) on the basis of the 
formality/informality of their practices and institutions. Clearly, this would require a 
definition of what is meant by ‘formality’, and more research in those regions which 
are supposedly formal to verify the presence of informal elements there as well.  
Nonetheless, the Central Asian case can be a good starting point to start thinking 
of other analytical techniques and methodological routes to identify regional 
international societies, where the distinctive element(s) can be the shallow degree of 
interiorisation of global norms complemented or indeed even substituted by a resort to 
informal local habits and informal practices, something well researched domestically 
but still absent from the international realm (Acharya 2004; Helmke and Levitsky 
2004; Razo 2008). 
 
5. Diachronic studies show how can we move from solidarism to pluralism and 
vice versa 
 
This thesis can be said to be the first ES work to treat a regional international society 
diachronically, and therefore moves beyond the present literature focused on regional 
international societies as they appear now (as opposed to as they develop). Indeed, this 
thesis is a ‘diachronically idiographic analysis’ (Costa-Buranelli 2014a: 27) of the 
social character of international relations in Central Asia.  
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Chapters 4 and 5 treated the region in an evolutionary way, showing how its structural 
conformation moved from a dead-letter solidarism to a strong pluralist environment 
and due to what factors (penetration of Great Powers, increasing rivalries over water, 
sharper definition of modes of development, harder conceptualisation of state-related 
institutions such as sovereignty and borders).  
The ES literature, as it is, presents very detailed accounts of how different 
regional societies look like at the moment of writing or in the past, focusing on their 
pluralist or solidarist institutional character, but an analysis of how a regional 
international society evolves from a normative and structural perspective is still 
missing, as well as an analysis of a region that encompasses moves along the 
pluralist/solidarist spectrum.  
The hope is, therefore, that this work, still imperfect in many respects, will 
nonetheless encourage more idiographic, intensive works on specific regional 
international societies, covering decades of evolving social relations sustained by 
different norms, rules and institutions. 
 
6. There seems to be a correlation between regional international society, 
regional security complex and forms of regionalism  
 
When writing in 2009, Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez argued that the analysis of the 
Middle Eastern regional international society provided ground for theorising a 
hypothetical relationship between regional international societies (RIS) and regional 
security complexes (RSC). Building on a set of conceptual dyads, they argued that a 
power-political RIS would constitute a dense RSC structured on enmity lines, a 
solidarist, convergent RIS would constitute a dense RSC structured on amity lines, 
and a co-existential RIS would constitute a weakly structured RSC, where uncertainty 
is the main socio-relational feature.  
This thesis in its turn, complements an existing body of research, and puts 
forward the case for considering not just a correlation between the density of a RIS 
with the density of a RSC, but also considerations on regionalism (RGN). Put in 
relation with each other,  
 
the regional international society pillar represents the social 
character of relations among states, from conflict to confederation, 
passing through co-existing pluralism to developmental solidarism 
[…]; the regional security complex pillar represents the strategic-
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security character of the region, which can develop from conflict 
formation to security community where war is unthinkable among 
the regional members; the forms of regionalism represent the 
integrative character of the region, ranging from sporadic 
interactions through more coordinated and integrated action to a 
federation of states […] (Costa-Buranelli 2014a: 29).  
 
The Central Asian case presented in this research reinforces Buzan’s and Gonzalez-
Pelaez’s hypothesis, having found that the weak, sub-RSC described in the literature 
(Allison and Jonson 2001; Buzan and Wæver 2003) is mirrored, or rather, sustained, 
by a co-existential, Westphalian RIS, where regional stability is achieved through the 
respect of few, minimal norms and, in particular, via the non-intervention principle.  
This ‘hyper-institutionalisation’ of sovereignty in the Central Asian RIS has of 
course effects on the prospects of regionalism, as has been observed in this thesis and 
in the wider literature as well. Sovereign rights, diverging national interests, the 
Turkmen neutrality and the prevalence of bilateralism as the regional diplomatic norm 
have thwarted prospects for more inclusive, integrated regionalism. In particular, the 
low level of security interactions (and cooperation) among the Central Asian states 
have been described by regional analysts as ‘uncertain’,293 and this characterisation 
fits well with the proposed correlation between types of RIS, levels of RGN and types 
of RSC.  
In sum, this research has shown that there is scope for more comparative 
research focussing on the relationship between RIS, RSC and RGN: East Asia, Latin 
America and West Africa are good candidates for this kind of analysis. While 
generalisation here is not appropriate, it should be noted that the Central Asian case 
presented here follows the theoretical premises advanced by Buzan and Gonzalez-
Pelaez, and therefore suggests that more research in other regional domains may 
entrench this work’s theoretical findings. 
 
7.4 The Bear in the Room 
 
 
Yes, usually we are uncomfortable with ‘an elephant in the room’, especially when we 
pretend that it does not exist. Yet, a bear may cause the same effect. And by reading 
this thesis, one may ask: where is Russia? Is Russia part of the international society 
                                                 
293 Interview with Rustam Burnashev; interview with Irina Chernykh. 
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found in Central Asia?294  
This question seems extremely relevant for three factors. First, the historical 
and political legacies shared by Russia and the region at the time of the USSR. 
Second, the role that Russia plays as security-guarantor in the region.295 Third, the 
development of a new pole of integration led by Russia, namely the Eurasian 
Economic Union, soon to be Eurasian Union. At a more theoretical level, this question 
has relevance for general ES regional studies as well: to what extent are great powers 
members of the regional societies they border or are simply proximate to?296  
An easy and elusive answer to this question would be: the focus of the thesis 
was on the Central Asian republics only, and therefore any presence of any external 
actor was not considered. Even if Central Asian intra-regional relations were indeed 
the focus of the thesis, to rely on this answer only would not actually answer the 
question of whether Russia is part of them or not. This would be analytically 
inaccurate and theoretically biased. Instead, a more comprehensive answer would be 
what follows. Using the theoretical framework of the ES, I have claimed that Russia 
certainly forms a system with Central Asia, but it is not strictly part of the society of 
states there. Russia has not been cut out of the picture altogether, but has been rather 
located in the GPM institution of international society.  
In chapter 4 and 5 I have discussed how, for problems such as terrorism, 
fundamentalism, drug-trafficking, Central Asian states are willing to adopt the 
institution of GPM to shield them from such dangers and menaces. Even Karimov has 
recently argued that ‘Russia’s interests have always been present in Central Asia, and 
it always had a stabilizing character’ (Akipress 2014e). Yet, I have also explained how 
in bilateral spats, GPM is explicitly rejected in the region, for fear that more powerful 
                                                 
294 I am grateful to Dr Ruth Deyermond for having encouraged me to tackle this problematique over 
the course of my research. 
295 Russia has been consistently the main security provider in the region since 1991. For a recent 
overview on military assistance, weapons sales and military cooperation, see Gorenburg (2014). 
From an economic viewpoint, Russia is the top exporter to Kazakhstan (36%) and Uzbekistan 
(22%), second top exporter to Kyrgyzstan (26%) and Tajikistan (18%) and third top exporter to 
Turkmenistan (17%; all data have been taken from http://atlas.media.mit.edu). In addition, Russia 
still constitutes a model of governance with respect to the adoption of domestic laws to thwart civil 
society (Michel 2014). Yet, for a recent contribution on Russia’s declined presence in the region, 
see Meshcheryakov (2014a,b). 
296 This question, for example, is dealt with by Merke with respect to the relationship between the US 
and Latin America (2011: 16-21); by Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez with respect to the US and the 
Middle East (2009); by Buzan and Zhang with respect to the US in East Asia (2014a); and by Aalto 
with respect to Russia and the European international society (2007). 
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actors would take advantage of the situation. 
Furthermore, there are two additional reasons why, in my opinion (an opinion 
supported by findings and narratives of international society actors in Central Asia), 
Russia cannot be considered a fully-fledged member of the Central Asian 
international society and, moreover, these reasons are strongly dependent on one 
another.  
The first one is a crucially different understanding of the bedrock of 
international society, which is sovereignty. The second one, related to the former, is 
the different structure of international society that Russia seems to have in mind, 
clashing with the Central Asian one.  
The CIS has been recently described as an international society on its own 
(Hansen 2014; Pourchot and Stivachtis 2014) on the premise that Westphalian 
sovereignty and non-interference are the foundational, constitutional norms of the 
region. Yet, recent events in Georgia (2009), Transnistria (2004-2010) and Ukraine 
(2014) seem to indicate that Russia has shifted to a weaker conceptualisation of 
sovereignty that allows for intervention and interference in its neighbourhood (Allison 
2013: 146-147; Allison 2014; Kaczmarska 2014: 10-11; Navari 2014).297  
Indeed, as Roy Allison has aptly put it, ‘Russia has traditionally regarded 
sovereignty as a capacity, not a right’ (2013: 214, emphasis added), which is a 
diametrically different view from that of the Central Asian states, as noted also in 
Chapter 6. This reading of sovereignty is paired with, I argue, a reading of the 
structure of regional international society, which is fundamentally different from the 
Central Asian understanding. Keeping in mind Watson’s pendulum (1992), Russia 
seems to favour a ‘hegemonic’ international society, by proposing a new order based 
on the legitimacy of its power and its role in maintaining the Eurasian continent 
cohesive, in particular via the CSTO.298 During the years of the ‘coloured revolution’, 
Central Asian states were indeed in favour of such ‘protective integration’. As it has 
                                                 
297 Quite tellingly, a recent poll published by the Russian Public Opinion Research Centre at 
www.wciom.com showed that 56% of respondents saw ‘Northern Kazakhstan’ as part of the 
‘Russian world’. Yet, I was not able to find the actual size of the sample. 
298 Roy Allison, although implicitly, frames this structural mismatch in the CIS in the following 
passage: ‘Russia, as a would-be regional hegemon, has a particular conception of norms which it 
enforces, and seeks to socialise others into viewing as legitimate, within its sphere of influence. … 
The consolidation of this kind of normative regionalism, its evolution into some kind of regional 
international society, depends, however, on the internationalisation of its constituent norms by states 
other than Russia’ (Allison 2013: 214, emphasis added). 
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been argued,  
 
[Central Asian states] viewed [CSTO] increasingly as an instrument 
to enlist Russian support for regime security, as a vehicle to 
bandwagon with Russia in forging a kind of Eurasian political club 
that only selectively promotes and applies Euro-Atlantic political 
principles and values (or openly resists them). The CSTO offered a 
form of normative bandwagoning, or “protective integration”, to 
bolster the political legitimacy of CSTO presidents on the 
international stage (Allison 2013: 140). 
 
 
Yet, as noticed, recent events show how this now contrasts with the strong, 
sovereignty-as-equality-based system in Central Asia, where a firm balance of power 
and a strong notion of sovereign parity exist among members.  
Already in 2011, for example, Nazarbayev proposed at the Astana SCO 
summit in June 2011 a council for resolving territorial and regional conflicts in the 
‘SCO’s area of responsibility’ (Allison 2013: 142). Even if there was no follow-up, 
this can be read as a sign of balancing competing readings of order within the CIS by 
adopting a peculiar practice of the institution of great power management, that of the 
management of great powers (Goh 2014).  
In addition, recent difficulties in establishing supranational bodies of political 
character within the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), for example, show how even 
for Kazakhstan, the Central Asian state which is most in favour of cooperating with 
Moscow in multilateral bodies, the issue of sovereignty is crucial (24 News Agency 
2014).299 The following words, again by Allison, on how Central Asia wants to be 
somehow ‘detached’ from a more hierarchical CIS support the points made above: 
 
[The failure of making the CSTO more interventionist] has left the 
CIS regional order, especially its Central Asian flank, fractured and 
tense. The Arab Spring has made regional leaders more defensive 
about their domestic political legitimacy and cohesion as well as 
their standing in the wider international community. At the same 
time, insecure CIS states remain sensitive to possible regional 
encroachments on their sovereignty if their grip on power weakens, 
whether that might be undertaken by their immediate neighbours, by 
Moscow or (especially for Uzbekistan) by a Russian-led structure 
like the CSTO (2013: 146, emphasis added). 
 
 
                                                 
299 See, e.g. for Kazakhstan Akipress, 25 August 2014; for Kyrgyzstan BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 24 April 2014. 
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By showing how sovereignty has crystallised itself in the region and how Central 
Asian states have been practising it both regionally and globally (via its endorsement 
in the UNGA), it has been show how this sub-regional environment is normatively 
different from the former patron in terms of sovereignty rights.  
 It may be worth nothing that the issue of the conceptualisation of sovereignty 
between Russia and Central Asia came up spontaneously also in one of the interviews 
I conducted in the region, when a Kazakh IR scholar argued that ‘with respect to 
sovereignty, Russia is not playing according to the game, to the Central Asian game. 
Every leader here knows that China is playing according to the rules. If the situations 
keeps on going like this, China will be more part of the Central Asian system than 
Russia’.300 
This, again, shows how different normative dynamics are in play within the 
CIS, and how therefore, contra Pourchot and Stivachtis, the wider region cannot be 
considered as a completely uniform society from a normative perspective, but rather 
one where norms and institutions are being negotiated and disputed. 
At the same time, though, as it has been recognised in the course of the thesis 
and especially in Chapter 5, the role of Russia in structuring international relations 
between Central Asian states cannot simply be dismissed entirely. According to the 
literature (see for example Tolstrup 2009; Cameron and Orenstein 2012; Melnykovska 
et al. 2012), over the years Russia has relied on three main tools to advance these 
interests: (1) integration of the CIS under Russian domination; (2) the use of military, 
economic, and political leverage to subordinate the independence of the Caspian 
states to Russia’s interests; and (3) international recognition of an exclusive Russian-
led CIS peacekeeping role.  
For better or worse, many states in the region will remain dependent for some 
time on Russian security guarantees and military assistance and Russia will continue 
to play a substantial role in shaping political, economic, and security developments. 
For example, the recent events in Tajikistan, in the course of which a coup d’etat has 
been attempted by former deputy defense minister General Abduhalim Nazarzoda, 
have revamped asymmetrical relations between Russia and Tajikistan, with Russia 
ready to provide for military and economic help in exchange for Tajikistan joining the 
EEU (Ramani 2015).   
                                                 




But as initially discussed in Chapter 3, this supremacy and primacy have not 
been translated in effective, legitimate and durable hegemony. Russia’s hopes for CIS 
integration, for example, have been dashed by the refusal thus far of Azerbaijan, 
Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to join CIS political and economic structures. These 
ambitions were dealt a further blow by the recent decision of Uzbekistan to leave 
CSTO. Consequently, the limited integration that has been achieved to date is largely 
informal and tenuous. Although some CIS states remain dependent on Russia 
militarily and economically, especially Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (for the case of 
Kyrgyzstan, see Lewis 2015), most of this cooperation has been achieved within a 
bilateral rather than multilateral framework, and after prolonged negotiations.  
This complex coexistence of engagement and retreat shows that while Russia 
may be irreversibly locked into a long-term process of ‘involuntary’ disengagement 
from the region, Russian weakness will not necessarily mean Russian passivity, and 
this will continue to have repercussions on the socio-structural architecture of Central 
Asia.  
In sum, as we have seen in the course of the thesis, Russia still retains power 
over the region, and we can speak of ‘hegemony by invitation’ when ‘the system’ is in 
danger, that is to say, when the very survival of the units is in danger. The Bear still 
provides for security and protection in Central Asia when big threats put in danger the 
whole region. But this power is often negotiated, seldom imposed. As we noted in 
Chapter 5, bilateral diplomacy and informal communication works between Central 
Asian states are preferred methods to manage the raison de systeme and, in fact, 
Russia is kept at bay for fears of self-interested interference.  
When this hegemony is not invited, or called for, it becomes a ‘tragic 
hegemony’, that is to say, a hegemony that fails to materialise in legitimate hierarchy 
and that results in unwelcome interference. This ‘pendular’ condition of Russia’s 
hegemony in the region has been recently noted in the literature (Gayoso Descalzi 
2011), and has been called also ‘incomplete hegemony’ in the light of its both material 
and legitimacy shortcomings (Jackson 2014: 183). 
 
 
7.5 Directions for further research 
 
 
The value of a piece of research can be said to consist in two different, but 
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nonetheless interrelated, components: the ability to shed light on previously under- or 
non-researched aspects of a given puzzle, and the ability to open new avenues of 
inquiry and new challenges to established knowledge. It can be said, therefore, that a 
valuable piece of research provides answers as well as new questions. The answers 
provided by the present thesis have been discussed above. Here, the linkages to 
further research, as well as to other disciplines, are discussed and presented.  
First, this research enhances the possibility, for the ES, to produce a truly 
comprehensive comparative sociology of international relations and regional 
international societies. This work adds to the already published works on Latin 
America, the Middle East, East Asia, Europe and the wider CIS, as well as South East 
Asia and Africa in a way that allows to compare for different configurations, 
institutionalisation and normative cohesion and peculiarity (as opposed to the global 
level) in different regional/sub-global domains.  
Questions to be asked would be, for example, what accounts for a different 
interpretation of a norm, what similarities exist across regional international societies 
and why; what the effects of post-colonial developments are on the socio-normative 
structure of regional international societies; which regions more closely resemble the 
western/global one and why; whether the presence of a hegemon is likely to generate 
a particular kind of regional international society; whether particular institutions exist 
by virtue of historical and/or political legacies, or by virtue of state-weaknesses and 
regime concerns, and so forth.  
Second, this research compels the ES to question its simplistic account of the 
state as a basic sub-ontology of international society. How states are formed, 
wherefrom they are formed, through which modes of development and based on what 
source of legitimacy seem, prima facie, important questions to ask to understand the 
kind of international society formed at the regional level. This research, for example, 
has made the implicit claim that in Central Asia the combination of post-colonial 
states, bordered by a powerful and hegemonic former patron, based on relatively weak 
forms of popular legitimacy, characterised by authoritarian or semi-authoritarian 
forms of government and with poorly diversified economies have given birth to a 
strongly pluralist, coexistential international society.  
Perhaps this thesis is guilty of focusing more on the practices within the 
society than on whether their adoption was caused, or rather, affected, by the nature of 
the state in the region. To what extent this finding is generalizable, however, is still a 
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matter of doubt in ES and comparative IR studies. But it can be said that this piece of 
research is a good starting point to reflect on this issue, which has been addressed 
only very recently (Ba 2014).  
Third, departing from the state-centric focus of this thesis, it seems that a 
fertile terrain for further research would be an investigation into the presence of a 
Central Asian ‘world society’ in ES terms, defined as non-state actors, mainly people, 
enjoying ties and relations based on common cultural, civilisational and historical 
relations. Many interviewees made implicit references to the presence of a thriving 
and active world society underpinning the Central Asian regional international 
society, mentioning also the hindrances to developing it due to the strongly 
sovereignty-centric character of the inter-state level of this society (see Appendix 3).  
Nonetheless, it seems that these linkages still exist, and a multi-disciplinary 
research project combining scholars from IR, history, anthropology, business and 
cultural studies in general could shed light on this potentially fertile aspect of Central 
Asian studies (for similar studies in different regions, namely the Middle East and 
East Asia, see Valbjorn 2009; Kang 2014).301 Seen in the tradition of the ES, what is 
intended here is to complement the structural approach of Bull with the more 
culturally-informed one of Martin Wight to provide a deeper understanding of the 
societal and normative dynamics within the region.302  
Fourth, further research should be developed on the possible development of 
the Central Asian regional international society: will it evolve in the formation of a 
possible Eurasian international society? And if yes, based on what values, made up of 
which states and sustained by what institutions? Or will it drift towards a substantial 
entrenchment of the SCO, thus leaning towards China and strengthening its pluralist 
character by rejecting fully-fledged cooperation with Russia? Or will it evolve 
autonomously, and will we observe a revival of the ‘indigenous projects’ of the 
1990s? Political resistance to further integration within a Eurasian space and 
economic hurdles experienced by Central Asians due to global factors affecting 
Russia’s economy such as sanctions and falls in oil prices may be a possible 
                                                 
301 Of course, this would likely not be limited to the five republics of Central Asia, but would possibly 
expand further to Mongolia, Iran and northern Afghanistan. This would be a ‘sub-innovative’ field 
of research for the ES; namely to investigate the coterminous aspects of (regional) international and 
(regional) world societies. 
302 I am thankful to Dr Peter Duncan for discussing this topic with me during the last BISA 
Conference in Dublin, 20-21 June 2014. 
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indication of the difficulties in forming a fully cooperative-solidarist regional 
international society capable of going beyond regime-protection solidarity.  
Deeper ties within the SCO are also difficult to observe in the immediate 
future, as the organisation itself seems to be currently uncertain on its future 
developments. But, as observed above, more solid ties within it may serve as a 
‘management of great powers’ strategy to preserve room for manoeuvre for the 
Central Asian republics, and to off-set the two giants on their borders.  
A return to a solidarist regional international society seems unlikely given the 
on-going definitions of foreign policies, national agendas, economic modes of 
development and underlying power-political factors across the region, in particular in 
the south-eastern flank.303 Yet, the fact that political as well as economic consultations 
are on the rise in the region, as noted above, may be read as a sign of a nascent 
opportunity for the weak Central Asian international society to become more mature 
and less conflict prone.  
Given the findings of this research, the most accurate prediction would be 
perhaps the permanence of Central Asia as a weak regional security complex as well 
as a weak, sovereignty-centred international society, careful in examining the 
prospects of enlargement and integration, both internally and externally. The 
endogenous factors (regime-change facing the two main actors, Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan, and economic development) as well as the exogenous, systemic ones 
(development of the Afghan conflict in the light of ISAF withdrawal, evolution of 
Sino-Russian ties, viability of the Eurasian Economic Union, evolution of norms and 
institutions at the global level) are too important and too powerful to be dismissed 
from the analysis. But more time and more solid research are needed to trace their 
development in a consistent way. 
 
 
7.6 The last word? In fact, the first 
 
 
Going back to what was said in the introduction to this thesis, it can be said that this 
                                                 
303 An Uzbek diplomat argued that, even if time is not ripe due to differences in socio-economic status 
of regional countries, ‘integration between Central Asian countries is still an option on the table’. 
Yet, the entrenchment of bilateralism as a regional norm and Karimov’s recent rejection of this plan 
is an indicator of the difficulty of this option, at least in the short-, medium-term. Interview with 
official Uzbek source. 
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work is the first of its kind: a socio-normative analysis of the five Central Asian 
republics had yet to be provided, described and accounted for in the wider literatures 
of International Relations and Area Studies. By avoiding a mere analytical analysis 
and focusing on both structural and interpretive narratives, a multi-faceted, more 
comprehensive and more complex reading of international relations in Central Asia 
has been offered by identifying, consistently with the premises, norms, rules and 
institutions operating between countries, evolving over time, and helping them 
stabilise the environment they live in and manage.  
While a markedly specific, indigenous ‘Central Asian’ international society 
has been difficult to discern from the global level, by virtue of its recent birth, its 
being ‘in flux’ and the interfering presence of great power politics operating in the 
region, the norms identified and brought to the surface make a modest but nonetheless 
innovative contribution to the literature on the region by providing a totally new 
theoretical perspective.  
Now that IR theory has been linked to Central Asia, the hope is that new 
questions, new puzzles and new problematiques, as those identified above, will keep 
researchers and scholars on the region busy for the years to come, and possibly 
inaugurating a new agenda. Far from being the last word on the topic, this thesis 
strongly hopes to be the first one of a fruitful, dynamic and thoughtful body of 
research that compares the evolution, the impact and the interpretation of different 
norms and institutions across the world, as well as sharper and deeper studies of how 
such norms and institutions will shape the conformation of the region in the next 
years.  
Lastly, this research has shown that for a more sophisticated, less 
(intellectually) hierarchical reading of international relations and to avoid imposing 
readings and narratives which may run the risk of being theoretically hegemonic in a 
domain different from the Western one, the role of local practitioners is crucial to 
understand how norms and institutions are understood and played out. In this way, 
following the methodological intentions spelled out in Chapter 3, this thesis has 
exported the ES abroad and given voice to local international-relations makers, thus 
combining emic and etic epistemologies.  
With this move, it is hoped that Central Asia can move from being a mere 
‘chessboard’ in great power politics to being considered more as an arena where intra-
regional dynamics are important as well, and it is hoped that the ES can become more 
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flexible in its understanding of international societies world-widely. By encouraging 
mutual beneficial dialogue between ES, area studies and regionalism, this thesis has 
aimed at being the starting point for thriving cross-disciplinary research, and hopes to 
foster more dialogue between disciplines, traditions, schools of thought and research 
communities in the West and Central Asia.  
 
Should this research be expanded, debated, contested or simply be discussed by ES 
theorists, area scholars, Western and Central Asian practitioners and academics in 
general, this would be already a success. Should this research provide a more 
complex, a more nuanced, a more comprehensive and a more faithful account of 
international relations in Central Asia, doing justice to local diplomats’ and experts’ 































Indicative questions for interviews 
 
 
What is, in your opinion, Central Asia? What does it mean? Who is part of it? 
 
What is the perception of sovereignty of your country?  
 
What is the role played by sovereignty as a policy-motivator?  
 
What, according to you, constitutes a threat to sovereignty in Central Asia? 
 
According to you, is sovereignty respected in the region? 
 
What kinds of activities would you regard as a violation of sovereignty? 
 
Do you feel bound by any rules in dealing with your neighbours? 
 
What kind of neighbour does your country try to be?  
 
What kind of behaviour do you expect from a neighbour? Or  
What examples can you cite in the region of ‘good-neighbourly’ (or ‘bad-
neighbourly’) behaviour? 
 
What, according to you, should a state in the region NOT do when relating to others? 
 
How do you assess the role played by international law in the region? Can you 
provide specific examples? Has it been used to resolve disputes? 
 
What is your country's perception of borders? Are they a means of communication or 
closure? 
 
Is the protection of environment a key factor in your international relations? Can you 
provide some examples? 
 





Do you consider diplomacy as the standard way of communication among countries 
in the region? 
 
Do you consider your country as a Central Asian one? If so, why? 
 
Why, according to you, is there no Central Asian political institution/organisation? 
 
How are the relations of your country with the other Central Asian states? 
 
How do you evaluate the experience of Central Asian Union in the 1990s? And 
Central Asian Cooperation Organisation in the early 2000s? How has cooperation in 
the region developed throughout the years, and why so? 
 
What are the prospects for future regional cooperation? 
 
Why according to you there has never been inter-state war in Central Asia?  
 
What is the role played by the market economy in the region? Would you consider 
your country as following market-economy precepts? 
 
Do you think that Central Asian countries should cooperate more? If yes, why? And 
on what principles? 
 
Is there a ‘common strategy’ of Central Asian countries within international 
organisations?  
 
Is Russia a Central Asian country? If not, how is it related to/perceived in the region? 
 
Is there anything peculiarly ‘Central Asian’ in how your states conducts its 
international relations? 
 
In your opinion, do the states of Central Asia form a regional international society, i.e. 
a group of states where common rules and norms are usually (not always) respected? 
If yes, then: What distinguishes this region from its broader environment? Which 
countries of the region, in your opinion, are members of this society? 
 
In your opinion, which are the norms, rules, institutions and other elements that bound 






Examples of narratives on Central Asia 
 
 
Interview with Kazakh Professor 2 at KIMEP University, 13 November 2013, Almaty, 
Kazakhstan:  ‘Kazakhstan is now part of [Central Asia]. We are different but we are 
also similar. Economically we are different, political institutions we are different. 
Even sometimes in terms of traditions. At the same time we accept the term Central 
Asia, it is in current discourses. Mongolia and Afghanistan are still a bit out. Soviet 
inheritance is still crucial. Five major stans are preferable. Regions are never too 
much coherent’. 
 
Interview with Kazakh expert 1, 13 November 2013, Almaty, Kazakhstan: ‘The 
region is made up of five post-soviet countries. The historical meaning is very 
different from the geopolitical one, because it was much bigger. Why these five 
countries? These countries are not only united by the borders, by common borders, 
they also have a cultural heritage due to the soviet past, as well as similar economic 
systems. Due to the Soviet rule, which lasted for 70 years, these countries became 
even more similar to each other than to their other neighbours. And they also have a 
common transport and energy system’. 
 
Interview with diplomatic source in Kazakhstan, 12 May 2014, location undisclosed: 
‘Central Asia is one of our priority vector, if not the priority vector: because of roots, 
of culture, of proximity. It was stressed also during the last meeting between our 
President and Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan. Sure the region exists, any time we speak 
of foreign policy in this area, we refer to Central Asia’. 
 
Interview with Dosym Satpaev, Political Risk Assessment Group, 18 November 2013, 
Almaty, Kazakhstan: ‘According to the post-Soviet definition, Central Asia consists of 
five republics; then we have the Western definition, the five post-Soviet republics plus 
other states, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Iran…big Central Asia! But I must say this latter 
definition here in Kazakhstan is not very popular, and here when we speak of Central 
Asia, here we mean the five post-Soviet republics. I think this because of the Soviet 
heritage. It is interesting, however, to note that recently Kazakhstan affiliated itself 
not with Central Asia, but with Eurasia. Often now officials say we are not a Central 
Asian country, we are Eurasian. But it is less because of culture; rather, because 
Nazarbayev likes to portray himself as a regional leader, even world leader! And 
Central Asia is too small’. 
 
Interview with Sultan Akimbekov, Director of the Institute for World Economy and 
Politics, 20 November 2013, Almaty, Kazakhstan: ‘The definition, for me, […], is the 
five countries: it’s dominating, in academia, in science, it means five post-Soviet 
republics. It is ambitious, and I agree with this definition. It means something like 
“Central”, you know, we are situated there; it is very useful, because it means that in 
this region there are concentrated all big powers, like Russia and China and the US, 
and also a lot of regional powers, Iran, Saudi Arabia, also Europe…it’s difficult to 
find any other place in the world with such a concentration. Kazakhstan is more 
comfortable with “middle Asia”, because neighbours are poor and less stable, but 
internationally the concept is sound, and Kazakhstan is part of it, actually the main 
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part of it’. 
 
Interview with Kamoluddin Abdullaev, Tajik Historian, 15 January 2014, Skype 
interview from Milan, Italy: ‘despite the artificiality of the states there and the use of 
modern concepts to describe something that in the past did not exist, such as 
sovereignty and nation, Central Asia is indeed one region. In the past it was composed 
by the sedentary tribes at the centre and the nomadic tribes at the margins, forming a 
systems of relations, and nowadays it is made up of the five former republics, partly 
because of identity (they refuse to join other ‘worlds’, only now we have a narrative 
of Eurasianism) and partly because of necessity following the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union. There was an urge to define themselves. Of course, the position of 
Tajikistan is quite unique. It is not fully Turkic, it is a mistake to consider it fully 
Persian, it was created by Stalin in order to weaken the position of communist Turks, 
especially in the 1920. There is some mutual attraction with Iran, but less than it is 
usually thought. There are differences in Islam, in priorities of foreign policy, even 
cultural matters are a bit frozen now. But Rahmon is willing to play the Iranian card to 
disentangle himself from Uzbekistan and other forms of pressure coming from the 
region. Nonetheless, Tajikistan fully shares the problems and the feature of Central 
Asia such as borders, water, weak state, Soviet inheritance etc. This is why it is 
correct to identify it as a Central Asian country, in my opinion as a scholar and as a 
Tajik’. 
 
Interview with Roman Mogilevskii, Director of IPPA, 26 November 2013, Bishkek, 
Kyrgyzstan: ‘For me, Central Asia is five post-Soviet countries. […] Usually 
Kazakhstan is not happy to be associated with its poorer neighbours, but that’s the 
case, I mean, they have too much in common, you know, lots of things, culture, 
mentality, institutions. Sure, we have divergent paths, and institutionally we are 
getting different, but for me an indication that we are indeed a region is…I know 
many people question that, and they have good arguments, and internal cooperation is 
very far from being effective, but my point is that they understand each other, we 
understand us much better than what’s going on in other countries, even with 
Caucasian countries we have less understanding, we have a different mentality. It’s 
not just understanding…it’s understanding in detail: psychology, few clear ways of 
behaviour. Few years ago I was working for UNICEF and I travelled to all five 
countries. I did appreciate of course how different we are now, but I also clearly 
understood why people did or did not do something, immediately. I am a professional 
on the region [and from the region, so I feel I can generalise, also at the level of the 
society’.  
 
Interview with Bermet Tursunkulova, Vice-President of Academic Affairs and 
Professor of International Relations, AUCA, 27 November 2013, Bishkek, 
Kyrgyzstan: ‘For natives of Kyrgyzstan, traditionally the five former republics of 
Central Asia keep the relationship to the term. There are other arguments linking 
Afghanistan and other countries to the region, but for now it’s Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It is exactly these five 
countries because of their post-Soviet past, which affected their mentality…mentality, 
but also the kinship if I may say, at the societal level. For Kyrgyzs, Kazakhstan is 





Interview with Shairbek Juraev, Independent Analyst, 28 November 2013, Bishkek, 
Kyrgyzstan: ‘For me, the notion of Central Asia should remain relevant; […] what 
makes the region is still some form of more or less inter-societiness, there are also 
geographical, cultural, linguistic ties that keep us together from our past, so I don’t 
really buy the whole debate about disputing the term […]. So for me, Central Asia 
should be seen as states part of a post-Soviet space who have common issues, 
common conflicts, common priorities of concerns etc. Kazakhstan is very much 
integral part of the region in terms of water-sharing, agriculture, communication 
routes, especially with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan’. 
 
Interview with Emil Juraev, Professor and analyst, AUCA, 2 December 2013, 
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: ‘At the end of the Soviet Union, it was clear that these countries 
had shared something in common, again, especially as opposed to the rest of the 
world, in terms of development, in terms of culture, in terms of being similar and 
being Muslim part of ex-Soviet republics…During the Soviet Union…[…] the CA 
republics were seen as something at the backward part, the distinct part, the mostly 
agricultural part etc. etc. When the USSR collapsed, Kazakhstan was not so 
comfortable to share such a long border with Russia, especially in the north where 
there were a lot of Russians, this was an incentive to be identified with the southern 
region, rather than to stay independent, to be part of no region and to be exposed to 
Russian influence’.  
 
Interview with Marat Kazakhbayev, Senior Analyst, IPP, 2 December 2013, Bishkek, 
Kyrgyzstan: Now Central Asia means five countries: ‘Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. I agree with this definition, because politically 
speaking and economically speaking Azerbaijan is more closely related to the 
Caucasus rather than Central Asia. And of course Kazakhstan is part of Central Asia, 
especially from a political viewpoint. The factors linking together these five countries 
are political and economic. Also from a comparative point of view, all the regimes are 
similar and connected. Another factor linking these five states together is the 
geopolitical one: they form a centre where the interests of Great Powers converge’. 
 
Interview with former Kyrgyz Diplomat now Member of the Diplomatic Academy of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 2 May 2014: ‘The region exists, 
we refer to it, I would include also Uighur territories, at least as far as culture is 
concerned. We have been living together for centuries! We have also the same attitude 
towards things, we have the same idea of Islam…we are far from Iran, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan…I don’t consider them as Central Asian countries. For me, there is no 
doubt that Kazakhstan is a Central Asian country. Historically, we are one people. 
Now of course they are oriented also to other parts of the world, but we feel they are 
part of the region, and I think they think the same, too. They speak of Central Asia as 
well’.  
 
Interview with a Central Asian representative of the UNRCCA, Central Asian capital, 
29 November 2013: ‘I refer to Central Asia as, first of all, the five post-Soviet 
republics…Of course there are a lot of interpretations of the region and so on but I 
think, I mean the beauty of this term is in its simplicity. It just describes the five 
countries, and everything related to them, you know, everyone gets it. This is Central 
Asia, so we mean five “stans” countries, and that’s it. […] I am fine with the term…of 
course it’s difficult to call it a region, because it has a lot of differences, and first of all 
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maybe the countries do not want to become a true region, but in general it is a region, 
I mean, it’s a geographic…common space…and I think it has the right to exist. […] 
When you say ‘the Middle East’, you have an immediate image in mind, you have 
your own stereotypes…the same happens with Central Asia’. 
 
Interview with Uzbek sources 3 and 4, 13 December 2013, location undisclosed: 
‘Central Asia is an existing and identifiable region, made up of the five former 
republics. This is because of political relations, and also because of history, legacy 
and culture. Of course, we recognise that there are many differences among the states 
in the region, but that the degree of interconnectedness is extremely high. There is no 
other option than having close ties with our neighbours. It is a post-imperial reality, in 
the sense that while these states are looking for their own space in international 
relations, the legacies of the previous imperial past are keeping them together such as 
borders, minorities, water and so forth’. 
 
Interview with Uzbek Diplomatic source, 12 February 2014, location undisclosed: ‘If 
we speak in geographical and political terms, we are speaking of five countries. Full 
stop. However, in a cultural, ethnographic sense, Central Asia is wider. We should 
also not forget that there are different attempts to “read” the region. Turkic readings, 
religious, some even want a caliphate, to unite then Central Asia and South Asia. We 
should also pay attention to the provenience of the researcher. In each part of the 
world there are different understandings. We interpret the region as made up of five 
countries. The position of Kazakhstan is of course controversial because of the 
Custom Union, the Eurasian Union and so forth. You know, there is even a “Srednaya 
Aziya i Kazakhstan” position in Tashkent, arguing for a Central Asia made up of four 
countries without Kazakhstan, but it is not very popular. In sum, the region should be 
five states. The five stans. Why? Because, I mean, look at our surroundings. In a 
geographical/political, cultural/political terms, there is a gap with South Asia. The 
Uzbeks in Afghanistan are different from us. Also the language is different. There, 
you can clearly see the 70-year long partition. Mentally, behaviourally, we are worlds 
apart. China is a different civilisation and anyway, yes, there is Xinjiang with a strong 
Uighur component, but politically it’s part of the sovereign state of China! Russia? 
We are different in terms of religion, perhaps less in terms of culture. Most 
importantly, the governments in the region do refer to Central Asia, even Kazakhstan. 
For us, for Uzbekistan, not only Central Asia exists, but is also top-priority. Our 
neighbours come first. In importance, Afghanistan comes later, even if we share a 
border. In the region, borders are more open than with Afghanistan. We do recognise 
we are interdependent, we are landlocked. Of course there are disagreements, but we 
all recognise the inevitability of our interdependence. The countries here try to 
differentiate themselves, but in the end they can’t escape from the net. It is good that 
each country tries to find its own identity, it is a right, but politically, economically 
and culturally we are too much bond to each other. And note: every time a Central 
Asian country is not included in a single integration project, such project is doomed to 











Examples of references to norms, rules and international society elements 
 
 
Interview with Uzbek Source 1 and Uzbek Source 2, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  7 
November 2013, Tashkent, Uzbekistan: ‘Values in the region, accepted by all states, 
are those of peace, how is it called….tranquillity (Uzbek 2) Yes! Tranquillity! 
Tranquillity and harmony, both at the level of government and at the level of peoples. 
Peace and stability are utmost values, top-priority. They are almost religious values!’ 
 
Interview with Askar Nursha, independent Kazakh expert, 14 November 2013, 
Almaty, Kazakhstan: ‘The most evident aspect of the Soviet heritage is in the 
mentality. Their sense of unity was forged during the Soviet period. The memory of 
central brands is still perceived as part of a common something. Also, in the region 
you have respect for authority rather than for rule of law’. 
 
Interview with Bulat Auelbaev, KISI, 15 November 2013, Almaty, Kazakhstan: ‘Non-
interference is a necessity, there must be adherence to international law by the 
countries of the region. If we had intervened in the Russian-Georgian conflict, then 
we would have legitimated intervention in other zones close to us, like Xinjiang. 
 
1. Balance of Power. Although I mentioned that there is no integration, it does not 
mean that it won’t happen. Although all the states chose a different mode of 
development, they all adhere to the balance of power, because the danger in 
changing the balance of power operates as a constraint. Identification with Iran 
is not accepted, Chinese identification is not accepted, there is a reaction also to 
Russian culture. The identification of Kyrgyzstan with the US was evident in the 
results of the revolution. 
2. Development: social stability, very much interlinked. All countries in the region 
want to develop. Even Rogun, with all its controversies, can be seen in the 
prism of development. The desire to develop also gives directions for economic 
activities. Given that the West developed so quickly, it is hard to ignore the 
West. And of course Russia as well, and also China. 
3. Political stability: social stability and political stability are associated with 
economic stability, this is why Karimov, for example, always quotes numbers 
and figures; also Nazarbayev, Rahmon… 
4. Sovereignty: sovereignty is a very sensitive issue, because all these countries are 
not only on their way to development, but in the process of state-identification 
and statehood as well. It’s an internal problem for each country. Until borders 
among the countries will not be fully demarcated, sovereignty will always be a 
priority issue. 
5. Peaceful coexistence in the region. While many say that the region is volatile, 
this is not true because everything in the region is aimed at peaceful coexistence 
between the countries. In terms of formality, some issues make this coexistence 
still not yet ripe, so the formal establishment of effective mechanisms for 
coexistence and integration, such as water resources, until they have a clear-cut 
understanding of whom does the water in the river belongs to they will not be 
able to build effective formal institutions or organisations for that purpose. What 
we have now are stages, stages of development of a formal framework. There is 
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an informal system of peaceful coexistence that stems from the realisation of the 
necessity of this coexistence, and then we will see if it becomes integration. And 
the main components of this informal coexistence are international law and 
diplomacy 
 
If the countries did not appreciate the value of peaceful coexistence, countries of the 
region would have already departed from each other, signing deals with external 
propositions, and even geographical proximity would not contain those differences 
(like in the Caucasus)’. 
 
Interview with Kazakh Professor 2 at KIMEP University, 13 November 2013, Almaty, 
Kazakhstan: ‘If I may say, what is specific Central Asian in this “peaceful 
coexistence” is the constant reference, in our historical-cultural development, to 
“symbiosis”. It is both domestic and international. All states are a sort of hybrid, but 
they don’t mention that! It is something which is really flexible, based on interaction. 
And this symbiosis is always reflected in criticism: if you cooperate with the EU, you 
are too Western; if you cooperate with Russia, you are too Russian; if you develop, 
you are too far from traditional values: we are always halfway! There is also a matter 
of legitimacy: what sort of leader you are if you cannot create some kind of…order, in 
your neighbouring area; we have been living together for centuries! It is a matter of 
shame. Leaders in Central Asia may exaggerate things sometimes, but again, within 
certain limits.’ 
 
Interview with Marat Kazakhbayev, 2 December 2013, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: ‘[In 
Central Asia] there is no open conflict, but the potential is there. But why no conflict? 
There are some mechanisms to avoid the escalation. Now, the first mechanism is the 
fact that, in the end, people agree on matters. Second, the fact that there is good inter-
state level mediation. You mentioned commissions, right? These smoothen tensions, 
even if they are not very effective in terms of results. And a third factor, perhaps the 
most important one, is that for example in the Ferghana Valley there is a high 
potential for conflict, right? Well, the leaders of the countries still defer this conflict, 
there is a common understanding that a conflict there would be explosive. The leaders 
still prefer tensions and micro-conflicts to open conflicts that may lead to instability. A 
bad peace is better than a good war. All of them understand that open conflict would 
not be beneficial for any of the sides. The conflict is never solved, but it is always 
cooled down.’ 
 
Interview with Mars Sariev, 3 December 2013, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: ‘To be surprised 
by the absence of conflict in Central Asia is something really European. In the 
European history, you see that the approach that European adopted was an offensive 
one, with conflicts, conquests, so this is why you have this perspective. A European 
would expect to have conflict here, but it is different. In Central Asia, there is a 
different perspective. Peoples of Central Asia refer to an ethic code, a codex, dating 
back to Chingis Khan, which emphasises collectivism rather than individualism. For 
example, it is tradition to join a person who is having food. It is a rejection of 
individualism. In Central Asia, there is a united society, a sense of commonality. For 
example, this is why conflict between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, between Karimov 
and our leadership, can be contained, can be regulated. We know this codex, there can 




Interview with Kamoluddin Abdullaev, 15 January 2014, Skype interview from 
Milan, Italy: ‘War is absent because of regional solidarity. Despite disagreements, 
minor conflicts, skirmishes and cleavages, the region is still intact because of the 
Soviet past, of the common mentality, of the pre-eminence of the state as a subject of 
international relations and because of the peaceful culture of the society at the very 
general level. There are scars, such as the civil war in Tajikistan, that prevent conflicts 
from escalating. There is no tolerance of violence. Also, the presidents understand this 
very well. When they meet, it is commonly known they drink together, speak about 
these issues with the aim of cooling them down, they share lots of cultural traits, 
contacts at high level are a huge deterrent for war in this region’. 
 
Interview with official Uzbek source, 12 February 2014, location undisclosed: ‘Inter-
agencies ties in Central Asia are deep. They are immediate, swift. And you know, in 
this region, 99% of the time, diplomacy is used to prevent conflict, not to solve it! 
Preventive! These inter-agencies work effectively’.  
 
Interview with Farkhod Tolipov, 6 February 2014, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Skype 
interview from London, UK: ‘informal contacts play a pivotal role. With Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan there are several interactions across borders, between 
officials, guards, contacts are kept alive, there is diplomacy. Should anything happen 
with respect to gas and water, there is immediate communication. These are really 





































Interview with Kazakh expert 1, 13 November 2013, Almaty, Kazakhstan: ‘There are 
a number of things that these countries have not passed through, a lot of challenges, 
so there is an opportunity for more solidarism’.  
 
Interview with Askar Nursha, independent Kazakh expert, 14 November 2013, 
Almaty, Kazakhstan: ‘There is an international society in formation in Central Asia, 
they are getting there but it is not there’. 
 
Interview with Zhenis Kembayev, Professor of International Law, KIMEP University, 
15 November 2013, Almaty, Kazakhstan: ‘Central Asian states adhere to a classical 
approach to international relations. […] If we try to impose new, formal rules, here we 
may encounter resistance. Adaptation must be evolutionary, otherwise it can be even 
counterproductive. We entered a system with already established norms. Before 
independence, we were in a different world’.  
 
Interview with Aidos Sarym, Political Risk Assessment Group, 17 November 2013, 
Almaty, Kazakhstan: ‘Central Asia is an international society, developing. If you read 
the literature after the two World Wars, there were signals of despair, but then the 
system always recovered. It can happen here. The world also is interested in a stable 
and manageable Central Asia’.  
 
Interview with Shairbek Juraev, Independent Analyst, 28 November 2013, Bishkek, 
Kyrgyzstan: ‘To some extent, I agree with the idea that in Central Asia there are some 
mechanisms, some norms that prevent the situation from deteriorating. Of course, I 
am not pushing the argument to the extent that these mechanisms will prevent 
violence…there is a lot of violence…but yes, overall, they are in play. And they are 
informal. In the West, in the Western understanding, certain things are given, like the 
law, the state…here, they are negotiable’. 
 
Interview with Payam Foroughi, Researcher, OSCE Academy, 30 November 2013, 
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: ‘To characterise Central Asia as an international society is to 
describe the region at this stage, it’s a very good observational framework, also on the 
water and war issues, they understand they have to follow the sovereignty issue, with 
a Westphalian interpretation, modern…with all these meetings that they have, it’s all 
basically aimed at avoiding war…which is basically the international society 
formula…maybe everything is not institutionalised…you know…but…I mean, I 
don’t want to…but they do have their conflict resolution mechanisms, the states 
understand the risks…’.  
 
Interview with Azamat Temirkulov, Professor of International Relations at AUCA, 5 
December 2013, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: ‘The international society approach is a very 
interesting approach…it’s a combination of neorealism and neoliberalism…which 
tries also to take into account what has not been previously taken into account by 
neorealism and neoliberalism, which is informal rules and informal institutions…but 
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which really exist in the international arena. Of course this is present in Central Asia, 
of course! International law is not always respected by Central Asian leaders…but 
nonetheless….there are red lines, understandings….you know…Central Asia is an 
international society…but we even can’t call them norms, because norms are 
something established and practiced for quite a long period, but here it is not 
something practiced for long’.  
 
Interview with Kamoluddin Abdullaev, Tajik Historian, 15 January 2014, Skype 
interview from Milan, Italy: ‘institutions in Central Asia are “in dynamics” [sic]. They 
entered the world system absolutely with no idea of what these norms were. They had 
to rely on Russia’ [he mentioned some meetings in the US, where he was living in 
1994, with Tajiks ‘diplomats’ not speaking any English and with Russian advisors], 
but ‘now Central Asian states are becoming more confident, more aware of their 
prerogatives. They manage to play multivectoral foreign policies, they are able to 
manoeuvre themselves in the international arena. Of course with difficulties because 
they are new and weak states, but they learnt the rules of the game’. 
 
Interview with Farkhod Tolipov, Director, Bilim Karvoni Education Institution, 
Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 6 February 2014, Skype interview from London, UK: ‘[after 
listening to the definition of international society he said] I agree with this reading, to 
a great extent. Although they are not much inclined to cooperation, international 
norms region-wide, historically-shaped relationships and social cohesiveness can let 
us speak of something like that. Realist and Liberal readings of the region have not 





Central Asia’s Voting Convergence in the UNGA 
 
The tables below show the dyads analysed using the United Nations General 
Assembly Voting Dataset, which contains also the Affinity of Nations scores 
(Strezhnev and Voeten 2013). The variable considered has been ‘agree3un’ – Voting 
similarity index using the interval (0-1) – computed using 3 category vote data (1 = 
‘yes’ or approval for an issue; 2 = ‘abstain’, 3 = ‘no’ or disapproval for an issue.) - 
Abstention, therefore, is counted as half-agreement with a yes or no vote. I considered 
the ‘agree3un’ variable since 1992 (first date available) and computed it for each dyad 
of Central Asian countries (10 dyads) and then calculated the mathematical average 
value for each dyad. Not all years were available. Also, dyads with Russia and each of 






TK - TJ  TK – KG 
1 1992  0.944444 1992 
0.961538 1993  0.944444 1993 
0.922222 1994  0.925 1994 
0.875 1995  0.954545 1995 
1 1996  0.833333 1996 
0.866667 1997  0.890625 1997 
0.921053 1998  0.9 1998 
0.982759 1999  - 1999 
0.97619 2000  0.931818 2000 
- 2001  - 2001 
0.956522 2002  0.958333 2002 
0.919643 2003  0.92623 2003 
0.94 2004  0.942308 2004 
0.963636 2005  0.927273 2005 
0.954545 2006  0.940678 2006 
0.96 2007  0.959184 2007 
0.980392 2008  0.95098 2008 
0.980392 2009  0.962963 2009 
0.973214 2010  0.95 2010 
0.962963 2011  0.954545 2011 
0.975 2012  0.958333 2012 












TK - UZ  TK – KZ 
- 1992  0.964286 1992 
- 1993  0.913793 1993 
0.940476 1994  0.920455 1994 
0.833333 1995  0.923077 1995 
0.8 1996  0.75 1996 
0.833333 1997  0.909091 1997 
0.852941 1998  0.925 1998 
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